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To: T L Comiskey who wrote (46985)1/24/2002 3:39:47 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
7 Enron execs made millions from stock


By Melita Marie Garza
Chicago Tribune staff reporter
Published January 24, 2002

WASHINGTON -- Seven officers of Enron Corp. unloaded as much as $175 million worth of their company's shares last year in a stock-selling spree that was extraordinary even by the standards of the aggressive energy-trading industry.

The seven--former Chairman Kenneth Lay, who resigned from Enron Wednesday night, former Chief Executive Jeffrey Skilling and five other high-ranking Enron executives--were responsible for 91 percent of all sales by people defined as "insiders" under federal securities laws. The seven walked away with as much as $130 million in net profits.

Altogether, 18 top officers and directors of Enron executed at least 64 sales of the company's stock in 2001, according to filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. By any standard, experts say, that is a huge number of sales by corporate insiders in a given year.

Many blue-chip companies record fewer than a dozen insider sales per year. For instance, insiders at Dynegy Inc., Houston-based Enron's hometown rival, sold their company's stock nine times in 2001.

"The mass selling of company stock by high officers and directors is rarely considered good and is generally considered a sign that things haven't gone so well for the company," said Charles Elson, director of the University of Delaware's Center for Corporate Governance. "I don't think a senior officer or director should be selling stock."

In addition to Lay and Skilling, the insiders posting the biggest sales of Enron shares last year were Lou Pai, former CEO of Enron subsidiary Enron Energy Services; Kenneth Rice, former CEO of subsidiary Enron Broadband Services; John Baxter, a former Enron senior vice president; James Derrick, Enron's general counsel; and Stanley Horton, CEO of subsidiary Enron Transportation Services.

Much criticism has already been leveled at Lay for selling huge quantities of Enron stock and then a few weeks later urging Enron employees to buy it. In e-mail exchanges with Enron employees on Sept. 26--about eight weeks after his last recorded stock sale on July 31--Lay encouraged workers to "talk up the stock and talk positively about Enron to your family and friends." The stock, he said then, was "incredibly cheap."

Lay's e-mailed instructions to Enron workers came about a month after Sherron Watkins, an Enron vice president, sent him an anonymous though highly detailed letter arguing Enron had serious accounting problems that might threaten its survival. Indeed, in November Enron was forced to revise its earnings downward by more than $500 million because of accounting irregularities similar to those described by Watkins.

Ethical questions raised

While there is no indication that the many insider sales at Enron last year were illegal, experts said the volume and the value of the sales raise serious ethical questions.

"There's nothing in the public record so far to suggest that the Enron officers and directors did any illegal selling of shares," said Stephen Bainbridge, a professor at the UCLA School of Law. "It would be illegal if they possessed material, non-public information, such as the fact that these various Enron partnerships were in serious financial difficulty and as a result Enron's financial situation would deteriorate."

"It's the old Watergate question," Bainbridge added. "What did they know, and when did they know it?"

Attorneys for the seven Enron executives couldn't be reached for comment. Earl Silbert, a lawyer for Lay, has previously sought to counter the impression his client was dumping Enron stock by saying that Lay used proceeds of Enron sales to repay millions of dollars in loans from the company and in August exercised an option to purchase 68,000 shares, which he still owns.

Some of the officers who sold Enron stock left the company last year, including Skilling, who resigned in August after a six-month stint as chief executive.

Robert Monks, the founder of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., a leading corporate governance consulting firm, noted that "insider trading" by directors and corporate officers is defined in the law as the taking of "short swing" profits by individuals who buy stock and sell it within six months, making a quick profit. Nothing in the record, experts say, suggests that this is what the Enron officers and directors were doing last year.

"In the Enron situation, however, the question is sure to be asked whether the directors acted on `inside information,' a category that is not clearly defined in law," Monks said.

"It may well be the case that all these Enron executives and directors had personal financial difficulties that would have caused them the need to raise capital all at the same time," Bainbridge said.

Still, he added, the large number of transactions raised legitimate questions.

`Trying to get out?'

"I think that any time you have a consistent pattern of high-volume selling by officers and directors, it raises a red flag from a legal and a business perspective," Bainbridge said. "If all the insiders are selling and nobody's buying, I'm worried that they know something that I don't. If they are all running for the exits, it raises the question: Are they trying to get out while the getting is good?"

Bainbridge noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission has had considerable success in winning civil insider trading cases that rested heavily on circumstantial evidence.

"They only need to prove by a preponderance of evidence," Bainbridge said.

However, in criminal cases, winning a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is a much greater challenge, Bainbridge said.

"When you don't have the smoking gun, that's harder to do," he said. "I assume that they are looking for someone who would be willing to turn state's evidence. And, I imagine it's first come, first served in terms of who approaches the Justice Department and gets leniency for cooperating."

Copyright © 2002, Chicago Tribune



To: T L Comiskey who wrote (46985)1/24/2002 4:34:28 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
NEWS ANALYSIS: Safeguards failed to stop Enron fiasco

Regulators, auditors and media didn't detect company's problems

sfgate.com



To: T L Comiskey who wrote (46985)1/25/2002 5:23:45 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Investors Lured to Enron Deals by Inside Data

By KURT EICHENWALD
The New York Times
January 25, 2002

Enron (news/quote) executives enticed wealthy individuals and institutions to invest in one of the partnerships that helped wreck the company by dangling the prospect that inside knowledge could potentially help them double their money in a matter of months, according to partnership records and prospective investors.

In dozens of pages, the confidential records of a partnership called LJM2 describe the inner workings of an entity at the heart of the Enron debacle. The records show company executives wearing two hats, offering banks, insurance companies, Wall Street firms and wealthy investors inside knowledge about Enron and its off-the-books holdings — information that they denied company shareholders.

The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating whether Enron's accounting for its partnerships violated the law, though details of its inquiry have not been disclosed.

Under pressure from the S.E.C. investigation, Enron began disclosing details of its partnerships last fall and started down what turned out to be the road to collapse.

The records show that Enron disclosed to potential investors the conflicts of interest posed by Enron executives' playing a dual role, but sought to allay concern over them.

The LJM2 partnership was run by Andrew S. Fastow, who at the same time was Enron's chief financial officer. It was set up, in part, to invest in entities that Enron controlled and to purchase investments that Enron did not want on its books.

Mr. Fastow and other Enron executives who managed the partnership had a duty to maximize returns for Enron shareholders, the documents note, even as they were offering a separate set of lucrative deals to banks, Wall Street firms and wealthy individuals who owned stakes in the partnerships.

According to the documents, the spectacular returns were possible because the partnerships would be investing in deals originated by Enron, then in its heyday as a swashbuckling global pioneer of energy deregulation. The investments would draw on confidential, nonpublic information developed by the energy company, the documents explained.

"Enron frequently has access to investment opportunities that are not available to other investors," the private placement memorandum for LJM2 said.

Securities experts say that knowledge of the investment plans and strategies of hot companies, like Enron was at the time, is a coveted commodity on Wall Street because it can provide investors a leg up.

The records show that investors in LJM2, which set out to raise $200 million and ultimately took in $349 million, were given more information about Enron's financial situation than the company's shareholders.

For example, documents sent to potential investors in 2000 revealed that Enron controlled about 50 percent more assets than disclosed in Enron's securities filings. The difference — $34 billion versus $51 billion, as of June 30, 1999 — was the value of assets moved off Enron's books through various partnership deals.

The disclosures created conflicts for Wall Street firms, as well. For example, the investment banking arm of Merrill Lynch (news/quote) & Company, which underwrote the LJM2 offering, was aware of the off-balance-sheet figures for Enron; indeed, Merrill's name is on the cover page of the offering containing the data.

But because the numbers were confidential, that information could not be shared with Merrill brokerage clients who were investing in Enron stock. Joe Cohen, a Merrill spokesman, declined to comment.

Merrill was not alone. Dozens of other banks, brokerage firms, pension funds and other institutional investors were approached to invest in LJM2 just over two years ago, and all were provided with the confidential data about the extent of Enron's off-balance-sheet dealings.

Enron's shareholders learned little of these deals until the company restated its financial results last fall, erasing nearly $600 million in profits over five years, and provided additional, but still fragmentary, details.

Wall Street firms are supposed to maintain a so-called Chinese wall to ensure that customers of their brokerage operations are not made privy to inside information gleaned by their investment bankers. In this case, securities experts said, the intent of those laws was undermined.

The transactions "followed the legal norms to produce a perverse result," said John C. Coffee Jr., a securities law expert at Columbia University. "It's a case where the Chinese wall is working to injure public investors, rather than benefit them."

At the same time, analysts of the Enron stock were provided little information about the partnerships.

John Olson, an analyst with Sanders Morris Harris in Houston who was long a skeptic on Enron stock, recalled that he once questioned company executives about their partnerships.

"They told us, `We can't discuss it, it's confidential, and we are enjoined from disclosing anything about it,' " Mr. Olson said.

Among the investors in LJM2, according to court records, are Citicorp (news/quote), the American Home Assurance Company, the Travelers Insurance Company, and an investment partnership affiliated with Morgan Stanley.

The partnership documents made clear to potential investors the magnitude of the conflicts of interest created by the dual roles of the executives. "One of the most challenging due diligence issues for the partnership is the potential for conflict as a result of the principals' dual positions as Enron employees and principals of the partnership," the offering memorandum said.

A separate document disclosed last week by Congressional investigators said that Enron's board waived the company's code of ethics to allow Mr. Fastow to serve as LJM2's general partner. Investors were told that Richard A. Causey, who is still Enron's chief accounting officer, was assigned responsibility for monitoring the partnership and mediating conflicts of interest.

The partnership documents — including sales presentations made by Mr. Fastow to potential institutional investors in LJM2 — describe in detail the workings and performance of several partnerships that have gotten the most attention since the Enron scandal began to unfold.

Among them are limited partnerships known as JEDI I and JEDI II, an acronym with a "Star Wars" glint that stood for Joint Energy Development Investments.

The records said that investors in those partnerships initially were promised returns of 15 percent and 20 percent, respectively. By the time LJM2 was being marketed, JEDI I had returned 23 percent annually for its life, and JEDI II — which was still in operation — was expected to return 194 percent annually.

For the LJM2 partnership, according to internal records and marketing materials, the Enron executives were expecting a minimum annualized return of 30 percent. But sales agents also emphasized the earlier partnerships' results.

"The implication of their pitch was very clear," said one person who heard it. "At least 30 percent could mean well over 100 percent or more."

As of last March 31, according to confidential partnership records, three of the four largest investments in LJM2 brought in returns of more than 100 percent. The lowest return, from an investment in another Enron entity called Raptor I, was 58 percent over four months; the highest, in Raptor II, was 212 percent in just over three months.

In the first quarter of last year, the partnership distributed $75 million to investors — or about 44 percent of the total of $171 million that was invested in the partnership by the end of 2000.



To: T L Comiskey who wrote (46985)1/25/2002 6:18:59 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Now, the $51-Million Severance Question

Pay: Enron's Chapter 11 status may jeopardize compensation for ex-CEO Kenneth Lay.

By NANCY RIVERA BROOKS and JAMES F. PELTZ
LA Times Staff Writers
January 25, 2002

Ousted Enron Chief Executive Kenneth L. Lay could get a severance package worth at least $25 million--and perhaps exceeding $51 million--although his ability to collect that payday is clouded by the company's Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing.

Lay, who resigned Wednesday under fire, also could get parting gifts that include a lifetime annual pension of nearly $475,000, a $12-million life insurance policy and payment of taxes on any severance pay.

But Lay may never see a dime because, with most of Enron Corp.'s operations tangled in U.S. Bankruptcy Court, he slipped overnight from corporate commander to yet another among the thousands of Enron creditors.

"I would be incredulous if he got any money, and if he did take any money he'd be spending the entire amount on bodyguards," compensation expert Graef Crystal said.

Lay, who received more than $200 million in compensation from Enron since 1999, has been accused of misleading shareholders about Enron's finances as it plunged toward ruin last year.

In his 15 years building Enron from a small pipeline company to the world's largest energy trader, Lay was paid handsomely, and his severance agreement and other benefits reflect that, according to documents on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Exactly how much Lay might receive in severance is only vaguely spelled out in Enron's most recent proxy statement, filed with the SEC in March. Enron representatives declined to clarify the matter and hinted that the payout might not be a sure thing.

"The terms of Mr. Lay's separation are still being determined," Enron spokesman Vance Meyer said.

Three Times His Salary and Bonus, Plus Lay's severance is based on payments he received in 2000, multiplied by the three full calendar years left on his contract. That means Lay would be entitled to a lump sum of about $25 million, or three times his 2000 salary of $1.3 million and bonus of $7 million.

That $25-million tab would be further swelled by an unspecified "long-term grant value" received in 2000, according to the proxy statement. Compensation experts said that could include the $7.5 million of restricted stock and a $1.2-million cash payment that Lay also received in 2000, which Enron called "long-term compensation."

If that assessment is correct, the total payout would be $51 million.

The SEC filing also said that Lay is entitled to a lifetime pension that would have been valued at $475,042 if Lay, 59, had stayed until 65. In addition, the company said it would pay all taxes on Lay's severance if the IRS rules that the severance package is an "excess parachute payment."

What is more, Lay, as of the end of 2001, owns a $12-million life insurance policy that Enron helped him buy, according to Lay's 1996 employment agreement, also filed with the SEC.

Lay also remains as an Enron director, and they are paid at least $50,000 a year.

Compensation experts said it is unlikely Lay will get his severance package and most of his pension because all preexisting contracts are invalidated by the bankruptcy filing and the fact that Lay technically resigned, rather than being terminated. But the refusal of the company to rule out a severance is "troublesome," Crystal said.

In any event, even as Enron was hiding losses in a murky series of off-the-books partnerships and using questionable accounting on its way to the nation's largest bankruptcy filing, the company served another purpose that nearly was hidden from public view: It effectively was a personal bank for Ken Lay.

The company last year provided Lay with an unusual line of credit of as much as $7.5 million that he used repeatedly, often to help cover soured investments he made elsewhere, his lawyer has said. This despite the fact that Lay has received more than $200 million in compensation from Enron since 1999.

And the collateral securing the line of credit apparently was Lay's own Enron stock, shares of which were showered on him by the thousands either directly or through stock options that were part of his compensation package during Enron's explosive growth in the late 1990s.

Lay typically repaid the credit line with his Enron shares, then would draw down the loan again and repeat the process, Earl Silbert, Lay's lawyer, said. Lay did this on 15 occasions between February and October, just as Enron's collapse was accelerating.

Lay Expected to Face Huge Legal Bills

Lay's apparent financial problems, signaled by his repeated tapping of the credit line, are compounded by the specter of huge personal legal bills facing him. Lay is the subject of more than 50 lawsuits resulting from Enron's financial meltdown, as well as numerous federal investigations.

His credit line is a perk that has surprised several experts in executive compensation, a field already chock-full of various stock options, bonuses and other benefits paid to Corporate America's leaders.

To have a standing credit line for an executive who can pay back the loan with stock the company has awarded him is "very unusual," said Alan Johnson, managing director of Johnson Associates, a compensation consultant in New York. The arrangement, approved by Enron's board, allowed Lay "to treat the company as a personal piggy bank," he said.

Bill Coleman, senior vice president of compensation at Salary .com, an Internet compensation site, said that "there is something fundamentally odd about a company loaning money to an executive and collateralizing it with the company's own stock."

"Why is Enron in the business of loaning money?" he asked.

Company Loans to Top Management

It is common for a company to make one-time loans to senior managers--say to help them relocate or to buy the company's shares. Sometimes corporations will even waive the interest, or total repayment, as part of the executive's future compensation. Indeed, Enron in 1997 made a $4-million loan to Jeffrey K. Skilling, its chief executive who abruptly quit in August.

Also, the dollar amount of Lay's credit line isn't sizable relative to the billions of dollars of debt that sank Enron. After a series of financial setbacks that sent its stock plunging and eroded investors' confidence, Enron filed for Bankruptcy Court protection Dec. 2, citing more than $31 billion in debt and $50 billion in assets.

The stock, which traded around $80 a share a year ago, now trades for just pennies, and the options that Lay and others still have are virtually worthless.

Silbert did not return calls requesting elaboration on Lay's arrangement, and Enron spokesman Meyer said he could provide no further details.

No one has suggested that Lay's arrangement involved any wrongdoing, and Enron's proxy statement last year disclosed--in two sentences--that the credit line existed. About the same time that the proxy appeared, in March, was when Lay was starting to use the credit line repeatedly.

He typically repaid it by returning shares of his Enron stock to the company, said Silbert, who said he made the public disclosure to offset speculation that Lay was aggressively dumping shares because the executive knew the company was headed toward disaster.

But that disclosure--coming on top of so many other revelations, including that some top Enron executives had financial interests in partnerships that helped finance Enron's operations--adds to the appearance that "there is an awful lot of self-dealing going on in this case, and this is symptomatic of that," said Rajesh Aggarwal, an assistant business professor at Dartmouth College.

In September, at the same time Lay was using his Enron stock to support his line of credit, he urged company employees to buy more shares only weeks before Enron disclosed the worst financial results in its history.

The stock then was selling for about $25 a share, and two months later for $4 a share. The stock's collapse wiped out billions of dollars of investor holdings and the retirement savings of Enron employees who owned the stock.

In general, Lay's credit-line arrangement "is not one that's shareholder friendly," said Salary.com's Coleman. The whole point of executive compensation is to give top managers incentives to build the company and boost its stock price for all shareholders, he said, yet Lay's credit line gave him protection from having to reach into his own wallet even when Enron's stock nose-dived.

"He doesn't get hurt," Coleman said.

The credit line served another purpose not afforded the average Enron stockholder, said Kevin Murphy, a finance professor at USC. Letting Lay repay his credit line with Enron stock "allowed him to get liquidity out of his stock that was easier than going to the open market," he said. In other words, Lay didn't have to first sell $4 million or so of Enron shares on the stock exchange--an event that likely would have depressed Enron's price on the market--each time to pay back his Enron loans.

"That gives him an advantage that most stockholders don't have," Murphy said.

The credit line also raises questions about the amount of risk Lay was personally accepting at the same time he was leading Enron's fight for survival.

It's unclear why, in light of his enormous compensation at Enron, he was having to repeatedly tap his credit line.

Besides his salary and bonuses, Lay realized $43.8 million from stock options that he cashed in during 1999, and $123.4 million from exercising options in 2000, according to Enron's government filings.

Lay sometimes borrowed from his Enron line of credit last year when he expected to face margin calls from other lenders, Silbert has said. That meant he had bought other investments partly with borrowed funds--or on "margin"--and now had to repay some or all of those amounts because their underlying investments had tumbled in value.

Lay recently put several properties up for sale, including vacation homes in Aspen, Colo.

Now that Lay is gone, Enron is searching for a restructuring specialist to run the company. Sources close to the company said an interim chief executive will be announced in the next few days.

Enron reportedly has narrowed the candidates for its interim chief executive, and the front-runners are three New York companies that specialize in corporate turnarounds, according to Bloomberg News. Those companies--Alvarez & Marsal, Glass & Associates and Zolfo Cooper--all declined to comment.