Has common sense finally come to the US State Dept.?
Tuesday, November 20, 2001 Kislev 5, 5762 Israel Time: 18:06 (GMT+2)
haaretzdaily.com
Analysis / For the Americans, the ball is in Arafat's court
By Aluf Benn, Ha'aretz Correspondent
Colin Powell: Did not want to get into scrap with Sharon over prime minister's demand for seven days of quiet.
(Photo: AP)
American foreign policy is like an aircraft carrier: It moves slowly, but is extremely powerful and operates long-distance. After 10 months of fence-sitting and evading involvement in the Middle East, the Bush administration followed in the footsteps of all its predecessors and committed itself to achieving peace between Israel and its neighbors, as a central goal of its foreign policy.
Monday's speech of Secretary of State Colin Powell will serve from now on as the workplan of the U.S. in the Middle East, until the end of the present administration. The weight it carries, therefore, is greater than the immediate loss-gain assessment for Israel and the Palestinians.
The messages Powell delivered largely reflected a continuity of U.S. policy. President George W. Bush adopted the principles of the Clinton plan: aiming for an "end to the conflict and nothing less than that" as the goal of the peace process; dividing the land into two states, Israel and Palestine, and the definition of Israel as a "Jewish state"; an agreement on the issue of Jerusalem, on the basis of the demands of both sides and freedom of religion; and a "just, fair and realistic" solution to the Palestinian refugee question.
The deal presented by Powell is simple: The Palestinians will end terror and incitement, and Israel, the occupation and the settlements. First a cease-fire will be achieved, and then diplomatic negotiations will be renewed, along the lines of the Tenet and Mitchell plans.
Sharon was quick to praise the U.S. plan, and for good reason. The prime minister's main goal is to win time, while preserving his unity coalition and refraining from making any territorial concessions or evacuating any settlements. In his speech in Kentucky, Powell gave Sharon a lot of rope. The speech set out a timetable, with all the short-term demands being made of the Palestinians, who have been called on to immediately cease the violence and incitement, and to arrest the terrorists.
The demands on Israel, first and foremost to freeze the settlements, will only go into effect in the next stage, after the shooting has stopped and the two sides complete the "cooling-off" period stipulated in the Mitchell Report. Who knows how long that will take, and what will happen by then on the ground.
The administration made every effort to steer clear of a confrontation with the prime minister. Several dozen drafts of the speech were written and every word was considered in the light of pressures from Israel and the Arab world. Powell decided to erase from the final draft his reservations regarding the "seven days of quiet," which Sharon has demanded as the first stage in the Mitchell plan.
Washington rejects Sharon's assertion that the U.S. agreed to this demand, but they assessed that it was not worth getting into a fight over a matter like this before a cease-fire has been achieved. The dispute over the "days of quiet" has now been handed over to the new U.S. envoy to the region, General (ret.) Anthony Zinni.
Sharon made the correct decision when he chose to postpone his visit to the U.S. and first hear Powell's speech. The administration had wanted to put pressure on him to present a new diplomatic plan to Bush. Now, Sharon will only have to reply to the principles outlined by Powell, and to conduct a general discussion with Bush on how to proceed with the stages that will follow once a cease-fire has been achieved.
As far as the Americans are concerned, the ball is now in the hands of one man: Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. They hope they will find in him a partner for a cease-fire. If they do, they will then pass the ball to Sharon, and see whether he fulfills his part of the deal.
Administration officials have been encouraged by the calls from second-tier Palestinian leaders for an honorable end to the Al Aqsa Intifada. These messages have generated hope in Washington and they contributed to the decision for Powell to give his speech at this juncture.
The Americans have taken a positive view of the local cease-fire agreements brokered in the West Bank, which enabled the Israel Defense Forces to withdraw from Palestinian-controlled areas there, and which were achieved with Arafat’s blessing. They also believe that Arafat agreed, even if only retroactively, to the arrest of the Islamic Jihad leader in Jenin by West Bank security chief Jibril Rajoub.
But this is still only circumstantial evidence. The position of the chairman remains a mystery, and it will be up to the duo of Zinni and assistant secretary of state for the Near East, William Burns, to decipher Arafat's true direction when they arrive in the region next week.
The speech of Secretary of State Colin Powell will serve from now on as the workplan of the U.S. in the Middle East, until the end of the present administration. The weight it carries, therefore, is greater than the immediate loss-gain assessment for Israel and the Palestinians.
The messages Powell delivered largely reflected a continuity of U.S. policy. President George Bush adopted the principles of the Clinton plan: aiming for an "end to the conflict and nothing less than that" as the goal of the peace process; dividing the land into two states, Israel and Palestine, and the definition of Israel as a "Jewish state;" an agreement on Jerusalem on the basis of the demands of both sides and freedom of religion; a "just, fair and realistic"; solution to the Palestinian refugee question.
The deal presented by Powell is simple: The Palestinians will end terror and incitement, and Israel the occupation and the settlements. First a cease-fire will be achieved, and then diplomatic negotiations will be renewed, along the lines of the Tenet and Mitchell plans.
Sharon was quick to praise the plan, and for good reason. The prime minister's main goal is to win time, while preserving his unity coalition and refraining from making any territorial concessions or evacuating any settlements. In his speech Monday, Powell gave Sharon a lot of rope. The speech set out a timetable, with all the short-term demands being made of the Palestinians, who have been called on to immediately cease the violence and incitement, and to arrest the terrorists.
The demands on Israel, first and foremost to freeze the settlements, will only go into effect in the next stage, after the shooting has stopped and the two sides complete the "cooling-off" period stipulated in the Mitchell Report. Who knows how long that will take, and what will happen by then on the ground.
The administration made every effort to steer clear of a confrontation with the prime minister. Several dozen drafts of the speech were written and every word was considered in the light of pressures from Israel and the Arab world. Powell decided to erase from the final draft his reservations regarding the "seven days of quiet" which Sharon has demanded as the first stage in the Mitchell plan.
Washington rejects Sharon's assertion that the U.S. agreed to this demand, but they assessed that it was not worth getting into a fight over a matter like this before a cease-fire has been achieved. The dispute over the "days of quiet" has now been handed over to the new U.S. envoy to the region, General Anthony Zinni.
Sharon made the correct decision when he chose to postpone his visit to the U.S. and first hear Powell's speech. The administration had wanted to put pressure on him to present a new diplomatic plan to Bush. Now, Sharon will only have to reply to the principles outlined by Powell, and to conduct a general discussion with Bush on how to proceed with the stages that will follow once a cease-fire has been achieved.
As far as the Americans are concerned, the ball is now in the hands of one man - Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. They hope they will find in him a partner for a cease-fire. If they do, they will then pass the ball to Sharon, and see whether he fulfills his part of the deal. Administration officials have been encouraged by the calls from second-tier Palestinian leaders for an honorable end to the Intifada. These messages have generated hope in Washington and they contributed to the decision for Powell to give his speech at this juncture.
The Americans have taken a positive view of the local cease-fire agreements brokered in the West Bank which enabled the IDF to withdraw from Palestinian-controlled areas there, and which were achieved with Arafat's blessing. They also believe that Arafat agreed, even if only retroactively, to the arrest of the Islamic Jihad leader in Jenin by West Bank security chief Jibril Rajoub.
But this is still only circumstantial evidence. The position of the chairman remains a mystery, and it will be up to the duo of Zinni and assistant secretary of state for the Near East, William Burns, to decipher Arafat's true direction when they arrive in the region next week. |
