Ground War: The Northern Alliance Offensive
2355 GMT, 011107
Summary
The Pentagon is planning ground operations in Afghanistan because an air campaign alone will not defeat the Taliban. A strategic offensive by the Northern Alliance, with extensive U.S. air support, appears the most desirable option. But with opposition troops unlikely to capture Kabul before winter falls, the United States must prepare ground forces to launch attacks in Afghanistan next spring.
Analysis
It is increasingly clear that the U.S. air campaign alone will not break up the Taliban's resistance in Afghanistan. With the harsh Afghan winter fast approaching the Taliban as defiant as ever, there is no hope that the war in Afghanistan will be over soon. The Pentagon must explore ground war options in the country.
Any ground force assembled from abroad would not be able to launch before spring. Only forces already in Afghanistan have a chance to defeat the Taliban before winter. The U.S. command appears to be pinning its hopes on the Northern Alliance, the only organized military force opposing the Taliban on the ground. However, the Northern Alliance lacks the manpower, skills and equipment necessary to defeat the Taliban in combat near Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif.
The Northern Alliance -- a loose coalition of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras -- has been fighting the Taliban for seven years with little success. When the United States launched air strikes a month ago, it did not immediately try to help the Northern Alliance by bombing the Taliban frontline positions.
Ground War Strategies Part 1: Grand Strategy
After more than a month of bombings, Washington is now contemplating the second phase of the campaign in Afghanistan. Having achieved air superiority, the military must move to a strategic ground offensive. This week, STRATFOR will examine what options the United States -- as well as its enemies -- may pursue as part of a ground strategy in Afghanistan.
Analysis
The battle between the United States and al Qaeda, with the first attacks and counterattacks over, is settling into the extended warfare most reasonable people expected it to be. The Sept. 11 attacks hurt the United States but did not cripple it. The U.S. counterattack has similarly hurt the Taliban but has not crippled it either.
The Bush administration did this for two reasons. First, it was mindful that crucial coalition supporter Pakistan is a foe of Northern Alliance. Second, the administration hoped that an air campaign and covert attempts to turn Pushtun tribes in the country against the Taliban would do much to achieve its goals. Washington believed that the Pushtuns themselves would overthrow the hard-line regime of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. But attempts by prominent Pushtun leaders, including recently executed opposition leader Abdul Haq, have failed so far.
A week ago, Washington switched its strategy to heavy bombing of Taliban forces opposing Northern Alliance troops in positions north of Kabul, south of the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and close to the Afghan-Tajik border in the northeast. The Bush administration apparently believes that its massive support to the Northern Alliance will not alienate Pakistan, since even with the fall of Kabul the war would be far from over and a role for pro-Pakistani Pushtuns in a future government could still be negotiated.
The United States hopes the bombing will encourage the Northern Alliance to launch a major offensive. So far, the opposition has not undertaken an attack against Kabul. Minor attacks at Mazar-e-Sharif have been repulsed, although some tactical success was reported 40 miles south of the city on Nov. 6.
Plans
With the U.S. bombing campaign intensifying in recent days, the Pentagon expects the Northern Alliance to launch a major assault before winter. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld seems to have finalized the coordinated support for such an offensive during his recent visits to Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India. A spokesman for the Northern Alliance said Nov. 5 that the group is preparing to launch a major offensive in about a week.
The plan is likely to include almost simultaneous attacks on Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Taking Kabul would mean a major military defeat for the Taliban and would cut off its forces in the north from Pushtun-populated areas in eastern and southern Taliban strongholds. The United States would then be able to establish a ground and air force presence in the capital area and would be in a better position to launch fresh attacks on the Taliban.
As important as Kabul is, taking Mazar-e-Sharif is even more important. It would establish for the first time a land corridor from abroad into Afghanistan, and it could be used as an invasion route for U.S. ground forces from Uzbekistan next spring.
Taking the city would also mean cutting the Taliban forces in the north into two isolated groups, one in western Afghanistan and another in the northeast. That would make it easier for the opposition to defeat significant Taliban formations and clear all of northern Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance would also establish direct communication and supply lines via Mazar-e-Sharif between its forces in northwestern and northeastern Afghanistan.
The ground attacks by the Northern Alliance will likely be supported by close U.S. air support, including AC-130s and helicopter gunships. Air strikes will be coordinated by U.S. Special Forces on the ground, which will identify targets and the immediate needs of the opposition units on the ground.
A major offensive on Mazar-e-Sharif would have to start a few days before an attack on Kabul. The Northern Alliance would want some forces, after they have captured the city, to advance south along a major highway to Pol-e-Khomri. Taking this city would cut off a strong Kunduz grouping of the Taliban in the north. Allied forces would then proceed further south through the strategic Salang pass to secure the heights around the Bagram air base and eventually join the fight in Kabul.
Though the Northern Alliance command envisions heavy fighting at each stage, especially around Kabul, it is counting on a focused and severe U.S. bombing to make Taliban frontline resistance impossible. The opposition hopes to take Mazar-e-Sharif in three days after the beginning of a major attack there and then capture Kabul by the end of the month.
Impact of geography and terrain
The Northern Alliance offensive will take place on very complex terrain, mostly high-altitude mountains. The Hindu Kush mountains to the north of Kabul range from 4,500 meters (14,764 feet) to 6,000 meters (19,686 feet). The altitude descends in the direction of Kabul to 3,000 meters (9,843 feet)and lower. The Alliance forces near Kabul will use the mouth of the Panjshir Valley as their staging ground. As it nears Kabul, the fight will be concentrated on a narrow front. On the one hand, this means the opposition will have to use mostly frontal attacks that typically lead to heavy losses. On the other hand, the concentration of Taliban defenders in a small area means that they are also likely to suffer major casualties from the U.S. bombardment. The key to taking Kabul is securing control over several strategic heights where the Taliban forces have fortified their positions for years.
The hardest part for the Alliance would be if some Taliban forces decide to fight within the city limits. Urban fighting in Kabul -- a large city with myridad, partly ruined low buildings and hundreds of narrow streets and dead ends - would represent a nightmare for any attacking force.
The Alliance reinforcements that intend to join the fight for the capital after taking Mazar-e-Sharif would have to move slowly because the only highway from thence to Kabul is barely usable, due to numerous bombings and mine explosions in recent years. The main obstacle would be getting through the strategic Salang Pass, which has an altitude of 3,878 meters (12,723 feet). The pass previously served the opposition well; Alliance fighters exploded the south entry in order to stop the Taliban offensive to the north. Now the Taliban can use the same or similar techniques to stop Alliance forces from advancing south.
As to Mazar-e-Sharif, the city is located in the steppes. Like any large city, it could potentially bog down an attacking force. But it will be even more difficult for Alliance forces to overcome stiff Taliban resistance in the rogue foothills of the Bozarak mountain range, where heavy fighting with no decisive changes has been reported for the last several days. Unfortunately for the opposition, it does not control the plains to the north of the city. However, this northern route from the Uzbek border city of Termez can be used by Uzbekistan's government forces if President Islam Karimov decides to send troops camouflaged as Northern Alliance fighters to the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif. Uzbek military sources say Karimov is keen on the idea but hesitates because he fears political repercussions at home and reprisals from the Taliban.
A poor network of airfields in the regions around Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif make close air support for a ground offensive very difficult. The only airstrip the United States can try to use for both logistics and fire support has just been built with advice from U.S. instructors in Gulbohar. The airstrip is located at the mouth of the Panjshir Valley, 50 miles to the north of the capital. Using it will be risky due to its proximity to the frontline. The Taliban are threatening to destroy the airstrip by firing tactical missiles and long-range howitzers, Pakistan's Nation reported Nov. 7.
It would appear that the task of providing close air support to Northern Alliance troops in the forthcoming offensive will fall almost entirely to the U.S. Air Force and Navy located outside the country. In this regard, getting three air bases just to the north of the war theater, in Tajikistan -- as was announced during Rumsfeld's visit to the country -- may help. But getting the bases ready to host the U.S. ground attack aircraft will take time. It is unlikely this job will be finished by the time the Northern Alliance launches its offensive.
Military capabilities
The balance of military forces near the frontlines at Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif will determine the success of the Northern Alliance offensive. The opposition lacks the necessary minimum manpower and equipment ratio of 3:1 to defeat the Taliban.
On the Kabul front, the Taliban -- with 15,000 soldiers deployed in three brigade-size formations -- outnumbers the alliance despite the U.S. bombing campaign. A 4,000-strong brigade of Pakistani volunteers is also moving into position near Kabul. Of about 8,000 more Pakistani volunteers that crossed the border to join the fight, about 2,000 traveled to the Kabul front. Some 5,000 Arab militants were based in Afghanistan before U.S. strikes began Oct. 7, and a majority of them are still in the Kabul area. With nothing to lose, they will prove among the city's staunchest defenders -- unless the Taliban and al Qaeda commanders disperse them and other forces in the countryside to prepare for guerrilla attacks. Since Oct. 7, hundreds of other Arabs and other militants have entered Afghanistan, potentially bringing the Taliban's manpower at Kabul to 25,000.
Most are light infantry armed with Kalashnikov submachine-guns, other small arms and grenade launchers. About 60 tanks, 80 infantry combat vehicles (ICVs) and armed personnel carriers (APCs), 60 various field guns and howitzers (from 76- to 152-mm caliber), 70 multiple rocket launching systems, hundreds of mortars, anti-tank weapons and recoilless rifles - almost all Soviet-made - are still operational at Kabul. There may be about 10 operational SS-1A/B SCUD surface-to-surface tactical missiles. Taliban air defenses there include more than 100 low-range anti-aircraft guns and a few dozen Stingers. What is left after the U.S. bombing is unlikely to be used in the battle for Kabul.
Tajik forces, the strongest part of the anti-Taliban coalition, will launch the offensive on Kabul. About 12,000 fighters are gathered on the front. Until recently the Alliance there had there about 40 tanks and roughly the same number of ICVs and APCs, about 50 various artillery pieces, about 15 SCUD and FROG-7 missiles and dozens of other heavy weapons, all Soviet-made.
In October, Russia decided to provide extensive, urgent deliveries to the Tajik force. These included about 40 T-55 tanks, 100 other armored vehicles, six batteries of 122-mm D-30 howitzers, two batteries of 100-mm MT-12 anti-tank guns, four batteries of 120-mm mortars, three batteries of 82-mm automatic mortars, 10 122-mm Grad multiple rocket launchers, 100 anti-tank missile launchers, 200 grenade launchers and thousands of small arms, as well as four to six Mi-24 helicopter gunships and the same number of transport helicopters, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported Oct. 10, citing military sources. Almost all the arms - paid for by Britain -- were designated for the Kabul front.
STRATFOR believes that only a minor portion of this arsenal has reached the frontline, for two reasons: a majority was sent by train, and Uzbekistan - which supports only Uzbek factions of the Northern Alliance -- has not allowed Russian trains with arms to cross the Uzbek-Tajik border. The arms have had to follow a longer route via Kyrgyzstan.
On the Mazar-e-Sharif front, the Taliban has deployed two 2,500-strong battalions. About 3,000 militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and roughly 1,000 Chechen fighters also defend the mostly Uzbek-populated city. In addition, pro-Taliban forces may receive some reinforcements from larger contingents located to the east in the area of Kunduz: 2,500 Taliban soldiers and about 5,000 IMU militants. Mazar-e-Sharif defenders are armed with 20 tanks, 30 ICVs and APCs, 25 various field guns and howitzers, 15 multiple rocket launching systems, several dozen mortars, anti-tank weapons and recoilless rifles. Taliban air defenses there include about 40 low-range anti-aircraft guns and about 10 Stingers.
The Uzbek forces of Gen. Abdul Dostum - who is infamous for repeatedly changing sides during the Afghan civil war - will launch the offensive on Mazar-e-Sharif. Dostum has about 7,000 fighters on the front, including about 2,000 on loan from the Uzbek army, according to sources at the Uzbek Ministry of Defense. They are armed with about 15 tanks and 30 ICVs and APCs, about 20 various artillery pieces, 10 multiple rocket launchers and several dozen other heavy weapons. Russia does little to supply this Uzbek force, and Uzbekistan cannot fully substitute for Moscow. On the eve of the offensive, U.S. transport helicopters were actively supplying Dostum with ammunition from Uzbekistan's caches.
Yet on both fronts, Northern Alliance troops are still short of ammunition and fuel, and they have gone unpaid for months. One commander on the Kabul front said each of his tanks has been allocated 26 gallons of fuel, "just about enough to drive to the frontline and back," according to Agence France Presse.
Also, on both fronts, the Taliban have cleared large areas around vital defense areas and laid tens of thousands of mines. Many bridges and tracks in ravines and narrow passes have been prepared for demolition and ambush, while accumulated reserves of ammunition, spares and fuel may last at least six months in combat, according to AFI Research.
On both fronts, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance lack coherent command and communications structures typical of modern armies. But the Taliban appears to have a larger number of combat-tested Afghan field commanders, some command cadres from Pakistan and experienced guerrilla leaders from Chechnya, Kashmir and some Arab countries.
The U.S. bombing campaign has not broken the Taliban's morale, which remains higher than the combat spirits of the Northern Alliance. The same is true for combat qualities and skills of the soldiers. In a war in which light infantry plays a vital role, these advantages are likely to help the Taliban withstand the forthcoming Northern Alliance offensive.
Operations
A Northern Alliance offensive represents the only chance for the United States and its allies to turn the tide of war before winter comes. U.S. air strikes will play a crucial role in this offensive, but a few factors may preclude the opposition from taking full advantage of close air support.
First, close air support cannot be effective if the attack aircraft originate thousands of miles from the war theater, which excludes B-52s and other strategic bombers. Carrier-based F-18s and F-16s also lack the range to reach Mazar-e-Sharif. That leaves the United States with only 21 AC-130s and about 25 F-14s capable of refueling and reaching the frontlines. Washington could improve its position if U.S. helicopter gunships from Uzbekistan are used, and if Russia and Uzbekistan send their ground assault aircraft into battle.
Second, Northern Alliance commanders and soldiers lack experience in conducting consecutive ground attacks under close air support. The help of U.S. Special Forces on the ground is unlikely to reduce confusion, and some friendly bombing within the opposition units could occur.
Third, on the both fronts the ferocity of combat will often amount to close and even hand-to-hand combat. Providing air support in these instances will be impossible.
Fourth, even if all strategic heights around Kabul are leveled, the battle for the city will not be over. The Taliban is likely to engage the Northern Alliance in street fighting, and some Kabul citizens -- half of whom are Pushtuns who remember atrocities committed by Tajik and Uzbek troops in 1992 to 1995 -- are likely to join the defenders' ranks.
The most the Northern Alliance can do by winter is capture some important heights north of Kabul under heavy U.S. air support, allowing the city to be shelled through winter. However, it is more likely a Northern Alliance offensive will be bogged down and make only minor tactical gains.
Dostum's offensive on Mazar-e-Sharif may be more successful if a couple of Uzbek mechanized infantry brigades move toward the city. Both sides could encircle and gradually squeeze the defenders out of town. But even then, the fate of the battle in northern Afghanistan would remain far from certain.
The Taliban has a 1,500-person force on the Afghan-Uzbek border that may delay Uzbekistan's march southward. The difference in combat qualities of each side is such that several hundred Chechen fighters could also easily wear down the forces of Dostum and Uzbekistan in urban fighting in Mazar-e-Sharif.
No air support, however devastating and timely, can save a ground force from defeat if it is inferior to a determined opponent on the ground. If the United States is serious about destroying the Taliban, a bloody war next year with numerous U.S. and allied forces on the ground in Afghanistan is a must. |
