SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Strategies & Market Trends : Guidance and Visibility -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Frederick Langford who wrote (862)6/22/2001 4:32:21 PM
From: 2MAR$  Respond to of 208838
 
yup , Meg does a pretty fine breast stroke , fred !

for a "dot.com" girl ...

;-)



To: Frederick Langford who wrote (862)6/23/2001 12:21:15 PM
From: keithcray  Respond to of 208838
 
Internet & Technology
Monday, June 25, 2001

Chip Foundries Enjoy A Boom
Despite glut of manufacturing capacity, new factories are opening overseas
By James DeTar

Investor's Business Daily

The timing seems curious.

Chip sales are in a slump. There’s a glut of chipmaking capacity. And no one’s sure there’s an end in sight.

Yet a couple of new semiconductor foundries are getting started. What’s more, they’re not in Taiwan, the traditional home of chip contract manufacturing – they’re in South Korea and Germany.

Analysts say the new plants make sense. They’re part of an industry move toward outsourcing. Chipmakers are contracting out their manufacturing to independent chip foundries.

Foundries now make some 10% of all chips. Research firm Gartner Dataquest Inc. expects the number to pass 50% by 2012. In the process, foundries will expand beyond the cramped confines of Taiwan.

“They’re out of land, power and water in Taiwan,” said Sue Billat, an analyst at Robertson Stephens Inc. in San Francisco. “The number of chips made by foundries is going up, and that’s leading to globalization.”

Two foundry upstarts – Dongbu Electronics Co. and Communicant Semiconductor Technologies AG – are banking on that trend. Dongbu has opened up a plant in Seoul, South Korea, and Communicant is building one in Frankfurt, Germany.

The reason for the growth of foundries is simple. As chipmakers embrace more sophisticated technology, it’s getting very expensive to build new chip plants.

The industry is starting to make chips out of 12-inch wafers, instead of 8-inch wafers. That lets chipmakers squeeze 2 1/2 times as many chips onto each wafer, but it means a costly upgrade of equipment.

Defraying Upfront Costs

The cost of building new 12-inch wafer plants is about $2.5 billion each. That’s where foundries come in.

One foundry can support any number of chip firms, helping defray upfront costs. According to Credit Suisse First Boston, foundry revenue will grow from $5.2 billion in 1999 to more than $25 billion by 2003.

The strategy of both Dongbu and Communicant is to offer customers the latest manufacturing technology. Communicant hopes to do especially well with developers of communications chips.

“Our proprietary technologies and intellectual property will position Communicant as the world’s leading communication-focused foundry,” said Klaus Wiemer, chief executive of the German company.

Dongbu and Communicant have many things in common. Both enjoy the support of their governments. And both are starting out by using other companies’ manufacturing techniques.

Communicant will rely on Intel Corp. (INTC) technology. Dongbu Electronics is using Toshiba Corp.’s.

With the launch of these companies, the foundry business is going global. Until recently, almost all of the world’s chip foundries were in Taiwan. The island nation still dominates the field, as it’s home to the largest foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSM), and others.

The new foundries plan to compete with the Taiwanese, and soon the mainland Chinese, who are spending billions of dollars to build their own chip plants.

Dongbu Electronics is South Korea’s second chip foundry. Its first – Anam Semiconductor Inc. – has mostly made chips for Texas Instruments Inc. (TXN)

According to Wesley Min, Dongbu’s chief operating officer, conditions in South Korea are ripe for a new foundry.

South Korea has been making chips for 30 years, thanks to its memory chip companies. So there’s lots of chipmaking know-how, Min says.

The government supports Dongbu, in part because it wants to see production of other kinds of chips. Memory isn’t very lucrative anymore.

“Korea has an unbalanced semiconductor industry,” Min said. “Eighty percent of its product is memory chips.”

Dongbu won’t get money from the government, but it will get indirect help. For example, foreign investors in Dongbu don’t have to pay taxes on their returns for seven years.

Min says the company is making about 300 wafers a month right now. It plans to grow to 45,000 wafers a month over the next couple of years.

Dongbu Electronics is a spinoff of Korean conglomerate Dongbu Group, a $7 billion company with holdings in electronics, construction and finance.

The start-up is spending $2 billion to get off the ground, says Peter Hillen, the company’s vice president of worldwide marketing and sales.

It raised $440 million in its first round of financing and hopes to raise another $310 million by the end of 2001. Loans will cover the rest of the start-up costs.

Halfway around the world, Communicant aims to be Germany’s first foundry. The factory, which is backed partly by Intel, will cost $1.5 billion. It’s still in the early stages, though, and won’t be open until 2003.

Waiting List

It’s a good time to start a chip plant, says Communicant’s Wiemer. For one, it’s easier to get equipment in a slow economy.

“We’re going to spend about $1 billion on semiconductor process equipment,” in the months ahead, Wiemer said. There was a waiting list of 24 months for some chip gear last year. This year, gear makers are fighting over orders.

“If I called today, they would say, ‘When would you like it?’ ” Wiemer said. “And getting favorable prices in terms of building a factory – I don’t think we could have picked a smarter time.”

But even as foundries grab a bigger share of the chipmaking pie, new semiconductor plants are always a gamble. And this is one of the worst years ever for chip sales.

If the chip market doesn’t turn around later this year or in 2002, Communicant and Dongbu could find they’re pouring money into a bottomless pit.

Several chipmakers issued sales and profit warnings recently. Among them: General Semiconductor Inc. (SEM), Texas Instruments, Infineon Technology AG (IFX) , Transmeta Corp. (TMTA) and Philips Electronics NV. (PHG)

Still, that could be an advantage for Communicant and Dongbu. Many chipmakers may slash budgets so much that they won’t be able to meet demand during a recovery. Some may then turn to foundries.

That’s the game plan of the two new foundries, analysts say.

“Their strategy is to get up and running during a slow period, so when business recovers they will be in a position to take advantage of it,” Billat said.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



To: Frederick Langford who wrote (862)6/24/2001 11:15:56 AM
From: keithcray  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 208838
 
Great article outlining the Bandwidth Issue: AVNX-CORV-ONIS have better solutions than LU and NT.

gilder.com

So the new digital divide is between the companies focused on big, costly bandwidth such as Nortel and Lucent, and companies focused on cornucopian connectivity such as Avanex, Corvis and ONI. The color-blind, big-bandwidth players will lose just as surely as the big supercomputer players lost to the PC.

June 19, 2001

Bad Bets on Bandwidth
by Bret Swanson

With Lucent and Nortel firing workers and bleeding cash—at about $19.2 billion, Nortel's second-quarter loss will be one of the biggest losses ever by any company—two of the telecom-gear companies that drove the '90s market boom are running out of time to get themselves on the right side of the latest digital divide.

The last great digital divide played out in the mid-1980s. On one side were companies achieving billions of operations per second in a single computer; on the other were companies enabling production of hundreds of millions of computers. Companies such as Control Data, Cray and IBM that focused on aggregating computation in a single, costly box lost to companies that focused on enabling millions of people to use computers: Intel, Microsoft and Dell.

Abundant Bandwidth

Today we've got a similar divide in communications networks. It also revolves around the key abundances and scarcities of an industry. The computer era's most abundant and cheapest resource—and thus the one you want to waste in order to conserve other, more precious resources—was transistors on chips. Today's key abundance—as the companies that spent billions in recent years laying currently unused fiber-optic cable are finding out—is bandwidth. In computers we wasted transistors to give everyone a computer—that is, unshared processing resources. In communications, the new mandate is to waste bandwidth to give everyone an unshared connection. At the moment, Lucent and Nortel are betting on the wrong technology.

Wave division multiplexing is the process of combining many colors of light, each carrying separate streams of data, onto a single fiber-optic strand and sorting them at the other end. It is the most crucial technology of the Internet economy, and it has increased the carrying capacity—the bandwidth—of a single optical fiber to almost 3 terabits (3 trillion bits) per second.

Every six to nine months the number of wavelengths (colors) on a single fiber thread doubles, from 4 in 1996 to 320 in 2001—all with no increase in cost. The amount of data that can be carried on each color of light is also increasing, but only one-half or one-third as quickly.

The key decision in the industry—the one that marks the great divide—is whether to increase the data rate on each wavelength of light by pushing the limits of silicon technology, or to make more wavelengths of light (more colors, more communication paths), each carrying data at a slower rate.

Think of a how a railroad compares to a superhighway. A railroad track supports a single train carrying a large payload. On a large highway, instead of a single track, you have many lanes. The automobiles traveling in each lane carry much less than the train, but if you add all the contents of all the autos in all the lanes, you can match the train's total capacity.

The difference is the manageability of the traffic. All the cars in the train have the same starting point and the same destination. If you want to add or drop off a car at a point in between, you take the train off the main track, disassemble it, hook or unhook the car in question, reassemble and remount the track.

On a superhighway, autos exit via off-ramps, leaving the rest to speed on by. You know which car needs to exit by the lane in which it is driving.

In a single-track optical network, the work of disassembling the stream of data (the train) and finding and rerouting the correct bits (railroad cars) is performed by expensive and slow microchips. In a multilane optical network, the off-ramp is just a cheap mirror that steers the bits (the autos) traveling on a particular color of light (the lane) onto another fiber (a side road). A train is a shared method of transportation. Autos are autonomous.

In the communications world, Nortel is the leading proponent of railroads. It plans to offer 80 gigabits per second on each of 80 wavelengths early next year. That's 6.4 terabits of information. Not to be outdone, Lucent proclaims the laboratory feat of putting 160 gigabits per second on a single wavelength.

Lucent is doing so because it was roundly criticized for not upgrading its 2.5 gigabit-per-second product to 10 gigabits per second in time to compete with Nortel two years ago. Lucent has learned the wrong lesson. Sixty or 80 wavelengths in a world where thousands are soon possible is analogous to the single-track train. Fewer wavelengths, and more data per wavelength, require more sharing of wavelengths, and thus more electronic processing to sort out the correct bits of information for the right customers. If you send 6.4 terabits down a single thread in a second—roughly as much as the total average traffic of the world's telecom infrastructure—you have accomplished nothing unless you can distribute the bits to the correct users.

By adding to network complexity and exacerbating the dearth of last-mile connectivity, this focus on raw bandwidth has been key to the meltdown of the fiber-optic carriers and service providers. People will not pay for raw bandwidth any more than for raw transistors; people will pay for connections and easy-to-use services.

The obvious alternative is to multiply colors. Instead of 80 colors of 80 gigabits each, why not make 640 colors of 10 gigabits each, or 6,400 colors of one gigabit each? The consumers of optical bandwidth—servers, routers, storage devices, and someday PCs—would much rather deal in one-and 10-gigabit chunks. It is more than enough for any application you can imagine, and it more closely conforms to the needs of the end user.

Cornucopian Connectivity

So the new digital divide is between the companies focused on big, costly bandwidth such as Nortel and Lucent, and companies focused on cornucopian connectivity such as Avanex, Corvis and ONI. The color-blind, big-bandwidth players will lose just as surely as the big supercomputer players lost to the PC.

Yet Lucent is now trying to pay off debt by selling its most important division, the one best positioned to capitalize on this new trend in connectivity—its optical fiber business. The Lucent-Alcatel merger talks that failed recently, in fact, grew out of Alcatel's bid for that Lucent division.

Neither Lucent nor Nortel is going to save itself with outside deals. They need the right inside technology. The big, bold bet is against big bandwidth, against "big iron." Bill Gates, Andy Grove and Michael Dell have already shown how it can work.