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To: Sully- who wrote (46621)1/17/2002 4:32:43 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
'A Crooked Company'

The Washington Post
Thursday, January 17, 2002

IT IS NOT just outsiders who find the Enron scandal outrageous. Insiders at the company apparently found its conduct shocking too. Last August, four months before Enron filed for bankruptcy, a senior executive named Sherron Watkins wrote to Enron's chairman, "I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals." She conceded that "a lot of accountants including AA & Co. [Arthur Andersen] have blessed the accounting treatment," but she insisted that "none of that will protect Enron if these transactions are ever disclosed in the bright light of day." And she noted that she was not alone in thinking Enron's bookkeeping dubious. Two other senior executives had also voiced objections. A mid-level employee had told her, "I know it would be devastating to all of us, but I wish we would get caught. We're such a crooked company."

Two reasons seem to explain why this crooked behavior -- which cheated ordinary investors of millions of dollars -- took place despite protests from within the company. The first is the character of Enron's leadership. The executives who set up the shell companies that masked Enron's true financial profile were consciously trying to deceive investors, including many of their own staff who had bet their retirement funds on Enron stock. These executives knew they were acting dishonorably, which is why they appear to have deliberately silenced doubters. One of the doubters mentioned in the Watkins letter -- Jeff McMahon, the company treasurer -- was moved into a different job after questioning the shell companies. And when the letter reached Kenneth Lay, Enron's chairman, Mr. Lay's response was to ask Vinson & Elkins, Enron's law firm, to look into the matter. But the letter had pointed out the firm's conflict of interest: Vinson & Elkins had apparently approved some of the deals that started the shell game.

The other reason why Enron behaved scandalously is that the accounting rules themselves are a scandal. It is clear that Enron's shell companies cheated investors and appalled company insiders; it is clear that they throw into question the whole basis of stock-market capitalism, which is that investors assign values to corporations by scrutinizing their accounts. And yet, unbelievably, it is not clear that these shell companies were illegal. Equally, it is known that Enron's auditors spotted $51 million worth of problems in Enron's accounts back in 1997, yet they felt able to certify the accounts as accurate because the discrepancies were not "material." Rules that permit this sort of discretion are unworthy of the name.

Harvey Pitt, the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, says he wants a new system for policing auditors. His concern is welcome. As he weighs the various reform options, he should keep in mind one passage from the Watkins letter. "The overriding basic principle of accounting is that if you explain the 'accounting treatment' to a man in the street, would you influence his investing decisions?" It is extraordinary that any executive should feel the need to point this out to a corporate chairman. Mr. Pitt should not rest until chairmen start to behave differently: until accounts really do convey the information that investors need to make decisions.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company



To: Sully- who wrote (46621)1/18/2002 7:24:53 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Ex-Andersen employees doubt Duncan acted alone

By MIKE TOLSON
Jan. 17, 2002, 10:12PM
Copyright 2002 Houston Chronicle

When the glare of publicity suddenly found him, David B. Duncan was cast as a rogue accountant, panicked into a shredding frenzy by the thought of investigators sifting through his auditing team's paperwork.

The image may yet prove true. But those familiar with Arthur Andersen, and to the high-stakes auditing of Big Five accounting firms, suggest it stretches credibility to think he operated as independently as the bosses who fired him two days ago claim.

Accountants are not gamblers and they don't get ahead in a conservative profession by being mavericks.

"I have a feeling that David Duncan would not go to the bathroom without talking to a partner," said a former Andersen accountant who left in the late 1980s. "The joke when I was there was that the people who made partner were the ones who could put up with the most crap. People who had individuality or creativity got out. It's a real team-oriented firm."

He recalled a large spiral notebook of company practices and procedures that was updated regularly. Employees who failed to add updates or follow the book got into trouble.

"It's as close to a McDonald's franchise as you can get," he said. "I would be amazed if this guy was involved in criminal conduct on his own."

Andersen fired the 42-year-old Duncan on Tuesday, following revelations that he had ordered the shredding of thousands of documents upon learning the Securities and Exchange Commission was investigating Enron's books.

Andersen was Enron's longtime outside auditor -- until being fired Thursday.

Saying the termination of Duncan "was absolutely the right thing to do," Joseph Berardino, Anderson's CEO, placed three other auditors on administrative leave and removed four partners from management duty.

Duncan was atop a large pyramid of personnel who reviewed Enron's books. A huge account, it brought in $1 million a week. Duncan oversaw it all and signed the final report.

As the "engagement partner," with primary responsibility for a big account, Duncan was handsomely paid -- somewhere between $500,000 and $1 million, according to estimates by former employees. He lives with his wife, Peggy, and three young daughters in a house in exclusive Hunter's Creek Village valued on the tax rolls at $776,000 and by neighbors at close to $1 million.

He sat on an important Andersen committee and represented the firm on the board of the American Council for Capital Formation, a Washington-based pro-business organization.

At his alma mater, Texas A&M, he was on the accounting department's professional advisory board and was in charge of recruiting new graduates from the university.

"He's always been very professional and dignified," said James Benjamin, head of the school's accounting department. "He's passionate about his firm, his profession and Texas A&M."

Benjamin, who taught Duncan as an undergraduate, saw him on more than two dozen occasions and never noticed anything particularly different about him. He wasn't overly personal, or overly anything -- except successful.

"There's nothing about him to distinguish him from any of the other fine graduates that would put him in this situation," Benjamin said. "I never would have anticipated anything negative about him or the Houston Andersen office."

Duncan worked for Andersen since graduating in '81. As Houston recovered from the oil and real estate bust of the 1980s, Andersen became the largest accounting firm in town, with many big clients in the energy industry.

Andersen's Houston office started to become a local and national powerhouse when Von Graham took over in the mid-1980s. Graham was part of the "Mississippi Mafia," eight graduates of the University of Mississippi in powerful positions at Andersen offices throughout the country.

Graham was known for persuading Andersen headquarters in Chicago to strengthen the Houston office as it pursued big energy accounts. Among those it landed were Pennzoil and the corporate predecessors of Enron.

When Graham retired in 1996, Andersen's Houston office was larger than the eight other accounting firms in town. In 2001, the local office had more than 1,700 employees, with more than 280 certified public accountants.

Duncan, who has headed the Enron team since 1997, was well-regarded by many, but certainly not all. Some found him demanding and unpleasant to work for, said a former Andersen manager.

"But he was chosen for that trait," he said, because Enron's reputation for being pushy required a like-minded account manager.

Duncan spent most of his time in his office in Enron's headquarters at 1400 Smith, causing some to feel that he related more with Enron than Andersen.

But of the former local Andersen employees who spoke to the Chronicle, none said Duncan would have been an independent operator.

"It's not like he was standing there running the show," one said. "No one is an island at Andersen."

But no one doubts Enron's importance to Duncan, which could have motivated him to do everything possible to protect his client.

"At Arthur Andersen, money speaks louder than anything," said a former Andersen accountant who asked not to be named. "Your future depends on how much you control."
___________________________
Chronicle reporter Tom Fowler contributed to this story.



To: Sully- who wrote (46621)1/18/2002 4:03:01 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Enron mess signals moral decay in U.S.

BY: Dalton Camp
The Toronoto Star
12/18/02

The giant energy corporation, Enron, is now
bankrupt, many of its shareholders have lost their
life savings and the political community is in a
frenzy of buck-passing and a feverish hunt for scapegoats.

The fall of Enron, friend and spoiled child of the Bush administration, its principal
donor and maximum financial supporter, has been described as a systemic failure
in which Murphy's law presided over the flight of management oversight, the due
diligence of corporate directors, the accountability of the high-priced accountants
and the reliability of investment analysts. Perhaps, worst of all, politicians who
had been hopefully bought would not stay bought. To sum up, what former
British prime minister Edward Heath memorably described as "the unpleasant and
unacceptable face of capitalism" is on view in all its inglorious reality in the
corporate boardrooms of America.

This is no trifling matter: corporate executives dumping their shares secretly on
the market, aware of the corporation's imminent collapse while urging their
employees to hold onto their shares - indeed, preventing them from selling, all
the while assured by the corporation's accountants that all was well and knowing
better. The betrayal of trust was a flagrant, deliberate management stratagem and
represented the easy triumph of insider information over the understandable
innocence of employee shareholders.

As Watergate's "Deep Throat" advised seekers of the truth: "Follow the money."
The truth is that Enron's was not the only bankruptcy; there is the moral
bankruptcy of American democracy. Following the money has become the
entrenched first principle of America's political system. In the rhetoric of its
advertisers, the people govern. But they do not. Fewer of them vote, fewer are
heard. It is money that talks. Money buys access. Money is the coin of the realm
in American politics. Those who pay increase their accessibility, their proximity to
power. People answer phone calls from those who pay. The converse is obvious;
if Americans do not pay, they do not have access and lack the privileges
conferred upon those who give money to elected politicians.

Consider the president of Enron. He is the largest donor to George W. Bush.
Since Bush was a gubernatorial candidate in Texas, Enron has been his largest
supporter. Enron is the largest supporter of the Bush presidential campaign. The
corporate media, hastening to the defence of the system, have been gratified to
report Enron has also given to Democrats, as well as Republicans. But Enron has
made 75 per cent of its political contributions to Republicans.

Then Enron's president, Ken Lay, called upon his friends, seeking help. At the
outset, Bush claimed he really didn't know Lay very well and went on to suggest
he thought Lay was a Democrat. No matter what Bush may have thought about
Lay's politics, the Enron president called two Bush cabinet members and the
budget director, seeking help and information. They all took his call. To profound
relief and satisfaction, the Bush administration was of no direct help to the
beleaguered Lay.

But the Bush stimulation tax package did include a three-year corporate tax rebate,
a divine gift to the corporate state. Lay called Bush's budget director to ask about
the likelihood of Enron getting the rebate soon. No small matter to Enron, the
Bush tax rebate represented $250 million (U.S.). Nothing wrong, in this cozy
environment of a steadfast corporate donor, such as Enron, hoping to get some
of its money back.

But then - speaking of the American democracy and the moral standards of
American democracy and the moral standards of American capitalism - who
else but a corporate alms provider and pocket-liner to an entire political
establishment could summon cabinet members to their telephones? Someone who
had their numbers at work, who was a presidential pal and committee member to
the vice-president and, at the same time, a man of evident sharp practice and
seriously deprived of any serious schooling in ethical behaviour.

It helps that Commerce Secretary Paul O'Neill failed to inform the President of
the perils of their mutual friend. Besides, as he was inspired to say that
bankruptcy is an everyday thing in America, a land of losers and winners,
accountants destroying its files and some 100,000 cheated Enron shareholders
who, alas, do not have O'Neill's phone number.

For the past decade, America's economic system has been the biggest game in
town and true heroes were its CEOs. Wealth was a sign of virtue. Investors
bought stocks because stocks were going up and the more they bought, the more
they went up. The Laffer Curve, an economic theorem, had been first drafted on
a café tablecloth. Endorsed by the Wall Street Journal, Arthur Laffer proclaimed
the "new physics," which proved that everything that goes up stays up, given
lower taxes. According to theory, it was programmed to last forever, but it didn't.

No one should ignore these signals of the profound and growing moral decay at
the heart of America's political and economic life. For a presumed leader of the
free world, it is a sorry sight and a disheartening one.
______________________
Dalton Camp is a political commentator. His column appears on Wednesday and
Sunday.

torontostar.com