Ground War Strategies Part 3: The U.S. Mission
2300 GMT, 011109
stratfor.com
Introduction
This analysis is a study of what a U.S. ground campaign in Afghanistan will look like. Drawn entirely from public sources, the study in no way provides an advantage to any combatant who would have superior sources of intelligence, deeper experience in warfare and more intimate knowledge of terrain. This reported is intended to benefit the citizens of all combatant countries and is designed to inform them, in as objective a fashion as possible, of the issues involved in a land war in Afghanistan.
Summary
The United States is now weighing options for launching a large-scale ground offensive in Afghanistan. In order to understand the menu of choices, military planners must first identify characteristics of the theater of operations that will determine the shape of battle. In treating the Afghan theater of operations in isolation, the critical question is whether the United States can impose a comprehensive military solution.
Analysis
The U.S. military campaign has two goals in Afghanistan. Its primary objective is to destroy the al Qaeda network, but U.S. forces cannot rout al Qaeda so long as the Taliban regime, which provides safe haven for the group and has refused to negotiate with Washington, remains in power. Therefore the secondary target -- the Taliban -- must be disabled first.
Bringing down the Taliban and destroying al Qaeda's network in Afghanistan will not dismantle the network's global operations. Nonetheless, the military campaign in Afghanistan will disrupt al Qaeda's planning and training capabilities, hindering its ability to mount attacks against the United States. It will also satisfy another U.S. goal: discouraging other countries from providing safe haven to terrorists by demonstrating that doing so is unacceptable and carries a price.
Ground War Strategies Part 3: Approaches to the Battlefield
Imposing a comprehensive military solution requires the deployment of ground forces. This, in turn, means the United States will need staging areas where troops and supplies can be positioned in preparation for sustained battlefield operations. Getting U.S. troops to the battlefield is a strategic dilemma that will have consequences for both the U.S. war in Afghanistan and the region as a whole.
Analysis
All U.S. interventions in Eurasia, from World War I to Desert Storm, required Washington first to mobilize its forces, which were transported and then deployed near the theater of operations. The second phase -- an assault by these forces on the enemy -- was entirely dependent on the first.
Click here to continue.
Related Analysis:
Ground War Strategies Part 1: Grand Strategy
-5 November 2001
Ground War Strategies Part 2: The Northern Alliance
-7 November 2001
Afghanistan: The Theater of Operations
In evaluating the Afghan theater of operations, the critical question becomes: What are the United States' military options? Clearly, a comprehensive military solution is necessary. Comprehensive implies three things: first, that Washington decisively imposes its will on Afghanistan -- meaning that neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda's Afghanistan operations are left intact. Second, the solution must be military in nature because efforts at political resolution have failed. Third, the mission must be accomplished by a predominantly U.S. force, in which coalition partners are fully integrated with and subordinated to U.S. military command.
One example of such a comprehensive military solution comes from the re-conquest of Kuwait from Iraq. The United States relied on a coalition, but allies were integrated under the U.S. command. The outcome was wholly determined by military force and was decisive, at least insofar as the strategic goal of ousting Iraq from Kuwait was concerned. Thus, the question at hand is whether a Desert Storm-style solution is possible and what shape such a solution might take.
The U.S. Ground Campaign
Washington launched air strikes against Afghanistan Oct. 7, the first phase of the U.S. initiative to effect a military solution there. The assault has so far consisted primarily of strategic air bombings of Taliban and al Qaeda air bases and positions in Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat -- using cruise missiles, naval aviation and long-range U.S. Air Force bombers.
The United States quickly achieved air superiority, but Washington cannot realize its strategic goals through an air campaign alone. Afghanistan's terrain and the Taliban's limited dependence on targets vulnerable to air strikes render the bombings largely ineffective. For the most part, the targets are individuals and therefore must be individually identified, targeted and destroyed.
Mounting a U.S. ground offensive in Afghanistan, then, raises an important question: Who and what will U.S. troops face on the battlefield?
The Enemy Defined
The United States has already determined that the al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan and the Taliban are one coherent force, and for the purposes of a military campaign, considers them interchangeable and inseparable. This is an important determination because defining the enemy is a first rule of combat.
An irregular army comprised primarily of light infantry and guerrilla forces, the Taliban and the Afghanistan-based forces of al Qaeda are estimated to number about 55,000. Moreover, Taliban numbers are not fixed: The regime can recruit additional forces both from Pushtun tribes inside Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan. It also attracts foreign jihadists from the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia and Africa.
Although loosely organized, the Taliban forces seem to be divided into four regional commands. In the north, about 5,000 troops are grouped into four battalion-size formations in and around Mazar-e-Sharif and the Tajik and Uzbek borders. In the east, 25,000 fighters are deployed in five loose, brigade-size formations around Khost-Jalalabad -- between the capital Kabul and the Pakistani border -- in order to guard the Salang Pass, a strategic supply route. In the south and east, another 25,000 fighters protect the Taliban headquarters at Kandahar, as well as Herat near the Iranian border and the strategic supply routes into Quetta, Pakistan, according to AFI Research.
Reports on weapons and military equipment vary and are usually outdated. However, the Taliban are known to have a variety of small arms including AK-47s, light machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Other equipment the Taliban are thought to control include 120 main battle tanks in operational condition, armored personnel vehicles, artillery and mortars ranging from 76-mm to 160-mm M-160s, anti-tank guns, missiles and some anti-aircraft weaponry, such as SAMs and Stingers. The Taliban's air force capabilities have reportedly been destroyed by the U.S. air campaign.
The Taliban are thought to have at least a six-month supply of ammunition, fuel, spare parts, food and water stored in caches throughout the country. A U.S. spring offensive would conceivably capitalize on a Taliban force diminished by a harsh winter and supply shortages stemming from interdiction by U.S. forces.
The Battlefield
The United States' key dilemma is logistical. It is a naval power and would like to shape the battlefield to fit its force structure. But landlocked Afghanistan, on the other side of the world, denies the United States the advantage of its navy.
The United States can deploy troops fairly quickly using military and commercial aircraft. But deploying armor and other weapons systems, as well as building up and maintaining lines of supply to the front -- especially in times of intense conflict -- requires sea lift.
Similarly, air power can deploy quickly and many munitions can be delivered by air, but the masses of munitions needed to fight a war and the critical fuel supplies needed to sustain it must arrive by ship or be secured locally. None of this is possible in Afghanistan.
Terrain and Topography
The well-trained Taliban militia is not the only enemy U.S. troops will face in Afghanistan. The country's rugged terrain and harsh climate will act as a force multiplier for the Taliban.
Afghanistan is dominated by a series of mountain ranges that define the central part of the country, running northeast to southwest. More than 49 percent of the total land area lies more than 6,000 feet (2,000 meters) above sea level. The Hindu Kush mountain chain reaches heights of 14,000 to 18,000 feet (4,500 to 6,000 meters), stretching 600 miles (966 kilometers) laterally through the center of the country. Other smaller ranges include the Koh-e Baba, Salang, Koh-e Paghman, Spin Ghar, Suleiman, Siah Koh, Koh-e Khwaja Mohammad, Selseleh-e Band-e Turkestan and the western Paropamisus.
Numerous high passes transect the mountains, forming a strategically important network for traffic between the northern and southern parts of the country. The Kotal-e Salang mountain pass, reaching a height of about 12,700 feet (3,878 meters), is one of the most important because it links Kabul to northern Afghanistan. The Salang Pass includes an extensive network of Soviet-built approach roads.
The Salang and Tang-e Gharu passes have been used extensively as strategic routes for heavy military equipment throughout Afghanistan's civil war and are in very bad repair, according to the Library of Congress Country Studies. Further west, the Shotorgardan pass links Logar and Paktiya provinces on the border with Pakistan between Kabul and Kandahar. The Bazarak pass leads to Mazar-e-Sharif; the Khawak and the Anjuman -- both in the Panjshir Valley -- provide access to the north. The 8,900-foot (2,713-meter) Hajigak pass and the Unai at 10,990 feet (3,350 meters) lead into the eastern Hazarajat and the central Bamiyan Valley. The passes of the Paropamisus in the west average 1,968 feet (600 meters) in height.
These mostly barren mountains are a strategic advantage to the Taliban as its fighters are very familiar with the terrain. Moreover, the network of caves and tunnels in the southeastern ranges serve as Taliban arms caches and supply dumps.
Plains in the far north and the southwest provide the most easily accessible battle fields, yet direct confrontation with most Taliban forces is not likely to be concentrated in these open areas.
Facing a light infantry force of guerrillas on their home territory is a nightmare. From a military standpoint, the U.S. can only hope to gain an advantage by isolating the Taliban inside Afghanistan and cutting off its lines of supply. Doing so, however, will require the United States to take the war beyond Afghanistan's borders. |
