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To: Tom Clarke who wrote (22)8/7/2001 5:30:24 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER  Respond to of 33
 
Echoing G.M. Tamas' Post-Fascism... (*)

brookes.ac.uk
Excerpt:

I must side with the Manicheans. The modern world is not an interregnum, but it is an endgame, one being continually played out, like the eternal recurrence of world snooker competitions and European cup football on British TV, superimposing a cyclic pattern on rectilinear history. "It is only our concept of time which causes us to use the phrase The Last Judgment: actually it is a court in permanent session." Now that millennium hysteria has died down, it might become easier to see that the last act being constantly performed in our age has nothing to do with a particular date or a technological glitch, or even a final reckoning between liberalism and the conveniently alien ideological "other" provided by fascism, communism, or fundamentalism. Instead it is between genuinely liberal versions of democracy open to global humanitarian and ecological perspectives on the one hand, and radical right versions on the other which exploit the profound ambiguity of the concept "demos". Nor is it necessary for openly radical right political formations such as the Front National or the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia to triumph for liberalism to be corroded by the ethnocentrism which they represent. Given the evidence of contemporary Europe's continuing implication in forces which, according to some reliable humanitarian monitoring agencies, are generating mounting structural poverty and ecological depredation in the "South", it is possible to see "actually existing" liberal Europe not just as a socio-economic fortress, but as an ethno-cultural one as well, protected by ramparts being continually reinforced. It is a concentration of ethnocentric power which, though liberal in its domestic politics, continues to operate prevalently as a radical right wing force in terms of its total impact on the global community.

The effect of propaganda put out by ethnocratic ideologues and parties can only reinforce this tendency, no matter how marginalized they are from actual government, making it even more impossible for politicians to present populations with policies which would involve a substantial transfer of wealth and resources (back) from the North to the South or address the structural reasons for mounting immigratory pressures, for fear of the mass dissent it would arouse. The next few decades should decide whether a healthy liberalism can prevail or whether, in the midst of a deteriorating environment and escalating demographic explosion which the new millennium inherits from the old, its contamination takes a permanent hold. Meanwhile, one of the messages transmitted by the protesters against the WTO in Seattle in the autumn of 1999 for those who habitually treat the radical right as "out there" is that it might also be already in our midst. If the radical right is based on a malfunction of human empathy, on an affective aridity, then it might be legitimate to appropriate lines written in a very different context by T. S. Eliot, someone who managed to make the transition from fellow traveller of radical right cosmologies to a pundit of "high" liberal humanist culture:

The desert is not remote in southern tropics,

The desert is not only round the corner.

The desert is squeezed into the tube-train next to you,

The desert is in the heart of your brother.

____________________

(*) bostonreview.mit.edu



To: Tom Clarke who wrote (22)8/22/2001 5:41:52 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER  Respond to of 33
 
Beware of the European Frankenstein...

Slavenka Drakulic
Who is Afraid of Europe?
Opening Speech for the 14th European Meeting of Cultural Journals Politics and Cultures in Europe: New Visions, New Divisions
Vienna, November 9th 2000


I live in Sweden, Croatia and Austria. Europe is my home. I remember when, a couple of years ago, the checkpoint at the border crossing between Austria and Italy was abandoned and we were passing the border near Klagenfurt, barely believing that we were not going to be stopped by the police. But there was no police, only empty booths. What a great feeling of relief it was! Especially because I remembered the strange sensation when I crossed the newly erected border post between Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 for the first time. Being an Eastern European, I also know how it feels standing in line at the airport checkpoint that says "non-EU citizens", or sometimes just bluntly "Others".

Living on both sides of real and imagined European borders and crossing them back and forth all the time, I have to say that only a year ago I believed in the project of constructing a united Europe much more than I do today. But of course, that was before the elections in Austria, in Norway and Switzerland or in the city of Antwerp, before the referendum on the Euro in Denmark - or incidents such as the one in Malaga where a mob, mobilized by a neo-Nazi web site, chased Moroccan workers for three whole days. The list of disturbing events all over Europe is much longer. It is as if there is suddenly a pattern of a different Europe emerging in front of my eyes, and when I look at it, it gives me goosebumps. It is not a deja vu because I belong to a generation that did not experience fascism, but I can see growing xenophobia, nationalism and racism everywhere. Moreover, because of where I come from, I can tell when the fear of the Other becomes something one must start to take into account. And I just wonder if these are isolated incidents or are perhaps already signs that the project of European integration is in danger of losing its momentum?

I was born after WW II and grew up on a sleepy continent divided by the "iron curtain", dwelling in the shadow of a possible nuclear war. As school kids, we would practice what we had to do in the case of such an attack. We learned to recognize its characteristics by heart: first a mushroom cloud would appear on the horizon, followed by a blast of heat and ashes. You should hide behind any barrier, pull the gas mask over your face and under no circumstances drink water (the bit with the water was particularly strongly impressed upon us and I always wondered why). Although only children, we understood that these preparations would give us little protection if such a horror as described in our textbooks would happen. Still, we practiced dutifully. It did not help us. When the next war, the war in the Balkans erupted much later, we were taken by surprise. Little did we know in the late
fifties that the war we would witness would be a local one, limited and of small intensity - the war that would catch us totally unprepared.

My generation grew up with the idea that such a war, with genocide, concentration camps and forced resettlement of entire populations is simply impossible after WWII. Europe had learned its lesson, the history teachers told us, and such horrors could not take place any longer. Today, after the war in my country and in Bosnia and Kosovo, I no longer believe that Europe has learned that lesson. But perhaps I am wrong. After all the last war happened not quite in Europe, but in the Balkans. Are the Balkans Europe? Today it seems so, although tomorrow it could be decided differently. But if this is so, what then is Europe and where does it end?

Back then, in my school days, even that was somehow clearer. Europe was where the Soviet Union was not. The big political changes during the last ten years blurred that childish certainty. The Europe of today is no longer a question of geopolitics and defined borders to the East, not even of economic
unity - but more of attitudes, definitions, institutions, of a certain mental landscape. There is no longer any "iron curtain" to make definitions easier.
During the last ten years the peoples of Europe witnessed the collapse of communism and the disappearance of the common enemy, the speeding up of
the integration process within the EU, its planned enlargement into the East as well as the war in the Balkans. At the same time the globalization process
seems to engulf the entire world. But these changes happened too fast for people to comprehend them, to grasp them fully. They reacted as people
always react to the unknown, with a feeling of uncertainty and fear. While the known world is dissolving in front of their eyes, the new one that is taking
shape is not yet comprehensive. What is Europe really and how far can it spread eastwards whilst still remaining Europe? Is Turkey Europe? In that
case, what about Russia?

These are not abstract questions. The bottom line here is how these changes will influence the life of Europeans, their work, income, education,
language and so on. More and more people have the feeling of losing the possibility to control their own lives. A feeling of anxiety undermines their
confidence in the world around them and their sense of certainty. This anxiety is vague, to be sure. But although it is not entirely identified or specified,
often not even recognized as such, it is out there, palpable, measurable in opinion polls, referendums, election results, articulated as doubts about the
necessity of a common currency, of integration and enlargement, or about free circulation of a working force. That is to say, as vague as it is, this anxiety
is already having effects on the political life of some countries and might perhaps soon bring substantial changes to the political landscape of Europe.

The mechanism of exploiting fear is simple and well known. As an individual, you may feel lost and confused, swept away by the speed and magnitude
of historical events. Suddenly, there is somebody offering you shelter, a feeling of belonging, a guarantee of security. We are of the same blood, we
belong to the same territory, our people first, so goes the rhetoric. To scared ears it is soothing to hear old-fashion words like blood, soil, territory, us,
them. Hearing that, you feel stronger, you are no longer alone, confronted with the Others - with too many immigrants, Muslims, Turks, refugees,
Africans, asylum seekers, Gypsies or too much big bureaucracy that wants to rule your life from Brussels. Once you have found the pleasure of
belonging, Others don't frighten you any longer. From the fear of the unknown to the creation of the "known" enemy, it sometimes takes only a small
step. It doesn't need much more than that vague sense of anxiety, plus a political leader who will know how to exploit it. The media will do the rest.
[snip]

eurozine.com



To: Tom Clarke who wrote (22)2/12/2002 4:52:06 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 33
 
The Eurasian Politician - Issue 4 (August 2001)

THE RISE OF THE EURASIANS

By: Victor Yasmann
Source: RFE/RL Security Watch, 30th April 2001


Eurasianists rally around Putin. Speaking at the founding congress of the new political movement "Eurasia," geopolitician Aleksandr Dugin said his group has been created to provide "total support" to President Putin, RIA-Novosti reported on 21 April. Among participants in the movement are Vsevolod Chaplin, the secretary of the Patriarchate's Foreign Relations Department, Talgat Tadzhuddin, the chief mufti of the Russian Muslim Spiritual Directorate, Did-Khabalam, the leader of Russian Buddhists, and Hassidic Rabbi Avram Shmulevich.

* * *

The new Eurasia movement brings under one political roof representatives of all major religious confessions, something that has not happened since Soviet times. More importantly, it represents another effort to popularize the concept of Eurasianism and make it into a national ideology for post-Soviet Russia.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, several variants of Eurasianism have been proposed, but they have not attracted much support either because they were too mired in the 19th century origins of that idea or failed to correspond to the new conditions of globalization.

Given the background of Eurasianism, articulated by Count Nikolai Trubetskoi in the 1920s and then developed by anthropologist Lev Gumilyov in the 1960s, that is not surprising. The ideology's chief postulates are that Russia has a special role to play in the lives of other Eurasian states, that the people of the region live in non-antagonist relationships, that there is an irreconcilable difference between them and the West, and that this confrontation cannot be overcome by compromise but only by the victory of one side or the other.

During Soviet times, Eurasianism attracted supporters within the military and the KGB, particularly the latter?s special anti-terrorist Alfa group. Many Alfa men are now among the founders of the new movement. And that background is reflected in the earlier career of the leader of the movement, Aleksandr Dugin.

The son of a KGB officer and knowledgeable in many languages, Dugin was trained as a historian. He began his public career in the early 1980s as an activist in Dmitry Vasiliyev's rabidly anti-Semitic Pamyat organization. Later, Dugin joined forces with Eduard Limonov to form a group called Conservative Revolution. A decade ago, they translated into Russian and popularized the ideas of many German and Italian fascists, but the two had a falling out, and Dugin turned toward Eurasianism, an idea that attracted solid financial support and which enabled him to publish his works on geopolitics.

Dugin updated Eurasianism by dropping its initial postulate about the eternal hostility of Russia and the West as a whole. Instead, he spoke about the concentration of what he called "the world evil" in the naval powers of the West, Great Britain, and the United States. And he argued that Russia should form an alliance with Europe against those Atlantic powers, not only for ideological but also for geoeconomic dominance.

According to Dugin, the economic strength of the naval powers is based on their control of the oceans. In response, Russia should lead Eurasia in creating east-west and north-south land transport networks. That idea has already found expression in the speeches of President Vladimir Putin.

In the Eurasia movement's manifesto, published at the website eurasia.com.ru , Dugin suggests that "Neo-Eurasianism has had a strong impact upon political parties and movements in modern Russia - we find large borrowings from the neo-Eurasianist ideological arsenal in the programmatic documents of Unity, the Communist Party (KPFR), Fatherland-All Russia (OVR), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the movement Russia, and in a series of smaller movements and parties."

And in yet another indication of the rising influence of Dugin and Eurasianism, the media reported last year that the hall of Lev Gumilyov University in Astana was decorated with Dugin's slogans when President Putin came to visit. Dugin, who also serves as an official adviser to Duma speaker Gennady Seleznyov, has stressed, however, that he does not seek power but only an extension of his ideological influence. He clearly has achieved a lot in that direction already.

* * *

Copyright (c) 2000. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org

cc.jyu.fi