SPECIAL REPORT
Gains slow in global probe of Al Qaeda
By Anthony Shadid and Michael Kranish, Globe Staff, 12/2/2001
MADRID - Despite the high level of international cooperation in the war against terrorism, the impact
of some highly publicized arrests may have been exaggerated, and the vast majority of Al Qaeda
members are still at large in cells around the world, according to investigators and experts.
At home, US officials have arrested relatively few members of Al Qaeda, massive publicity about
more than 1,000 detentions notwithstanding. And overseas, in countries such as Spain and Britain,
investigators have acknowledged in interviews that they cannot draw direct ties between the Sept. 11
attacks and some of the most high-profile terrorism suspects.
In a sweep that followed Sept. 11, as many as 3,000 people around the world have been arrested or
detained on suspicion of being involved in terrorism, according to a database maintained by the
International Center for Terrorism Studies, a nonpartisan Virginia think tank. Of those, about 1,000
may be members of Al Qaeda, the network headed by Osama bin Laden that is estimated to have
about 12,000 hard-core followers, according to the center.
That still leaves more than 90 percent of Al Qaeda members at large. Some are in cells damaged
here in Madrid, elsewhere in Europe, and in North America, but many are intact in East Asia,
especially in the Philippines and Indonesia, said Michael Swetnam, chairman of the Potomac Institute
for Policy Studies, which advises Congress on terrorism issues. ''Significant progress has been made,''
Swetnam said. ''But it will be a lot more difficult as we go to the further reaches of the Al Qaeda
network, and it will probably be much harder to get.''
Michael Fowler, a specialist on law enforcement, said: ''The battle against the Taliban and against
Osama bin Laden may well be seen by future historians as the easiest and least controversial of all
the stages in the campaign against international terrorism.''
It is far too early to declare the war against terrorism a success or failure. President Bush repeatedly
has emphasized that the effort will take years - and experts agree with that assessment. Attorney
General John Ashcroft said last week that the United States has kept secret the Qaeda background of
some detained suspects.
But more than 11 weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, penetrating and breaking up a network with so
many tentacles in so many countries is proving exceedingly difficult.
US investigators are encountering the usual problems inherent in coordinating law enforcement across
borders. Publicly, countries have vowed to work with the United States in the investigation. But
largely out of public view, many are refusing to extradite suspects to the United States, and are
balking at freezing assets of suspected terrorists.
And despite warm words last week from Bush and the Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar,
there are indications of frayed relationships between US and some European authorities. A Spanish
investigator complained, for example, that FBI agents were reticent in sharing information with their
Spanish counterparts.
The more novel challenges are posed by trying to track down the Qaeda network itself. The network
spans 60 countries, but remains amorphous. Its links are often personal, and are rarely structured. Its
activities involve hundreds, if not thousands, of militants. And in Europe, known for its liberal asylum
laws, much of Al Qaeda's work was legal - such as raising money to send fighters to Bosnia and
Chechnya.
All agree that unprecedented cooperation between US and European intelligence services is crucial to
success in fighting terrorism, particularly in the next phase, post-Afghanistan, as the United States is
forced to rely heavily on local law enforcement.
Arrests in Madrid
presage a hard road
The arrests on Nov. 13 of eight suspected Islamic militants in Madrid provide a window on the extent
of the difficulties posed by the global investigation into the attacks.
Spanish police have painted a detailed picture of the cell's activities, beginning in 1994. Its activities fit
the mold of Al Qaeda cells in Europe and elsewhere - its means, legitimate and otherwise, for raising
funds; its tactics in sending money to operatives abroad; its style of recruitment; and the cover its
members used to divert attention.
The cell, led by a Syrian named Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, fenced stolen credit cards, forged
documents, faked telephone calling cards, and resorted to armed robbery to raise money to finance
the cell's own trips, as well as those of recruits to camps in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Indonesia,
according to a 25-page Spanish indictment.
Money was sent in relatively small amounts - $6,400, $3,200, $2,000 and $500. That practice, meant to
divert attention that large transfers would attract, is standard for Al Qaeda cells, investigators say.
Members, they say, were involved in the campaigns that defined militant Islamic activism in the 1990s
- bitter struggles in places like Bosnia and Chechnya. The indictment says the cell arranged travel for
recruits and veterans. One route, it said, was from Bosnia to Spain by way of Yemen, a country that
has served as a base for Al Qaeda.
Members of the cell traveled to the camps as well. One operative, a Spanish convert to Islam named
Luis Jose Galan Gonzalez, trained in Indonesia in July.
Police had kept an eye on the cell since at least 1996. They acted now because, in the words of the
indictment, its members ''have been directly related to the preparation and development of the
attacks'' on Sept. 11.
The Spanish investigation has focused on the role of Yarkas, also known as Abu Dahdah. The
evidence connecting Yarkas includes the discovery of his telephone number in an apartment shared
by the lead hijacker, Mohamed Atta, and a series of phone conversations with a European operative
that suggest Yarkas knew of the attacks.
With Prime Minister Aznar at his side, Bush said last Wednesay that ''Spain has arrested Al Qaeda
members and has shared information about those Al Qaeda members and it's incredibly helpful.'' But
those links remain tenuous, officials acknowledge, and in recent days they have said they will need
more evidence for a conviction.
Investigators theorize that Yarkas met Atta, who traveled to Spain at least twice, and perhaps three
times, between January and July. But segments of Atta's trips remain unknown, depriving police of
crucial clues.
''There are some days missing in the calendar of Mohamed Atta's time in Spain,'' Juan Cotino, Spain's
national police chief, said in an interview. ''We couldn't keep track of him.''
Another Spanish investigator was more direct. When asked what evidence police have linking the
cell's members to Atta, who is considered the coordinator of the Sept. 11 attacks, he answered:
''We've got none.''
Neither have they identified the European operative named ''Shakur'' who seems to have discussed
the attacks with Yarkas. The indictment describes the operative as 34 years old and speaking with a
heavy accent.
But Jesus Alonso, a Madrid prosecutor who coordinates Spain's response to Islamic terrorism, said
Shakur's true identity remains a mystery. ''We don't know who he is,'' Alonso said. ''We don't know if
it's one guy or a name that different people use.''
Whether directly tied to Sept. 11 or not, Yarkas's career offers a glimpse into the difficulties
investigators are facing in tracking Al Qaeda operations and deciding which ones should be broken
up. Yarkas was an effective operative, concealing well-established ties to bin Laden's lieutenants
beneath the veneer of an immigrant on the make. He lived with his Spanish wife, who had converted
and had adopted the veil, and with his four children, in a red-brick building of 120 apartments.
To his neighbors, he was well-dressed and polite. He was gregarious, and his Spanish was almost
perfect. He offered to help women carry their shopping bags. He seemed religious, but not overly
ardent. And, like the Sept. 11 hijackers, he sought to fade into his surroundings.
''We didn't imagine anything until we saw him on TV,'' said Santiago Martinez, a 43-year-old neighbor
in a working-class Madrid neighborhood. ''Maybe he had to be that way so nobody would suspect
anything.''
Finding a network
dating from Bosnia
But he was well-known to the militant networks that operated legally in Europe in the 1990s, providing
funds and recruits to conflicts in Bosnia and elsewhere. Al Qaeda clearly fed into that flourishing
network, exploiting jumbled and intricate channels and connections.
Yarkas traveled more than 20 times to Britain, as well as to Turkey, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Jordan, according to the Madrid indictment. He kept up phone contacts with
militants in Germany, Indonesia, Australia, and Afghanistan. The indictment suggested that the cell's
illegal activities went to funding his trips, which it said could not have been paid for on Yarkas's salary
as a used car dealer.
The challenge to investigators is that for years, the activity of Yarkas and others on behalf of Muslim
fighters was considered legitimate. US allies like Saudi Arabia and Malaysia encouraged it, providing
funding and even logistics.
''It was not officially supported as it was in the case of Afghanistan'' in the 1980s but there were no
restrictions whatsoever,'' said Azam Tamimi, an Islamic activist in London. ''Everybody was
involved.''
Navigating those networks - and determining which militants constitute a threat - poses a key obstacle
in the effort to break up Al Qaeda, specialists say.
''These cells are very numerous and scattered around the world, not really connected, and this
network is still spreading like a cancer, like a web, not all really connected to Al Qaeda groups,''
France's top antiterrorism magistrate, Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere, said in a telephone interview on
Friday. ''When you destroy one network you have one other one. The problem we have right now is
to discover all the networks which can be working on the undercover basis. This is very dangerous
for the future. We have to continue to work and enhance the cooperation between the states.''
Alonso, the Spanish investigator, hinted at the scope of the challenge. He estimated that hundreds of
people were involved just in Europe in activity loosely connected with Al Qaeda in most major
European cities: London, Paris, Naples, Rome, Brussels, Hamburg and Madrid. Another reputed
haven is Milan, where police last week arrested two men accused of recruiting fighters for Al Qaeda.
Some of the top suspects remain at large, including the hijackers' alleged paymaster, Mustafa
Muhammad Ahmad, and another man suspected of being the intended 20th hijacker, Ramzi bin
al-Shibh of Yemen. If either is captured - or a bigger cell is cracked - the investigation might move
much more quickly.
''This cell has disappeared,'' Alonso said of the Madrid group, ''but there are more in Spain and there
are more in Europe.''
The local limits
to international help
US investigators say that those cells are in at least 60 countries, and that terrorist organizations
operate in more than 100 countries. But with a few exceptions, such as Afghanistan and perhaps
Somalia, the United States is counting on authorities within those nations to track suspects.
As the investigation proceeds, conflicts are arising.
US law enforcement has no legal right to act in another country without permission. Typically, the
United States asks another country to arrest a particular person, and then seeks the suspect's
extradition. But many countries have refused to make such arrests, and European nations have balked
at extraditing suspects who might face the death penalty or who might be tried by military tribunals.
Only 13 suspected terrorists were extradited to the United States between 1993 to 1998, a period that
included numerous attacks attributed to Al Qaeda. That included Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, who was arrested in Pakistan, and several of those
responsible for the attacks in 1998 on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
Last week, authorities in Spain said they would not extradite Yarkas or his accomplices unless they
were assured that the death penalty would be waived. They said they would insist, too, that the
suspects not go before the secret US military tribunals created by President Bush.
Others in Europe are expected to take similar positions, and the biggest successes so far - an
Egyptian militant extradited to Cairo from Syria and the reported capture in Afghanistan recently of
Ahmed Abdel-Rahman, son of Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was convicted of plotting to blow up
New York City landmarks - occurred outside the United States and Europe.
Britain, in particular, could pose a problem to US investigators. While Britain remains the chief ally of
the United States in the antiterrorism effort, it has blocked extraditions of terrorist suspects for years -
a source of irritation not only for the United States but also for Arab countries like Egypt and Jordan,
who accuse it of providing safe haven for their fugitives.
Among the most high-profile cases are those of Khaled al-Fawwaz, Ibrahim Eidarous, and Adel
Abdel Bary, all three indicted in the United States in connection with the 1998 embassy bombings in
Africa. They have successfully fought extradition from Britain.
Emerging as another focal point is Lotfi Raissi, a 27-year-old Algerian pilot who is detained in
London. Widespread media reports initially portrayed Raissi as having trained some of the Sept. 11
hijackers. But when the United States formally requested his extradition last week, it turned out that
the charges dealt mainly with making false statements on immigration and license forms. The British
judge overseeing the extradition hearings suggested that evidence had shown only a ''tenuous
connection'' with the attacks. Nonetheless, US officials still hope to show Raissi was involved. The
extradition itself could take years, some experts say.
Other Al Qaeda suspects wanted in Arab countries remain free in Britain. They include Abu Qutada,
also known as Omar Mahmoud Abu Omar, who is named in the Madrid indictment as a key contact
of Yarkas and whom Jordan suspects of a role in planning attacks on tourist sites during millennium
celebrations. The US Treasury asked that Qutada's assets be frozen - by all accounts meager, since
he receives welfare - and Britain detained him briefly in February.
Qutada denies any link to the Spanish suspects, and police apparently have insufficient evidence to
keep him in custody.
''A lot of people come to this mosque to pray. Do I know all of them? No,'' Qutada said in an
interview outside the Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre in a dreary London neighborhood. ''Their
names are unfamiliar to me.''
A Scotland Yard spokeswoman declined to comment on his case, saying only that ''we have groups
and individuals we monitor.''
Few resources,
many conflicts
So far, much of the US investigation overseas remains undercover, handled primarily by the CIA.
Before Sept. 11, intelligence agencies in other countries often resisted CIA requests for information.
But after the attacks, a number of countries have provided intelligence that has led to arrests. CIA
agents have been allowed to interview terrorist suspects or informants in other countries, a US
intelligence official said, describing a process that previously would not have been allowed in some of
those nations.
While arrests since Sept. 11 in Britain, Germany, and Spain have received the most attention, one of
the most important may have been made a few months earlier with little fanfare in the United Arab
Emirates. In July, Emirates officials arrested Djamel Beghal, who is suspected of being a ringleader in
a foiled plot to blow up the US Embassy in Paris.
Beghal, who reportedly has been interviewed by both CIA and FBI officials, began talking to
authorities about a number of plots by Al Qaeda, including the Paris bombing. But while Beghal at
least initially said he had ties to bin Laden, he apparently did not provide information about the Sept.
11 attacks.
Meanwhile, when it comes to police work - even in an investigation of this scope - the United States
is being forced to rely on modest resources abroad. The United States has 2,000 people devoted to
working with law enforcement agencies in other countries, with responsibilities for everything from
customs to immigration to illegal drug trafficking to terrorism. These include 44 ''legats,'' the FBI
agents who work as legal attaches in US embassies.
But the 2,000 US officials often do not work together, because of bureaucratic infighting. Cooperation
with other countries could prove difficult, as well. In Spain, one investigator bridled at the attitude of
his US counterparts after an hourlong meeting in Madrid after the indictment.
''They didn't talk much,'' he said. ''They didn't say a word about their investigation.''
Shadid reported from Spain and London, Kranish from Washington. They can be reached by
e-mail at ashadid@globe.com and kranish@globe.com
This story ran on page A1 of the Boston Globe on 12/2/2001.
© Copyright 2001 Globe Newspaper Company. |
