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Politics : Idea Of The Day -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (41049)	10/15/2001 3:49:35 PM
From: IQBAL LATIF	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 50167

Pages from history...budber.... I was DC Peshawar in 1959 when I first met Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. A central minister, he was in Peshawar as chief guest at a Rural Academy function. After the speeches were over, Bhutto was visibly bored and wanted to get away but did not know how to manage it. I rescued him and we went to the Peshawar Club where we spent a very pleasant evening. Bhutto was young, witty, well-read, well-dressed, more at ease in the company of young civil servants than his cabinet colleagues. His next visit to Peshawar was as Acting Foreign Minister. On arrival, he told me he would like to visit BadaBer, the US base near Peshawar, and before leaving for Warsak, made it clear he would like to see all the facilities at the Base. I got in touch with the American Base Commander and requested him to receive the minister and make necessary arrangements for his visit. The Commander said the minister would be welcome to visit the cafeteria where he would be served coffee and sandwiches. He politely turned down Bhutto’s request to visit the Base’s operational and other sensitive areas. In deference to my wishes, he did promise to refer the matter to Washington. Half an hour later, he called back to inform me that, except the cafeteria, no other facility would be shown to the Minister. Bhutto was visibly upset and asked me if the Americans knew he was Pakistan’s acting Foreign Minister. I said they did. Bhutto kept quiet and the matter ended there. I was still in Peshawar when the U2 incident took place, which provoked Khruschev into the dramatic gesture of drawing on the map, a red ring around Peshawar. The spy plane, as we learnt later, had taken off from Peshawar. Bhutto took up the matter with President Ayub, who decided to terminate the 1959 Communication Agreement which governed the Base and publicly announced his government’s position on the Peshawar facility. President Johnson’s reaction was quite sharp. He asked his ambassador to deliver the following letter to President Ayub. Dear Mr. President: In the spirit of honesty and frankness that has always been at the heart of our relationship, I feel I must tell you of my deep concern over the reports I have received during the past several weeks from Ambassador Oehlert about your Government’s attitude toward our Communications facility at Peshawar. I have delayed writing to you personally until now because I hope that some mutually acceptable solution could have been worked out by this time. I was surprised and disturbed that your Government saw fit publicly to announce its position on the Peshawar facility before any real discussion between our two Governments was possible. And it was particularly distressing to learn that your Government’s action may have been taken because of threats and demands by another power. I had thought you and I shared a convection that our own security— as well as the security of many other nations— was well served by our cooperation in maintaining the Peshawar facility. Accurate technical and scientific information on the intentions and capabilities of others, can, as you know, be a stabilizing element in the present uncertain state of the world. In all frankness, the actions of your Government do not seem to me to be appropriate to the close relationship that has existed for so many years between our two countries and which has been manifested in our contribution of more than $3½ billion in aid to Pakistan. I accept of course, your right to terminate the 1959 Communications Agreement, although I would hope that even now you could reconsider that decision. I do want you to know, simply and unequivocally, that closing down of the Peshawar facility in July 1969 will give us real problems. In this connection, I must point out that this facility is a complex one. Some of its elements can be moved relatively easily. Others will take more time. Their hasty removal could result in significant gaps in our understanding of the intentions of others and thereby diminish the sense of security we both seek. If, however, your decision is firm, I would hope and expect that you might allow our representatives to discuss an arrangement whereby the various elements of the facility can be phased down and closed but in an orderly way during a period beyond the formal termination date of July 17, 19 69. I have asked Ambassador Oehlert to convey these views to you and to be prepared to enter into full discussion of them at an early date. I cannot hide from you the fact that the loss of Peshawar facility will be a real blow to what I believe to be our mutual interests. But I do think that if we can agree to arrangements that will permit a reasonable withdrawal period it will lessen the impact. Such arrangements, if arrived at through imagination and good will on both sides, would make the transition easier to accomplish. I do not think, old friend, this is too much to ask. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson Ayub stuck to his position and did not oblige. The Base was closed down.