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Non-Tech : The Enron Scandal - Unmoderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Karen Lawrence who wrote (591)1/22/2002 1:39:35 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3602
 
Bush defends White House's handling of Enron crisis

BELLE, W.Va., Jan 22 (Reuters) - President George W. Bush on Tuesday defended the administration's handling of Enron Corp.'s collapse, declaring that the White House did ``the exact right thing'' and challenging critics to ``let me know'' about any allegations of wrongdoing.

``Our administration has done the exact right thing,'' Bush told reporters traveling with him in West Virginia.

The president also expressed ``outrage'' at the treatment of shareholders, noting that the first lady's mother, Jenna Welch, had bought stock in the company last summer. ``It's not worth anything,'' Bush said.

Bush's team has close ties to Houston-based Enron and its chairman, Kenneth Lay, a major Bush campaign contributor. Last autumn, Lay called Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill and Commerce Secretary Don Evans, Bush's 2000 campaign manager, to warn them of Enron's mounting financial problems.

Enron President Lawrence ``Greg'' Whalley also called Treasury Undersecretary Peter Fisher in late October and early November seeking help for the beleaguered energy-trading giant, which filed for bankruptcy on Dec. 2.

Bush noted a ``couple of contacts'' between members of his Cabinet and Enron executives, but said their response was, ``No help here.'' Bush said anyone with ``an accusation about some wrongdoing just let me know.''

biz.yahoo.com



To: Karen Lawrence who wrote (591)1/23/2002 5:55:08 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Campaign Finance After Enron

Washington Post Editorial

Wednesday, January 23, 2002; Page A16

AS CONGRESS resumes business today, it has a chance to act immediately on one aspect of the Enron scandal. That aspect is campaign finance. The existing system of soft-money donations allowed Enron to buy access to the administration and Congress. Although it is not clear yet whether this access corrupted the policy of the Bush administration, it appears likely that it did corrupt Congress in the late 1990s, contributing to a misguided decision not to regulate the financial instruments that triggered Enron's bankruptcy. Moreover, the soft-money system has allowed Enron's auditor and the other big accounting firms to sway Congress on the issue of audit regulation, contributing to the lax standards that made the Enron scandal possible. Now that thousands of Enron employees have lost their jobs and in some cases their retirement savings, there is no excuse for further delay in banning soft money.

It is true that the Bush administration refused to help Enron stave off bankruptcy. But those who suggest this exonerates the existing campaign finance system have a steep hill to climb. Enron and its officers would not have donated $1.7 million in the 2000 election cycle -- 70 percent of which came in the form of soft money -- if they thought they would get nothing in exchange. Even the suspicion that the money bought something is enough to corrode public trust in the political system. The fact that some members of Congress are now returning money received from Enron underlines the damage that soft money can do to politicans' standing.

But the larger point is that the Bush administration's indifference to Enron's final pleas may have been the exception. Enron's money may well have played a role in persuading the administration, in the form of no less a person than Vice President Dick Cheney, to intervene on its behalf with an Indian leader. It may have made a difference to the White House's energy policy. And it almost certainly bought sympathy in Congress. In 1998 the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the federal agency that regulates derivatives, suggested that there should be oversight for the kinds of "over-the-counter" instruments that Enron trades. But Congress buried the proposal, apparently because Enron and other industry participants did not want to be regulated.

Then there are the Big Five auditing companies, all of which featured among the top 20 contributors to the Bush campaign, and all of which have showered money on Congress. On three occasions in the 1990s Arthur Levitt, the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, tried to tighten regulation of auditors. Each time the industry persuaded Congress to squelch his ideas. In one fight, in which Mr. Levitt tried to prevent auditors from limiting their legal liability, the industry even persuaded Congress to overturn the president's veto. If the auditors' soft-dollar contributions had been limited, and if their sway over Congress had been diluted, it is conceivable that the rules governing auditors would now be more robust.

The Enron scandal raises other issues that will take months to resolve. But the work on campaign finance is fairly advanced already. The Senate has passed a good bill, and reformers are organizing a petition to force a vote in the House over the objections of the Republican leadership. It would be extraordinary, in the face of Enron, if Congress failed to act now.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company



To: Karen Lawrence who wrote (591)1/23/2002 3:02:34 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Enron Audit Fee Raises Some Brows

By JERRY HIRSCH
LA Times Staff Writer
January 23, 2002

The fee Enron Corp. paid the Andersen accounting firm to audit its books was one of the richest in corporate America, a fee that reflects the complexity, and possibly the risk, inherent in the job.

Enron paid Andersen $25 million for the year 2000 audit, a figure higher than all but one of the companies in the Dow Jones industrials that reported their audit fees. The average charge among the blue chips was just $9 million, according to a review of such fees by The Times.

It also was large compared with the fees other energy companies paid their accountants, even Andersen. In a review of fees listed in Securities and Exchange Commission filings, The Times found that audit contracts averaged $3 million at nine large energy companies, including Andersen clients Mirant Corp., UtiliCorp United Inc., Dynegy Inc. and Calpine Corp.

Andersen's fee was a red flag to some experts and critics who say it could have clouded the company's judgment as it examined Enron's tangled financial structure. The high fee no doubt reflected the difficulty of the audit, but it also may have hinted that Enron's finances contained unknown risks. Indeed, Andersen executives debated internally whether the audit and other fees would be perceived as a breach of the firm's independence.

An Andersen spokesman defended the fee, saying it reflected the size and complexity of Enron.

"This was a very sophisticated business," Andersen spokesman David Tabolt said. "The fee is set by the scope of the audit and the kind of people that have to be brought in to do the work. There are a whole lot of factors that go into it."

Tabolt said the audit fee was in line with those of Enron's peers--the top 10 companies in the Fortune 500. But even by that standard, the fee was large.

The nine other companies at the top of that list paid an average of $14.5 million for their audits. Only Citigroup Inc., the nation's largest financial services company, paid more than Enron: $26.1 million.

Even if Enron were looked at as a financial services company, the fee it paid was unusual. The Times examined the fees of seven large financial services companies--including Citigroup, American International Group, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Bank of America Corp.--and found that the average audit charge was $15.5 million.

Several accounting professors and industry insiders said the high fees could be an indicator of the complicated nature of the Enron audit or the perceived risk of the account.

"The relationship between a client and its auditors is a complicated thing because auditors get paid by the client but are supposed to be independent," said Rick Antle, an accounting professor at the Yale School of Management.

"If you tell your client 'no' too many times, you don't have a client. But if you go along with everything they suggest, you could end up in jail," said Antle, who added that there is insufficient information yet to determine whether the high fees Andersen collected influenced its judgment.

However, critics of the accounting industry say the fees Enron paid Andersen--including an additional $27 million for consulting work--and the scandal arising from the audit highlight problems that include the independence of auditors and how the business is marketed and sold.

They argue that the fee clouded the minds of auditors, who were loath to endanger Andersen's contract by forcing Enron to adhere to stricter financial standards.

The audit--and its failure to more fully disclose internal conflicts of interest of Enron executives, billions of dollars in hidden debt and hundreds of millions of dollars in losses--is now the subject of multiple federal investigations.

Even top Andersen executives debated the propriety of the fees it was collecting from Enron--which, including the consulting work, reached $1 million a week.

In a meeting almost a year ago, a group of the firm's top partners on the Enron engagement and at Andersen headquarters in Chicago discussed "whether there would be a perceived independence issue solely considering our level of fees," according to a Feb. 6 internal e-mail summarizing the meeting.

The partners estimated that the combined take on the Enron audit and consulting contracts could reach $100 million annually. Ultimately the partners decided that they were not troubled by such a figure "as long as the nature of the services was not an issue."

The amount a firm charges for accounting services can be a warning sign for audit problems, said Mark Cheffers, who operates the AccountingMalpractice.com Web site.

Certainly, the Enron fee was large enough to have the potential to color the judgment of the firm's staff, Cheffers said.

But there is equal danger at the other end of the scale, where low audit fees are designed to gain an accounting firm entry to a large company so it can sell a host of profitable consulting and other services, Cheffers said.

Companies only last year began disclosing what they paid auditors, and there is not enough information yet to interpret what differences in fees mean, said Lawrence Revsine, a Northwestern University accounting professor.

"We can't say that when there is a $25-million audit versus a $15-million audit, something rotten is afoot here, but we will be able to as more information about audit fees comes out now and it is studied," he said.

Revsine said researchers will look at how differences in a company's number of locations, employees, complexity of transactions and other factors can affect an audit.

Audits are intended to provide independent verification that a company is giving investors an accurate picture of its finances and that it is following consistent and generally accepted accounting rules and standards.

Enron's downfall, caused in part by the accounting treatment of a series of partnerships and ventures affiliated with the Houston energy trader, has thrown thousands of employees out of work and has cost the company's pensioners and investors billions of dollars in stock value losses.

Yet it would be a mistake to assume that all audited financial statements go through the same type of scrubbing and are comparable, said Ira Solomon, who heads the accounting department at the University of Illinois.

For example, two identical companies with the same level of sales and cost structures could have different profit figures based upon the way they construct their financial statements. The cost of inventory can be calculated by two methods that yield different results in the short term. Each approach is an accepted practice, and each produces a different profit figure, Solomon said.

J. Terry Strange, vice chairman, assurance and advisory services, for accounting firm KPMG, which audits Citigroup, said it makes sense that financial services companies pay higher audit fees than other companies.

"The size of the fee is directly related to the size, and more importantly, the complexity of the enterprise being audited," Strange said. "Financial services companies are, generally speaking, the most complicated businesses. The reason they are complicated is that they are in the financial risk business.

"So risk enters into [calculating an audit fee]--the nature of risk that the enterprise takes and the amount of work that must be done to become comfortable that the auditor understands and agrees with the accounting and believes that the enterprise has controls in place to manage the risk they are taking," he said.

By those standards, it would make sense that Enron would be an expensive audit. The company in many ways operated as a financial services business, developing new trading mechanisms and markets for everything from energy to telecommunications services--in the process inventing transactions that were new to the business world.

With that came high risks.

"Clearly this was a very high-risk client. They were doing things in an industry that had never been done before," said Randolph Beatty, dean of USC's Leventhal School of Accounting.

But Andersen spokesman Tabolt said the company does not build a "risk premium" into its audit fees.

Each of the five largest accounting firms conducts the audits of 2,000 to 3,000 publicly traded companies in the United States, according to the Public Accounting Report, an industry newsletter. They so dominate the business that the No. 6 firm in the country, BDO Seidman, has only 325 SEC-reporting clients.

Although companies occasionally change auditors for such reasons as fees or arguments or service issues, most companies stay with the same auditor for years, occasionally putting their contracts out to bid.

Certain firms specialize in industries. Andersen, which audits only two of the 30 companies that make up the Dow Jones industrial average, has a large energy business practice. PricewaterhouseCoopers specializes in large companies and audits 14 of the Dow 30.

_ _ _

Times staff writer Ralph Frammolino in Chicago contributed to this report.