To: JohnM who wrote (8756 ) 11/3/2001 1:23:19 PM From: Thomas M. Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500 1. Actually, Chomsky's numbers seem about right, and I don't think Hitchens disagrees with them. He just disagrees with Chomsky's tone. I do agree that Chomsky might be exaggerating when he talks about the political and social consequences of the bombing, comparing this to Guatemala or the Congo. 2. The evil part of the U.S. bombing in Sudan is not the actual bombing. That caused minimal casualties, and it might have been an honest effort to halt chemical weapons production. The real crime is the ensuing action, blocking UN inquiry into the matter and blocking any efforts by the Sudan to rebuild. One unfortunate consequence of our actions in Sudan: <<< Just before the missile strike, Sudan detained two men suspected of bombing the American embassies, notifying Washington, US officials confirmed. But the US rejected Sudan's offer of cooperation, and after the bombing Sudan "angrily released" the suspects (James Risen, NYT, July 30, 1999), since named as bin Laden operatives. Recently leaked FBI memos add another reason why Sudan "angrily released" the bin Laden associates. The memos confirm that the FBI wanted the suspects extradited, but the State Department refused. One "senior CIA source" now describes this and other rejections of Sudanese offers of cooperation as "the worst single intelligence failure in this whole terrible business [of Sept. 11]. It is the key to the whole thing right now," because of the voluminous evidence on bin Laden that Sudan offered to produce, offers that were repeatedly rebuffed because of the administration's "irrational hatred" of the Sudan, the senior CIA source reports. Included in Sudan's rejected offers was "a vast intelligence database on Osama bin Laden and more than 200 leading members of his al-Qaeda terrorist network in the years leading up to the 11 September attacks." Washington was "offered thick files, with photographs and detailed biographies of many of his principal cadres, and vital information about al-Qaeda's financial interests in many parts of the globe," but refused to accept the information, out of "irrational hatred" of the target of its missile attack. "It is reasonable to say that had we had this data we may have had a better chance of preventing the attacks" of Sept. 11, the same senior CIA source concludes (David Rose, Observer, Sept. 30, reporting an Observer investigation). >>> Tom