<<<Who Is Osama Bin Laden?
by Michel Chossudovsky
Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa
Centre for Research on Globalisation (CRG), Montreal
Posted 12 September 2001
A few hours after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon, the Bush administration concluded without supporting evidence,
that "Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation were prime suspects".
CIA Director George Tenet stated that bin Laden has the capacity to plan
``multiple attacks with little or no warning.'' Secretary of State Colin
Powell called the attacks "an act of war" and President Bush confirmed in an
evening televised address to the Nation that he would "make no distinction
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them".
Former CIA Director James Woolsey pointed his finger at "state sponsorship,"
implying the complicity of one or more foreign governments. In the words of
former National Security Adviser, Lawrence Eagleburger, "I think we will
show when we get attacked like this, we are terrible in our strength and in
our retribution."
Meanwhile, parroting official statements, the Western media mantra has
approved the launching of "punitive actions" directed against civilian
targets in the Middle East. In the words of William Saffire writing in the
New York Times: "When we reasonably determine our attackers' bases and
camps, we must pulverize them -- minimizing but accepting the risk of
collateral damage" -- and act overtly or covertly to destabilize terror's
national hosts".
The following text outlines the history of Osama Bin Laden and the links of
the Islamic "Jihad" to the formulation of US foreign policy during the Cold
War and its aftermath.
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Prime suspect in the New York and Washington terrorists attacks, branded by
the FBI as an "international terrorist" for his role in the African US
embassy bombings, Saudi born Osama bin Laden was recruited during the
Soviet-Afghan war "ironically under the auspices of the CIA, to fight Soviet
invaders". 1
In 1979 "the largest covert operation in the history of the CIA" was
launched in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in support of the
pro-Communist government of Babrak Kamal.2:
With the active encouragement of the CIA and Pakistan's ISI [Inter
Services Intelligence], who wanted to turn the Afghan jihad into a global
war waged by all Muslim states against the Soviet Union, some 35,000 Muslim
radicals from 40 Islamic countries joined Afghanistan's fight between 1982
and 1992. Tens of thousands more came to study in Pakistani madrasahs.
Eventually more than 100,000 foreign Muslim radicals were directly
influenced by the Afghan jihad.3
The Islamic "jihad" was supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia with
a significant part of the funding generated from the Golden Crescent drug
trade:
In March 1985, President Reagan signed National Security Decision
Directive 166,...[which] authorize[d] stepped-up covert military aid to the
mujahideen, and it made clear that the secret Afghan war had a new goal: to
defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan through covert action and encourage a
Soviet withdrawal. The new covert U.S. assistance began with a dramatic
increase in arms supplies -- a steady rise to 65,000 tons annually by 1987,
... as well as a "ceaseless stream" of CIA and Pentagon specialists who
traveled to the secret headquarters of Pakistan's ISI on the main road near
Rawalpindi, Pakistan. There the CIA specialists met with Pakistani
intelligence officers to help plan operations for the Afghan rebels.4
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using Pakistan's military
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a key role in training the
Mujahideen. In turn, the CIA sponsored guerrilla training was integrated
with the teachings of Islam:
Predominant themes were that Islam was a complete socio-political
ideology, that holy Islam was being violated by the atheistic Soviet troops,
and that the Islamic people of Afghanistan should reassert their
independence by overthrowing the leftist Afghan regime propped up by
Moscow.5
Pakistan's Intelligence Apparatus
Pakistan's ISI was used as a "go-between". The CIA covert support to the
"jihad" operated indirectly through the Pakistani ISI, --i.e. the CIA did
not channel its support directly to the Mujahideen. In other words, for
these covert operations to be "successful", Washington was careful not to
reveal the ultimate objective of the "jihad", which consisted in destroying
the Soviet Union.
In the words of CIA's Milton Beardman "We didn't train Arabs". Yet according
to Abdel Monam Saidali, of the Al-aram Center for Strategic Studies in
Cairo, bin Laden and the "Afghan Arabs" had been imparted "with very
sophisticated types of training that was allowed to them by the CIA" 6
CIA's Beardman confirmed, in this regard, that Osama bin Laden was not aware
of the role he was playing on behalf of Washington. In the words of bin
Laden (quoted by Beardman): "neither I, nor my brothers saw evidence of
American help". 7
Motivated by nationalism and religious fervor, the Islamic warriors were
unaware that they were fighting the Soviet Army on behalf of Uncle Sam.
While there were contacts at the upper levels of the intelligence hierarchy,
Islamic rebel leaders in theatre had no contacts with Washington or the CIA.
With CIA backing and the funneling of massive amounts of US military aid,
the Pakistani ISI had developed into a "parallel structure wielding enormous
power over all aspects of government". 8 The ISI had a staff composed of
military and intelligence officers, bureaucrats, undercover agents and
informers, estimated at 150,000. 9
Meanwhile, CIA operations had also reinforced the Pakistani military regime
led by General Zia Ul Haq:
'Relations between the CIA and the ISI [Pakistan's military intelligence]
had grown increasingly warm following [General] Zia's ouster of Bhutto and
the advent of the military regime,'... During most of the Afghan war,
Pakistan was more aggressively anti-Soviet than even the United States. Soon
after the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan in 1980, Zia [ul Haq] sent his
ISI chief to destabilize the Soviet Central Asian states. The CIA only
agreed to this plan in October 1984.... `the CIA was more cautious than the
Pakistanis.' Both Pakistan and the United States took the line of deception
on Afghanistan with a public posture of negotiating a settlement while
privately agreeing that military escalation was the best course.10
The Golden Crescent Drug Triangle
The history of the drug trade in Central Asia is intimately related to the
CIA's covert operations. Prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, opium production in
Afghanistan and Pakistan was directed to small regional markets. There was
no local production of heroin. 11 In this regard, Alfred McCoy's study
confirms that within two years of the onslaught of the CIA operation in
Afghanistan, "the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became the world's top
heroin producer, supplying 60 percent of U.S. demand. In Pakistan, the
heroin-addict population went from near zero in 1979... to 1.2 million by
1985 -- a much steeper rise than in any other nation":12
CIA assets again controlled this heroin trade. As the Mujahideen
guerrillas seized territory inside Afghanistan, they ordered peasants to
plant opium as a revolutionary tax. Across the border in Pakistan, Afghan
leaders and local syndicates under the protection of Pakistan Intelligence
operated hundreds of heroin laboratories. During this decade of wide-open
drug-dealing, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency in Islamabad failed to
instigate major seizures or arrests ... U.S. officials had refused to
investigate charges of heroin dealing by its Afghan allies `because U.S.
narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against
Soviet influence there.' In 1995, the former CIA director of the Afghan
operation, Charles Cogan, admitted the CIA had indeed sacrificed the drug
war to fight the Cold War. `Our main mission was to do as much damage as
possible to the Soviets. We didn't really have the resources or the time to
devote to an investigation of the drug trade,'... `I don't think that we
need to apologize for this. Every situation has its fallout.... There was
fallout in terms of drugs, yes. But the main objective was accomplished. The
Soviets left Afghanistan.'13
In the Wake of the Cold War
In the wake of the Cold War, the Central Asian region is not only strategic
for its extensive oil reserves, it also produces three quarters of the
World's opium representing multibillion dollar revenues to business
syndicates, financial institutions, intelligence agencies and organized
crime. The annual proceeds of the Golden Crescent drug trade (between 100
and 200 billion dollars) represents approximately one third of the Worldwide
annual turnover of narcotics, estimated by the United Nations to be of the
order of $500 billion.14
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a new surge in opium production
has unfolded. (According to UN estimates, the production of opium in
Afghanistan in 1998-99 -- coinciding with the build up of armed insurgencies
in the former Soviet republics-- reached a record high of 4600 metric
tons.15 Powerful business syndicates in the former Soviet Union allied with
organized crime are competing for the strategic control over the heroin
routes.
The ISI's extensive intelligence military-network was not dismantled in the
wake of the Cold War. The CIA continued to support the Islamic "jihad" out
of Pakistan. New undercover initiatives were set in motion in Central Asia,
the Caucasus and the Balkans. Pakistan's military and intelligence apparatus
essentially "served as a catalyst for the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and the emergence of six new Muslim republics in Central Asia." 16.
Meanwhile, Islamic missionaries of the Wahhabi sect from Saudi Arabia had
established themselves in the Muslim republics as well as within the Russian
federation encroaching upon the institutions of the secular State. Despite
its anti-American ideology, Islamic fundamentalism was largely serving
Washington's strategic interests in the former Soviet Union.
Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the civil war in
Afghanistan continued unabated. The Taliban were being supported by the
Pakistani Deobandis and their political party the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam
(JUI). In 1993, JUI entered the government coalition of Prime Minister
Benazzir Bhutto. Ties between JUI, the Army and ISI were established. In
1995, with the downfall of the Hezb-I-Islami Hektmatyar government in Kabul,
the Taliban not only instated a hardline Islamic government, they also
"handed control of training camps in Afghanistan over to JUI factions..." 17
And the JUI with the support of the Saudi Wahhabi movements played a key
role in recruiting volunteers to fight in the Balkans and the former Soviet
Union.
Jane Defense Weekly confirms in this regard that "half of Taliban manpower
and equipment originate[d] in Pakistan under the ISI" 18
In fact, it would appear that following the Soviet withdrawal both sides in
the Afghan civil war continued to receive covert support through Pakistan's
ISI. 19
In other words, backed by Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI) which in
turn was controlled by the CIA, the Taliban Islamic State was largely
serving American geopolitical interests. The Golden Crescent drug trade was
also being used to finance and equip the Bosnian Muslim Army (starting in
the early 1990s) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In last few months
there is evidence that Mujahideen mercenaries are fighting in the ranks of
KLA-NLA terrorists in their assaults into Macedonia.
No doubt, this explains why Washington has closed its eyes on the reign of
terror imposed by the Taliban including the blatant derogation of women's
rights, the closing down of schools for girls, the dismissal of women
employees from government offices and the enforcement of "the Sharia laws of
punishment".20
The War in Chechnya
With regard to Chechnya, the main rebel leaders Shamil Basayev and Al
Khattab were trained and indoctrinated in CIA sponsored camps in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. According to Yossef Bodansky, director of the U.S. Congress's
Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, the war in Chechnya had
been planned during a secret summit of HizbAllah International held in 1996
in Mogadishu, Somalia. 21 The summit, was attended by Osama bin Laden and
high-ranking Iranian and Pakistani intelligence officers. In this regard,
the involvement of Pakistan's ISI in Chechnya "goes far beyond supplying the
Chechens with weapons and expertise: the ISI and its radical Islamic proxies
are actually calling the shots in this war". 22
Russia's main pipeline route transits through Chechnya and Dagestan. Despite
Washington's perfunctory condemnation of Islamic terrorism, the indirect
beneficiaries of the Chechen war are the Anglo-American oil conglomerates
which are vying for control over oil resources and pipeline corridors out of
the Caspian Sea basin.
The two main Chechen rebel armies (respectively led by Commander Shamil
Basayev and Emir Khattab) estimated at 35,000 strong were supported by
Pakistan's ISI, which also played a key role in organizing and training the
Chechen rebel army:
[In 1994] the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence arranged for Basayev
and his trusted lieutenants to undergo intensive Islamic indoctrination and
training in guerrilla warfare in the Khost province of Afghanistan at Amir
Muawia camp, set up in the early 1980s by the CIA and ISI and run by famous
Afghani warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In July 1994, upon graduating from Amir
Muawia, Basayev was transferred to Markaz-i-Dawar camp in Pakistan to
undergo training in advanced guerrilla tactics. In Pakistan, Basayev met the
highest ranking Pakistani military and intelligence officers: Minister of
Defense General Aftab Shahban Mirani, Minister of Interior General
Naserullah Babar, and the head of the ISI branch in charge of supporting
Islamic causes, General Javed Ashraf, (all now retired). High-level
connections soon proved very useful to Basayev.23
Following his training and indoctrination stint, Basayev was assigned to
lead the assault against Russian federal troops in the first Chechen war in
1995. His organization had also developed extensive links to criminal
syndicates in Moscow as well as ties to Albanian organized crime and the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In 1997-98, according to Russia's Federal
Security Service (FSB) "Chechen warlords started buying up real estate in
Kosovo... through several real estate firms registered as a cover in
Yugoslavia" 24
Basayev's organisation has also been involved in a number of rackets
including narcotics, illegal tapping and sabotage of Russia's oil pipelines,
kidnapping, prostitution, trade in counterfeit dollars and the smuggling of
nuclear materials (See Mafia linked to Albania's collapsed pyramids, 25
Alongside the extensive laundering of drug money, the proceeds of various
illicit activities have been funneled towards the recruitment of mercenaries
and the purchase of weapons.
During his training in Afghanistan, Shamil Basayev linked up with Saudi born
veteran Mujahideen Commander "Al Khattab" who had fought as a volunteer in
Afghanistan. Barely a few months after Basayev's return to Grozny, Khattab
was invited (early 1995) to set up an army base in Chechnya for the training
of Mujahideen fighters. According to the BBC, Khattab's posting to Chechnya
had been "arranged through the Saudi-Arabian based [International] Islamic
Relief Organisation, a militant religious organisation, funded by mosques
and rich individuals which channeled funds into Chechnya".26
Concluding Remarks
Since the Cold War era, Washington has consciously supported Osama bin
Laden, while at same time placing him on the FBI's "most wanted list" as the
World's foremost terrorist.
While the Mujahideen are busy fighting America's war in the Balkans and the
former Soviet Union, the FBI --operating as a US based Police Force- is
waging a domestic war against terrorism, operating in some respects
independently of the CIA which has --since the Soviet-Afghan war-- supported
international terrorism through its covert operations.
In a cruel irony, while the Islamic jihad --featured by the Bush
Adminstration as "a threat to America"-- is blamed for the terrorist
assaults on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, these same Islamic
organisations constitute a key instrument of US military-intelligence
operations in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the truth
must prevail to prevent the Bush Adminstration together with its NATO
partners from embarking upon a military adventure which threatens the future
of humanity.
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Endnotes
1.. Hugh Davies, International: `Informers' point the finger at bin Laden;
Washington on alert for suicide bombers, The Daily Telegraph, London, 24
August 1998.
2.. See Fred Halliday, "The Un-great game: the Country that lost the Cold
War, Afghanistan, New Republic, 25 March 1996):
3.. Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism, Foreign Affairs,
November-December 1999.
4.. Steve Coll, Washington Post, July 19, 1992.
5.. Dilip Hiro, Fallout from the Afghan Jihad, Inter Press Services, 21
November 1995.
6.. Weekend Sunday (NPR); Eric Weiner, Ted Clark; 16 August 1998.
7.. Ibid.
8.. Dipankar Banerjee; Possible Connection of ISI With Drug Industry,
India Abroad, 2 December 1994.
9.. Ibid
10.. See Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside
Story of the Soviet Withdrawal, Oxford university Press, New York, 1995. See
also the review of Cordovez and Harrison in International Press Services, 22
August 1995.
11.. Alfred McCoy, Drug fallout: the CIA's Forty Year Complicity in the
Narcotics Trade. The Progressive; 1 August 1997.
12.. Ibid
13.. Ibid.
14.. Douglas Keh, Drug Money in a changing World, Technical document no 4,
1998, Vienna UNDCP, p. 4. See also Report of the International Narcotics
Control Board for 1999, E/INCB/1999/1 United Nations Publication, Vienna
1999, p 49-51, And Richard Lapper, UN Fears Growth of Heroin Trade,
Financial Times, 24 February 2000.
15.. Report of the International Narcotics Control Board, op cit, p 49-51,
see also Richard Lapper, op. cit.
16.. International Press Services, 22 August 1995.
17.. Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Exporting Extremism, Foreign Affairs,
November- December, 1999, p. 22.
18.. Quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 3 September 1998)
19.. Tim McGirk, Kabul learns to live with its bearded conquerors, The
Independent, London, 6 November1996.
20.. See K. Subrahmanyam, Pakistan is Pursuing Asian Goals, India Abroad,
3 November 1995.
21.. Levon Sevunts, Who's calling the shots?: Chechen conflict finds
Islamic roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 23 The Gazette, Montreal, 26
October 1999..
22.. Ibid
23.. Ibid.
24.. See Vitaly Romanov and Viktor Yadukha, Chechen Front Moves To Kosovo
Segodnia, Moscow, 23 Feb 2000.
25.. The European, 13 February 1997, See also Itar-Tass, 4-5 January 2000.
26.. BBC, 29 September 1999).
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>>>
Namaste!
Jim |
