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Strategies & Market Trends : Gorilla and King Portfolio Candidates -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Uncle Frank who wrote (47278)9/29/2001 5:33:24 PM
From: Stock Farmer  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 54805
 
Hi Uncle Frank,

To each of your points, in order:

"If your comment is a statement of intent...": No it isn't.
"Surely that isn't what you're addressing": You're right, it isn't.
"Then I'd like you to consider... ": I did.

John



To: Uncle Frank who wrote (47278)9/29/2001 11:21:34 PM
From: chaz  Respond to of 54805
 
Uncle Frank/John Shannon--

I couldn't be more pleased at the extended hand from the former, and it's acceptance by the latter.

Now, let's get on with figuring out how to make some money!

Respectfully,

Chaz



To: Uncle Frank who wrote (47278)9/29/2001 11:55:02 PM
From: Wyätt Gwyön  Respond to of 54805
 
hi uf,

all this talk about the past has got me all wistful and reminiscin'...

i don't think John has been posting here too long, but his many excellent posts on CSCO date back over a year. and i believe he recently provided some "reality mathematics" regarding QCOM that was quite interesting. i hope nobody has him on ignore here.

speaking of CSCO, i would like to reminisce about a few posts i made here last year regarding that fine establishment. the idea here is not to beat a dead dog, but to consider: what are some of the things not typically considered by G&Kers in their analysis of a particular co (CSCO) when it was four or five times its current price? would it have been possible to make some extrapolations from a CSCO analysis at the time to some other companies popular among G&Kers? and so on.

the following is a brief reprisal; some of the posts have links to more detailed posts i made on the CSCO thread. John's posts from that period on the CSCO numbers were a pleasure to read and might provide you with some further investing insights as we enter the "post-bubble" age of Gorilla Gaming.

#reply-14788349 [summary of issues of concern]
The link notes the accelerating revenue growth trend. The issue of how long growth can accelerate aside, for clues as to CSCO the stock's weakness, you might also want to check out the trends in:

* margins
* share count
* inventories
* DSOs
* other income (as a percent of pretax income)
* composition of CSCO's investment portfolio (percentage of bonds therein)

Amazingly, I have yet to see a Cisco bull discuss these numbers, much less explain how to derive a bullish case from them.


#reply-14820742 [revenue growth rate trend was a popular theme among CSCO bulls at the time; putting that "growth" into perspective]
My point would be that if you just look at those numbers without looking at anything else, you are not getting a very clear picture of the story. On the most basic level, for example, you would need to divide the rev-growth rate by the increase in share count. Share count increased over 8% in the past year, so logically, you would need to divide the growth rate by 1.08 to see what the growth is on a comparable basis. That is just one nitpicking little thing, of course. But a lot of nits can lead to a different picture. For example, you can look at their declining margins. It's great to have more revenues, but what if earnings don't keep up?

#reply-14820842 [an analysis of CSCO the bellwether is important in understanding trends throughout the tech market]
, I have an interest in Cisco not as a short or long play, but as a bellwether for tech and also for Cisco's stock-centric way of evolving its business. I believe this is a rather new trend in the business universe (compared to, say, a debt-centric cash flow model), which has thus far developed in a pretty favorable secular environment. While Cisco is perhaps the co. best known for this practice, the trend has obviously caught on elsewhere (e.g., JDSU and its Pacman model). How the model will withstand more hostile business conditions remains to be seen.


#reply-14821411 [skepticism on a stock-centric business model]
I guess my skepticism relates to the fact that Cisco is already a huge company and is priced pretty much to perfection. I just don't see how the market will cut them more slack. This wouldn't matter if their share price weren't so central to their strategy, but it is. If the stagnation on the earnings front starts to gain more attention, the share price could suffer. This would not only be bad for shareholders; it would also be bad for Cisco's strategy

[and regarding stock trading in general (dissing LTBH of what were essentially momo stocks)]
#reply-14788470
I still believe if a stock can go up quickly, it can come down even quicker, so protecting profits is important.

#reply-14788531
if a stock quintuples in the space of a few months or a year, there is nothing to stop it from falling 60% from its 52-week high. I see no reason to let outsized gains slip away, and I would never want a profitable trade to turn into a loss. In addition to outright selling of equity, I have found covered calls to be helpful in reducing basis. But if a stock really plummets, covered calls will not save you so it is important to be able to pull the plug sometimes

[the importance of focusing on accounting issues (like those of CSCO's)]
#reply-14789782
I cannot believe that somebody can be considered a fundamentalist if they do not look at accounting issues.

[and, perhaps most important, a sense of historical perspective (this said to a long-term (8 yrs) CSCO holder, who was commenting on my focus on protecting certain short-term gains)]
#reply-14791171
You, too, are operating in a very short time frame. A decade, two decades, is very small in the frame of history and the markets. I appreciate your example, but I am also trying to consider examples from like the Pleistocene age of markets. In other words, I consider 1999 to be just an exaggerated version of the whole 90s in terms of broader investing history. Just as there won't be another 1999 anytime soon, there won't be another 1990s.