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To: Paul A who wrote (18066)1/7/2002 10:45:51 PM
From: Tom Hua  Respond to of 19633
 
Paul, that was easy albeit tricky. Sent someone down to the trading floor to spread the rumors that NTAP might not make the quarter, stock dived, Briefing.com picked up on the story, stock tumbled some more <g>.

INVN and OSIS in the BostonGlobe today

boston.com

Err-to-air combat

Security experts agree that explosive-detecting devices alone won't
make airports safer. The challenge, the say, lies in combining
technology with stricter screening standards

By Stephanie Stoughton, Globe Staff, 1/7/2002

abbed last month as he allegedly attempted to blow up an American Airlines
flight from Paris, Richard Colvin Reid failed miserably in his mission when he
couldn't light up the plastic explosives stashed in his high-top sneaker. But the fact
that he managed to board the plane highlighted the weaknesses in airport security
systems.



For decades, airports, airlines, and governments have been struggling to bring in new
technology that can detect explosives on people and in baggage. But as the US
government races to assess systems that can ''sniff'' explosive particles and view
everything between you and your jeans, some security experts are sounding alarms.

An overwhelming reliance on technology, they say, is not the answer. The latest
machines are not fail-safe. Plus, they provide few protections when deployed without
the far-reaching policies and skilled security workers needed to scrutinize suspicious
passengers.

''We need a combination of the human factor and technology,'' said Lior Zouker,
CEO of ICTS, a Dutch security firm hired by carriers such as American Airlines.
''Technology is important, but it is more important to have a comprehensive and
integrated [security] system.''

The first time the Federal Aviation Administration demanded that airlines deploy
explosive-detection equipment was in 1989 after a bomb placed in checked luggage
blew up Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland. But it was not until 1994 that the FAA
certified the first bomb-detection screeners for baggage from InVision Technologies
Inc. of California.

Using ''computed tomography'' technology similar to CAT-scan medical devices,
InVision's CTX units can detect C-4 and other plastic explosives. About 250 CTX
devices are now in use at airports worldwide, with about 160 in the United States.

By the end of 2002, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandates that all
checked bags in the United States must go through explosive-detection equipment.

The machines are not perfect. Although the FAA has set minimum performance
standards, the accepted explosive detection and false-alarm rates are still ''not those
rates desired by the aviation industry,'' James F. O'Bryon, deputy director of the
Defense Department's operational testing office, told Congress in October.

''Rather these thresholds have been driven by the inability of current equipment to
perform any better.''

Some government and airline officials have been particularly critical of machines
made by L-3 Communications Holdings Inc., the only other company certified by the
FAA to provide explosive-detection systems.

The New York company had lobbied hard in Congress to bring its eXaminer
scanners to airports, but one of the company's $1 million baggage scanners at
Dallas-Fort Worth Airport repeatedly broke down, while nine other devices idled in
warehouses.

L-3 executives have blamed the problems on typical start-up glitches, and said the
Dallas baggage scanner was intended to be a demonstration model.

Other versions of the equipment, now installed in airports in Baltimore, Hawaii, and
Italy, have not had the same problems, chief executive Frank Lanza said. ''The
performance has improved dramatically,'' he said.

Over the next year, US airports are expected to experience more frustrations as they
make room for the bulky equipment that screens checked baggage, said Tom Jensen,
president of the National Safe Skies Alliance, a nonprofit organization in Tennessee
that researches aviation security equipment.

''There are going to be lots of problems going forward,'' Jensen said.

To make room for the equipment, some airports have knocked down walls and taken
over lobby space. West European countries, which have battled terrorists for
decades, have overcome many of the glitches in installing and operating new
checked-baggage screening machines.

In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks and Reid's alleged Dec. 22 bombing attempt,
there has been renewed interest in explosive-detecting technologies, including new
devices that scan passengers and their carry-on bags. Today, the vast majority of
walk-through detectors used to scan passengers do not detect plastic explosives, and
the X-ray machines for carry-on items rely heavily on humans to recognize a vast
array of potential weapons.

Companies such as Rapiscan Security Products, a subsidiary of OSI Systems Inc. of
California, say their products could have caught the explosives in Reid's shoes. The
FAA recently awarded Rapiscan $1.4 million to step up development of technology
to detect explosives in checked and carry-on baggage. The company uses a
multienergy X-ray system that distinguishes between inorganic and organic materials,
and uses different colors on the screen to classify items under scrutiny.

Rapiscan has developed a walk-through detector that can see everything between a
passenger's skin and clothing.

Using low-level X-ray technology, the portal creates a computer image of the body,
showing the shape, size and precise location of ceramic knives, C-4, and other hidden
weapons. It can also see love handles and body parts - one reason why airlines have
eschewed it.

''It's more an issue of privacy,'' said Sanjay Sabnani, an OSI Systems spokesman.
''Several correctional institutions use it. But these are places where you forego your
rights.''

The FAA also has funded the development of bomb-screening devices made by
InVision's Quantum Magnetics subsidiary. Quantum's ''Qscan'' baggage scanner and
handheld wand use a technology related to the magnetic resonance imaging used in
hospitals.

Billerica-based American Science and Engineering has re-

entered the fray with a device that uses low-level X-rays to highlight explosives. The
company, which has provided equipment to the US military and several federal
agencies, previously moved away from the aviation industry after the FAA picked
computed tomography as the winning bomb-detection technology.

At Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, authorities are now testing a walk-through
portal made by Ion Track Instruments Inc., based in Wilmington. The device ''sniffs''
the air around a person for vapors and microscopic particles given off by drugs and
explosives. Although the system might have detected the explosives in Reid's shoes,
it is only being used for passengers traveling to the Middle East.

In spite of the new high-tech developments, most equipment manufacturers and
security experts agree that the airport screening process is only as good as the
security policies in place and the workers used to implement them.

''I am very frustrated,'' said ICTS's Zouker, a former El Al sky marshal, who said he
has tried to get US airlines to adopt more stricter screening standards. ''You have to
have a system - a much more thorough means of searching - not just technology.''

Zouker declined to discuss the specifics of Reid's screening at Charles de Gaulle
Airport on Dec. 22 and the previous day, when a wary ICTS security worker called
for French border police.

Although no metal detector would have caught the plastic explosives in Reid's shoes,
French police have been criticized for allowing the British drifter to board Flight 63
bound for Miami in spite of numerous warnings signals. They included no fixed
address, a murky travel agenda, no checked luggage, and a one-way ticket purchased
with cash.

At no time was Reid searched by hand or sniffed by dogs that can detect plastic
explosives.

Over the summer, El Al took a more aggressive approach toward Reid before
allowing him to board a flight from Amsterdam to Israel. Security workers were so
skeptical that they interrogated him, gave him a body search, and removed his shoes
for screening. Then the airline reportedly assigned him to a window seat in the back
of the plane. His seatmate: an armed sky marshal.

The challenges of deploying the Israeli system is more daunting in the United States,
which has hundreds of airports and thousands of planes. Today, US security officials
are still trying to devise ways of deploying bomb-detection equipment without
creating long lines, as well as integrating technologies in a way that is invisible to
passengers.

But in addition to installing new equipment, the United States must develop better
intelligence and screening policies to identify risky fliers, security officials said. Then,
passengers who arouse as much suspicion as Reid should be given both the high-tech
and low-tech treatments, including body searches and the use of bomb-sniffing dogs,
officials said.

Other recommendations include cross-referencing the FAA's Computer Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System with law enforcement and financial databases and
beefing up training and requirements for airport security workers.

Security screeners have been a glaring weakness in the system. In FAA tests,
screeners missed 13 percent of potentially dangerous objects in 1978, and 20 percent
in 1987. Test data for 1991 to 1999 revealed that greater percentages of weapons
were being missed, according to a US General Accounting Office report. The report
blamed the low detection rates on rapid turnover of underpaid employees and
''inadequate attention to human factors.''

There is also great hope that the nation's intelligence community and aviation officials
are keeping a step ahead of tomorrow's criminals. But as the nation patches
yesterday's security holes, terrorists are likely thinking of new ways to sneak
explosives onto planes.

''I don't think there is a fail-safe system in anything,'' said Frederick Muntz, a vice
president at InVision. ''What we can do is continue to make it better, knowing full
well that every time we make it better, we deter. ... The bad guys will know.''

Stephanie Stoughton can be reached by e-mail at stoughton

@globe.com.

Regards,

Tom