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Non-Tech : The Enron Scandal - Unmoderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Karen Lawrence who wrote (650)1/24/2002 3:40:57 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
7 Enron execs made millions from stock

By Melita Marie Garza
Chicago Tribune staff reporter
Published January 24, 2002

WASHINGTON -- Seven officers of Enron Corp. unloaded as much as $175 million worth of their company's shares last year in a stock-selling spree that was extraordinary even by the standards of the aggressive energy-trading industry.

The seven--former Chairman Kenneth Lay, who resigned from Enron Wednesday night, former Chief Executive Jeffrey Skilling and five other high-ranking Enron executives--were responsible for 91 percent of all sales by people defined as "insiders" under federal securities laws. The seven walked away with as much as $130 million in net profits.

Altogether, 18 top officers and directors of Enron executed at least 64 sales of the company's stock in 2001, according to filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. By any standard, experts say, that is a huge number of sales by corporate insiders in a given year.

Many blue-chip companies record fewer than a dozen insider sales per year. For instance, insiders at Dynegy Inc., Houston-based Enron's hometown rival, sold their company's stock nine times in 2001.

"The mass selling of company stock by high officers and directors is rarely considered good and is generally considered a sign that things haven't gone so well for the company," said Charles Elson, director of the University of Delaware's Center for Corporate Governance. "I don't think a senior officer or director should be selling stock."

In addition to Lay and Skilling, the insiders posting the biggest sales of Enron shares last year were Lou Pai, former CEO of Enron subsidiary Enron Energy Services; Kenneth Rice, former CEO of subsidiary Enron Broadband Services; John Baxter, a former Enron senior vice president; James Derrick, Enron's general counsel; and Stanley Horton, CEO of subsidiary Enron Transportation Services.

Much criticism has already been leveled at Lay for selling huge quantities of Enron stock and then a few weeks later urging Enron employees to buy it. In e-mail exchanges with Enron employees on Sept. 26--about eight weeks after his last recorded stock sale on July 31--Lay encouraged workers to "talk up the stock and talk positively about Enron to your family and friends." The stock, he said then, was "incredibly cheap."

Lay's e-mailed instructions to Enron workers came about a month after Sherron Watkins, an Enron vice president, sent him an anonymous though highly detailed letter arguing Enron had serious accounting problems that might threaten its survival. Indeed, in November Enron was forced to revise its earnings downward by more than $500 million because of accounting irregularities similar to those described by Watkins.

Ethical questions raised

While there is no indication that the many insider sales at Enron last year were illegal, experts said the volume and the value of the sales raise serious ethical questions.

"There's nothing in the public record so far to suggest that the Enron officers and directors did any illegal selling of shares," said Stephen Bainbridge, a professor at the UCLA School of Law. "It would be illegal if they possessed material, non-public information, such as the fact that these various Enron partnerships were in serious financial difficulty and as a result Enron's financial situation would deteriorate."

"It's the old Watergate question," Bainbridge added. "What did they know, and when did they know it?"

Attorneys for the seven Enron executives couldn't be reached for comment. Earl Silbert, a lawyer for Lay, has previously sought to counter the impression his client was dumping Enron stock by saying that Lay used proceeds of Enron sales to repay millions of dollars in loans from the company and in August exercised an option to purchase 68,000 shares, which he still owns.

Some of the officers who sold Enron stock left the company last year, including Skilling, who resigned in August after a six-month stint as chief executive.

Robert Monks, the founder of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., a leading corporate governance consulting firm, noted that "insider trading" by directors and corporate officers is defined in the law as the taking of "short swing" profits by individuals who buy stock and sell it within six months, making a quick profit. Nothing in the record, experts say, suggests that this is what the Enron officers and directors were doing last year.

"In the Enron situation, however, the question is sure to be asked whether the directors acted on `inside information,' a category that is not clearly defined in law," Monks said.

"It may well be the case that all these Enron executives and directors had personal financial difficulties that would have caused them the need to raise capital all at the same time," Bainbridge said.

Still, he added, the large number of transactions raised legitimate questions.

`Trying to get out?'

"I think that any time you have a consistent pattern of high-volume selling by officers and directors, it raises a red flag from a legal and a business perspective," Bainbridge said. "If all the insiders are selling and nobody's buying, I'm worried that they know something that I don't. If they are all running for the exits, it raises the question: Are they trying to get out while the getting is good?"

Bainbridge noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission has had considerable success in winning civil insider trading cases that rested heavily on circumstantial evidence.

"They only need to prove by a preponderance of evidence," Bainbridge said.

However, in criminal cases, winning a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is a much greater challenge, Bainbridge said.

"When you don't have the smoking gun, that's harder to do," he said. "I assume that they are looking for someone who would be willing to turn state's evidence. And, I imagine it's first come, first served in terms of who approaches the Justice Department and gets leniency for cooperating."

Copyright © 2002, Chicago Tribune



To: Karen Lawrence who wrote (650)1/24/2002 3:48:07 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Enron's board should have known better

By W. Michael Hoffman and Dawn-Marie Driscoll
from the January 24, 2002 edition
The Christian Science Monitor

WALTHAM, MASS. - The failure of corporate governance was at the heart of Enron's collapse. The role of Enron's board of directors was to oversee how profits were made, as its members are the ultimate arbiters of the company's ethics and integrity. Perhaps Enron's board now wants to correct its deficiencies. This would be our report to them:

Dear Enron Board of Directors,

While you have finally decided to pay attention to your role in upholding the ethical standards of Enron, you probably realize that board attention to ethics must happen before bad things happen, not after. But it's never too late to learn.

Ethics and integrity start at the top. That means you. We urge the board to establish its own ethical code of conduct, although this might mean eliminating a third of your members. Consulting contracts, charitable contributions, service on boards that do business with Enron, and any position that would raise the appearance of a conflict of interest would be prohibited. Such a code should include provisions about when, if ever, an active board member could sell stock.

Enron already has a code of ethics and stated core values. But words alone are meaningless unless they are accompanied by real commitment and oversight. The mere existence of board audit and corporate governance committees doesn't ensure a company's commitment to ethics.

If you were serious about ethics, you would not have considered "waiving" your code of ethics to permit a blatant conflict of interest with the outside partnerships that you approved - partnerships that did millions of dollars worth of transactions with Enron, yet were run and partially owned by Enron executives. Ethics and values need to be thought of like the Constitution: inviolable. Values - not people - must govern how the company is run, day in and day out.

Had the board shown ethical leadership, you would not have allowed executives to hide critical financial information from regulators, analysts, and shareholders, since your own stated company values include "communication" and "integrity." Your chairman would not have been allowed to blithely assure employees that the company was in solid financial shape and urge them to keep buying stock when others knew and acted differently.

You would have noticed that your chairman's Nov. 13 letter to vendors and contractors touted Enron's "highest ethical standards" at a time when Enron's ethical failures were well known by the general public. An ethics infrastructure would have already been established that would have allowed Sherron Watkins, the letter-writing whistleblower, to come directly to the board instead of the chairman, and the board would not have given her letter for investigation to the same law firm that worked for Enron and helped structure the partnerships.

Finally, legal compliance programs or social-responsibility initiatives should not be confused with business ethics. We know that Arthur Andersen reviewed Enron's internal controls and compliance programs and assured you that they were fine. But compliance programs alone do not help employees resolve situations that can't be found in the rulebook.

The fact that a proposed action is legal does not mean it is right. Social responsibility focuses on doing good in the external world. While environmentalism, philanthropy, and volunteerism are important, they are not to be confused with business ethics, which prevents harm and avoids risk within the corporation. Business-ethics initiatives include ethics training, company-wide ethics committees, and resources for assistance and registering concerns. In other words, structures and strategies are needed to develop an internal ethical culture that will guide ethical business activities.

We suggest you start by reviewing what the best American companies have already established and appointing a senior ethics officer who will report to the chairman and the audit committee of the board of directors. We look forward to welcoming your new appointment in the national Ethics Officer Association so that Enron will benefit by the research, materials, and experiences of other companies who are already leaders in business ethics.

We hope this has been helpful.

_____________________________________________
W. Michael Hoffman is the executive director and Dawn-Marie Driscoll is an executive fellow at the Center for Business Ethics, Bentley College.

csmonitor.com



To: Karen Lawrence who wrote (650)1/24/2002 4:35:25 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
NEWS ANALYSIS: Safeguards failed to stop Enron fiasco

Regulators, auditors and media didn't detect company's problems

sfgate.com



To: Karen Lawrence who wrote (650)1/24/2002 5:03:24 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3602
 
Enron-type accounting problems widespread, ex-SEC chief says

msnbc.com



To: Karen Lawrence who wrote (650)1/25/2002 5:28:33 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 3602
 
The Woman Who Saw Red

Enron Whistle-Blower Sherron Watkins Warned of the Trouble to Come

By Jennifer Frey
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, January 25, 2002; Page C01

HOUSTON

When she woke up on Monday morning, Jan. 14, Sherron Watkins was just one of the legions of high-powered executive moms, the kind of woman who drove an SUV, who liked to take her 2 1/2-year-old daughter to preschool on the way to the office, who caught up with her sister by cell phone during her morning commute.

At age 42, Watkins had climbed to the rank of vice president at Enron, she owned a lovely home in an upper-class Houston neighborhood, and she finally had the family she'd so long desired.

Twenty-four hours later, she was the so-called "whistle-blower" in one of the biggest corporate scandals in modern memory, the woman who had warned Enron's now-former chairman, Kenneth Lay, of major irregularities in the company's accounting practices months before the corporation collapsed, embroiled in a major Securities and Exchange Commission investigation.

"I am incredibly nervous," she wrote in that now-infamous six-page memo, "that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals."

That memo, which she personally gave to Lay in a meeting on Aug. 22, was discovered in a box of documents seized by investigators at Enron headquarters. It was released, in its entirety, on Jan. 15. And Watkins found herself cast as the hero in the Enron scandal: Suddenly, she was the tough-talking Texas woman who had stood up to all the good old boys in the corporate hierarchy, the men who had been making millions while their employees and shareholders watched some, or all, of their life savings evaporate.

And Watkins was in no way prepared for what that meant.

On the morning of Jan. 15, Watkins's sister, Julie Reagan, was returning home after dropping off her two young children at school in their home town of Edmond, Okla., when she turned on National Public Radio and heard newsreader Carl Kassel talking about her sister.

"I was like, OH. MY. GOD," Reagan says. "I drove the rest of the way home with my chin on my chest. [Kassel] kept talking about her all the way until I pulled into my driveway."

So Reagan ran inside, grabbed her phone and dialed her sister's number at Enron.

"I said, 'You're not going to believe it, but Carl Kassel is talking about you,' " Reagan says.

Her sister was not surprised.

"You're not going to believe it," Watkins told Reagan, "but there are news crews parked outside my house."

Stunned, Reagan asked her sister why on earth she had gone to work that morning.

Work, Watkins told her, was a haven. Yes, things had been a mess at Enron headquarters for weeks, months even. Bankruptcy had been declared, retirement funds decimated, lawsuits filed. The building was something of a ghost town, with 4,000 employees laid off from the main office of a company that had, just last year, employed 7,500 in Houston. Documents had been shredded, subpoenas issued.

A haven?

"Because of the security," Watkins explained. "Here, nobody can get past the parking garage."

A Growing Apprehension

A few days after Sherron Watkins's memo was publicly released, a moving crew arrived at her office -- the office she and Reagan jokingly had referred to as "the cubbyhole."

She wasn't being fired. She wasn't being evicted. She was being moved into a new office -- a big one with its own conference table.

"I don't know the motivation for the move," says Watkins's attorney, Philip Hilder. (Through Hilder, Watkins and her husband, Richard Watkins, are declining all interview requests.)

"It might be because, well, they have a lot of room there now."

Watkins used to have an office like that, back last summer, back before she spoke up, before she requested a transfer to a new department because she no longer felt comfortable working for then-Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow. (Fastow -- who ran the partnerships related to the devastating $1.2 billion reduction in shareholder equity that Enron announced in mid-October -- was ousted on Oct. 24.)

"She asked to be reassigned," Hilder says, "because she felt that there were severe questions with the accounting and did not want to work for Mr. Fastow."

A former employee at Arthur Andersen -- Enron's auditor, which is also under fire -- Watkins had worked at Enron for nearly eight years when she wound up working under Fastow last July. While looking for assets to sell off for the company, she discovered Enron had, in effect, been hiding significant losses by some of its equity investments.

She was fearful of approaching then-Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey Skilling with what she had discovered. Once Skilling abruptly resigned on Aug. 14, though, Lay invited employees to submit questions, by e-mail or anonymously, about company-related issues. That's when, with some trepidation, Watkins wrote an anonymous letter to Lay, which she deposited in a drop box he had posted.

When her concerns were not addressed at a company-wide meeting on Aug. 16, Watkins grew more wary.

She called a friend and former colleague at Andersen and spelled out what she had found, wanting reassurance that she was not, as she later would put it in her memo, "all wet." That friend concurred with her concerns, going so far as to put them into an in-house Andersen memo -- a memo that also now has surfaced in the Enron investigation.

Resolved to do something to save what she saw as impending disaster, Watkins drafted her six-page memo and faxed it to her mother, Shirley Klein Harrington, a retired business teacher who lived 30 minutes away, in Watkins's home town of Tomball.

"I thought it was the right thing to do," Harrington says. "There was no option about whether or not she was going to send it. She knew she had to say something. But all along, she never imagined that she was going to be the only one."

But, as Watkins would find out weeks later, when Enron did implode, she had, indeed, been the only one.

"She was out there in the field all by herself," says her cousin Joe Klein.

Deep in the Heart of Texas

Tomball, a town of a little fewer than 10,000 residents, is teeming with Kleins. Richard Klein, Watkins's uncle, owns Klein Market -- a rare family-run supermarket to survive in this era of mega-chains. Watkins worked there as a teenager, running the cash register. So did her cousin Joe, who now manages the store for his dad. Another cousin, Matthew Klein, runs Klein Funeral Home, across the street from the market. His daddy owns the place.

Watkins's mother has lived here all her life, as did her mother, and her mother's mother. She's married to the mayor, H.G. "Hap" Harrington, who helped rear Watkins and her little sister, Julie, since they were in their early teens.

Settled into the couch of her living room, Harrington is surrounded by pictures of Kleins. There are several of Sherron, and an adorable snapshot of Watkins's daughter. There are stacks of family reunion photos -- one with "just the first 20 cousins," and one with a pregnant Watkins in the back row and her second cousin, country singer Lyle Lovett, a few rows in front.

Lovett was among nearly a hundred Kleins who descended upon Salem Lutheran Church on Sunday to be honored on the church's 100th anniversary, says Harrington. The original Klein ancestors arrived in this part of Texas from Germany in the mid-1800s, and helped establish the church. And so there were aunts and uncles, cousins and second cousins, on hand Sunday.

It was a day for Watkins -- who drove out from Houston with her daughter -- to be wrapped in family.

"Everybody was hugging her, saying they were proud of her," Harrington says. "They all said that she was in their prayers."

Religion played a strong role in Watkins's upbringing. She attended the local Lutheran school through eighth grade. She went to public high school -- first Klein High School, then Tomball High, where she was a member of the Tam O'Shanters drill team -- but her mother believes that it was her religion that led her to be such a devoted student, a member of the National Honor Society.

"Lutheran school always stressed that you do your best for the glory of God," Harrington says.

Upon graduation, Watkins enrolled at the University of Texas, where she took her mother's advice and studied accounting. She graduated in 1981, and received a master's degree the following year, then went to work for Arthur Andersen.

Outspoken and independent since childhood -- Reagan remembers that her big sister used to make her sleep on the floor when she came running into her room at night, claiming nightmares -- Watkins grew bored in the Houston office, despite an exciting personal life that included regular scuba trips to the Caribbean. So she asked for, and received, a transfer to the New York office.

"When that happened," her mother says, "she thought she was in high cotton."

There was nothing of the "little girl lost in the big city" in Watkins when she landed in New York, despite her small-town roots. She rented an apartment near Carnegie Hall until she was able to buy her own place, at Second Avenue and East 57th Street. She summered in the Hamptons, sharing a group house with 21 other young professionals. She traveled. She moved on from the basic German recipes learned from her mother to gourmet cooking. And she picked up some "street smarts," as her mother put it, that would color her already strong personality -- and, occasionally, her language.

"So when she came back here," Harrington says of her daughter, who returned to Houston to work for Enron, "she really had to readjust to this way of life."

In a way, though, Watkins was a perfect Texan. In addition to her mom's long Texas family history, her father, Dan C. Smith III, is a descendant of a former Houston mayor, Dan C. Smith I, who served his term after the Civil War.

"After all," Hilder says, "there's nothing really soft about Texans. They're independent and rough-and-tumble."

A Direct Connection

Jessica Uhl remembers the first lunch she had with Watkins, in 1997. She'd been hired through an Enron recruitment program, and Watkins was assigned to be her mentor. Watkins wasted no time; she spoke bluntly and honestly about the company, surprising Uhl with her candor.

"She was incredibly direct and incredibly articulate and incredibly thoughtful in what she said," says Uhl, who became close friends with Watkins. "It's just a part of her personality. She spoke her mind."

Uhl has been on maternity leave the past two weeks, having just given birth to her first child, so she hasn't been at her desk at Enron to see the fallout in recent days. She expected this to happen, though. Watkins had told her about the letter, about what she had done. It made perfect sense to Uhl.

"Sherron has a unique combination of skills, and that makes her one of the best people in the company to do this," Uhl says. "She has the background. She was a CPA, she's worked at Arthur Andersen. So she completely gets what was going on in a way that other people might not.

"She also had the personality," Uhl continues. "She had the sense of conviction to do what she did, and the ability to articulate what needed to be said."

And she thinks gender is a part of that equation.

"Look at the management team: There's not a lot of female faces up there, and there never has been," Uhl says. "Sherron's a vice president, so she's obviously not an outsider, but there is a dividing line there. If you're not part of the boys' club, maybe that makes it a little easier to take a big risk."

Watkins was not a top-tier Enron executive who made millions from the company.

The first paragraph of her memo to Lay makes that clear: "Has Enron become a risky place to work? For those of us who didn't get rich over the last few years, can we afford to stay?" she wrote.

After living the life of a successful, adventurous young professional, Watkins married Richard Watkins in 1997, at the age of 37. The two met through mutual friends at the First Presbyterian Church in Houston, where Watkins is a member.

"She knew she always wanted a family and children," says Reagan, who married and had two children while her big sister was still climbing the corporate ladder.

Marion was born in 1999. With a new house -- valued at more than $500,000 -- in a wealthy neighborhood near Rice University, the Watkinses enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle. They went to Italy to celebrate Rick's 50th birthday, and to Mexico for a summer vacation. Sherron got a Lexus SUV.

"She enjoys life, which is good for her," Reagan says.

An executive in the energy business, Richard Watkins works for a company based in Calgary, Alberta. He commutes to and from Houston, sometimes staying home for a week, other times for shorter visits. After Marion's birth, Sherron Watkins was able to carve out a new role at Enron that involved far less business travel. She hired a full-time nanny, but she manages to get home every night in time to tuck her daughter in.

On the surface, it seemed the kind of life that could make someone just content enough to close her eyes to what was happening around her.

"She's a very loyal person -- loyal to her friends and her family and even her job," Reagan says. "So I think if she didn't care about Enron, she would have left without ever having bothered to correct what was going on. But what she wanted to do was make it right."

And so she spoke up. And was essentially ignored.

When Enron started to fall apart, Watkins -- like her colleagues -- started to panic. On the advice of another cousin, Houston lawyer Alex Klein, she hired Hilder as her attorney, just in case she was called to testify at any SEC hearings. She joked with Joe Klein about watching the plants being removed from the Enron building, and going upstairs to get coffee, only to find the coffeemaker gone.

"She was telling me, 'I've got this paycheck and maybe another one,' " says Joe Klein. The future was so uncertain for everyone at Enron.

"One day, I talked to her, and she thought she was gone," Joe Klein recalls.

A supervisor told Watkins that once she finished her current project, she could gather up her things, but another official interceded, telling Watkins to stay put.

According to both Reagan and Klein, Watkins had begun job discussions with Reliant Energy -- another large energy-services firm based in Houston -- before Enron filed for bankruptcy and the current scandal broke. "When all that stuff started coming out," Reagan says, "they basically said, 'Let's put this process on hold until we see what happens.' "

Hilder said that, to the best of his knowledge, Watkins is not job-hunting at the moment.

And with her new celebrity, she likely has far less reason to be concerned that she'll be involved in any future layoffs.

"She'll keep her job," Joe Klein says, "but eventually what are they going to pay her with? Tiddlywinks?"

'Our Hero'

People call out to Watkins on the street now to thank her. At the Web site www.laydoff.com (a play on Kenneth Lay), a former Enron employee sells T-shirts for the scandal-affected, including one that hails Watkins as "Our Hero." (It misspells her first name as "Sharron.") Watkins has received dozens of e-mails, voice mail and letters of support.

One woman wrote to say Watkins is the kind of example she wants for her 15-year-old.

"I think she's been very encouraged," says Watkins's mother.

Life in the offices at Enron is difficult, but not unbearable. Hilder calls it "awkward."

"Most colleagues are supportive," he says, "and yet there are many of those who just don't know how to treat her."

The television trucks have disappeared from in front of her house on Dunstan Street, where a huge American flag hangs beside the front door.

And she is learning that -- despite her fame -- not everyone has been sucked into the frenzy.

Watkins visited her pastor last week to ask to be added to a prayer chain, looking to the church for moral support in her current crisis. As she talked, she realized that the man had no idea about her current starring role in the Enron fiasco.

"That makes her think," Reagan says, "that things will get back to normal."

Watkins has spent several recent evenings taking Marion with her to dinner at a friend's, the kids playing while the adults unwind.

"It's where she goes to commiserate," Harrington says.

Mostly, though, she has turned to her faith, and her family. Rick Watkins flew in from Calgary the day the news broke to stand by his wife's side.

And little Marion -- who is, of course, oblivious to all of this -- is her mom's greatest escape.

"Her personality is just like her mother's," Harrington says. "She's an independent child, and Sherron was the same way. She wants to be in charge."

On Saturday morning, four days after she first heard her sister's name on NPR, Reagan called Houston to have the usual sister-to-sister morning chat.

At that time, Watkins's biggest crisis was a common one in the life of a mom with a 2-year-old. She was trying -- repeatedly, futilely -- to convince Marion that cookies were not a breakfast option.

And, according to Reagan, Marion was standing her ground.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company



To: Karen Lawrence who wrote (650)1/25/2002 7:48:35 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Conflicts of interest abound in business

01/24/02
By Mike Francis
The Oregonian

If you're looking for silver linings in the Enron debacle -- and I don't mean the linings of certain executives' pockets -- you may find it in the sudden attention being paid to the conflicted role of Arthur Andersen, the consulting and accounting firm.

From the sound of things, many elected officials, regulators and financial observers are shocked -- shocked! -- by the fact that Andersen was extracting huge fees from Enron for two, unrelated sets of services.

On the one hand, Andersen was Enron's accountant, checking the books, keeping the records and handling taxes. At the same time, it was providing management consulting services. Andersen's CEO has acknowledged that Enron represented as much as $100 million in potential annual fees for Andersen. (Last year, Enron paid Anderson $52 million for its services.)

Why, such fees mean that Andersen might have had an incentive to avoid unpleasant conversations with Enron! Conversations between Enron and a diligent auditor, for example, might have focused on the danger of dubious tax strategies, the need to disclose the structure of interlocking limited partnerships and the necessity of more straightforward communications with employees and other shareholders.

Heavens to Betsy! That would make it hard to stay friendly.

The startling magnitude of Enron's failure, combined with its trail of misguided or deceitful dealings, is shining a light on a range of practices that aren't commonly discussed in the media or in Washington.

This is the silver lining. Of course there's an inherent conflict of interest in the role Andersen played with Enron. But this is hardly the first time it's been seen. The same conflict exists in many companies large enough to require the service of professional auditors and business consultants. It's healthy that, at last, this situation is being questioned.

In business, as in politics, conflicts of interest abound. Consultants use one professional service as a wedge to sell another. Elected officials take money from companies' political action funds and executives, then vote on legislation that affects corporate interests. Analysts make money based on transactions generated by their opinions.

On Wall Street, for example, stock analysts rarely publish candid, negative opinions (when they have them) for fear of disturbing the business relationship between a public company and the investment bank that employs them. Just count the number of stocks that are listed as "sells" by the major brokerages. And isn't it troubling to think that the broker who's advising you to unload or snap up shares is going to benefit from the commission on your transaction?

Technology firms, especially those in relatively arcane segments such as computer-aided engineering, pay consultants to evaluate their products. Then they cite them as experts when the press or their customers come calling. (I remember one call from a Portland-area chief executive officer who was responding to my question about whether a consultant's glowing opinion was influenced by the fee he was paid by the CEO's company. The CEO sounded impatient. "It's absolutely standard," he insisted.)

From the Enron mess, we are likely to see legislation that erects some sort of wall between divisions of professional service firms. We are likely to see some heightened requirements for disclosure of various professional relationships. And it's entirely possible that we'll see the collapse of one of the most storied names in the accounting profession.

All this will come as belated and regrettable acknowledgement that then-Securities and Exchange Commission chairman Arthur Leavitt was on the right track when he proposed prohibiting accounting firms from providing consulting services to their audit clients. The protests from accounting firms forced him to back down.

Yet in a few years, memories will fade. And consultants, brokerages, bankers, insurers and lobbyists will establish new frameworks for their interlocking professional and political relationships.

Real reform is dreadfully hard to come by. Businesses are difficult to compartmentalize. Services may sprawl over a range of departments. People move from company to company, board to board or into or out of the public sector. Yet they remain connected to the places they've been before. That leaves a lot of threads draping through the branches.

Our web of professional relationships can get messy. Enron and Andersen have simply given us our sharpest reminder of just how messy.
____________________________
Reach Mike Francis, a Portland financial writer and editor, via e-mail at bizmike@aol.com.

oregonlive.com