Hi Pearly_Button; Re: "btw. I have also read how the European Air war and "bomber Harris" etc had "little effect on the outcome of the war". That is another fashionable view that I am in disagreement with. For example...Are we saying that air power was not important in WW2? What a joke from some statistician sitting in an armchair somewhere."
It's not fashionable among the military to suggest that strategic bombing has been unsuccessful, but it is very true that the only country that ever surrendered (more or less) unconditionally to it is Japan, and they got nuked twice. The concept that strategic bombing is ineffective dates to quite some time ago. The oldest proponent I could find was this one, referenced by the author 54 years later, in 1999:
Peace Through Patience, Not Air Power
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, The New York Times, April 25, 1999
Fifty-four years ago this month, I became the director for overall effects of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. After some months of work with a talented staff, the interrogation of Albert Speer and other German officials and the examination of excellent German records, we concluded that the great strategic air attacks had not appreciably reduced German war production. Nor had they effectively shortened the war. That was won by ground troops with tactical air support up from Normandy and across the vast plains of Russia.
This finding was strongly assailed by friends of the Army Air Force, as it then was, but in the end was mostly accepted. It was also learned, not surprisingly, that the ordinary citizens of the German cities -- Cologne, Hamburg, Berlin and, just as the war was ending, Dresden -- were far more in fear of the American and British bombers than of their own highly adverse Government.
In Japan, a similar study found the country's industrial plants to be more vulnerable, but it was civilians -- men, women and children -- who suffered, including at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The war was won by ground troops fighting island by island up from Guadalcanal, and by sea power, including, of course, carriers and combat aircraft.
A few years later in Korea the situation was the same. That war was brought to an end by troops on the ground. Air power did not save Gen. Douglas MacArthur's forces on his venture to the Yalu River or his own personal command.
Twice the weight of bombs dropped on Germany did not affect the outcome of the war in Vietnam or in Cambodia. It took ground troops to recover Kuwait. Saddam Hussein has survived the subsequent air attacks and perhaps been strengthened by the public reaction thereto.
And now we are relying on aircraft in Serbia and Kosovo. In keeping with the history, it is possible that our aerial assault has, indeed, strengthened Slobodan Milosevic. For the ordinary Serbian citizen there is less to fear from him than from our bombers. And one can at least wonder whether many of the refugees from Kosovo left because of the threat from the air.
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diaspora-net.org
No one, as far as I know, has ever suggested that tactical air power is ineffective. Anyone who's seen gun camera footage from an A-10 will argue otherwise. Despite what he says above, I'm not sure Galbraith is so well respected (and loved) in military circles. I find him politically naive, though I trust his histories of economics. So I went looking and found some more articles, but on military websites
How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo
Gian P. Gentile,
U.S. Department of Defense Aerospace Power Chronicles Web site
Perhaps some readers might categorize How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? as a book written by an Army author promoting a conspiracy theory against the Air Force by hunting for airpower Rasputins who manipulated the historical picture of strategic bombing in order to promote Air Force independence. But there is certainly something to be said for a book that makes an argument—and this is a good one.
...
airpower.maxwell.af.mil
Strategic Bombing in World War Two, ed. by David MacIsaac, Garland Publishing Company, 1976
Fighting with a Conscience
The Effects of an American Sense of Morality on the Evolution of Strategic Bombing Campaigns
Edward C. Holland III, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
U.S. Department of Defense Aerospace Power Chronicles Web site
...
The new tactics proved devastatingly effective. The first fire-bombing mission caused parts of Tokyo to burn for over 12 hours. When the conflagration finally subsided, reconnaissance photos showed that an area of 15.8 square miles had been destroyed, including 18 percent of the industrial area and 63 percent of the commercial area. More than 80,000 Japanese died in the raid and more than one million were left without homes. Measuring approximately three by four miles, the rectangular area bordered the “most important industrial section of Tokyo and included a few individually designated strategic targets.” The results allowed the XX Bomber Command intelligence staff to remove 22 industrial objectives from their target lists. No other air attack of the war, in either theater—including the atomic attacks—was so destructive to life and property.
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General LeMay knew he was responsible for thousands of civilian deaths, and later admitted, “I suppose if [we] had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal.” But LeMay did not view himself as guilty. He felt his bombing campaign was ethical, especially in a total war for unconditional surrender, because he saved lives. “Actually I think it’s more immoral to use less force than necessary, than it is to use more. If you use less force, you kill off more of humanity in the long run, because you are merely protracting the struggle,” he later stated.
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In an effort to avoid civilian deaths, LeMay’s XXI Bomber Command conducted a leaflet-dropping program to warn Japanese citizens of impending raids. The text of the leaflets accurately described the objectives of the fire-bombing campaign. According to LeMay, the warning stated that “We are not particularly at war with the Japanese Citizen, per se, but your leadership has gotten you into this mess, and you are going to be in danger. We are going to destroy the industrial areas of your city. We advise you to seek safety and leave.”25 The leaflet reflected LeMay’s view. His main goal was to end the war as quickly, and as cheaply, as possible. If, in killing 330,000 civilians, he also saved millions who might have died in an invasion, then he succeeded.
research.maxwell.af.mil
And here's a cool one: (Don't try this at home girls and boys!)
The Electromagnetic Bomb - a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction
Carlo Kopp, Defense Analyst, Melbourne Australia,
U.S. Department of Defense Aerospace Power Chronicles Web site
High Power Electromagnetic Pulse generation techniques and High Power Microwave technology have matured to the point where practical E-bombs (Electromagnetic bombs) are becoming technically feasible, with new applications in both Strategic and Tactical Information Warfare. The development of conventional E-bomb devices allows their use in non-nuclear confrontations. This paper discusses aspects of the technology base, weapon delivery techniques and proposes a doctrinal foundation for the use of such devices in warhead and bomb applications.
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Historical experience [14] suggests that manufacturing industries are highly resilient to air attack as production machinery is inherently mechanically robust and thus a very high blast overpressure is required to destroy it. The proliferation of electronic and computer controlled machinery has produced a major vulnerability, for which historical precedent does not exist. Therefore it will be necessary to reevaluate this orthodoxy in targeting strategy.
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[14] - The classical argument here is centred upon Allied experience in bombing Germany during WW2, where even repeated raids on industrial targets were unable to wholly stop production, and in many instances only served to reduce the rate of increase in production. What must not be overlooked is that both the accuracy and lethality of weapons in this period bore little comparison to what is available today, and automation of production facilities was almost non-existent.
airpower.maxwell.af.mil
-- Carl |
