Thread: I apologize for posting this information on Christmas Eve. It is not appropriate for this day, and I suggest you ignore it and get on with your celebrations of peace and good will. What follows is intended for "Solon" only.
Mr. "Solon": Your citation for the selected excerpts from the Strategic Bombing report, which you have posted many times, is this:
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The sponsor of this site is Chuck Anesi. In case you may not have visited Mr. Anesi's site yourself, I thought you might be interested in his comments on the report:
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How the United States
Strategic Bombing
Survey reports
endorsed the use of the
atomic bombs
The United States Strategic
Bombing Survey reports do not
state or even suggest that the use
of the atomic bomb against Japan
was unwise. On the contrary, a
careful analysis of the USSBS
findings supports the wisdom of
using the bombs.
The USSBS Summary Report for the Pacific war states (page 26, emphasis added):
On 6 August the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and on 9 August Russia entered the war. In the
succeeding meetings of the Supreme War Direction Council, the differences of opinion previously existing as to
the Potsdam terms persisted exactly as before. By using the urgency brought about through fear of further
atomic bombing attacks, the Prime Minister found it possible to bring the Emperor directly into the
discussions of the Potsdam terms. Hirohito, acting as arbiter, resolved the conflict in favor of unconditional
surrender.
The public admission of defeat by the responsible Japanese leaders, which constituted the political objective of
the United States offensive begun in 1943, was thus secured prior to invasion and while Japan was still
possessed of some 2,000,000 troops and over 9,000 planes in the home islands. Military defeats in the air, at sea
and on the land, destruction of shipping by submarines and by air, and direct air attack with conventional as
well as atomic bombs, all contributed to this accomplishment.
There is little point in attempting precisely to impute Japan's unconditional surrender to any one of the numerous
causes which jointly and cumulatively were responsible for Japan's disaster. The time lapse between military
impotence and political acceptance of the inevitable might have been shorter had the political structure of Japan
permitted a more rapid and decisive determination of national policies. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, even
without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring
about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion.
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese
leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability
prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if
Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.
Which makes it abundantly clear that:
The Survey assumed that continued conventional attacks on Japan -- with additional
direct and indirect casualties -- would be needed to force surrender by the November
or December dates mentioned;
The Survey's estimate of Japan's likelihood of surrender without the atomic
bombings, subject only to continued conventional attack, was based largely on
information collected after the end of the war, and not known to decision makers in
August, 1945;
The Survey acknowledged that use of the atomic bombs hastened the end of the war;
and
The Survey did not, in any way, criticize the use of the atomic bombs or suggest that
they were not the most humane and least costly means for ending the war. (They
merely opined that Japan's surrender could have been achieved through
conventional air power only; they did not say that the use of conventional air power
would have been more merciful or less costly.)
Writers who question the wisdom of the atomic bombings ignore all these points. As a
result, these writer impute to decision makers a knowledge they did not possess. These
writers also fail to ask the obvious question: what casualties would have occurred if the
United States had used only conventional air power to force Japan out of the war? Would
they have been worse than those caused by the atomic bombings?
The following table lists the casualties of various kinds that would have occurred had the
war been prolonged and unconditional surrender forced by conventional air power, instead
of by the atomic bombs.
Souce of additional casualties
Notes and Survey References
Japanese military and civilian casualties
resulting from continued air attack.
The Survey's pet scheme was to interdict transportation.
It believed this would have "reduced Japan to a series of
isolated communities, incapable of any sustained
industrial production, incapable of moving food from the
agricultural areas to the cities, and incapable of rapid
large-scale movements of troops and munitions."
(Summary Report, p. 19).
In addition, the Survey said, "In order to bring maximum
pressure on the civilian population and to complicate
further the Japanese economic problems, night and bad
weather attacks on urban areas could have been carried
out simultaneously with the transportation attack."
(Summary Report, p. 20)
Given that 185,000 casualties were sustained during the
first Tokyo attack on 9 March 1945 (Summary Report, p.
20), it seems likely that direct casualties from continued
conventional bombardment would have exceeded those
caused by the atomic bombs.
Civilian casualties from malnutrition and
disease.
"The average diet suffered even more drastically from
reductions in fats, vitamins and minerals required for
balance and adversely affected rates of recovery and
mortality from disease and bomb injuries.
Undernourishment produced a major increase in the
incidence of beriberi and tuberculosis." (Summary
Report, p.21)
Obviously significant casualties would have accrued, had
the war been prolonged several months, from
malnutrition and disease. (Remember that antibiotic
treatment for tuberculosis and other bacterial infections
was not available to Japanese civilians at that time.)
Japanese military casualties in bypassed
areas.
"In the Central Pacific, many of the islands the Japanese
expected us to attack were bypassed, and the garrisons
left to wither and die. Survey examination of the bypassed
islands in the Pacific and interrogation of the Japanese
survivors confirmed their intolerable situation. Their
planes and ground installations were destroyed by air
attack. Cut off from any supplies or reinforcements,
except occasionally by submarine, their food ran out. On
certain of the islands, Japanese actually ate Japanese."
(Summary Report, p. 13)
Prolonging the war would have resulted in even greater
suffering for these soldiers, and for any civilians
unfortunate enough to be on the same islands.
Civilian casualties in Japanese-occupied
areas.
The savage mistreatment of civilians in
Japanese-occupied China (e.g. germ warfare experiments
and promiscuous slaughter of civilians) and French
Indo-China (more slaughter, including the use of mustard
gas) is well known. These areas were still in Japanese
possession at the time of the Japanese surrender.
Prolonging the war would have prolonged the agony of
these civilian populations.
United States military casualties.
Although those who criticize the use of the atomic bombs
seem not to care at all about U.S. military casualties, the
result of continuing the war for several additional months
would have been substantial casualties -- from combat,
tropical diseases, accidents and losses at sea.
Economic cost of continuing the war.
False piety aside, war is a very expensive business, and
delaying our demobilization by several months would have
been very, very costly. I assume here that readers
understand that human life cannot be viewed as priceless,
and is not viewed so by any civilized country on earth.
This is probably the first time you have seen an analysis of this sort. This is because most
historians and nearly all journalists couldn't analyze their way out of a paper bag. It's
unfortunate, but it's true. Any attempt to ennumerate and quantify the costs of various
decision alternatives is beyond them.
Complete text of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific
War)
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