Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: tekboy who wrote (14774)	12/26/2001 3:56:48 PM
From: Hawkmoon	Respond to of 281500

Second, given an accurate assessment of the relative merits of those options in light of a wide range of different interests, which nets out the best (or the least bad)? Or what they can manage to scratch together in a short period of time, driven by a mentality of "putting out the fires" as quickly as possible, and in a form that creates as little outrage as possible. And then adjust fire when some country, or special interest, is able to raise sufficient complaints as to make the position untenable. I have a friend over at the State Dept (who shall remain nameless) in a position of such responsibility, that many position papers directed toward a specific region's economic iniatives pushed at ambassadorial to presidential level, are actually penned by this person. And the greatest insight this person has provided me is how reactionary much of US foreign policy is. It's either (over/under)reacting to events beyond our control and squelching them before they get out of hand, or it's some political appointee trying to make a name for themselves proposing a new program iniative that has no foundation in reality. And my friend, of all of the many sleepless nights spent typing up some "must have" proposal, or position statement, still finds most of the credit for his/her's creations being given to the political appointees. Here's to the unknown, and unheraldled "staff pukes" who REALLY direct this country's foreign policy in hopes of someday being recognized for their endless toil, and to the continuity of specialized knowledge they provide to the "political temps", posing as foreign service officers. Btw, my friend was out of country for about half of this year, living in foreign hotels and having his/her government credit card ran up (which he/she must make payments on until reimbursement follows months after returning and filing the paperwork.. if nothing gets lost, that is). Hawk

To: tekboy who wrote (14774)	12/26/2001 4:42:50 PM
From: JohnM	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Most of those hypothetical policies are not realistically available alternatives, because they would be eliminated somewhere along the way by powerful forces of one kind or another. That's not nefarious conspiracy theory, just the way the world works. This all makes sense from the viewpoint of the policy wonk. I would not argue otherwise. But there are two other considerations. First, all policy outcomes in major conflict situations must carry the weight of large, usually tragic, human losses (if I had a poetic touch perhaps I could do that sentence more justice). It's important to remember those, even in the settlements, though the compromises might not include them. For instance, as I read Said and as I read the Foreign Affairs essay on the Palestinians you recommended, I'm struck by the talk of the pre 1967 boundaries. To the Palestinians, it seems to me, that's a critical memory. Also, Said keeps mentioning that Jews, who may have been born anywhere, have a "right of return" while Palestinians, who were born in "Palestine" do not. Whatever settlement is worked out, if one is, needs to remember these alternative outcomes or history does becomes as the oft quoted aphorism of Nietzsche (tough spellling) goes, only the tale of the winners. Second, those lost outcomes need to be remembered, or at least some of them, because they tend to be alive in the memory of a good many actual subjects and survive as disappontments, anger, whatever, and can become the basis for future mobilization. Said, for instance, makes the point that the Oslo agreements were destined to fail because they failed to account for these "lost outcomes" (my term) among other things and, thus, became the basis for future conflict. So, back to your all outcomes suck, some just suck less than others. You might note to your students that if there is a widespread sense of "suckiness" in the not-so-powerful, the suckers might become the suckees. (Wow, genuine non-humor there). John (can't find a copy of Martin Kramer so have been reading Bernard Lewis' essay in the January 02 issue of Atlantic Monthly as a substitute and am reading the section of Orientalism on Lewis--very clear that Said lays it on thick)