Hi Hawkmoon; Some excerpts from a US military document from Kuwaiti War of Liberation: (Read the whole thing if it seems particularly interesting.)
Airpower Against an Army - Challenge and Response in CENTAF's Duel with the Republican Guard
William F. Andrews, Lt Col, USAF, February 1998
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Upon receiving the plan, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Powell insisted that the USAF include operations against Iraqi armored units, demanding "smoking tanks as kilometer fence posts all the way to Baghdad."
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Maj Roy Y. Sikes, a Checkmate analyst, considered the probability of Iraqi adaptations to an air attack and devised means to minimize the effects of Iraqi countermeasures. He emphasized concentration and massive attacks on specific ground units until the desired level of destruction was achieved (estimated to be between 20 percent and 40 percent of full strength). Under continuous attack and constant scrutiny from forward air controllers (FAC), units would be unable to survive long enough to benefit from a learning curve. Air attacks would then rapidly shift to another unit, destroying it in turn.
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The renaissance of high-altitude tactics was an innovation generated at the unit level during Desert Shield. Individual units gradually shifted from low- to high-altitude tactics during the months before Desert Storm. Most wings began Desert Shield with the belief that low flying would be required to survive against the Iraqis. One wing commander attributed this to a widespread overestimation of the Iraqis' capabilities. Observation of the desert environment and increased understanding of the Iraqi threat hinted at the need for change. As familiarity with the desert increased, groups within the combat wings began to question the wisdom of low-altitude tactics. A series of low-altitude training accidents (resulting in six fatalities) during Desert Shield precipitated a 1,000 (ft) minimum altitude restriction from CENTAF. Low-altitude advocates railed against the restriction, arguing that training should be conducted as low as 100 ft (most USAF crews were trained to fly as low as 300 ft). The accidents gave many units an opportunity to reappraise their tactics and led to a gradual (but uneven) shift to high-altitude operations.
This Adaptation to the anticipated conditions of war took place before the outbreak of hostilities and was the result of considerable internal debate (and in some units, strife). The change, being bottom-up, was an uneven one. Observation opportunities were limited; there were no Iraqis available to test high-altitude propositions. Some units tested ideas by conducting simulated high-altitude attacks against friendly airfields and were encouraged because observers on the ground found it nearly impossible to acquire the raiders visually, even when attack times and directions were known beforehand. The USAF units most reluctant to transition to high altitude were the night interdiction wings equipped with F-111s, F-15Es, and B-52s. These units saw low-altitude night operations as their forte, and their mental orientation was an obstacle to innovation. The low-flying ethos was so powerful in these wings that all flew some missions at low altitude in the first days of the war. European units (British, French, and Italians) were similarly oriented and worse off in the sense that their aircraft were purpose-built for low-altitude operations. The Tornado and Jaguar weapons delivery systems were ill suited for high-altitude attacks. Once the shooting began, feedback (observation and orientation) was instantaneous and all quickly and universally abandoned their low-altitude orientation.
A primary reason for the uneven shift to high altitude is that CENTAF refused to dictate tactics, leaving those decisions to the tacticians and commanders at the unit level. It is likely that Generals Horner and Glosson shared the views of other Vietnam War avaitors -- that Vietnam was "a war of fatal oversupervision". When General Glosson was queried by a pilot whether he could use low-altitude tactics during Desert Storm, his reply was "you can if that's what the wing decides to do. The mission commanders and smart captains should be the ones deciding tactics, not higher headquarters."
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The first innovation improved effectiveness against the Republican Guard with A-10 attacks on the Tawakalna Division. General Glosson reversed a decision to concentrate A-10s against the forward echelon by assigning this additional weapons system against the Republican Guard, possibly in response to unfavorable F-16 and B-52 feedback. Use of the A-10, the USAF's prime CAS platform, on deep interdiction constituted a major innovation because it was contrary to the attack-pilot ethos. Deep, high-altitude interdiction by the A-10 had been discussed in some circles, mainly by weapons officers, but ran contrary to accepted practices and culture. Deep interdiction was seen by many as a mission unsuited for the A-10: slow, and heavily armored, the A-10 would be exposed to enemy ground fire for extended periods of time during ingress and egress. If attacked, it would lack the energy and maneuverability required to evade SAMs at high altitude. Close air support was viewed as the A-10 raison d'etre, many pilots believing the proper use of their weapon system should entail low-altitude Maverick attacks on enemy positions "while standing on the shoulders of the lead tankers."
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As the first troops crossed the Iraqi border, the Republican Guard heavy divisions were estimated by ARCENT to be down to 54 percent (Medinah), 55 percent (Tawakalna) and 77 percent (Hammurabi) strength. CENTAF could have driven the figures lower with more time, but the commanders seemed to place less importance on the 50 percent figure as the ground war approached. Iraqi desertions made it clear that the Iraqi Army was disintegrating. Time for increased attrition was not available as political pressures to launch the ground war overrode military considerations.
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, and in the ensuing Battle of Rumaylah, the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division claimed 187 armored vehicles, 34 guns, 16 rocket launchers, and 400 wheeled vehicles destroyed. US casualties included one soldier wounded and M-1 destroyed. The Iraqis fled back towards Basrah and were not involved in any more engagements with the coalition. It can be assumed the remnants of the Republican Guard division reformed around Basrah and gradually filtered across the Euphrates over the next several weeks.
Major elements of the Republican Guard were destroyed as an effective military force. Remnants may have been lashed together to suppress internal unrest after the war, but the guard was no longer the most intimidating military force in the region. The guard's potential as a strategic instrument of coercion was immeasurably diminished when two of the Republican Guard's finest divisions were crushed in Desert Storm as the third fled. No longer referred o as Iraq's fearsome battle hardened elite, the guard was seen now as a technologically inferior third world force unable to effectively wage modern war.
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Appreciating that most of Iraq's military hardware was destroyed or captured during this famous victory, accusations and recriminations have rebounded between the services as each service sought to stake a claim in the postwar mechanized body count. At least two teams traveled to Kuwait to autopsy desetroyed Iraqi tanks and determine the cause of death. Findings, however, were inconclusive for a variety of reasons: some vehicles had experienced multiple killing shots (possibly from land and air attack), many others were never inspected because an indeterminate number of vehicles had already been removed and because many areas were inaccessible due to transportation limitations and the danger posed by unexploded munitions.
In an effort to use more subjective sources, each service, branch, and weapon system has been able to find an Iraqi prisoner debriefing that suggests that their weapon system, branch, or service was predominant.
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At the tactical level, guard armor was no match for US equipment, nor were Iraq's top soldiers a match for the soldiers of the VII or XVIII Corps. Iraqi T-72s were vulnerable to coalition weapons, even many that were not expected to be effective against armor. The American M-1A1, however, proved impervious to most of Iraq's weapons. Advantages in American sights and ballistics computers gave them a decisive edge at long range. At closer ranges, individual American initiative and superior training paid off. US soldiers were at a peak when the ground war commenced, having adhered to a heavy training schedul during the air campaign. Iraqi soldiers, normally requiring extensive workup training, were unable to prepare for the ground war under steady air attack. Iraqi soldiers were, instead, trained by weeks of bombing to flee their crew-serviced weapons and seek shelter.
Iraq's respected long-range artillery that survived the air campaign was ineffective. Denied air surveillance by coalition air superiority, Iraqi artillery units lacked any meaningful targeting capability. Intimidated by continuous air presence, the Iraqis never turned on their counterbattery radars. There is evidence that some Iraqi artillery positions may not have been manned as US units approached. Iraqi fires were described as "erratic" and "completely ineffective". The units that were able to fire were dealt with swiftly. US units were able to use counterbattery radars continuously to silence Iraqi fires with powerful rocket barrages. Fixed in place by the destruction of their prime movers, Iraqi artillerymen faced a dilemma: stay and die or abandon the equipment and live.
Iraqi Prisoner of War Comments
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US Army versus artillery as paraphrased by Colonel Scales, USA: "A prisoner of war whose artillery unit . . . opposed VII Corps . . . Revealed that his 64 gun battalion group lost seven pieces during the air phase and 46 to MLRS raids. . . . One captured battalion commander stated that his unit fired only once during the battle, and within moments, artillery bomblets devastated his position. A third of his soldiers fled the position and left most of his guns destroyed and the rest of his soldiers dead."
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au.af.mil
-- Carl |
