To: Neocon who wrote (3584 ) 6/18/2001 9:46:35 AM From: jttmab Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 93284 We should wrap this one up with closing comments from each of us... While the concept of flexible response was implemented, my exposure was that there were few people that actually believed it was a real scenario. The thoughts of those people and myself, was that once one was released, you might as well do them all. Fortunately, we haven't found out which theory is correct. Oddly, under the MAD concept, retaliation is more of a humanitarian act. It would be a more decided act of revenge to just let the other side die from lower levels of radiation and in darkness over a long period of time, sic months. Ref. Nuclear winter theories. I think SDI is a concept that is based on a mis-placed notion of mission. SDI is focused on the defensive capability of destroying specific platforms of delivery rather than the weapons of mass destruction. Many platforms can deliver weapons of mass destruction and SDI only addresses a very small number of them. The platforms that SDI is intended to defend against are intercontinental and mid-range ballistic missiles. It is postulated that these platforms of delivery would be used by either rogue nations or terrorist camps. Terrorists clearly do not have the capability or funds necessary to develop such platforms; more importantly there is no demonstrated threat that terrorists would pursue any such platform. The attacks have been and continue to be characterized by the use of low technology, low cost platforms such as cars, trucks, dingies, and human martyrs. Mid-range ballistic missiles, if not already obsolete are rapidly becoming so. Use in threatre and local operations is meaningless. The US as well as other major countries have already demonstrated their preference for smaller and as [or more] accurate weapon's delivery platforms, particularly cruise like missiles and guided or smart munitions. All equally capable of delivering a nuclear device at a lower cost than a mid-range ballistic missile. Neither cruise or guided/smart weapons [or the preferred delivery platforms of choice by terrorists] are detectable or even projected to be capable of being detectable by the SDI system. Mid-range ballistic missiles also offer the disadvantage of greater detectibility by intelligence operations and suffer from limited mobility. The proper mission, IMO, is to focus on the weapon and not the delivery vehicle. Two thrusts of such a mission would be more productive than the proposed SDI. First, International policies and agreements directed at controlling the manufacture and safekeeping of weapons grade materials. A low cost effort. The second thrust [and independent of the first] is investment in the further development of intelligence capabilities to detect development, manufacture, location, or intent to use weapons of mass destruction. Aside: Under previous administration, we had a policy of purchasing weapons grade material from the countries of the former Soviet Union. Do you know whether that is still a policy of this administration? I don't. Cheers?, jttmab