Let’s review all this information you posted:
It's meaningless to have a market (in Q's case) but not have access to broadband architecture IPRs for low cost implementation. IDC has this.
It is economically meaningless not to have full access to either narrowband or broadband capable patents without also having access to low cost means of implementation. IDCC has consistently claimed that they have developed the means to allow for the low cost implementation of data transfer within the broadband pipe. A consistent emphasis, at IDCC, has been on the cost of the implementation, not only the narrowband vs. broadband application. TDD, within the standard, provides a low cost alternative for data transfer within a broadband wireless context.
It's Golden Bridge's technology in the WP-CDMA relationship which will replace Qualcom/Ericsson's technology. Golden Bridge is supplying the full physical layer for 3G. Qualcom/Erricsson's technology is closer to 2 - 2 1/2G given their inferior speed. That's probably why Qualcomm/Ericsson are "stalling" as they know that AT&T, with Golden Bridge technology can go without Qualcomm/Ericsson patents for 3G. A 3G standard is coming. IDC will play a part.
The above statement came from an engineer, PhD, in early 1999 who has over 80 patents to his name, who was heavily involved in the standards' process. He also worked at GoldenBridge. GoldenBridge did submit "technology" (that is, CPCH, or common packet channel) which was accepted and approved by the standards committee. This replaced both Qualcomm's and Ericsson's submitted solutions in November of 2000. Later, in early 2001, Ericsson submitted an addition to the CPCH, which was also accepted as "optional". This "so-called" minor accepted change created ill will between Ericsson and GoldgenBridge. By Ericsson's estimation, their solution improved GoldgenBridge's CPCH submission...and so this is where it currently stands. This PhD has stated that he believes it is possible that Ericsson may now claim that their single accepted change may completely alter GBT's 3g involvement (another lawsuit). GoldenBridge, with AT&T, LU, IDCC, Et. Al (the WP-CDMA group) did supply and propose the full physical layer for 3g (WCDMA), most of which, by mid-2001, was accepted, some rejected. Qualcomm and Ericsson's solutions did incorporate CPCH in order to improve the speed. They have also incorporated the other GBT "matched filter" concept (for WCDMA, not 1x, as yet). Without these added WCDMA-concepts, the Qualcomm/Ericsson solution would have remained a 2.5g hybrid. There remains contention between GBT/Ericsson/Qualcomm as to whose CPCH and matched filter solution is the most appropriate. Morgan Stanley must have believed the GBT report as they purchased the remaining shares of GBT in late 2000. However, since that time, Morgan Stanley has decided not to additionally fund the GBT effort. GBT does not have the current financial wherewithal, then, to withstand a long, protracted Ericsson battle. All Ericsson has had to do is wait. We've witnessed this before with another company...
Qualcomm's CDMA is technically 2G (second generation - although they like to call it 3G) and does not have inherent video capabilities and certainly won't serve a 4G world (where the internet is heading).
During that 1999 timeframe the defining of Q's CDMA2000 as "2g (which incorporated the concept of 2.5G)" was common practice among the standards groups. In early 2001 Qualcomm made a submission to the ITU requesting that CDMA2000 be labeled, once and for all, as 3g. The committee within the ITU that handled these matters, took a vote and so labeled it. Prior to this point, only "3x" was accurately labeled as 3g. Even so, today, if you venture into the field where installation of these systems are ongoing, engineers still refer to CDMA2000 as 2G. This is probably due to its narrow banding. In Europe most of the press continues to refer to CDMA2000 as 2g. Take your pick. There are other reasons why engineers have continued to refer to 1x is being 2g...
Cle, you stated in an old post that once the ASIC is released it will need to undergo more testing prior to sale thus dragging it into year 2000. Generally most of the testing is completed prior to sale. That's what they're doing now. So, once released, it's ready for sale. The release will be this year, so I've heard. It's supposedly a pretty hot product.
This post was referring to the BCDMA ASIC, which was already incorporated in testing platforms from India to South America to China. We were in communication with Samsung who had a BCDMA trial ongoing. The Samsung individual in charge of the BCDMA project in China called it "a hot product". There are others who can attest to these communications with Samsung. Samsung, along with its partner China Unicom in this trial, applied for broadcast in the 5mghz to 10mghz spreading range in late 1999. China had to set aside specific spectrum for the build-out of broadband local loop. Although China Unicom made a good case, the MII in China declined their application...stating, in essence, that such spectrum would be set-aside "in the future" for "other applications", such as mobile 3g. BCDMA could have been reconfigured to broadcast in available spectrum...but the cost of reconfiguration lay at the feet of IDCC. IDCC needed to justify an economic model to reconfigure a BCDMA ASIC. Although BCDMA represented the lowest cost user model (per bit, per installation, all the way around) to date for local loop applications, that particular spectrum would not be set aside for broadcast in the U.S. either...India and South America could set aside spectrum but, here again, the BCDMA ASIC would need to be reconfigured in order to broadcast within the proposed broadcast designations. IDCC could have reconfigured the BCDMA ASIC for approximately $25 to $30 million...they chose instead to concentrate their efforts on the Nokia 3g project. Nokia probably helped persuade them. IDCC's partner in the U.S. couldn't afford a $25 million remake, although they stated in no uncertain terms that BCDMA was "wonderful". IDCC also determined that the local loop market wasn't growing as quickly as some had originally projected...many case studies prove this out today.
The failure of IDCC in the BCDMA project, if any, was in better analyzing available spectrum before the project's start. The only problem in making such a judgment, though, was that the spectrum picture was constantly changing.
There was no national consensus for Local Loop spectrum. So..that which was availabe in the U.S. in 1996, was not deemed available by 2000. IDCC made a submission to the TIA to have BCDMA declared a separate "local loop" standard, qualifying it for its own spectrum. Although BCDMA was so classified, appropriate spectrum was never set-aside. 3g spectrum remains a problem in the U.S.
very few bought into QCOM's story in 91 and 92. The market got the picture though. IDC IPRs could be bigger than QCOM.
Very few bought in Qcom's story in 91 and 92. The market did eventually get the picture and properly valued Qcom. In 1999, if you had spoken to Gary Lomp and other IDCC representatives, you would have learned that TDD had a very bright future. He believed that IDCC would play a significant role in the output of TDD. He later wrote articles on this subject. If his vision comes to pass regarding the widespread use of TDD...it may still come to pass...and IDCC is properly credited with their TDD contributions, there is little reason to think that IDCC's IPR could receive greater value than Qcom. Most 4g technologies are now based on one TDD principle or another.
Per IDC's estimation, both CDMA and CDMA2000 are inferior to BCDMA operationally.
"Inferior operationally" is subject to several QoS tests, cost-per-user guidelines, cost per bit, ease of installation...what have you. It is no secret that several applications, both mobile and fixed, within the BCDMA model were more cost effective that Qcom's approach. IDCC's IPR was included in the 3g standards as a result of these verifiable tests. IDCC's engineers were comparing BCDMA relative to several of these tests in making this determination. But, back then, BCDMA didn't have the spectrum. BCDMA has the spectrum now - in the form of WCDMA.
no, not CDMA, GSM 900/1800 TDMA which is convertible to mobile WCDMA without extensive addtl. Infrastructure. As for BCDMA being "years away" from mobility - it's more accurate to say "months". There is no giant technological leap left of which I'm aware that would prevent bcdma from being mobile other than politics (a significant leap). It does appear IDC is playing quiet with the subject for now.
This was an answer to a question in February 1999 that concerned BCDMA in China. The trial in China went extremely well...but for the spectrum issue as discussed above. Three months later, by April, IDCC stated that they had already been heavily engaged with ITU efforts in turning BCDMA properties into a mobile WCDMA solution. The rest is history.
with QCOM selling infrastructure and R&D to ERICY, IDC becomes one of the technological leaders
Given the amount of IPR, contributions, that has been approved by the ITU for both WCDMA and TDD, IDCC is indeed one of the wireless "technological leaders". You should be saying, "Ge, that was prophetic". No one knew the exact amount of IPR that IDCC would have approved when this statement was originally made. No one could have guessed that IDCC's contributions would add to greater than 250.
But, to make a long story short, the end result of Ericsson's departure from the Qualcomm dispute would lead one to believe that (a) Ericsson would also settle with IDCC and (b) many of the same principles that would stop Qualcomm from succeeding in 3g (due to the Ericsson ITU battle) would also stop IDCC from succeeding. Ericsson's concession to Qualcomm opened a large door for the success of IDCC's IPR. Some of IDCC's IPR hinged on the success of Qualcomm in the marketplace. Ericsson and Qualcomm were engaged in a bitter dispute...Wall Street was of the opinion that Ericsson would beat Qualcomm in court...that Qualcomm did not stand much of a chance.
Now, here, with IDCC, the Special Master has ruled. He has ruled in favor of IDCC's concepts on six different, important issues. There was no such beneficial ruling in Qualcomm's favor regarding Ericsson...Ericsson decided to settle with Qualcomm because Qualcomm had something they wanted...namely Q's CDMA infrastructure business.
I was told today that the ERICY/QCOM deal is as bullish for IDC as it is for QCOM (even more if you follow the total IPR stream)
See the answer above. Your vision is clouded by your own dislike for IDCC as a company.
IDC has the only fully functional 3G system in operation which is handling voice, internet, and video - video being TV with proper spectrum allocation.
IDCC does have a fully functional 3g system in operation; their current portfolio includes a fully functional TDD set...something of which Qcom cannot brag. They demonstrated wireless video transmissions via BCDMA as early as 1996 in Singapore. In 1998 they were transferring both voice and Internet traffic wirelessly at 384kbps. Sidemens had tested the BCDMA system up to 512kbps without a hitch, they stated. These transmissions were going off in both 5mghz and 10mghz spreads. Nortel was involved in these trials...as a parts supplier. If this isn't 3g, what is? DECT is part of the 3g standard...
Bill, an interesting fact of IDC is that IDC and QCOM have cross-licensing of QCOM's CDMA patents, and QCOM of IDC's CDMA and BCDMA patents. Exact royalty payouts of the deal were not made public (i.e., if IDC uses QCOM's CDMA and vice versa), but, through this, Nokia has access to most of the necessary QCOM's IPRs for CDMA implementation. If Nokia gets use of all the CDMA they need through IDC for a more cost effective deployment (i.e., royalty payout), then...
I agree that the above is stated crudely, but, in March 1999, Nokia's engineers were talking. Freely talking. What they were saying was that Nokia did not need Qualcomm for 3g...that the 2g agreements between Nokia and Qualcomm was ALL that Nokia needed to proceed with 3g. Nokia did not want Qualcomm's additional 3g properties. They stated that Nokia could get any additional properties they needed on its own or through their current partner base...which included Interdigital. And so on. They did not believe that Ericsson would settle with Qualcomm, that Ericsson had a very strong case against Qualcomm (do you wonder why the press were find quotes for their Ericsson domination articles?).
That which essentially changed Nokia's engineering mind were three essential events: (a) Ericsson settled with Qualcomm, (b) Qualcomm's patents were upheld in Europe, (c) Qualcomm's patents were upheld in Japan (both Europe and Japan had "challenged" Qualcomm's patents. All these events occurred after March of 1999.
An interesting "door" in the Qualcomm/IDCC agreement happens to be that which covers the manufacture of chips. So, although Qualcomm did not give IDCC, ala carte, their entire IPR portfolio, IDCC has stated that through "alternate means" they have access to Qcom's properties, that is (a) be it through partners, or (b) through chip agreements. The leveraging of both a "limit clause" and this "chip clause" gives IDCC latitude with partners. The "limit clause" was behind the thinking that Qualcomm could only utilize IDCC's technology within "limits". IDCC's own development efforts, then, were "without these same limitations". Although a public limitation may be relative to spreading factors, an additional limitation had to do with the manufacture of chips relative to various IPR. The patents, which Qualcomm had “garnered” from IDCC, were in association with delivery at the chip level.
Clearly you of all people must know that BCDMA is not a failure. When it's dead and gone, a failure. It ain't gone and it ain't dead. Samsung received an addtl. $100 million proposed order to implement a broadband wireless CDMA system in Russia and some of it's satellites (in addt. to the order received last year).
BCDMA is not a failure. It lives on in WCDMA. In 1999 Samsung did receive a $100 million Local Loop CDMA order for Russia. Review the records. During the presentation to the Russian telecom unit, Samsung was presenting B-CDMA as the local loop technology of choice...this is surely available via the Internet...it was available from the head of Samsung's BCDMA unit during that year. Samsung's (China Unicom's) BCDMA proposal to the Chinese MII for additional spectrum was turned down. Our contact with the head of Samsung's marketing for BCDMA stated that he could "no longer communicate with us" regarding the MII decision nor the proposed Russian project. But, from news reports, even Russia decided not to take full advantage of the "local loop" concept. They ordered approximately $5 million US dollars of material and that was the last it was noted. So, Samsung's $100 million local loop project (their figures) became considerably less.
bottom line for NOK (and others for that matter), is they're looking for ways around paying Q all the dough; cut their costs.
NOK was looking for ways around Q's IPR. NOK challenged Q in both Europe and Japan. If this isn't looking for ways around a company, what is?
NOK has found applications in IDC's IPR base, which will assist it in doing that not only for CDMA but also GPRS (this is not just a CDMA issue). I think we've all said that before though. IDC's deal is that their software (already mobile) and even ASIC applications are reconfigured for mobile to meet this challenge.
IDCC was already developing the stack for mobile applications...you can witness this through the IFX agreement. Infineon came to IDCC as they stated they "searched for the best in class IPR" (verbatim statement at Barcelona) before choosing IDCC as a partner. IDCC was in the process of reconfiguring their BCDMA set for mobile applications...these applications were being submitted DAILY for consideration before the ITU. During a two-month stretch it appeared as if IDCC was THE most active participant within the ITU standards.
should state that IDC is not pursuing GPRS right now - although they may have too if GPRS becomes the step of choice to 3G. don't know why it would, though given NOK's statements that they can move directly to 3G from 2G and so on.
To our knowledge IDCC was NOT pursuing GPRS in mid-1999 from a chip or ASIC standpoint. But, as stated in earlier posts, IDCC had claimed property applications within GPRS. GPRS is essentially a GSM (TDMA) technology with packet-based transfers. But, guess what, given that GPRS has become a medium step of choice, IDCC is NOW pursuing it with the help of IFX...it is part of the M-Gold platform.
Nokia had made statements regarding 3g developments, which had appeared to go against the grain of the Operators they serve. For example, Nokia had stated, in 1999, that Operators, in general, didn't need bi-modal sets...that the problem of modality could be solved at the networking level. Vodaphone made public comments in 2000/2001 stating they would not aggressively pursue 3g until they had a bi-modal chipset available for handsets (helps reduce costs for Operators...certain costs shift from them to the user). So, my statement about Nokia "going directly from 2g to 3g" had, in part, to do with Nokia's 1999 vision that bi-modal chipsets would prove too costly and utilize too much power to serve as a viable transfer path. We know now that IFX, and others, through SoC developments, has tackled the problem of modality at the handset level. IFX has claimed they can solve these issues through improved chipset design and substrate.
Also, in mid-1999, the Nokia camp was "split" about whether to aggressively pursue GPRS. Nokia did not announce additional GPRS decisions, in this regard, until early-2000. This became an "Olilla program" based on a number of issues, some of which involved delays in the 3g standard.
Nokia has also since changed their stance regarding bi-modality; although you'll continue to find white papers on their website which proclaim that single set WCDMA handsets may be preferred relative to cost. The "single set" Nokia infrastructure model has set it apart from, say, the Sidemens' model. Nokia has begun to change their stance. Nokia presentations, at conferences, have begun to shift toward the acceptance of a bi-modal handset model. |
