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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46436)1/15/2002 9:32:31 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Rich Bernstein and the Merrill Curse

By Justin Lahart
Associate Editor
01/15/2002 07:38 AM EST

Rich Bernstein, Merrill Lynch's newly minted chief U.S. strategist, cut his recommended equity weighting to 50% Monday from 60%, worrying that the stock market has strayed back into speculative territory. Shares slipped.

But maybe Bernstein's got it wrong. Not because he isn't a nice guy or because he isn't smart -- nothing could be further from the truth -- but because Merrill's U.S. strategists have had a bit of a losing streak lately.

In the late 1990s, the firm's strategist was the bearish Chuck Clough, who shuffled away in early 2000 -- right before his call on stocks turned correct. Merrill then hired Panglossian pundit Christine Callies, who was rarely right. Bernstein, who as Merrill's chief quantitative strategist had often disagreed with Clough and had always disagreed with Callies, stepped to the plate in December. Now, the question is: Is three a charm?

Too Rich
"If I were wrong," says Bernstein, meaning the market keeps going up, "it could be it's just a liquidity-driven bubble. Or it could mean this time is different. I'm not sure I'm comfortable with either of those options."

Stock valuations are incredibly stretched, says Bernstein. Based on reported earnings (rather than the funky pro forma ones many companies like to use these days), the trailing price-to-earnings ratio on the benchmark S&P 500 is extremely high -- 40.8 at the end of last week, according to Standard & Poor's.

Compared with Merrill Lynch company analysts' long-term expectations for earnings to grow by 14.7% a year, the P/E-to-growth, or PEG, rate is at its highest point ever in the 21-year history of Bernstein's data. He notes that in the past whenever this PEG rate has hit extremes, troubled times for stocks have followed.

Bernstein goes on to say that Wall Street's characterization of his equity weighting cut as bearish says a lot about the kind of market environment we're in.

"It's interesting that it comes off as being so incredibly bearish," he says. "I think of it as being conservative. There are very few people out there that say one should be conservative in this environment."

The Squared Circle
Bernstein's equity weighting is, along with J.P. Morgan equity strategist Doug Cliggott's, the lowest on the Street. As it turns out, Bernstein has developed a sentiment indicator based on strategists' equity allocations, and notwithstanding his inclusion in it (yes, Mr. Heisenberg, we understand that could be a problem), it shows that bullishness has continued to reign on Wall Street even in the face of steep losses.

Bernstein believes that this downturn has been unique in that nobody "fought the Fed," reckoning that the reason the old maxim worked in the past was that there were always investors around who thought lower interest rates wouldn't get the economy on its feet, and that fighting the Fed would be a good idea. Since everybody kept on believing economic revival was right around the corner, valuations never came down as when the economy hit the skids in the past. In the trough of the last recession, for example, the S&P's forward P/E (based on analyst estimates, according to Thomson Financial/First Call) fell to 10.5. In contrast, the S&P's forward P/E has mainly stayed above 20 since the recession started in March, dropping below that level only briefly in September.

In fact, a forward P/E of 20 on the S&P has pretty much been rock bottom for valuations since early 1998. Perhaps there is some actual sense to Bernstein's quip about how maybe "this time is different." There have been times in the past when the market valuation framework actually has changed. In the late 1950s, for instance, companies began investing more in growth and paying less in dividends, basically ruining the dividend-based valuation models that a lot of people were using. As it happens, the late 1950s were the last time the fed funds target rate was as low as it is now.

Comps
"You've got your lowest interest rates in 40 years, so what's your historic benchmark?" asks Jeff Matthews, head of the Connecticut hedge fund Ram Partners. "I'm a low P/E guy. I don't own any stocks that you could consider indicative of this market. But I'm not going to say, 'Look at the multiple on the Nasdaq -- this is stupid.' "

Or one could also argue that with the Baby Boom generation hitting their peak period of earnings, and of investing, the valuation framework for stocks has been permanently altered. Because everybody needs to invest for retirement, stocks have become the prescription drug that everybody needs to take -- never mind the price.

But the problem with both these scenarios is that, while maybe they're true, there's no good way right now to differentiate whether there's been a valuation-regime change or if stocks have simply gotten incredibly pricey.

"Our work will probably never suggest overweighting stocks during a bubble or bubblelike environment," Bernstein cautioned in a note Monday morning. "Thus, similar to what happened during 1999 and early 2000, if liquidity growth accelerates and our fundamental forecasters do not turn, then our overall strategy might end up being inappropriate."

Nor would his work suggest overweighting stocks if for some reason the market's valuation framework suddenly shifted higher. But even if Bernstein ends up being, in hindsight, just as wrong as his predecessors were, he would say that buying something you can no longer price is a dangerous



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (46436)1/15/2002 9:53:53 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Accountants need to be held accountable

by: Jennifer Wells
The Toronto Star

thestar.com

WELL that about wraps it up.

Any bets that Arthur Andersen, the big accounting firm, could survive the Enron debacle are off.

One need look no further than the latest, calamitous, disclosures about what Andersen calls the Enron "engagement." Through the fall, after the departure of Enron's chief executive and after the energy giant knew that it was in deep trouble, the accounting outfit commenced the destruction of Enron documents.

This would be the Rose Mary Woods moment, recalling the devoted personal secretary to Richard Nixon who "accidentally" left her foot on the pedal of her transcription machine. There Ms. Woods was, scrupulously transcribing that June, 1972, conversation between Nixon and H.R. Haldeman, the one that took place three days after the Watergate break-in, and, you know, she takes a phone call and WHOOPS!, 18 minutes and 30 seconds of the good stuff gets over-recorded.

Nixon's credibility was sunk.

Andersen's is now sunk, too.

We don't know how many documents were shredded or electronically erased. Andersen says that "in recent months" a "significant but undetermined number of electronic and paper documents and correspondence" were destroyed.

When asked for clarification as to what the company meant by "recent months" Andersen replied: "Discarding of documents occurred during the months before the (Securities and Exchange Commission) issued a subpoena to Andersen."

As if that provides any relief.

It doesn't.

Andersen has been insisting — in congressional hearings, in the press — that its integrity is above reproach. Sure those "special purpose entities" were vetted by Andersen, and allowed Enron to offload some of the company's uglier numbers, thus disguising its true corporate health. But there was nothing illegal in that, insists the auditor. Andersen CEO Joseph Berardino told the House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services in December that his firm made a single blunder — failing to consolidate one of these SPEs — but that the blunder was relatively small. Translation: it's not our fault the company melted. Any errors made, he said, were "made in good faith." As to any funny business, Berardino told Congress to focus on Enron itself, which, said Berardino, had been withholding information.

We now know, thanks to a report in Time magazine, that an Oct. 12 memo ordered the destruction of what Time terms "all audit material, except for the most basic `work papers.'"

Andersen had lots of time to keep the shredders running. Enron announced on Oct. 16 that it had lost $618 million (U.S.) in the third quarter of the year. On Oct. 22 it said it was voluntarily co-operating with the SEC to illuminate the regulators about related-party transactions. The SEC didn't issue a subpoena until Nov. 8. In the meantime, Enron was scrambling to establish a "special committee" to investigate the company's massive earnings restatements, hoping that it could skin the cat by pushing through a sale of itself to a competing company called Dynegy Inc., and hoping, too, that calls to the likes of Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill would result in a fresh bank loan or two.

In other words, there was lots going on.

To what professional standards, pray tell, was Andersen adhering when it started detonating its files?

Andersen says it now has suspended its "current records management policy." The policy, says the firm in what has become its characteristically weasly way, "required in certain circumstances the destruction of certain types of documents." It sounds like a spy game.

Such an opaque defence is particularly disturbing coming from Andersen. We still don't know the whole story behind the Sunbeam Corp. caper. In May of last year, the SEC filed a civil injunction against five Sunbeam officers, and an Andersen partner, saying that fraudulent reporting created the illusion of a successful restructuring of Sunbeam. Without admitting or denying any guilt, Andersen, Sunbeam's auditors, paid $7 million (U.S.), the largest civil penalty in an SEC enforcement action. Andersen was also the auditor on the Waste Management Inc. file, in which the garbage hauler overstated pre-tax income by more than $1 billion.

Investors were shaken. Andersen, which has been around for nearly 90 years and was, once, the largest accountancy in the world, needed a public relations fix. Joseph Berardino was meant to provide that.

Instead, Berardino has emerged as the poster boy for everything that's wrong with accounting. The fact that the profession is self-regulating. That's got to go. The industry defence that accountancy firms open themselves up to "peer review," which is meant to provide reassurance enough to the public. That's got to go, too. (Deloitte & Touche, which has had troubles of its own, recently conducted a peer review of Andersen and concluded there was not a thing wrong with its methodologies.) The inherent conflict that arises in a single firm drawing auditing fees and consulting fees from the same client. Just kill it.

In a speech last June, before he resigned as chief accountant at the SEC, Lynn Turner reminded auditors that they need to be, first, "critical skeptics" who place "getting the numbers right" ahead of client relationships. He had many examples of "engagement" failures to turn to. None nearly so large as Enron, whose collapse is unparalleled. Change to the profession should have come before. It must come now.