How to Win the War Against Al Qaeda...
A strategy for defeating Osama bin Laden's organization.
BY KENNETH M. POLLACK
Tuesday, September 18, 2001 12:01 a.m. EDT
Wall Street Journal / Opinion
What exactly would it mean to wage a war on Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist network? Al Qaeda isn't a country with a defined geography, a uniformed military, or a physical political infrastructure. As a result, while many have called for war, few have been able to explain what such a war might look like. Indeed, one of today's great frustrations is coming to grips with this amorphous adversary.
If the U.S. concludes that Bin Laden's Al Qaeda is responsible for last week's attacks, it would be difficult, but quite feasible, for the U.S. to wage a war against the network. Our goal should be to destroy Al Qaeda as a functioning organization that is capable of attacking the U.S. or threatening our interests. An important secondary goal will be to convince or compel other nations either to join us in this task or to make it possible for us to do so ourselves. Our strategy in such a war should consist of four broad efforts:
• Define the sides. In nearly every war we have fought we have sought allies, and this effort has always served us well. This time should be no different. We should actively canvas our allies around the globe for those who are willing to take up arms with us in this effort. So far, the Bush administration appears to have this effort well in hand.
However, we also need to call Bin Laden's supporters on the carpet. We should make very clear that unless the Afghan government turns over Bin Laden and every other member of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan to us within a reasonable amount of time (72 hours to 96 hours seems about right) we will consider Afghanistan to be at war with the U.S.
The Taliban has already turned down the first such ultimatum, delivered by the Pakistanis. If they continue to do so, perhaps the most important step we could take would be to furnish large-scale arms, training and other support to the Northern Alliance, the Taliban's principal foe in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance is the last force stopping the Taliban from taking complete control over Afghanistan, and with U.S. assistance it might be able to cause considerable pain to the Taliban.
Beyond this, we need to make clear that those states that support or protect either Al Qaeda personnel or Afghanistan will also be considered to be at war with the U.S. Since the list of the Taliban's admirers is short, we are mainly talking about Pakistan, whom the Bush administration has rightly made its principal focus.
Pakistan is ruled by a shaky military dictatorship, has close ties to the Taliban, and Bin Laden enjoys popular support there. Nevertheless, we will need to convince Islamabad that it has only two choices: side with the Taliban and face horrible consequences, or side with the U.S. and enjoy the possibility of a better tomorrow. So far, the administration's efforts appear to be working, but Islamabad is likely to feel strong pressure to do as little; the administration will have to hold Pakistan's feet to the fire with sustained pressure.
We should be willing to reward Pakistani cooperation with meaningful economic and political assistance. On the other hand, if Pakistan reneges on its pledges, we should place them on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, sever all diplomatic and economic ties, seize Pakistani assets in the U.S., and actively work to undermine Pakistani interests. In particular, we might turn our budding friendship with India into a full-scale military relationship, including arms sales, training and intelligence exchanges.
• Roll out an intelligence campaign. A critical element of any war strategy would be to wage a covert operations campaign to go after the Al Qaeda network itself, which consists of thousands of personnel and hundreds of global safe houses, weapons factories and other facilities. We should go to those nations that are either harboring elements of Al Qaeda or turning a blind eye toward Al Qaeda activities on their soil, and demand that they arrest the organization's personnel, seize their facilities, and confiscate their assets.
We should be prepared to impose sanctions on those countries who refuse to do so. Such sanctions must have real teeth, and might include denying national airlines the right to land in the U.S., seizing or freezing assets, and severing economic and diplomatic relations.
In addition, we should work to disrupt Al Qaeda's network ourselves. Al Qaeda is a dispersed network that is heavily reliant on high technology and long-distance communications that we should disrupt and deceive. In addition, we should look to capture Al Qaeda operatives we have identified in foreign countries and bring them back to the U.S. to stand trial. Alternatively, we could kill them.
There is no law prohibiting assassination, only an executive order that could be reversed. Our past history has given good reasons for the existence of this executive order and we should think long and hard about whether we are opening a Pandora's box, but we should also consider that effectively waging war against a shadowy organization like Al Qaeda might require new weapons.
• Take direct military action. Direct military action may prove to be less central in waging such a campaign than determined diplomacy and far-reaching intelligence operations, but it should still play an important role. Assuming the Taliban chooses not to hand over Bin Laden and his associates, we should conduct direct military operations against Afghanistan and Al Qaeda facilities there. We should target the entire range of terrorist facilities, from training camps to weapons dumps, barracks to recruiting centers.
We should be looking to kill his people. In the past, we have demonstrated an unwillingness to inflict casualties-even military casualties. This time, we should be looking to maximize casualties; trained personnel are Bin Laden's crucial asset.
Although Afghanistan's extreme backwardness will constrain our targeting, there is still a range of relatively high-value assets we could strike to coerce the Taliban to turn over bin Laden and his minions. We could go after the Taliban's ministries of defense and intelligence, the remnants of the Taliban's air force, key garrisons, weapons dumps, motor transport pools, communications nodes, and other military bases.
Ideally, we would use a combination of manned aircraft, cruise missiles, and special-forces operations in a sustained campaign to destroy the Al Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan, hunt down Al Qaeda personnel there, and destroy Taliban military capabilities. We might even be able to provide direct support to the military operations of the Northern Alliance. However, it will be extremely difficult to mount airstrikes or special-forces operations in Afghanistan without the use of Pakistani airspace and bases-another reason why bringing Pakistan on board will be crucial.
• Step up security at home. Often, a good offense starts with a strong defense. Al Qaeda has demonstrated an ability to target and kill Americans. We will need to do more, especially at home, to protect U.S. facilities and personnel. This will include putting sky marshals on planes and security officers on trains and other forms of mass transportation, increasing security at public venues, and intensifying inspections of ships wishing to dock in U.S. ports.
Fighting a war against Al Qaeda will not be easy. No war ever is, and Bin Laden is a new kind of foe. Fighting a war will require the commitment of significant U.S. resources and political capital. It will undoubtedly entail further loss of American lives. Fighting a war might mean making important sacrifices on other issues of importance to us: Will the Russians demand concessions on North Atlantic Treaty Organization enlargement or missile defense in return for taking an active role in the fight? What will be required to bring Pakistan on board?
We should be ready to confront these kinds of decisions. But if we are committed and willing to make the sacrifice, the nebulous nature of our foe should not be an impediment to waging a successful war against Al Qaeda and its accomplices.
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Mr. Pollack is deputy director for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was formerly a director for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council, and a Persian Gulf military analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. |
