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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: CountofMoneyCristo who wrote (6084)	10/18/2001 8:12:44 PM
From: b-witch	Respond to of 281500

FWIW, Terri Gross, tonight on Fresh Air, National Public Radio, interviews Military affairs correspondent for The New York Times, Michael Gordon. He’s former Moscow bureau chief for the paper. He covered the war in Chechnya when The Times was one of only two western news organizations allowed in Chechnya by the Russian military. Gordon also covered the Gulf War and the war in Kosovo, and is co-author of the book The Generals' War about the Gulf War. Mountain time 9:00pm. I heard part where he states that VP Cheney is directing military strategy.

To: CountofMoneyCristo who wrote (6084)	10/19/2001 9:28:36 AM
From: RocketMan	Respond to of 281500

The important thing is that the United States, from its present position of military superiority, with its history of not having used these uniquely horrible weapons in nearly 60 years, does not open Pandora's Box on its own. However, if someone else does, then all bets are off, and all terrorist havens become legitimate targets. Right, and it may be time to review our Cold War nuclear doctrine that remained ambiguous on first-use. Here is the preface from a RAND document in the mid-90s that is particularly relevant to this issue today: U.S. Nuclear Declaratory Policy: The Question of Nuclear First Use David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, Dean Wilkening RAND Copyright © 1995 Preface The motivation behind this reexamination of American nuclear declaratory policy is the striking absence of deterrence from the debate over how to counter the widening threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical "weapons of mass destruction." Understandably, current counterproliferation policy has concentrated on ways to defend against this threat. However, given the widespread proliferation of these weapons and their means of delivery, the cost of totally effective defenses will be prohibitive. At the same time, not enough has been done to warn hostile regimes what the United States might do if American troops or friends abroad, let alone U.S. territory, were attacked with weapons of mass destruction. Thus, too much reliance is being placed on the surety of defense and too little on the utility of deterrence. Finally, the authors were motivated by the belief that a sound nuclear declaratory policy not only helps deter threats against U.S. interests but also advances the goal of slowing the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. This report reexamines the doctrine of nuclear "first use" that figured centrally in American and NATO strategy for decades. Specifically, it argues for the adoption of a U.S. declaratory policy that renounces the first use of any weapon of mass destruction. This research was sponsored with RAND corporate funds in the interest of furthering discussion and debate on future U.S. nuclear weapons policy. It has benefited from a broader investigation of deterrence in the post-Cold War era conducted by two of the authors--Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening.[1] Summary Current American declaratory policy regarding the use of nuclear weapons, formulated during the midst of the Cold War, is both out of date and unnecessarily vague--particularly with respect to biological and chemical threats. While the Soviet threat has receded, a different threat has appeared. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--nuclear, biological, and chemical--are spreading, frequently to nations hostile to the United States. Biological weapons can be nearly as horrible in their effects as nuclear weapons; and chemical weapons, though less destructive, are more easily acquired and more likely to be used. In response, much attention and investment is being directed toward improving the means to destroy enemy weapons of mass destruction preemptively or in flight. But attaining complete confidence in these means to protect the United States and its interests from WMD threats is likely to be beyond the fiscal grasp of the United States within current and projected defense budgets. Hence, it is essential to rely on deterrence to minimize the chance that weapons of mass destruction will be used against the United States, its troops overseas, or its allies. Having committed itself not to keep biological and chemical weapons, the United States now finds nuclear and conventional retaliatory threats to be the only means available to deter WMD attacks. Sole reliance on U.S. conventional retaliatory threats to deter WMD attacks will not assure deterrence, especially against adversaries already facing or prepared to face conventional strikes. Consequently, it is prudent for the United States to reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for any WMD attack as part of its declaratory policy, especially if the consequences of such attacks are severe (e.g., biological or chemical attacks against unprotected populations). Moreover, such a policy would remove some of the uncertainty regarding U.S. responses to biological and chemical attacks--an uncertainty that derives from current U.S. assurances that the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (even if they use biological or chemical weapons). In addition, this report calls for a change in U.S. declaratory policy from one that reserves the right to use nuclear weapons first to one that promises not to use any weapon of mass destruction first. The United States has emerged from the Cold War as the world's preeminent conventional military power, which suggests that the United States is well equipped to deter or defeat conventional attacks using conventional weapons alone. A U.S. promise not to use nuclear weapons against conventional attacks would go far toward refuting the criticism of non-nuclear-weapons states that the United States unfairly insists that others forswear nuclear weapons while remaining free itself to use them whenever it sees fit. Besides committing the United States not to use nuclear weapons against conventional attacks, this policy would send a message that any nation using any type of weapon of mass destruction against U.S. interests could suffer a U.S. nuclear response. By embracing the principle that the only legitimate use of weapons of mass destruction is in response to a WMD attack, the United States would strengthen deterrence. At the same time it would reduce the incentive some states may have for acquiring weapons of mass destruction, namely to intimidate the United States and U.S. allies. Hence, a no-WMD-first-use declaratory policy would be a wise step as the United States redefines the role of nuclear weapons in the emerging security environment.