The State of the War
2230 GMT, 011119
Summary
The recent withdrawal of Taliban forces from strategic areas of Afghanistan is a promising turn for the United States. But it is still not clear whether the retreat was part of a larger Taliban strategy. Whatever happens in Afghanistan, the United States must not lose sight of its top goal: preventing further attacks within America's borders.
Analysis
The war that began Sept. 11 clearly has taken an important turn in Afghanistan. But although recent events in the Afghan theater of operations were significant, it is not clear whether they represent a definitive conclusion to the war as a whole.
Let us recall the central war aim of the U.S. government: to render the al Qaeda network incapable of conducting any further attacks against the United States. A subsidiary goal was the death or capture of Osama bin Laden and others responsible for the attacks on the United States.
Replacing the government of Afghanistan was not an end in itself but merely a means toward an end. In the weeks after Sept. 11, the United States repeatedly said that if bin Laden were turned over to the United States, Washington would have no further quarrel with the Taliban. The United States had no interest in either involving itself in a war in Afghanistan or in shaping the future government of the country.
It was only after the Taliban refused to turn over bin Laden -- and it became evident that they were prepared to protect him to the end -- that the United States decided it had no choice but to attack and overthrow the government. This was not a fundamental goal nor even a core strategy but a subsidiary goal forced on the United States by Taliban action.
The United States neither wanted to commit major forces to the campaign nor was it in a position to do so. Thus, in STRATFOR's analysis War Plan: Part 2: The Afghan Theater of Operations, we forecast the following American strategy: "It appears to STRATFOR that the primary mechanisms available to the United States are relatively small scale, special operations forces that are highly mobile and have access to the nation's most comprehensive intelligence capabilities. This force can be coupled with some larger airborne and air mobile assets, but these must be limited in size for political and logistical reasons. The available air capability must be carrier-based, with some strategic support from long-range bombers and possibly, in special circumstances, from air forces in Turkey and the Persian Gulf."
Time is the key. Under most circumstances, a strategy like this would take years, and this would be unfortunate in this case. But it is not clear it would take this much time. The Taliban regime does not necessarily have as strong a grip on power as might appear, and it is possible, through effective operations, to rapidly spread the sense that they are doomed. In this case, the perception of failure can lead to the reality.
In short, the optimum strategy is one combining all of the elements of insurgency -- from psychological warfare to supply of weapons to insurgents. The virtue of this strategy is that it is the only one that could possibly bring down the Taliban and destroy bin Laden. We believe this is the option defense planners have selected. There will be no massive deployment of aircraft or divisions to the region. This will be a guerrilla war, with the United States orchestrating the guerrillas.
One way to view war is as the collision of two plans. It was clear to us that this had to be the American plan. The Taliban's plan was also clear to us. We wrote in a piece entitled First Strike Heralds Longer Campaign that defending the major cities of Afghanistan was not something the Taliban were going to do.
"However, the fall of Kabul," we wrote, "is not the key. Even the fall of Kandahar is not critical. What is critical is disrupting the ability of Taliban fighters to deploy over the countryside. The more strategic the bombardment in the cities, the greater the incentive and opportunity for the Taliban to disperse over the countryside, and the more complex and difficult the operations to destroy their armed forces will become."
Given the U.S. strategy, the Taliban would have been foolish to stand and defend the cities outside of its heartland. Even trying to hold their stronghold of Kandahar would have made no sense.
The fact that forces in Kandahar and Kunduz still appear to be fighting does not mean the Taliban are trying to retain control over the cities. In reality, at least one of the following scenarios is more likely: the forces in these areas are trapped and cannot escape, they are trying to tie down the Northern Alliance to keep them from pursuing the Taliban or they simply are not executing the pullout plan properly.
Afghan cities are the prizes of war, but they are not the key to victory. Losing them does not mean defeat. And for the Taliban, the cities were actually liabilities. Defending them meant concentrating infantry forces, making them extremely vulnerable to air power. Dispersing their troops negates the value of air power, undercutting U.S. strategy.
Moreover, holding the cities meant the Taliban would be responsible for feeding the citizen populations and would be held responsible for the calamitous starvation that would have undoubtedly taken hold. The logistical nightmare and political responsibility of such an operation is now transferred to the shoulders of the United States, which is where the Taliban wanted it.
Finally, abandoning the cities put in motion a process the Taliban desired: the disintegration of the alliance against them. The Taliban, having an intimate understanding of the Northern Alliance, understood that victory would lead to a splintering of competing groups.
More important, they hoped it would lead to a split not only between the United States and the Northern Alliance but also between Washington and Pakistan. When the United States promised Pakistan that Kabul would not be occupied by the Northern Alliance, which promptly went ahead and occupied the capital anyway, this created exactly the sort of tension the Taliban wanted.
Therefore, the Taliban's precipitous withdrawal from most major Afghan cities, even those not under particular military pressure, leads to one of two explanations. The first is that the American war plan worked, and the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif created a massive crisis within the Taliban that shattered their command and control structure, leaving them in ruins.
Barring that, the second explanation is that the Taliban war plan has been implemented. The Taliban have been withdrawing forces from these cities for weeks, and with the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif and the nearness of winter, they decided that now was the time to execute their war plan.
The Taliban left behind screening forces, primarily non-Afghans who would not be able to blend into the surrounding population, and withdrew their own remaining forces to their home villages and towns, where they will effectively disappear from view until called into action later.
At this point, we simply don't know which explanation is correct. We will probably not have a clear idea until spring, when the Taliban will have to launch operations to reassert itself.
A combination of both explanations is also possible. The Taliban might have been carrying out a plan to withdraw from the cities, but carrying out a strategic withdrawal and dispersal under fire is one of the most difficult maneuvers in warfare. Whether it was successful or not, it is doubtful that even the Taliban know yet how they made out.
But from the American perspective, this has little to do with the war as a whole. The war is not about the future of Afghanistan but about breaking the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan, in the rest of the world and especially in the United States. The entire Afghan operation is justified only to the extent that it contributes to this primary mission.
One of the efforts to achieve this goal was the recent rapid movement of U.S. Special Forces into buildings that housed al Qaeda operatives. They were looking for al Qaeda agents to capture and question as well as for documents that would provide information about the location of al Qaeda task forces, individual personnel and money outside of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is an intelligence opportunity, with the goal to protect the United States from any further attacks. The government of Afghanistan, Taliban or not, is a matter of total indifference to the United States. Even the fate of the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan is of interest primarily only to the extent that it leads to the identification of cells in the United States.
The question is whether or not such information is available in Afghanistan. Afghan centers would certainly have information about the location of dispersed al Qaeda command centers in Europe, North Africa and other places. It is no coincidence that there were quiet actions against alleged terrorist members or supporters in Spain, Egypt and Germany during the week.
Command centers in these areas would have the most important information of all: whether or not additional task forces had been deployed in the United States, the names of their commanders and the objects of their missions. The destruction of the Afghan base in no way guarantees that the groups already deployed in the United States will be rendered ineffective. Even the death or capture of bin Laden does not guarantee that.
It is critical to recall that Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, in his interview with the BBC last week, made it clear that the Taliban response would come in the United States. There is no reason to doubt him. As STRATFOR said Oct. 14: "It follows, therefore, that a combined strategy of dispersing Taliban troops, combined with another round of attacks in the United States, might force Washington to overextend its position and create the political conditions the Taliban badly needs. Thus, the current movements we see inside of Afghanistan may be part of a Taliban plan, and the current FBI warnings of imminent danger of attack might be serious indeed. The Taliban has every reason to stage an attack, and quickly."
"We think that this remains true today. If al Qaeda has additional task forces in the United States -- and there is no reason to think they don't -- striking now is clearly in the Taliban's interest. First, it proves that they have not been disabled, which is critical to their audience in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the rest of the Islamic world. Second, it might force the United States to overextend and possibly strike deeper into Afghanistan or into another Islamic country."
Therefore, the events of last week are extremely promising from an American standpoint, but they are far from definitive. The intercontinental theater of operations -- the multiple locations where al Qaeda's command, control and support system operates -- remains key.
The goal of the war is not to defeat the Taliban. It is to destroy the international network known as al Qaeda and secure the United States from attack. The news for the United States in that regard seemed pretty good last week, although judging clearly is difficult. But whatever is going on in Afghanistan, the top threat remains in the United States.
stratfor.com |
