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Politics : War -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (2507)	7/30/2001 12:55:50 AM
From: ajs	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 23908

Note that most of Ha'aretz articles or Op-Eds are by people from the far left segment of Israelis: Apologists for the PA's rejectionism By Dan Margalit Ever since Yasser Arafat rejected the peace proposals put forward by Israel and the United States, many members of the radical left have had to admit that this time around Israel had acted appropriately. However, the document recently made public by Robert Malley - a member of the American negotiating team at Camp David - and Hussein Agha - who helped to draft the Beilin-Abu Mazen document - mainly takes the Palestinian side; it once again lets the radical left off the hook as far as the need to present matters as if they were the official Israeli version. Malley was furious that his document was being depicted as an indictment that placed the entire blame for the failed Camp David summit on Ehud Barak. True, the study he wrote with Agha, which was published in The New York Review of Books, also contained some reservations about Arafat's actions. Nevertheless, the document provides an array of excuses to explain the Palestinian rejectionism that turned the hopes of peace awakened at Camp David into the current Intifada. Malley and Agha assail Barak for his "all or nothing" policy. Not only did Arafat adopt this same tactic, however, in 1999's Sharm el-Sheikh accord, but Barak's approach has proved to be the correct one. It would be complete folly to accede to all of Arafat's demands for anything less than peace. The Intifada has proved, after all, that he is wont to start shooting over any and every unresolved issue. According to Malley and Agha, Arafat saw the Camp David summit "as the embodiment of his worst nightmare." He wanted to reject it "so that he would have time to prepare himself." This is nothing but a smokescreen, as Arafat had been committed to preparing himself for this moment since 1993, and one month more or less would not change things. Malley and Agha are not telling it like it is: Arafat realized that Clinton was striving for a peace agreement based on the Beilin-Abu Mazen document - an agreement that does not include the return of refugees into Israel - and therefore opted to gain time until the change of government in Washington. Malley and Agha claim that Barak did not uphold his commitment to transfer certain villages near Jerusalem to Arafat. Is that indeed the case? Barak - at the head of a disintegrating coalition - had been authorized by the Knesset to do so, but that very day Arafat's security forces - not terrorists - opened fire on Israelis. Malley and Agha know that Barak shattered every Israeli taboo in his effort to achieve peace. "Nevertheless, it is difficult to say for certain how far he really was prepared he go." Instead of posing any theoretical questions about Barak's intentions, the two avoided saying that it was Arafat who brought down the Camp David summit by not putting his Israeli rival to the test of making good on his ideas. Barak arrived at Camp David prepared to discuss the transfer of 91 percent (and another 1 percent inside the Green Line) of West Bank territory to the Palestinians. (Clinton's proposal expanded that to 96 percent - actually 100 percent, when one includes the road network for the Palestinians that would be on Israeli soil). What did Arafat want? For Barak to begin the negotiations by accepting all his demands? Furthermore, how did the clever writers of the document fail to mention that Barak's readiness to give up 91 percent of the territory was nothing short of a revolution in the Israeli approach, even if it was still not enough for Arafat? On Jerusalem, Barak made unprecedented concessions that will not be offered again in the foreseeable future. Despite all the political vows not to divide Jerusalem, he offered Arafat the Muslim and Christian Quarters, and custodianship of the Temple Mount. Not a single word has been heard so far about this from the Palestinians, who know that this readiness will eventually contribute to bringing about peace more than any of the prattle engaged in by the participants in the summit. Barak agreed to discuss the division of the Old City (not only East Jerusalem, as Malley and Agha wrote), and Arafat offered nothing. Yet the Palestinian indictment still accuses Israel of not filling all of the blank spaces with ideas for resolving the problem of the capital. But let's assume that all this was still not enough for the Palestinians (why should we make that assumption, really?). Why, then, after the Israeli readiness to divide Jerusalem was officially expressed, in a history-making statement, did they open fire as they had not done when Benjamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Mordechai only offered them crumbs? Malley and Agha have no real answer. Barak also erred. He made a mistake by not bringing Shimon Peres into the negotiations and by not meeting with Arafat at Camp David. But he made a significant and painful step toward a permanent peace settlement with the Palestinians, whereas they - because their desire to have refugees over the Green Line border was stronger than their interest in putting an end to the wars - gave up the chance to end the conflict, and dragged the two peoples down into a blood-spattered arena. Even the brilliant writing of Malley and Agha cannot cover the black hole of Arafat's peace rejectionism. haaretzdaily.com