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Politics : Sharks in the Septic Tank -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Solon who wrote (42138)	1/10/2002 11:52:47 AM
From: TimF	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 82486

Nowhere does the report even hint that the projections of surrender were based on extrapolating a progressive and cumulative series of civilian deaths. It is dealing with the realities of the time. The reality of 1944 and 1945 is increasing bombing and destruction in Japan. There is no logical reason to exclude this reality from its projections. In fact it would be so basic to its projections that it is not surprising that it is not explicity stated. However it is indeed hinted at by "Nevertheless, it seems clear that, even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion." What would need to be explicitly stated is any deviation from what was happening in 44 and 45. They did for example explicity state "even without the atomic bombing attacks" because the attacks did actually happen and if you are going to project something different then the reality of the war it must be made explicit if the readers of the report are going to understand what you are talking about. Similarly if they would project a complete stop on bombing, or on bombing of cities the report would only be properly understood if they explicitly stated this. You can assume that the only thing these hundreds of investigators were interested in was the bombing of civilians, but simply forgot to set it down in their report and conclusions. You can assume whatever you like. But it was wrong and devious of you to interpolate your own words and assumptions into a Report that says nothing about bombing any additional targets. So if allied forces had been bombing Japan almost continually for over a year and the report doesn't explicitly say anything about the bombing continuing of ceasing we would assume that the authors of the report where talking about a hypothetical situation where it would stop before a surrender? That doesn't make any sense. Japan knew as early as 1943 that the war was inevitably lost. But the fanatics would never agree to surrender if their divine emperor (the Monarch and Symbol of a people) was to be humiliated, disgraced, and perhaps worse... Many of the fanatics new in 1943 that the war was lost but they prefered to go down fighting rather then surrender. To them any surrender was a humiliation and a disgrace. They might have agreed to a cease fire or even a peace treaty but not a surrender. I suppose that you could argue that a peace treaty in 43 or 44 that left Japan undefeated but saved lives on both sides, but the political realities of the time would not have allowed for it. Also it would leave the risk of a rearmed Japan trying something again in a few years (although with a more vigiliant and better armed post war America, such an attempt would have been even stupider then going to war with the US the first time so it might reasonably be considered unlikely). Again: there was no resistance. The only "resistance" left (so long as there was no invasion to make Americans vulnerable) was the resistance to surrendering their divine throne as a POW. As long as the Americans stayed away from walking on Japanese soil, the hopes and the power of the fanatics would dwindle. There was no resistance left (outside of resistance against any invasion, or AA fire against our bombers) because we where cutting off all supplies, and bombing military and industrial targets left and right (with of course many civilian deaths as the military was sometimes near civilians and the industry was located in cities which we were destroying). If stopped doing these things then there would have been some resistance. Effective resistance? No, atleast not unless we stopped doing these things for years but there would have been some resistance. But the resistance I was talking about was not that of attacks on US forces but rather resistance to surrendering. If you bomb then wait, then bomb then wait, you probably have to kill more people to compel a surrender then if you keep the pressure on. I have run out of food so I surrender. Later you tell the papers that you burned my children because you were trying to avoid their possible death by starvation. You tell the papers that you really really loved my kids; you were just trying to prevent unnecessary deaths... The allies hated the Japanese. We did not incinerate them becasue we were trying to save their lives. It would be more like burning one child out of a thousand then all of the children and to continue the analogy it might have been 5 out of the thousand that starved had surrender not been compelled. Also it would be more of an attack against you (but one I knew would also kill that one child) rather then an attack on the child. I agree that the atomic bombs where not dropped on Japan for the purpose of saving Japanese lives. My point is just that there is a good chance that they had that effect. Do not come to me, Tim, and try to pretend a serious discussion over murder. It violates every sense of justice which defines our humanity. I am not going to debate with you the case as to whether or not your might gives you the right to dispose of the innocent by playing at God. I agree that murder is wrong but my sense of it being an absolute wrong could fight with utlitarian ideas of morality and those ideas also are things that I atleast consider in extreme cases. For example the idea of going back in time to kill Hitler or Stalin when they where innocent children (assuming that was your only oportunity) because later they killing millions. Obviously killing them is wrong if they had not done anything seriously wrong yet but if I was sure that I would not create something as bad or worse by changing history there would be at least a degree where it would feel wrong to not kill them. Of course the situation with the question about dropping the bomb was not the same. The bombs killed many thousands not 1 person. Also the amount of people who may have been saved would not be as high as the number of Hitler's or Stalin's victims in fact its possible that it was even lower then the amount of people killed by the bombs but it was not low. The "killing Hitler or Stalin" question provides a better question to get to the ideas I am talking about because it is simpler and has an obvious enormous disparity in consequences. It also might be a less emotional question for you. I won't press you if you don't want to answer it, I merely ask for you to either answer it or not address the last two paragraphs of this post at all. Tim

To: Solon who wrote (42138)	1/11/2002 7:46:28 PM
From: J. C. Dithers	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 82486

"Japan had been trying DESPERATELY to surrender." Read these top secret telegrams from Foreign Minister Togo to his Ambassador to Russia, Sato, in July, 1945 (a matter of weeks before the bombing). Sato is giving instructions to his Ambassador, for his eyes only. Does he sound "desperate" to you? The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) [Tokyo,] July 17, 1945--p.m. Secret Urgent 913. Re your telegram No. 1392. 1. In the Present situation, strengthening friendly relations with the Soviet Union and, moreover, effectively utilizing the Soviets to terminate the war is difficult. This was clear from the outset but in view of the demands of the times it is essential to accomplish this boldly. Furthermore, for our side it is even difficult merely to prevent the Soviets from taking part in hostilities against Japan, and we must realize that to have them act to our advantage is a prospect hard to achieve. This is as I indicated in my telegram No. 890, and the negotiations for strengthening friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union constitute the basis on which to invite sincere Soviet mediation for terminating the war. Moreover, it is also considered essential in order to strengthen our stand in negotiations against the United States and Great Britain. Besides, we should not limit ourselves to sounding out the attitude of the Soviets concerning the termination of the war but should also endeavor to induce them to mediate in good faith. 2.Not only our High Command but also our Government firmly believes that even now our war potential is still sufficient to deal the enemy a severe blow, but against an enemy which can make repeated attacks we cannot always be completely free from anxiety. In such times, we continue to maintain our war strength; if only the United States and Great Britain would recognize Japan's honor and existence we would terminate the war and would like to save mankind from the ravages of war, but if the enemy insists on unconditional surrender to the very end, then our country and His Majesty would unanimously resolve to fight a war of resistance to the bitter end. Therefore, inviting the Soviet Union to mediate fairly does not include unconditional surrender; please understand this point in particular. 3. The Soviet reply concerning the dispatch of the special envoy should be obtained as soon as possible. It is extremely important to get Soviet approval quickly and I would like you to exert extreme efforts towards this end through Lozovsky. The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) [Tokyo,] July 21, 1945--9:30 p.m. Secret Urgent 932. Re my telegram No. 931. 1. We cannot accept unconditional surrender (understood fully your telegram No. 1416) in any situation. Although it is apparent that there will be more casualties on both sides in case the war is prolonged, we will stand united as one nation against the enemy if the enemy forcibly demands our unconditional surrender. . It is, however, our intention to achieve, with Soviet assistance, a peace which is not of unconditional nature, in order to avoid such a situation as mentioned above in accordance with His Majesty's desire. It will be necessary for us to expert our utmost efforts to have the United States and Great Britain understand thoroughly this intention. Thus, it is impossible at this time to ask the Soviet Union unconditionally for assistance in obtaining peace; at the same time, it is also impossible and to our disadvantage to indicate the concrete conditions immediately at this time on account of internal and external relations. Under such delicate circumstances, we hope to have Prince Konoye transmit to the Soviet Union our concrete intentions based on the Emperor's wishes and following a conference to have the Soviets deal with the United States and Great Britain, while considering the Soviet demands in Asia. 2. Taking into consideration the fact that this matter is a negotiation of the utmost importance which may determine the fate of our country, I request that you take full measures to grasp the true intentions of the Soviet Union by seeking sufficient explanations, for instance, even with respect to the Soviet reply transmitted in your telegramNo. 1417. 3. It is a matter of course that the special envoy has the responsibility of advising the Government; but please explain to the Soviets, if necessary, that the envoy is to be dispatched as a special envoy in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor, whose chief aim is benevolence. Please take care to fully impress the other party with the facts regarding his Majesty's trust in Prince Konoye and the prominent position held by the Prince in the political circles in our country. 4. If the proposal at the beginning of my telegram No. 1427 is not absolutely necessary, please avoid making a written proposal. A full record of this lengthy top secret correspondence is available at: nuclearfiles.org