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Politics : High Tolerance Plasticity -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: CpsOmis who wrote (7920)	9/15/2001 2:13:07 AM
From: stockman_scott	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 23153

Afghanistan - A bitter harvest... Sep 13th 2001 \| LAHORE From The Economist print edition The sufferings of Afghanistan come to New York IN ITS understandable rage for justice, America may be tempted to overlook one uncomfortable fact. Its own policies in Afghanistan a decade and more ago helped to create both Osama bin Laden and the fundamentalist Taliban regime that shelters him. The notion of jihad, or holy war, had almost ceased to exist in the Muslim world after the tenth century until it was revived, with American encouragement, to fire an international pan-Islamic movement after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. For the next ten years, the CIA and Saudi intelligence together pumped in billions of dollars’ worth of arms and ammunition through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) to the many mujahideen groups fighting in Afghanistan. The policy worked: the Soviet Union suffered such terrible loses in Afghanistan that it withdrew its forces in 1989, and the humiliation of that defeat, following on from the crippling cost of the campaign, helped to undermine the Soviet system itself. But there was a terrible legacy: Afghanistan was left awash with weapons, warlords and extreme religious zealotry. For the past ten years that deadly brew has spread its ill-effects widely. Pakistan has suffered terrible destabilisation. But the afghanis, the name given to the young Muslim men who fought the infidel in Afghanistan, have carried their jihad far beyond: to the corrupt kingdoms of the Gulf, to the repressive states of the southern Mediterranean, and now, perhaps, to New York and Washington, DC. Chief among the afghanis was Mr bin Laden, a scion of one of Saudi Arabia’s richest business families. Recruited by the Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Turki al Faisal, to help raise funds for the jihad, he became central to the recruitment and training of mujahideen from across the Muslim world. Mr bin Laden fought against the Russians on the side of the ISI’s favourite Afghan, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, whose Hezb-e-Islami party became the largest recipient of CIA money. After the Russians withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the Americans quickly lost interest in the country and a struggle for power erupted among the mujahideen. But since no group was strong enough to capture and hold Kabul, the capital, Afghanistan slumped into anarchy. In 1995-96, a movement of Pathan students—Taliban—from religious schools in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan swept the country, promising a restoration of order. They enjoyed Pakistani backing, and almost certainly the approval of the Americans. Meanwhile, Mr bin Laden had become a self-avowed enemy of America, appalled at the presence of American troops on holy Saudi soil during the Gulf war. Exiled to Sudan, he was soon forced to leave. He secretly returned to Afghanistan, becoming a guest of the Taliban, whose interpretation of Islam and hostility to the West he shares. After attacks on two American embassies in 1998, America tried to persuade the Taliban to surrender him. When the regime refused, the Americans retaliated by raining cruise missiles on guerrilla camps in Afghanistan. The Taliban have steadfastly refused to hand Mr bin Laden over. As their guest he remains.

To: CpsOmis who wrote (7920)	9/15/2001 9:22:25 AM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 23153

Why Was There No Warning?... The Washington Post Saturday, September 15, 2001; Page A26 THIS COUNTRY spends tens of billions of dollars a year on intelligence activity. The Justice Department, in addition, spends $23 billion to enforce the law. Given the size and technical capabilities of these agencies, how could they not have had even an inkling of the attacks that took place this week? The scattered details that have emerged about the plot put this failure in stark relief: More than 50 people were likely involved, Justice Department officials have said, and the plot required extensive communications and planning to pull off. The group's size -- not to mention the complexity of its endeavor -- should have offered many opportunities for intelligence infiltration. Yet the conspirators proceeded unmolested. What is striking is how safe these people apparently felt, how unthreatened by law enforcement. Some of the terrorists were here for long periods. They left and entered the country unimpeded. Some were reportedly on the so-called "watch list," a government catalogue of people who ostensibly are not permitted to enter the country. Yet this apparently caused them no problems. The evening before the attack, some people reportedly boasted at a strip joint in Florida of the "bloodshed" America would suffer "tomorrow." Since the attacks, law enforcement has been able quickly to tie many of the hijackers to terrorist groups. One, for example, came over from Hamburg, where German police say he regularly met with large groups of people planning spectacular attacks on American targets. The very speed with which such information has been gathered only begs the question of how much of it was knowable before. How could an act of such monstrous flamboyance not have been prevented? Already, people are suggesting that the proper response is to roll back civil liberties to allow greater monitoring of possible domestic threats. That is entirely premature. Freedom and openness are features that define us -- what we are fighting for when we fight terrorism. In the past, attacks like the Oklahoma City bombing provoked legislative responses that were essentially unrelated to the vulnerabilities that permitted the attacks in the first place. Many of the new capabilities went unused, and the vulnerabilities remained. It may be that the FBI and the CIA need more resources, or a reallocation of the funds they have. But before Congress moves to give the law enforcement and intelligence communities new powers or new funds, it should study how well they used the tools already at their disposal. © 2001 The Washington Post Company