To: Mark Adams who wrote (3376 ) 11/1/2001 9:36:19 PM From: Mark Adams Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 24758 Corporate Income Taxes In the 1990sitepnet.org Tax Rates by Industry Effective tax rates by industry varied widely. Over the combined 1996-98 period, industry effective tax rates ranged from a low of 12.3 percent to a high of 31.6 percent. In any given year, the range of industry rates was even greater. Oil companies enjoyed the lowest effective tax rate over the 1996-98 period, paying only 12.3 percent of their profits in federal income taxes. Oil company taxes declined sharply over the three years, falling to only 5.7 percent of profits in 1998. Other very low-tax industries—which paid less than half the statutory tax rate over the entire 1996-98 period—included electronic and electrical equipment manufacturers (13.1 percent), paper companies (13.9 percent), transportation companies (14.1 percent) and auto companies (17.1 percent). Only one industry, publishing, paid an effective rate of more than 30 percent over the three-year period (31.6 percent).What Happened to the Alternative Minimum Tax? The corporate Alternative Minimum Tax was established in 1986 to assure that profitable corporations pay some substantial amount in income taxes no matter how many tax breaks they otherwise take advantage of. But because of laws enacted in 1993 and 1997 that sharply weakened the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax, only a few companies now pay the AMT. In fact, almost as many are getting rebates for past AMT payments as now pay the AMT. In 1998, 23 companies reported AMT payments, while 19 reported rebates for AMT paid in the past. Almost half of the reported AMT payments in 1998 came from one company, General Electric (which still paid a very low 8% tax rate in 1998). Excluding the $549 million in AMT paid by GE, the net AMT for the 41 companies (payments less rebates) was only $186 million in 1998.Who Loses from These Low and Widely Varying Corporate Tax Rates? Low- and no-tax companies may be happy about their ability to avoid huge amounts in taxes every year, but our current low and widely varying way of taxing corporations is not a good approach for most of us. The losers from this system include:The general public. In fiscal years 1997-99, personal income tax payments grew by 28 percent and Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes on wages grew by 22 percent. But corporate income tax payments went up by a total of only 8 percent over the three years, and actually fell from fiscal 1998 to fiscal 1999. So one obvious group of losers from growing corporate tax avoidance is the general public, which has to pay more for—or get less in—public services. Disadvantaged companies. Almost as obvious is how the wide variation in tax rates among industries and among companies within particular industries gives relatively high tax companies and industries a legitimate beef that federal tax policy is helping their competitors at their expense. As the industry tables starting on page 17 detail, examples of these kinds of discrepancies abound: Maytag and General Electric both make kitchen appliances. But Maytag paid 35 percent of its profits in taxes from 1996 to 1998, while GE paid only 8.1 percent. Abbot Laboratories and Pfizer are both in the drug business, but the former paid almost 29 percent of its profits in taxes from 1996 to 1998, while the latter paid only 3.1 percent. Among industries, both publishers and oil companies provide much sought-after products. But publishers paid a 1996-98 effective tax rate of 31.6 percent, while the oil companies paid only 12.3 percent. The U.S. economy. The fact that the government is offering much larger tax subsidies to some companies and industries compared to others is also poor economic policy. Such a system artificially boosts the rate of return on investment dollars for tax-favored industries and companies and reduces the rate of return for those industries and companies that are less favored. To be sure, companies that push for tax breaks argue that the “incentives” will encourage useful activities. But the idea that the government should tell businesses what kinds of investments to make conflicts with our basic economic philosophy that consumer demand and free markets should be the test of which private investments make sense. In fact, the good news is that tax breaks often don’t have much effect on business behavior. After all, companies don’t lobby to have the government tell them what to do. They lobby to get rewarded for doing what they would have done anyway. But there’s no doubt that making some kinds of investments more profitable than others through tax breaks will sometimes shift capital away from what’s most beneficial and into lower-yield activities. As a result, the flow of capital is diverted in favor of those industries that have been most aggressive in the political marketplace of Washington, D.C., at the expense of long-term economic growth. State governments and state taxpayers. The loopholes that reduce federal corporate income taxes cut state corporate income taxes, too, since state corporate tax systems generally take federal taxable income as their starting point in computing taxable corporate profits.6 Thus, when the federal government allows corporations to write off their machinery faster than it wears out or shift U.S. profits overseas or shelter earnings from oil drilling, most states automatically do so, too. State corporate income taxes paid by the 237 companies that disclosed them averaged only 3.8 percent of pretax profits over the three years, less than half the weighted average state statutory corporate tax rate. Following the trend in federal corporate tax rates, the state effective corporate tax rate paid by the companies in the study fell between 1996 and 1998, from 4.0 percent to 3.7 percent.7 It’s a mathematical truism that low and declining state revenues from corporate income taxes means higher state taxes on other state taxpayers or diminished state and local public services. The integrity of the tax system and public trust therein. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to be suspicious and even outraged about a tax code that seems so tilted toward politically well-connected companies. In a tax system that by necessity must rely heavily on the voluntary compliance of tens of millions of honest taxpayers, maintaining public trust is essential—and is endangered by the specter of widespread corporate tax avoidance. +++ Very good material, for those who have the time to scan it. I pulled what I thought were some highlites relevant to recent discussions.