-- AB: GX: Detailed Analysis Indicates No Liquidity Issues And
Rev-Strong
Buy-Part --
06:03am EDT 18-Jun-01 Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. (R. Chopra/O.
Leary) GX
TC
Chopra, Rohit N. 212-469-7808 6/18/01
Leary, Owen J 212-469-7726
Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
GLOBAL CROSSING LTD. (GX) "STRONG BUY"
Detailed Analysis Indicates No Liquidity Issues And Reveals
Flexibility -Part
2/3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Date: 06/15/2001 EPS: 2000A 2001E 2002E
Price: 8.66 1Q (0.45) (0.69)A NE
52-Wk Range: 38 - 8 2Q (0.61) (0.80) NE
Ann Dividend:0.0 3Q (0.65) (0.77) NE
Ann Div Yld: 0.00% 4Q (0.70) (0.73) NE
Mkt Cap (mm):7,976 FY(Dec.) (2.41) (2.98) (2.97)
3-Yr Growth: 32% FY P/EPS NM NM NM
CY EPS NENE NE NE
Est. Changed No CY P/EPS NM NM NM
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
$1Mn.
The same xMbs of capacity can be purchased for $1Mn in a 3-year lease.
GX
would receive $333,000 each year for 3 years for a total of $1Mn.
After the 3
years GX would resell the same capacity for another 3-year lease. This
can be
done multiple times (albeit at a lower successive lease price) when
compared
to
an IRU, still allowing GX to generate more cash in the same 20 year
period.
The total cash flows are higher than the $1Mn realized in an IRU.
Cash Flows Would Decline - Use A/R For Financing - Non Issue
A shift to leases from IRUs would obviously have a negative cash flow
impact.
Less cash would be received up font. As we've mentioned there hasn't
been a
wholesale shift to leases from what we've been able to determine.
Since the
cash flow impact would be negative for the entire sector (if sector
went to
100% leases), leaving not one company fully funded. We're not sure why
a
company would do this, especially in tight capital markets. The
assumption
that only leases would be sold next year has no credibility in our
opinion.
However, assuming that a large portion of IRUs accelerate to a lease
structure
(more than we've assumed in our model), less cash would be received up
front,
negatively impact cash/liquidity and Accounts Receivable would
increase. This
should make sense as the IRU would disappear and cash would only be
received
for 1/3 of a three-year lease, leaving a receivable for 2 years. If
there
were
even a hint of cash flow issues at GX, we expect banks would step up
and
finance GX based on a receivable from Deutsche Telekom, for example.
This is
currently taking place today as GX has a bridge loan from banks to fund
the
company through the receipt of cash from Citizens. Thus, a shift to
leases
really is a non-issue in our opinion.
GX Remains Liquid - Doing The Math
We provide a liquidity analysis of GX based on our model and the most
recent
forecasts from the company. The analysis shows that the company is
MORE THAN
FULLY FUNDED today. We also provide an analysis to show how low
Adjusted
EBITDA must go in order to create liquidity issues. Our analysis shows
that
2002 EBITDA must fall 35% below our current estimate of $2.875Bn to
$1.869Bn
in
order to become illiquid.
Further, to maintain liquidity for working capital needs, our study
shows that
GX could comfortably lower 2002 Adjusted EBITDA of $2.88Bn by 20% to
$2.30Bn
and still maintain liquidity of approximately $400Mn. The notion that
EBITDA
of $2.1Bn in 2002 puts GX in a negative cash flow position is incorrect
according to our analysis. Even at these levels, GX is liquid to the
tune of
over $200Mn.
Table 1 shows that based on our liquidity analysis, GX is clearly
funded
beyond
YE02 with nearly $1Bn in liquidity. We have learned that GX will
receive
$3.5Bn from the sale of the ILEC to CZN on June 28th. The company
previously
guided the street to approximately $2.6Bn in net proceeds. We have
learned
that net proceeds will be approximately $3.0Bn, $400Mn higher than
expected.
We also believe GX will only spend CAPEX of approximately $4.8Bn this
year,
not
the $5Bn they were guiding the street towards. Additionally, we think
CAPEX
in
2002 will be below $2.5Bn, however we have assumed $2.5Bn in our
analysis.
Table 1: 2Q01-YE02 Liquidity Analysis ($Mn)
SOURCES USES
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cash (3/31/01) 1,384 Net Int + Div 2Q-4Q01 (533)*
Revolver (3/31/01) 380 Net Int + Div FY02 (708)*
Net ILEC Proceeds 3,000 Cash Taxes 0
Adj EBITDA 2Q-4Q01 1,559 Bridge Paydown (1,000)
Adj EBITDA FY02 2,875 Capex 2Q-4Q01 (3,500)
Capex FY02 (2,500)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total Sources 9,198 Total Uses (8,241)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Net Liquidity YE02 957
==============================================================
*Net Interest
Source: DBAB estimates, company data, does not included EXDS shares.
Next we perform a sensitivity analysis, adjusting 2002 cash EBITDA. We
believe
this shows GX has enormous flexibility in the event of a massive shift
to
leases, a macro economic meltdown or any other unforeseen event. Table
2
shows
that the company can lower 2002 comfortably by 20% from our assumptions
and
still remain liquid.
Going one extreme step further, GX could post flat EBITDA in 2002
($2.0Bn --
representing a decline of 30% from our estimates) and still hit
breakeven cash
flow.
Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis ($Mn)
% Decrease Implied Implied
Adj EBITDA in FY02 Adj EBITDA Adj EBITDA YE02 Net YE02 Net
2Q-4Q01 Adj EBITDA FY02 2Q01-4Q02 Sources Liquidity
======================================================================
1,559 0% 2,875 4,434 9,198 957
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1,559 10% 2,587 4,147 8,911 669
1,559 15% 2,444 4,003 8,767 526
1,559 20% 2,300 3,859 8,623 382
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1,559 25% 2,156 3,715 8,479 238
1,559 30% 2,012 3,572 8,336 94
1,559 35% 1,869 3,428 8,192 (49)
1,559 40% 1,725 3,284 8,048 (193)
1,559 45% 1,581 3,140 7,904 (337)
1,559 50% 1,437 2,997 7,761 (481)
======================================================================
*Uses $3.0Bn net ILEC proceeds and $2.5Bn FY02 Capex assumptions
Source: DBAB Estimates
Our analysis, which incorporates our latest estimates, clearly
indicates GX is
liquid in 2002. We believe investors who do the math can actually jump
on
board a massive buying opportunity created by incomplete analysis
extended to
the street.
Questioning The Increasing Number of New Networks and Pricing
We've provided investors with several opportunities to understand the
pricing
environment recently. Our analysis shows price declines are
decelerating. At
our "Backstage Pass" event, where investors had an opportunity to talk
to our
buyers, we learnt that LD voice prices have stabilized over the last 12
months.
Domestic LD is $0.025 and outbound international is $0.05 to major
hubs.
Long
haul capacity pricing was falling at 50% for the last 2 years and we
believe
it
has decelerated to 25-45% depending on routes. Recently, we've even
heard of
price increases in the LD space by AT&T and WCOM has alluded to price
increases. Prices have even begun to increase at dial up ISPs, large
users of
bandwidth and ports.
We believe price declines have somewhat stabilized due to the
rationalization
of capacity, the tight capital markets forcing the conservation of cash
and
the
exit of several telecommunications companies from the landscape. Most
assets
have fallen into the hands of rational players (see Table 3).
Table 3: Rationalization of Telecom Service Providers
Company Ticker Action
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
360networks TSIX Cancelled pan-Asian and Pacific cables
FLAG Telecom FTHL Partnering with LVLT in Asia and TCM in
Pacific
TyCom TCM Partnering with FTHL in Pacific
Level 3 LVLT Partnering w/FTHL in Asia, other
scalebacks
XO Communications XOXO Rationalization of network plans
Global TeleSystems GTS Rationalization of network plans
Williams WCG Sale of assets, no European activity
Aerie Networks private Nortel Networks cut funding
Velocita private Swaps
Viatel Chp 11 DTAG cuts connections
RSL Communications Chp 11
PSINet Chp 11
World Access Chp 11
Pacific Gateway Chp 11 MFNX buys IRUs
eSpire Chp 11 Asset sales
Teligent Chp 11
Winstar Chp 11
GST Chp 11 TWTC purchases assets
Star Telecom Chp 11
Additional Information Available Upon Request
Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. maintains a net primary market in the
common
stock of Global Crossing Ltd.; Asia Global Crossing Ltd..
Within the past three years, Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. has managed
or
comanaged a public offering of Global Crossing Ltd.; Asia Global
Crossing
Ltd.;
TyCom Ltd.; FLAG Telecom Holdings Limited.
The following stock(s) is (are) optionable: Global Crossing Ltd.; Level
3
Communications, Inc.; TyCom Ltd.; FLAG Telecom Holdings Limited.
There is a (are) convertible issue(s) outstanding on Global Crossing
Ltd.;
Level 3 Communications, Inc..
DBAB is acted as co-manager on pending IPO of Asia Global Crossing, a
subsidiary of Global Crossing.
Author owns shares
Symbols:
GB;5413600 US;LVLT US;GX US;AGCX GB;AGCX0O US;TCM US;FTHL GB;NWFX
GB;FTHL0O
18-Jun-2001 10:03:51 GMT
Source FC - First Call Research Notes
Categories:
BKR/AB FCIN/TELECM FCIN/UTILIT FCSU/SEO FCSU/ECO FCSU/IND FCSU/MKT
FCSU/OTH
FCSU/TIA GEO/US FCSU/CBM GEO/NME
-- AB: GX: Detailed Analysis Indicates No Liquidity Issues And
Rev-Strong
Buy-Part --
06:03am EDT 18-Jun-01 Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. (R. Chopra/O.
Leary) GX
TC
Chopra, Rohit N. 212-469-7808 6/18/01
Leary, Owen J 212-469-7726
Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
GLOBAL CROSSING LTD. (GX) "STRONG BUY"
Detailed Analysis Indicates No Liquidity Issues And Reveals
Flexibility -Part
1/3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Date: 06/15/2001 EPS: 2000A 2001E 2002E
Price: 8.66 1Q (0.45) (0.69)A NE
52-Wk Range: 38 - 8 2Q (0.61) (0.80) NE
Ann Dividend:0.0 3Q (0.65) (0.77) NE
Ann Div Yld: 0.00% 4Q (0.70) (0.73) NE
Mkt Cap (mm):7,976 FY(Dec.) (2.41) (2.98) (2.97)
3-Yr Growth: 32% FY P/EPS NM NM NM
CY EPS NENE NE NE
Est. Changed No CY P/EPS NM NM NM
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Industry: TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES - WIRELINE
Shares Outstanding(Mil.): 921.0
Return On Equity (2000) : 0.0%
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
HIGHLIGHTS:
* We disagree with a recent competitor report which assumes that GX
will have
a
funding gap in 2002 citing a wholesale shift to leases from IRUs, macro
economic environment and increased competition.
* As networks near completion, shift from IRUs, a method of using
customer to
finance networks with up front cash, to leases has been assumed by most
of the
financial community and has always been incorporated into our model.
We look
for this to occur over the next 12-24 months, first in the Atlantic by
YE01/early 02, then the Pacific in 2H02.
* Leases carry higher NPV than IRUs. IRU represent one-time payments
for
capacity, while short-term leases assume same capacity is sold multiple
times.
Decreased cash flow from leasing likely financed by accounts
receivable.
Leasing may also expand market by offering large capacity to carriers
without
the high up front costs of IRUs, generating higher volume.
* Wholesale shift to leases would have less of an impact on GX, as
network is
nearly complete and paid for. We believe negative cash flow impact of
leasing
will have greater impact on carriers building networks and counting on
IRUs
and
presales to fund network build - e.g. FTHL, TCM, LVLT, TSIX.
* We have conducted an extensive liquidity analysis on GX and believe
the
company will have excess liquidity of nearly $1.0Bn at the end of 2002,
based
on our estimates. This assumes net proceeds from ILEC of $3Bn, higher
than
previous $2.6Bn estimate. Additionally assumes CAPEX for 01, 02 to be
$4.8
and
$2.5Bn respectively - lower than previous estimates due to cheaper
sourcing of
equipment/services.
* We have also conducted a detailed sensitivity analysis, which
indicates GX
would have liquidity of $400Mn (enough for working cap needs) even if
02 Adj.
EBITDA falls 20% below our estimate of $2.8Bn to $2.3Bn. One step
further, GX
would still be liquid even if Adj. EBITDA fell 30% to $2Bn, flat with
01 -
leaving plenty of cushion for GX.
* The macro weakness has existed for some time now and is more than old
news.
We also believe that the concern over an aggressive pricing environment
(old
news) has also been priced into the stocks. Further, we believe price
declines
are actually becoming more reasonable (as highlighted in our recent
"Backstage
Pass" report). We contend there is less competition in the market as
highlighted by over 20 companies who have rationalized capacity or have
gone
bankrupt.
* We believe the decline in GX stock price has been more than overdone.
Our
analysis shows the company remains liquid even if for any reason the
company
decreases EBITDA estimates for 2002. We believe the stock price
already
prices
in the skepticism over the financials for 2001. We are reiterating our
Strong
Buy and $30 12-month target based on our conservative 10 year DCF. We
now
believe investors can make significant upside as GX now trades below
LVLT and
WCG on an EV/Revenue basis.
DETAILS:
Recently, a great amount of confusion over the financial health of
Global
Crossing has erupted due to a report issued by one of our competitors
questioning the funding status of the company. We understand the
report cites
an accelerated shift from long-term bandwidth contracts or IRUs to
short-term
leases, the macro environment, and pricing as the key reasons for
questioning
the funding position at GX. We continue to believe the company remains
funded
to FCF+ by 2H02. We find it unfortunate that aforementioned 3 reasons
are
only
now being addressed as they've existed for some time.
IRUs have always been a short-term strategy by network builders to use
a
customer to finance the build of a network. Once networks near
completion, it
has always been understood by most of the financial community that
leases
would
be more prevalent. We have always worked this assumption into our
model. The
macro environment has been weak for some time now. This has been
painfully
obvious by looking at every sector in the economy. Hence, we don't
believe
this is a new phenomenon. We have been extremely vocal for some time,
indicating that the macro environment will dictate the revenue ramp and
mix at
most communications companies, even GX. In fact, Global Crossing's
management
team has indicated several times (e.g. 1Q01 earnings call) that the
macro
environment is weak and the sales cycle is long. As for pricing
becoming more
aggressive due to more competition, we strongly disagree - based on all
the
research that's widely available to all. We believe even the most
simple
channel checks, fundamental analysis and attention to weak capital
markets
would reveal a rationalization of capacity and a deceleration of price
declines.
We also note Global Crossing management did not change or provide
further
guidance for this year at any of its recent meetings, contrary to most
rumors.
We still believe that even in a difficult macro environment, GX is
still the
best positioned emerging telecom company long term, with a stable
liquidity
position. We believe investors have overreacted to an opinion, which
is more
than old and lacks detail in our view.
In our note we provide an analysis of IRUs v leases, a sensitivity on
the
company's liquidity and our view on pricing.
IRUs v Leases - When?
Recall, that IRUs developed as a method to leverage customers to
finance the
build of new networks. For example, Global Crossing, FLAG, TyCom, have
traditionally signed multi-year long term capacity agreements (15-25
years),
and receive the cash up front. The cash is then used to finance the
builds of
the networks. Longer term, once networks were built, it has always
been our
assumption (and we believe most of the financial community) that IRU
sales
would decline and leases would become more prevalent. This would imply
that
cash and GAAP revenue converge over time, see our recent notes for this
analysis.
We want investors to be clear that there is no massive shift to leases
occurring today on large capacity contracts. We believe the shift to
leases
from IRUs will gain momentum over the next 12 to 24 months. Our
research
indicates that most large capacity contracts can only be purchased on
an IRU
basis. We recently received quotes for wavelength contracts in the
Pacific
and
Atlantic available for the most part on an IRU basis. However, we were
able
to
lease lower amounts of capacity, STM-1s for example. We urge skeptics
to
purchase their own bandwidth as we've attempted to do in order to
confirm
availability of IRUs and leases. Until most networks are nearly
complete, we
expect to see IRUs as the main type of large capacity contract. In the
Atlantic, we expect to see the shift to leases by YE01 and 2002. In
the
Pacific, we believe the shift will not occur until 2H02 - GX owns the
market
until then and will control what happens. Today, as we've indicated,
leases
of
large capacity are a fraction of the overall market. Large,
well-financed
buyers continue to lock in the capacity today. Take for example
Deutsche
Telekom's purchase of 2 wavelengths on PC-1 recently - an IRU. Other
recent
deals include FT/LVLT, C&W/GX, etc.
Who Benefits From Leases?
As we indicated above, IRUs were a method of financing a network build.
Once
networks were complete, leases would obviously take hold. This is an
important
fact, as today only a company, which has built and completed their
network,
would benefit from a shift to leases (ie Global Crossing). GX has
built and
nearly paid for most of its global network and does not need to use
IRUs any
longer.
However, most other emerging network players today count on
IRUs/presales to
fund networks - TSIX, TCM, FTHL, LVLT, etc. A shift to leases today
would
have
a greater negative cash flow impact on most of these companies, not GX,
as it
would extend the payback period of a network (no cash up front) and
create
cash
flow issues for the entire sector - leaving no company fully funded.
Leases Expand Market
In addition to benefiting a company that has completed a network and
hurting
companies with networks under construction, we believe the overall
bandwidth
market would expand. Instead of paying for an IRU, with a large amount
of
cash
up front, a smaller carrier could enter into a 3-year lease, paying 1/3
of the
cost each year. In other words, smaller carriers would now be able to
purchase
global capacity.
NPV of a Lease Exceeds IRU
Unfortunately, the full analysis of a lease vs an IRU has been
misunderstood.
It is our opinion that a lease has a higher NPV than an IRU.
Example:
A 20-year IRU for xMbs of capacity can be purchased for $1Mn. GX would
receive
100% of the cash up front for this transaction. Adjusted revenue in
year 1 is
$1Mn. GAAP revenue is $50,000 in years 1-20. The total cash always
remains
Additional Information Available Upon Request
Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. maintains a net primary market in the
common
stock of Global Crossing Ltd.; Asia Global Crossing Ltd..
Within the past three years, Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. has managed
or
comanaged a public offering of Global Crossing Ltd.; Asia Global
Crossing
Ltd.;
TyCom Ltd.; FLAG Telecom Holdings Limited.
The following stock(s) is (are) optionable: Global Crossing Ltd.; Level
3
Communications, Inc.; TyCom Ltd.; FLAG Telecom Holdings Limited.
There is a (are) convertible issue(s) outstanding on Global Crossing
Ltd.;
Level 3 Communications, Inc..
DBAB is acted as co-manager on pending IPO of Asia Global Crossing, a
subsidiary of Global Crossing.
Author owns shares
Symbols:
GB;5413600 US;LVLT US;GX US;AGCX GB;AGCX0O US;TCM US;FTHL GB;NWFX
GB;FTHL0O
18-Jun-2001 10:03:51 GMT
Source FC - First Call Research Notes
Categories:
BKR/AB FCIN/TELECM FCIN/UTILIT FCSU/SEO FCSU/ECO FCSU/IND FCSU/MKT
FCSU/OTH
FCSU/TIA GEO/US FCSU/CBM GEO/NME
-- AB: GX: Detailed Analysis Indicates No Liquidity Issues And
Rev-Strong
Buy-Part --
06:04am EDT 18-Jun-01 Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. (R. Chopra/O.
Leary) GX
TC
Chopra, Rohit N. 212-469-7808 6/18/01
Leary, Owen J 212-469-7726
Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
GLOBAL CROSSING LTD. (GX) "STRONG BUY"
Detailed Analysis Indicates No Liquidity Issues And Reveals
Flexibility -Part
3/3
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Date: 06/15/2001 EPS: 2000A 2001E 2002E
Price: 8.66 1Q (0.45) (0.69)A NE
52-Wk Range: 38 - 8 2Q (0.61) (0.80) NE
Ann Dividend:0.0 3Q (0.65) (0.77) NE
Ann Div Yld: 0.00% 4Q (0.70) (0.73) NE
Mkt Cap (mm):7,976 FY(Dec.) (2.41) (2.98) (2.97)
3-Yr Growth: 32% FY P/EPS NM NM NM
CY EPS NENE NE NE
Est. Changed No CY P/EPS NM NM NM
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Northpoint Chp 11 AT&T purchase
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DBAB estimates
We're not sure how one could even approach the notion that there has
actually
been an increase in new capacity as all evidence points to the
elimination of
potential capacity and the rationalization of the balance -- all
driving to a
rational price environment.
VALUATION - The Opportunity You've Been Waiting For
We believe the decline in GX stock price has been more than overdone.
Our
analysis shows the company remains liquid even if the company had to
decrease
EBITDA estimates for 2002. We believe the stock price already prices
in the
skepticism over the financials for 2001. We've indicated several times
that
the revenue mix will be dictated by the macro environment and is likely
to be
a
moving target. As for the overall numbers, we believe they are
aggressive but
still achievable. We expect further clarity at the 2Q01 conference
call in
late July/early August, as we've written in the past
We are reiterating our Strong Buy and $30 12-month target based on our
10 year
conservative DCF. We now believe investors can make significant upside
as GX
now trades below LVLT and WCG on an EV/Revenue basis.
Multiples Of MNOs At The Close On 06/15/01
Price EV/01E EV/01Rev EV/01E EV/EBITDA
EV/01E
06/15/01 Adj Rev /Grwth Adj EBITDA /Grwth
Net
PP&E
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
FLAG Telecom 5.54 0.8x 3.8x 1.0x 6.1x
0.3x
TyCom 15.00 2.3x 9.3x 7.7x 14.1x
3.0x
Level 3 7.62 2.7x 7.3x 9.6x 8.9x
0.6x
Global Crossing 8.66 2.4x 8.9x 8.5x 26.6x
1.3x
Asia Global Cross 5.95 5.9x 13.1x 15.8x 35.1x
1.3x
--no DBAB
coverage-------------------------------------------------------------
Williams Comm* 3.14 3.9x 6.7x NM NM
0.9x
Metromedia Fiber* 3.49 8.7x 12.4x NM NM
1.0x
360networks* 0.30 NM NM NM NM
NM
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
AVERAGE 3.7x 8.8x 9.9x 18.2x
1.4x
==============================================================================
=
Source: DBAB estimates, Multex(*).
Information herein is believed to be reliable and has been obtained
from
sources believed to be reliable, but its accuracy and completeness
cannot be
guaranteed. Opinions, estimates, and projections constitute our
judgement and
are subject to change without notice. This publication is provided to
you for
information purposes only and is not intended as an offer or
solicitation for
the sale of any financial instrument. Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc.
and its
affiliates worldwide, may hold a position or act as market maker in the
financial instruments of any issuer discussed herein or act as advisor
or
lender to such issuer. Transactions should be executed through a
Deutsche
Bank
entity in the client's home jurisdiction unless otherwise permitted by
law.
Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. is a member of NYSE and NASD. Copyright
2001
Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc.
Additional Information Available Upon Request
Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. maintains a net primary market in the
common
stock of Global Crossing Ltd.; Asia Global Crossing Ltd..
Within the past three years, Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown Inc. has managed
or
comanaged a public offering of Global Crossing Ltd.; Asia Global
Crossing
Ltd.;
TyCom Ltd.; FLAG Telecom Holdings Limited.
The following stock(s) is (are) optionable: Global Crossing Ltd.; Level
3
Communications, Inc.; TyCom Ltd.; FLAG Telecom Holdings Limited.
There is a (are) convertible issue(s) outstanding on Global Crossing
Ltd.;
Level 3 Communications, Inc..
DBAB is acted as co-manager on pending IPO of Asia Global Crossing, a
subsidiary of Global Crossing.
Author owns shares
First Call Corporation, a Thomson Financial company.
All rights reserved. 888.558.2500
Symbols:
GB;5413600 US;LVLT US;GX US;AGCX GB;AGCX0O US;TCM US;FTHL GB;NWFX
GB;FTHL0O
18-Jun-2001 10:05:00 GMT
Source FC - First Call Research Notes
Categories:
BKR/AB FCIN/TELECM FCIN/UTILIT FCSU/SEO FCSU/ECO FCSU/IND FCSU/MKT
FCSU/OTH
FCSU/TIA GEO/US FCSU/CBM GEO/NME |
