Chance for new world order in wake of new US war
By Lionel Barber
THE FINANCIAL TIMES
IN THE past week, the world has witnessed a geopolitical realignment potentially comparable to that of 1945, at the end of World War II, or the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
The US has exploited outrage over the aerial assault on New York and Washington to muster a coalition against terrorism that includes rivals such as China and one-time pariahs such as Cuba, Iran and Sudan.
Regional powers such as India, Pakistan and Russia are also being forced to make strategic choices as far-reaching as the Soviet Union's response to the US offer of Marshall Plan aid that accompanied the rescue of Western Europe.
In 1947, Stalin rejected US aid and sealed the division of the continent. But this week, President Vladimir Putin, his post-communist successor in the Kremlin, overrode resistance from his own armed forces and gave Moscow's blessing to US aircraft using airfields in the central Asian republics.
The decision paves the way for US troops to be stationed for the first time on the territory of the former Soviet Union, poised for an assault on Afghanistan.
Two questions arise: How far is international backing for the coalition conditional on limited US war aims and what price are countries demanding in exchange for their support?
The immediate thrust of US policy is the isolation of the Taleban regime in Kabul. Now that Saudi Arabia has severed ties, this diplomatic goal has been virtually accomplished.
Ostracising the Taleban paves the way for a US-led assault on the training camps of Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect in the terrorist attacks. An aerial bombardment, combined with search-and-destroy missions, could be unleashed in the next week or so.
Yet a US-led military operation against Osama is only Phase One of the war on terrorism. Phase Two is, potentially, far broader: A sustained campaign against the sponsors of terrorism that could target states such as Iraq and thus alienate members of the coalition, including countries in Europe.
In the short term, Mr Putin looks like he has made the most of a weak hand in Central Asia. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had each signalled varying degrees of willingness to tolerate a limited US military presence.
But in the longer term, Russia views the oil-rich region as belonging firmly within its sphere of influence. Experts such as Mr Andrei Fedorov, a former Russian deputy foreign minister, were last week predicting that Mr Putin would move cautiously.
'The pressure to stick to the status quo is overwhelming,' said Mr Fedorov. 'Besides, once you have invited a guest, it is difficult to ask him to leave.'
Mr Putin's move may, therefore, signal a more dynamic Russian foreign policy. Rather than merely asking Europe and the US to turn a blind eye to the crackdown against predominantly Muslim rebels in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, he may be preparing for a bigger game.
One theory is that Mr Putin is accumulating chips ahead of his visit to the US next month. Before the crisis, the talks were due to focus on Russian opposition to US plans to build a national missile defence programme and the next phase of Nato enlargement, most likely to include the Baltic states. The diplomatic position is now much more fluid.
First, Mr Putin may find his American hosts a little less determined to rush ahead with missile defence, partly because of a deteriorating budget outlook but also because the terrorist attacks have recast the debate on national security. The perpetrators used knives, not nuclear weapons, to commandeer aircraft and inflict devastation.
Second, as the Russian President made clear in this week's talks with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder in Berlin, Mr Putin is pressing to redefine Russia's relationship with Nato to the point where he may even seek membership.
A senior European official, echoing views in Berlin, argues that the present crisis offers a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to encourage the development of a civilised Russia that no longer threatens its neighbours. The pending enlargement eastwards of both Nato and the European Union should encourage a reappraisal of relations with Moscow.
US officials respond cautiously, noting that talk of a new partnership with Russia is 'Clintonian' and lacks credibility, at least for now. Far better to proceed with tangible goals such as preparations for Russian membership of the World Trade Organisation, which would match the recent entry of China and Taiwan.
Mr Robert Zoellick, the US Trade Representative, argues that trade liberalisation promotes the values at the heart of the anti-terrorism campaign. He is close to a deal with Congress to secure trade-promotion authority for the President. This would improve the outlook for November's ministerial meeting in Doha, which is due to decide whether to launch a new world trade round. It would promote a realignment between an affluent West and developing countries.
India and Pakistan, which to date have resisted such a new trade round, have used the crisis to secure the ending of sanctions imposed in 1998 over their testing of nuclear weapons. Pakistan, a prime sponsor of the Taleban until now, expects more assistance, such as relief on its US$36 billion (S$62 billion) of external debt.
In strategic terms, India's offer to provide the US with land or sea bases for its assault on Afghanistan may prove a more significant guide to future intent. Washington's tilt towards India was well established before the crisis, partly to counter the rise of China. Now it could grow stronger, though US officials say Pakistan's support does offer the US more room for manoeuvring between the two regional powers.
As for China, there are some fears that Beijing could seek to exploit its support for US action against terrorism, notably over Taiwan.
In the final analysis, a lasting geopolitical realignment will depend not only on how the crisis unfolds in Central Asia but also in the Middle East.
When President George W. Bush unveiled his list of terrorist organisations facing financial and other sanctions this week, he deliberately narrowed his focus to 'global' terrorism. Groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas, active in Israel and Lebanon, were omitted.
The US wants Iran, which borders Afghanistan and is hostile to the Taleban, to remain neutral; anything more would convey immense legitimacy in the Muslim world. Yet Iran's support is conditional on the US adopting a more qualified policy towards Israel. This is true of all Arab states, each desperate for a political accommodation between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
Ten years ago, a US-led international coalition, headed by Mr Bush's father, evicted Iraqi forces from Kuwait and inflicted defeat on Saddam Hussein. In the aftermath, Mr Bush spoke of a 'new world order'. He then pressured a right-wing Israeli premier to agree to a land-for-peace deal in the Occupied Territories.
Ten years on, it is tempting to predict a new US-led effort to build a new world order founded on a campaign to extirpate international terrorism, and a semblance of peace in the Middle East. But until the crisis unfolds and the Bush administration settles on its ultimate war aims, such predictions are premature. |
