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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Bilow who wrote (7217)10/23/2001 11:35:39 PM
From: CIMA  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Southwest Saudi Arabia: Hotbed of Radical Islam
October 23, 2001

Summary

Saudi Arabia's interior minister has warned members of the security forces against sympathizing with Islamic radicals. The unusually public comments reveal mounting uncertainty within the royal family over the loyalty of security forces. The U.S.-led war against terrorism has revealed a rift within Saudi society, and dissent from inhabitants of the southwest region may threaten the government in Riyadh.

Analysis

At an annual security conference in eastern Saudi Arabia, Interior Minister Prince Nayef warned security forces against sympathizing with Islamists opposed to the regime, the official Saudi Press Agency reported Oct. 18. Nayef's remarks -- unusually public for the notoriously secretive government -- suggest that Riyadh doubts the loyalty of security forces.

The government has reason for suspicion. Dissatisfaction with the royal family's extravagant spending has simmered just beneath the surface of Saudi society for years. In the southwest several seemingly unrelated incidents suggest growing unhappiness with the government in Riyadh and its relationship with the United States. Although a popular uprising in Saudi Arabia is unlikely, rebellion from within the security forces or organized Islamic militants from the southwest is possible.

The government's strict control over all aspects of society has so far kept organized political opposition in check. But growing animosity among citizens toward Riyadh's relationship with Washington -- evidenced by recent protests -- has prompted the royal family to reconsider the basing of U.S. troops on Saudi soil. Splits within the royal family pose a political problem for the United States. But the emergence of radical Islamic opposition could force Riyadh's hand, resulting in the expulsion of U.S. troops and a drawdown in ties with Washington.

Saudi Royal Politics Are Quicksand for U.S.

At the Tip of the Arabian Peninsula, A Contest For Influence



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To: Bilow who wrote (7217)10/25/2001 8:19:09 PM
From: maceng2  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Bilow,

Re: justification of WW2 strategic bombing campaign.

Thanks for the search tip. I have spent some time looking around the military sites. The only appropriate data on the web I have found is this. (It's a pdf file).

"The Luftwaffa and its war of attrition"

au.af.mil

In it you will see that Germany had an Air force that was precisely a tactical air force for fighting a ground war. It was a crucial part of the German "blitz" method of warfare.

When the USA plus Allies started strategic bombing it was gradually realized by the German High Command it's "tactical only" strategy had to change. With all the muddling and bombs falling, the Luftwaffa was crushed.

Throughout the document you can see that the time value was of overall importance. The Russian war went on for longer then expected. The air losses were high. Air superiority was lost. The Russians also gained air superiority. Battles were lost. The war was lost.

A crucial domino holding the Nazi machine together fell.

I would like to see what percentage of Luftwaffa forces were engaged fighting the Allied bombing campaign.

Regarding the percentage of USA/Allied fighters to bombers. I expect hindsight shows that the percentage of fighters manufactured should have been higher. Long range fighters should have been developed earlier. These problems were recognised and acted upon, although at a high casualty cost.

The fact remains that the air force component on the Russian campaign was relieved in a timely manner as possible given the resources available. The Russian casualties were of course also high indeed.

I wonder how many at the time expected the Russian campaign (and WW2 by implication) was winnable for the Allies?