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To: Cactus Jack who wrote (46303)1/13/2002 5:34:31 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
<<..."It's not hard to come up with a scenario for indictment here," says John Coffee, professor of corporate law at Columbia University. "Enough of the facts are already known to know that there is a high prospect of securities-fraud charges against both Enron and some of its officers." He adds that "once you've set up a task force this large, involving attorneys from Washington, New York and probably California, history shows the likelihood is they will find something indictable."

Enron has already acknowledged that it overstated its income for more than four years. The question is whether this was the result of negligence or an intent to defraud. Securities fraud requires a willful intent to deceive. It doesn't look good, Coffee says, that key Enron executives were selling stock shortly before the company announced a restatement of earnings.

As for Arthur Andersen, criminal charges could result if it can be shown that its executives ordered the destruction of documents while being aware of the existence of a subpoena for them. A likely ploy will be for prosecutors to target the auditors, hoping to turn them into witnesses against Enron. Says Coffee: "If the auditors can offer testimony, that would be the most damaging testimony imaginable."...>>

time.com

jpgill: My hunch is that there will be A LOT of indictments in the months ahead...Enrons's Officers and Board Members will be targets BUT so will The Andersen Accounting Executives. I hope the investigators (and prosecuters) get to the bottom of this and we see some SEVERE PUNISHMENTS for those accountable. I don't want to see Lay & Co. get lenient sentences because of who they know or what their expensive lawyers accomplish in court for them. I hope the Justice Departments' Investigators are VERY qualified, VERY objective, VERY thorough, and VERY aggressive....Lets leave no stone un-turned so that the guilty parties can become examples, laws can be changed and the country can learn from Enron's Perfect Storm.

Regards,

Scott



To: Cactus Jack who wrote (46303)1/13/2002 10:12:33 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Before Debacle, Enron Insiders Cashed in $1.1 Billion in Shares

By LESLIE WAYNE
The New York Times
January 13, 2002


While investigators are focusing on how much money investors and employees lost in the Enron Corporation (news/quote)'s collapse, some shareholders and lawmakers are now setting their sights on another target: the millions that Enron insiders received by selling their shares while the price was still high.

As Enron stock climbed and Wall Street was still promoting it, a group of 29 Enron executives and directors began to sell their shares. These insiders received $1.1 billion by selling 17.3 million shares from 1999 through mid-2001, according to court filings based on public records. They continued selling just before Enron's stock started to tumble early last year and the company began its slide into bankruptcy protection.

One of the biggest sellers was Kenneth L. Lay, who became prominent as the company's chairman and a leading contributor to President Bush. He was among more than a dozen Enron executives who received $30 million or more, including one who sold shares valued at $353.7 million.

Lawyers and spokesmen for the executives, board members and the company said that the sales were proper, and that the insiders had no special information or advantages over other investors.

"This issue is being investigated," said Robert S. Bennett, a lawyer for Enron. "But at this point in time, I am unaware of any evidence that supports the allegation there was improper selling by members of the board or senior management."

Many of these Enron executives retain large holdings in the company, selling shares regularly, as executives at other companies do. "In many instances, the sale of the stock was preplanned according to a strict timetable," Mr. Bennett said.

Mr. Lay himself sold Enron stock 350 times, trading almost daily, receiving $101.3 million. In all, Mr. Lay sold 1.8 million Enron shares between early 1999 and July 2001, five months before Enron filed for bankruptcy. As of last February, he still owned more than 7.7 million shares.

Mr. Lay sold his stock for $31 to $86 a share; this week, Enron was selling for under 70 cents a share. Often, Mr. Lay sold in amounts as small as 500 shares, while at other times he sold as many as 100,000 shares.

It has not been determined how much Mr. Lay or the others paid for their shares, or how much they gained. Much of Mr. Lay's holdings, and those of other executives, were in the form of stock options, which allowed them to buy shares at a discount.

Other top sellers were Lou L. Pai, the former chairman of an Enron subsidiary, who received $353.7 million for his 5 million shares; Rebecca P. Mark-Jusbasche, a director and former Enron executive who received $79.5 million for 1.4 million shares; and Ken L. Harrison, a director who sold 1 million shares for $75.2 million.

Jeffrey K. Skilling, the company's former chief executive, received $66.9 million for 1.1 million shares. Beginning in December 2000, Mr. Skilling began to sell his holdings at a pace of 10,000 shares about every seven days. He still owns about 600,000 shares and options, according to public filings.

Andrew S. Fastow, the company's ousted chief financial officer, who set up many of the financial partnerships that have been criticized for concealing Enron's large debts, received $30 million for his holdings.

A detailed accounting of these trades is contained in a lawsuit brought by Amalgamated Bank, of New York, which invested the pension money of union members in Enron shares. Representing the bank in this case, which is now in the Federal District Court in Houston, is the same law firm that brought shareholder suits against Charles H. Keating Jr. in the savings and loan scandal and against Michael R. Milken, the junk bond financier, for securities fraud.

While the suit has received little attention so far, it highlights one of the main points in the political debate now taking place in Washington — whether small shareholders were left out of a flow of information about Enron's deteriorating financial condition.

The differences in the trading strategies of the two groups — those outside the company who were buying Enron's shares and those inside the company who were selling them — reflect the different information that each group had, according to the suit.

"The defendants employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud," the lawsuit states. It accuses the 29 defendants of "unlawful insider trading" and says the group "materially misled the investing public" by issuing false statements.

Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Democrat of Connecticut and chairman of the Senate government affairs committee, has already announced hearings that will, in part, look at how Enron shareholders might have been deceived by the company's financial statements. Senator Barbara Boxer, Democrat of California, has also expressed concern for Enron's small shareholders, especially employees who put its shares in their 401(k) retirement plans only to lose their savings.

Representative Henry A. Waxman of California, the ranking Democrat on the House Commerce Committee, released a letter yesterday asking Mr. Lay to answer questions about optimistic statements Mr. Waxman said that Mr. Lay had made in e-mail messages to employees last August. In the e-mail, gathered by staff investigators, Mr. Lay said that Enron remained strong.

At Enron, more than half of the employees' 401(k) assets, or about $1.2 billion, was invested in company stock, which is now nearly worthless. Billions more were lost by other investors, from individuals to large institutions that bought Enron shares for the pension plans of unions and corporations.

The lawsuit claims the insiders withheld information, allowing Enron's shares to remain at an artificially high level while they were selling their shares. "This is the most massive insider bailout that we've ever seen and we've been prosecuting these cases for 30 years," said William S. Lerach, one of the bank's lead attorneys. "The overall size of this case is unprecedented."

Spokesmen for some of the defendants say that this group had done nothing wrong. An Enron spokesman, Mark Palmer, dismissed the suit as "completely without merit" and a "weak argument."

Gordon G. Andrew, a spokesman for Mr. Fastow, the former chief financial officer, declined to comment, but said that Mr. Fastow still had about 50 percent of his original holdings. Mr. Andrew said that Mr. Fastow's last stock sale took place in November 2000 and that Mr. Fastow had purchased shares in early 2001.

A spokeswoman for Mr. Skilling, the former chief executive, said that "there is absolutely no basis to the allegation that Mr. Skilling did anything improper with regard to the sale of Enron stock." The defendants have not yet filed answers to the complaint. Arthur Andersen & Company, also named, declined to comment.

At the top end of the selling was Mr. Pai, who headed an Enron subsidiary called NewPower Holdings (news/quote), an online retailer of electricity and natural gas. Before leaving Enron last spring, Mr. Pai sold five million shares of Enron between January 1999 and July 2001 for $353.7 million.

In January 2000, just 60 days after the formation of NewPower, Mr. Pai received more than two million Enron shares. He began to sell them almost immediately, mostly while they were trading above $70.

Enron directors, also named in the case, sold stock too. All Enron directors receive stock options as part of their $380,619 annual fees. Of that, 15 percent was paid in cash, the remainder in stock.

One director, Wendy L. Gramm, the wife of Senator Phil Gramm, Republican of Texas, sold all her 10,256 shares for $276,912. She sold the stock on one day — Nov. 3, 1998 — for $27 a share. Ms. Gramm said earlier that she and her husband decided to sell their Enron shares to avoid the appearance of a conflict. She was then paid in cash.

The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Justice Department are both investigating Enron. A Senate committee issued 51 subpoenas Friday as part of an investigation into the insiders' stock sales.

The investigations should aid the case against the insiders, said Michael Hennigan, a Los Angeles lawyer in the Orange County, Calif., bankruptcy lawsuit. "I assume that the government is going after the exact same things that Lerach is after," he said, referring to the lawyer for the bank suing Enron.

Last week, a federal judge declined to immediately freeze the assets of the defendants, asking for further information before reconsidering the request.



To: Cactus Jack who wrote (46303)1/14/2002 12:18:23 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Audit Papers Usually Held For Years, Accountants Say

January 12, 2002
The New York Times
By FLOYD NORRIS and REED ABELSON

There are no hard and fast rules
governing how soon an accounting
firm can destroy documents related to
an audit, but the papers are generally
maintained for years, accountants said
yesterday after the disclosure that
Arthur Andersen had destroyed Enron
documents.

Only some audit papers are maintained,
however, and accounting firms have long held that less important papers can be
destroyed as soon as an audit is completed.

But lawyers and accountants agreed that all relevant documents must be preserved
once an auditor learns of a government investigation related to the audit, even if it
would have been permissible to dispose of them before that. Investigators reported
on Thursday that Andersen auditors continued destroying Enron papers as
recently as November, after the Securities and Exchange Commission had begun a
formal investigation of the Enron collapse.

One major firm, Ernst & Young, decided to halt all routine document destruction
while it reviews its policy. Larry Parnell, a spokesman for Ernst & Young, said the
firm had been reviewing its practice for some time but did not decide until
yesterday to stop following the policy of allowing audit work papers to be destroyed
after six years.

It is not clear whether the documents destroyed by Andersen constituted work
papers, which must be preserved for at least some period of time.

Andersen has not discussed the nature of the documents, and a Congressional
investigator said that many of the documents were e-mail messages between
auditors and Enron executives - documents that might or might not be viewed as
vital to an audit. Andersen has also not disclosed the dates of the documents in
question.

Officials of PricewaterhouseCoopers said yesterday that
their practice had been to preserve documents for six
years, or longer if the matter was a subject of litigation or
investigation. The other major accounting firms, KPMG
and Deloitte & Touche, declined to comment on their
practices.

"With respect to retention, we really do not have a
definitive standard," said Charles E. Landes, the director
of audit standards for the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, which cites the six- year figure in a
handbook for accountants but emphasizes that firms
should consult their own lawyers.

The general standard for auditors, unchanged since 1982,
requires that "the auditor should adopt reasonable
procedures for safe custody of his working papers and
should retain them for a period sufficient to meet the
needs of his practice and to satisfy any pertinent legal
requirements of records retention."

Itzhak Sharav, an accounting professor at Columbia
University, said that made clear that any destruction of
recent audit papers by Andersen would be a violation of
the industry's ethical standards, particularly if it took
place after the S.E.C. began its inquiry.

Whatever the standard retention policy, there is a general
agreement that no documents should be destroyed if an
auditor is aware of an investigation.

"Any company records manager will tell you that is an
absolute," said Galina Datskovsky, the chief executive of
MDY Advanced Technologies, a
records-management company. "Any corporate counsel
will tell you that. That is an absolute standard."

Michael J. Wagner, a partner in the law firm of Baker &
McKenzie in Chicago, agreed and noted that in a lawsuit
or criminal case, juries can be instructed to assume that a
destroyed document was damaging to the party that
destroyed it.

Papers that are not considered work papers, like early
drafts of documents, have never been viewed as necessary
to save, some accountants say. But many are saved simply
because no one takes the time to dispose of them. It is not
clear if many, or even all, of the documents destroyed by
Andersen fell into the category of papers that need not be
saved.

David Tabolt, a spokesman for Andersen, declined to say
what his firm's policy was. But he said on Thursday that it
was being reviewed and that no documents would be
destroyed until the review was completed.

If it turns out that Andersen auditors destroyed actual
work papers, many accounting experts would be shocked.

"I would find it unbelievable that they would destroy their
audit work papers," said Peter Knutson, a retired professor
of accounting at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania. The paperwork that is necessary "should all be there, and none of
that should be destroyed," he said.

The timing of the destruction of documents could be crucial. According to
Congressional investigators, Andersen auditors began destroying documents in
September, before Enron's stock collapsed and before the S.E.C. started its
investigation. If the papers involved were not deemed to be work papers, that
destruction would probably not have violated Andersen's rules or industry practice.

The S.E.C.'s preliminary inquiry into Enron's accounting was disclosed on Oct. 22,
and Enron announced on Oct. 31 that the inquiry had become a formal
investigation. After that, lawyers said, no documents should have been destroyed,
even though no subpoena had been served on Andersen.

But Congressional investigators said the destruction continued into November. Mr.
Tabolt said that after Andersen was served with a subpoena in November, it notified
all its personnel to retain all documents. But, he said, the firm was not sure that
directive was followed.

nytimes.com



To: Cactus Jack who wrote (46303)1/14/2002 12:57:47 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
SEC chief's ties to Andersen complicate probe

By KEVIN DRAWBAUGH
Reuters News Service
Jan. 11, 2002

WASHINGTON - America's top markets cop is being hobbled in leading the Securities and Exchange Commission's probe of Enron Corp. by his links to the accounting firm entangled in the deepening scandal over the company's collapse, experts said today.

SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt represented the accounting firm Andersen, now under SEC investigation for its auditing of Enron's books, when he was a private attorney.

Pitt has had to step carefully in the Enron probe, sources said. Congressional aides said it was understood on Capitol Hill that he did not testify last month at a congressional committee hearing on Enron because of his ties to Andersen.

Edward Fleischman, a former SEC commissioner, told Reuters: "Harvey, I think, represented each and all of the Big Five auditing firms. That could very well be a reason that he feels it would be inappropriate" to take part in such a hearing.

The SEC refused to detail Pitt's role in the probe, citing a policy of not commenting on such issues. "Chairman Pitt is following the terms of his ethics agreement that was provided to Congress and the government ethics office when he took office," SEC spokesperson Christi Harlan told Reuters.

Pitt, who took over at the SEC in August, worked for Andersen and other accounting firms in battles with the SEC over auditor independence rules.

Andersen was just one of many clients over 20 years that helped him win a reputation as the nation's best securities lawyer, making it virtually certain he would face potential conflicts. "From the day his nomination was announced, people understood that this was going to happen. So it's not a surprise," said Donald Langevoort, a securities law professor at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

Last summer, as the Senate was considering his nomination as SEC chairman, Pitt pledged to distance himself for one year from SEC matters involving former clients.

Shortly after his appointment, the Enron affair erupted and Pitt's former client Andersen quickly became involved.

Enron slid in just weeks from Wall Street stardom to making the largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history on Dec. 2. Its downfall threw thousands out of work and hammered investors.

Questions arose about Enron's accounting practices, financial disclosures and other matters. The Justice Department said this week it was pursuing a criminal probe of Enron. The Labor Department and five congressional committees are also investigating the company, along with the SEC.

Andersen admitted on Thursday its employees had destroyed an unspecified number of documents related to those audits.

SEC probes are carried out by enforcement staff. Commission members, including the chairman, become involved twice -- once to vote on launching a formal investigation, and again at the probe's end on any staff request for enforcement action.

The commission voted in October to authorize a formal probe of Enron. Pitt would normally have had to recuse himself from the vote, but sources said due to a shortage of commissioners, he did vote. He was allowed to do so under a government ethics rules loophole that waives recusal requirements under some circumstances with full disclosure.

The SEC has suffered from a shortage of commissioners for some time. Four of its five seats are technically vacant, but one commissioner has stayed on past her terms' expiration to help and two have been nominated by President Bush.

Sources said Pitt was advised in October to distance himself from further aspects of the probe, although some said that could be difficult as the case gets more attention.

Commission members will probably not be faced with another formal vote on the Enron investigation for several months. By that time, when staff asks the commission to vote on an enforcement action, Pitt will have more options, sources said.

He will either be able to recuse himself because more commissioners will be aboard. Or, if the vote takes place after August, his one-year recusal period will have expired.

In the meantime, however, the SEC may suffer by being deprived of Pitt's expertise in handling the biggest case it has encountered since he became chairman.

"He's a very gifted and thoughtful chairman and you want his expertise any time you can get it," said Joel Seligman, dean of Washington University School of Law.



To: Cactus Jack who wrote (46303)1/14/2002 2:23:07 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
SEC censures Big 5 accounting firm KPMG

01/14/2002 13:49
--------------------------------------------------------

The Securities and Exchange Commission censured big five accounting firm KPMG LLP Monday for engaging in "improper professional conduct" because it was auditing the financial statements of a company in which it had made substantial financial investments. "This case illustrates the dangers that flow from a failure to implement adequate policies and procedures designed to detect and prevent auditor independence violations," SEC associate director of enforcement, Paul Berger said. The SEC found that the auditor held an initial $25 million investment in Short-Term Investments Trust, a money market fund with AIM family of funds, at a time when the firm's independence was impaired, the securities regulator said in a release Monday. The SEC said KPMG's violation occurred because of the firms lack of "adequate policies or procedures to prevent or detect such violations, and because the steps which KPMG personnel usually took before initiating investments of the firm's surplus cash were not taken in this instance."



To: Cactus Jack who wrote (46303)1/14/2002 3:17:03 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Former SEC Chairman Levitt on Enron's Collapse (Transcript)...

2002-01-14 14:49 (New York)
Boynton Beach, Florida, Jan. 14, 2002 (Bloomberg)

Former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman
Arthur Levitt talks with Bloomberg's Dylan Ratigan via
satellite about the collapse of energy trader Enron Corp.
and the need for an improved oversight process and improved
accounting practices. Levitt is a Bloomberg LP board member.

(This is not a legal transcript. Bloomberg LP cannot
guarantee its accuracy.)

RATIGAN: Well, after a seven-week stock slide and then
filing for bankruptcy on November 8th, the fall of the
largest energy trader, Enron, has brought many issues to the
forefront, ranging from accounting standards; 401(k) plans;
questions regarding auditing practices, in general, and
specifically, in this case, Arthur Andersen.

And Enron, as such, the focus in our visit with Arthur
Levitt. Joining us now from Florida is the former chairman
of the SEC and now a regular contributor to us here at
Bloomberg News, as well as a member of our board at
Bloomberg.

Arthur Levitt, it's good to see you. I say good
morning to you, a happy new year to you.

LEVITT: Good morning, Dylan.

RATIGAN: .and ask you what happened? What went wrong?

LEVITT: Well, what we really had here was an absolute
breakdown of the gatekeepers that would ordinarily protect
individual investors. It wasn't just the accountants,
although certainly they had the oversight responsibility.
It was the brokers who sold this. It was the analysts who
just didn't do their job. It was the rating agencies that
dropped the ball. It was the investment bankers that cooked
up a scheme to hide the obligations of the company and
subsidiaries. The system just didn't work; there wasn't
adequate oversight. And it could happen at other companies
just as well.

RATIGAN: What sort of solution would you suggest?

LEVITT: I think there are a number of things. I think
we have to take a clean look at the way we report out,
accounting standards. Right now, the independent standard
setter is the FASB up in Norwalk, Connecticut. But they are
funded by the very companies that they provide standards for
and the process is slow and cumbersome. We need oversight
of the accounting profession by an independent, perhaps
appointed by the SEC, oversight body that will supervise
them and not require the funding of the trade group that
represents the industry, the AICPA. It's got to be
independent. In addition to that, we need new standards for
analysts, to see to it that they're not comprised by
conflicts of interest that keep them from getting to the
heart of the story.

RATIGAN: You were - you were going to keep going?

LEVITT: I'm saying that these are a few of the issues
that have to be addressed. I think that, in addition to
that, corporate America has got to change the way their
boards are structured in terms of independence. I think we
have to consider very seriously about requiring publicly
owned companies to include at least 50 percent of their
board coming from independent directors, rather than the
present system of requiring only perhaps three.

RATIGAN: Talk to me about realistically, Arthur, what,
if any of what you just described, will actually occur, from
the accounting oversight, to conflict on the research side,
down the line.

LEVITT: I think a lot of it will. This is an
unprecedented business scandal. Occurring at a time when
the market has declined so precipitously, the public is
very, very engaged in this issue. I think there's never
been a better time to redo the way we derive accounting
standards, to redo the way we supervise the auditors. For
years, American business has been working at managing the
numbers in ways which have been deceptive to the American
public.

RATIGAN: Correct me, if I'm wrong, Arthur, but what
you're suggesting would imply that what happened at Enron
was not simply the work of a few executives that had
concocted a scheme of sorts, but at least an implicit
consent by a large number of people to allow this to occur?

LEVITT: I think that's true, Dylan. I think that this
represents the culmination of years of effort on the part of
individuals and corporations and others to kind of move us
towards the edge of the envelope, and, in doing that,
deceiving the public by failing to observe some of the basic
protections that are part of what has made our system so
great.

I think this is a time that we've got to review how
standards are set, how rules are established, how oversight
proceeds in terms of protecting the public interest. Not
ever has the accounting industry focused on the public
interest. Rather, their focus has been in terms of
protecting their own interests. That's got to be addressed.
It's a job for regulators; it's a job for the SEC; it's a
job for investors to ask the right questions.

RATIGAN: Fair enough. Listen, it's a true pleasure,
as always. We'll see you next week. Arthur Levitt with us
out of Florida.

***END OF TRANSCRIPT***