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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: FaultLine who wrote (2308)	10/2/2001 9:45:55 PM
From: Jerry in Omaha	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

FL & Thread, So what are Bill Kristol's military credentials? I'd rather listen to Hack and the people he admires. From Col. David Hackworth's (A warrior's warrior, all the way!) web page sftt.org <<This is an important read. Please give it max circulation. Try to get this document in the hands of the policy and decision makers. Knowing your enemy is the most important key to war. This letter was written by a very bright and Afghanistan street-smart West Point grad to his classmates. He knows the terrain, the enemy and the weather in Afghanistan from being there. Not from books. BURN HIS WORDS AND ADVICE INTO YOUR BRAINS. WE'LL WIN, IF WE ALL HANG IN THERE UNTIL IT'S OVER OVER THERE. HACK >> Read the whole letter at sftt.org By Richard Kidd, U.S. Army, West Point [SNIP] << I have been asked how I would fight the war. This is a big question and well beyond my pay grade or expertise. And while I do not want to second guess current plans or start an academic debate I would share the following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans. First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they can buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter. Second, also with this cash I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban leadership making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and build on existing discord. Third, I would support the Northern alliance with military assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans. Fourth, would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live rather than the choice between dying of starvation or dying fighting the "infidel." Fifth, start a series of public works projects in areas of the country not under Taliban control (these are much more than the press reports) again to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace. Sixth, I would consider vary carefully putting any female service members into Afghanistan proper-sorry to the females of our class but within that culture a man who allows a women to fight for him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the cooperation of Afghan allies. No Afghan will work with a man who fights with women. I would hold off from doing anything too dramatic in the new term, keeping a low level of covert action and pressure up over the winter, allowing this pressure to force open the fissions around the Taliban that were already developing. I expect that they will quickly turn on themselves and on OBL. We can pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after. When we do "pick-up" the pieces I would make sure that we do so on the ground, "man to man." While I would never want to advocate American causalities, it is essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat." As mentioned above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry operations against the enemy are essential. There can be no excuses after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this except for ground combat. And once this is all over, unlike in 1989 the US must provide continued long-term economic assistance to rebuild the country. >> Jerry in Omaha

To: FaultLine who wrote (2308)	10/2/2001 11:12:50 PM
From: tekboy	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Back in the Clinton years we used to say that problems in the WH were caused by a lack of "adult supervision." This was literally true in the sense that many of the staff were simply too young and inexperienced to make mature judgments. But it can apply metaphorically as well, to refer to people who while older chronologically are a bit, well, immature. There's no better way to piss off a neocon than to roll your eyes and adopt a tone of world-weary sophistication, as if to say, "please just let us professionals handle things rather than you ideologues." Here's an excellent example of that genre, in response to the Kristol et al. letter: washingtonpost.com Back in the Real World By Fareed Zakaria Washington Post Tuesday, October 2, 2001; Page A25 If you read Washington's newspapers and magazines these days, you'd think that we have just passed the D-Day of this war. Pundits, editorialists and television commentators are busy mapping out our strategy for the war on terrorism after we have defeated al Qaeda. With that small matter taken care of, the armchair generals urge that we quickly move to overthrow the governments of Iraq, then Syria, then Iran and then perhaps Libya if we're still in the mood. It would be as if, the week after Pearl Harbor, Americans sat down to plot whom to take on once America had disposed of Japan and Germany. Meanwhile, the Bush administration is beginning the long, hard process of fighting al Qaeda, the shadowy network that has been behind almost every attack on American citizens in the past decade. It is trying to find an effective military response to the barbarism of Sept. 11. It is constructing a coalition that will root out and destroy al Qaeda and its many branches. And it is trying to ensure that the short-term goal of the strike does not impair the long-term war by fracturing the alliance. This is an immense challenge, and one the administration is handling superbly. But in doing so it is already being criticized for neglecting its cardinal duty to destroy Saddam Hussein. Even more offensive to its critics is the fact that it's engaging in diplomacy. The notion that the military strikes against the Taliban will be easy is absurd. We could, of course, strike at empty camps, declare victory and go home. But this will fool no one. The kind of serious operation that has a chance of real success is likely to be risky. The record on these missions is daunting, from Nixon's Son Tay raid to Ford's Mayaguez operation to Carter's Desert One fiasco to the Bush/Clinton misadventure in Somalia. The administration is right to take its time, gather all the intelligence and strike hard and smart. Success, not speed, is what counts. The biggest part of this war effort is diplomatic. As everyone from George W. Bush to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledges, the crucial dimensions of the struggle are covert operations, intelligence gathering and police work. All of this requires the active cooperation of many other governments. U.S. Marines cannot go into Hamburg and arrest suspects. We cannot shut down banks in the United Arab Emirates. We cannot get intelligence from Russia except if the Russians share it with us. It's all very well to target states such as Syria that harbor terrorists, but al Qaeda has been smart enough to set up most of its bases in states that harbor them involuntarily, such as Germany, Britain, France and even the United States. The FBI estimates that 1,000 of these people live in America. How will bombing Baghdad close these cells? There has been a debate within the administration about how to proceed and, thankfully, Colin Powell and some others have been able to prevail -- for now -- over the hotter heads in the Defense Department. The Powell strategy has gained the crucial support of Vice President Dick Cheney, who understands that key allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt will not go along with a wider war against all terrorism instead of a campaign targeted against al Qaeda. Living close to the enemy, the Saudis and Egyptians know just how complex the battle against al Qaeda will be. It was inevitable that the sensible strategy would win out. When America faces a real crisis or enemy, fantasy foreign policies collapse and reality intrudes. You see a similar pattern in our relations with China. In the absence of a crisis, Americans have a fiery hothouse debate over just how we are going to overthrow the evil butchers of Beijing. And then something like the airplane crisis in Hainan takes place and the administration follows a sober course. In the first six months the Bush administration fired off in several unilateral directions, annoying countries around the world. Now a crisis is upon us and this very team is paying America's U.N. dues, taking matters to the United Nations, telling Russia that we understand its situation in Chechnya, forgiving Pakistan for its nuclear explosions and even finding a kind word for the Iranian mullahs. During the 1990s the United States lived in a foreign-policy funhouse. With no challengers in sight and a historic economic boom, we viewed foreign policy as a form of volunteer work. We did it, but strictly on our terms. The only constraints we faced were internal: Was it politically sustainable domestically? Foreign policy was a luxury, not a necessity. Now we face a real crisis, a real threat and real external constraints. No matter how often we proclaim it, other nations know that they are not all equally at risk. The United States is target No. 1. We need favors from them. And they will do them. But we will have to do favors in return. A foreign policy of fiats and ultimatums will give way to one of negotiations and diplomacy. Welcome to the real new world order. The writer is editor of Newsweek International and a columnist for Newsweek. © 2001 The Washington Post Company