An Old article on India -Israel relationship. Things have gotten a lot more pro-Israel since than, specially due to the very dramatic improvements in the Indo-US ties (before the sept. 11 disaster)
csis.org
Number 28 DECEMBER 01, 2000
INDIA PLAYS BOTH SIDES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
In the past year, India's economic and security ties with Israel have made
remarkable strides, while its political relations with Arab countries have
drifted. On the other hand, growing oil trade and substantial remittances
from Indians living in the Gulf have made India and the Arab states even
more economically intertwined. India's growing energy needs make energy
trade one of the key elements in its security and economic health. While
some BJP-friendly thinkers see India's future in a strategic relationship with
Israel and Japan, a more likely Indian approach will involve concurrent efforts
to build ties with Israel, Iran and the major Arab countries.
Israel: hot new friendship: During the independence movement, Nehru
and Gandhi rejected the Zionist claim to Palestine. When the Israeli state
became a reality, Nehru viewed Israel as an imperialist creation, and another
sectarian state like Pakistan. The BJP and its predecessors in the Hindu
nationalist movement saw Israel in a different light, as a fellow struggler
against Muslim militancy. But the Nehruvian perspective dominated Indian
intellectual circles for decades. More pragmatically, India needed Arab oil. It
may also have hoped, however vainly, that pro-Arab policies would earn it
some sympathy on the Kashmir issue.
The end of the Cold War, the upheavals of the Gulf War, and the post-1990
Middle East peace process changed Indian thinking. India wanted to be part
of the opening of formerly Soviet Central Asia and to engage itself in some of
the region-wide aspects of the Middle East peace process. This set the
stage for India's 1992 decision to establish full diplomatic relations with
Israel. New embassies in Tel Aviv and Delhi were followed in short order by
high level political contacts and reciprocal visits by senior defense officials,
along with reported contact between the two intelligence services.
This trend has strengthened in the past twelve months, under the BJP
government. This year Home Minister Advani, Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh and West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu have paid visits to Israel,
with a visit by Defense Minister George Fernandes slated for late November.
At the diplomatic level the two countries have initiated a formal dialogue on
counter-terrorism. A team of security experts from Israel was reported in the
press to have been touring Jammu and Kashmir and parts of embattled
Northeastern India.
Burgeoning defense ties: In October, Israel announced that it was lifting
its self-imposed ban on export licensing approvals to India. Since then, a
number of high technology deals have been discussed. Examples include
the Phalcon aerial early warning radar system and the Green Oren
anti-missile radar system. Both these systems, and potentially many
others, involve technology over which the U.S. asserts a requirement to
license exports from Israel, an issue that needs to be dealt with if major
sales are to take place. (Israel recently withdrew a proposed Phalcon sale
to China after strenuous U.S. objections.) Israeli sources have also said
they would sell remote-controlled surveillance aircraft to India. In addition,
there are reports of Israel performing upgrade servicing on some of India's
Russian-built equipment.
It is not clear how far the defense trade relationship will go. Economic
pressures and the desire to maintain a meaningful relationship with Russia
will undoubtedly send the Indian military back to Moscow for much of their
major foreign procurement. Indian defense scientists have always had a
strong preference for developing their own technology-however long it
took-rather than buying it off the shelf. But Israel may become an important
"niche" supplier, and should India decide to accelerate its military upgrade,
Israel would probably participate in the surge of foreign procurement that
would require. Collaborative research and development is another potentially
important area. Israel had to scrap development of the Lavi fighter in 1987
due to financial constraints. India has been working on its own light combat
aircraft since 1983, and faces development delays and budget problems as
well.
Indo-Israeli trade quintupled from $202 million in 1992 to nearly $1 billion this
past year. India's booming information technology industry may find useful
collaborations in Israel, and Israel's success in arid zone agriculture may
also offer some avenues for cooperation.
With the Arabs, strong economic links: On the Arab side, India's
economic links, always important, have grown in the past year and are likely
to continue doing so. In the next decade, India is expected to be the source
of the second largest increase in energy demand in the world, after China.
Most of its oil comes from Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Kuwait. Total oil
imports are expected to increase from $6.4 billion last year to $8.5 billion
this year, close to one-fourth of their import bill. India's dependence on
foreign oil to meet its energy needs have increased from forty percent in
1985-86 to sixty-six percent in 1999 and this trend will only increase as
domestic reserves begin to decrease. Trade with the Persian Gulf states, an
increasingly important export market, stands at around $10 billion a year.
And the Gulf is still an important source of offshore employment for Indians,
with an estimated 3.8 million Indians working there and remitting some $6
billion in 1999-2000.
India recognizes that its energy needs will require expanded and diversified
foreign sources of supply. India's government-owned Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation (ONGC) is expanding its involvement in overseas exploration
and production. It has been negotiating for partnerships in Yemen, Tunisia,
Iran and Iraq, but its highest profile and most advanced operations are
outside the Middle East-Central Asia, Vietnam, Sakhalin Island, and
Malaysia. India has also been developing sources of natural gas supply,
through LNG contracts with Qatar and others. It hopes that Bangladeshi
policy will change to permit gas imports from that country. There has been
much speculation about gas from Central Asia, but this would require either
a pipeline through Iran or one through Afghanistan and Pakistan (see below).
However, even if the diversification efforts are successful, oil will be critical to
the Indian economy, and the Persian Gulf will remain India's dominant
supplier of oil for a good many years to come.
Political drift: India's political ties to the Arab countries are not as strong
as one might expect, given this level of economic interdependence. India
has made some effort to maintain its links to the Muslim world. Its voting
record on Middle East questions in the United Nations is still consistently
pro-Arab. Advani and Singh both called on Yasser Arafat while on their trips
to Israel. However, India's reaction to the recent Arab-Israeli violence has
been relatively muted.
Iraq, traditionally one of India's closest friends in the region, has been
receptive to India's efforts to keep in touch. In September 2000, Indian
Minister of State for External Affairs Ajit Kumar Panja headed a business
delegation to Iraq. Panja called for an end to sanctions and affirmed that
stronger ties with Israel would not be at the expense of the Arab world. A
return visit by Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan is taking place
with considerable fanfare this week. (Reports in Israel that India would be
buying surveillance aircraft were awkwardly timed to coincide with his visit.)
Both ONGC and India's private sector energy companies such as Reliance
are keenly interested in working in the Iraqi oil sector, and India has little
enthusiasm for anti-Iraq sanctions.
India has received increasing criticism for its closer ties with Israel. A
concrete sign of Arab displeasure was the abrupt last-minute cancellation of
Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh's visit by the Saudis on the grounds that it
conflicted with a meeting with the Presidents of Egypt and Syria, which, in
fact, did not take place until a number of days later. The Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC) at its November, 2000 summit requested that the
U.N. Secretary General name a special envoy on Kashmir, another decision
distasteful to the Indian government. India's reaction to these events has
been to note the many countries - including the U.S. - that have good
relations with both Israel and the Arab countries. The government will
undoubtedly be trying to mend fences, but there is a sense of drift.
Iran: moving closer: India has been putting considerable effort into its
relations with Iran. Jaswant Singh visited Tehran this spring, and in
November, India hosted a number of high-level officials at the Iran-India
Dialogue Conference. India and Iran are also both upset with the activities of
the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan's relations with the movement. On the
economic side, there has been much discussion of the possibility of a
pipeline for gas and/or oil from Central Asia through Iran to India, either
through Pakistan or under the sea. India is most reluctant to route its
energy supplies through Pakistan, and the undersea route faces formidable
technical challenges. However, even a pipeline terminating on the Iranian
coast could be an important element in broadening India's energy supply.
Iran is already India's most significant non-Arab source of imported oil, with
1999 imports at $780 million.
A balancing act: Some Indian commentators portray India's ties to the
Middle East as a classic reversal of alliances, with a new strategic alliance
among India, Israel and Japan forming the skeleton of a "China containment"
strategy. According to this view, India's defense ties with Israel will protect
India's energy sources in the Middle East, and relationships with the
countries on China's periphery will deter threatening moves from Beijing.
While the pattern of India's ties in the Middle East has changed significantly
in the past decade, this analysis overstates the importance of the
Indo-Israeli connection, and understates the risk of an Arab backlash. India's
ties with Israel may well continue strengthening, especially if more defense
deals are completed. However, India's relationships in the Middle East need
not be a zero-sum game. Within the Arab world, the countries of greatest
importance to India have shifted: Egypt is somewhat less important to India
than it once was; Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Iran are more so.
Further diplomatic engagement with the Arabs is key, as is building bridges
with issues of mutual concern - the threat of terrorism and the security of
the largest oil-producing region in the world.
As long as relations between India and Pakistan are volatile, India's Middle
East policy must also deal with Pakistan's efforts to shore up its support in
the region. We will be exploring the relationship between Pakistan and the
Middle East in a future issue. |
