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Politics : Sharks in the Septic Tank -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Neocon who wrote (42634)	1/25/2002 1:14:30 PM
From: The Philosopher	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 82486

What, just because the Japanese admitted that it was the dropping of the bomb that got them to surrender means you think it will change Solong's mind?

To: Neocon who wrote (42634)	1/25/2002 2:23:00 PM
From: Solon	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 82486

That sounds like it was well meant; but actually Hirohito had long been trying to steer a surrender. Unfortunately, the army was the only viable power left in Japan. The air force and the navy were both gone. I don't know who controlled the suicide kids, but clearly none of them had any political power. The army were extremely dangerous; and they were also in line for a great deal of punitive retaliatiion by the victors, should a conditionally peace not be sued for. Without some concession to the Emperor, it was almost impossible for Hirohito to risk his hand beyond very careful persuasion, and guarded diplomacy. The entry of Russia doomed the Japanese hope for a mediated peace. Russia previously had a non aggression pact so the hope for peace was not a vain one. The entry of Russia is what shook the army resolve; and the concession to allow the Emperor to Act for his people (even though technically circumscribed by the will of the vistorious allies), was sufficient to finally make peace. It seems clear that this condition was not only sufficient--but necessary as well. Thus, many at the time, and many now (and we have their statements to consider the truth of the matter), believed that emotional agendas harmed American interests in the long run, and allowed Russia greater power than was necessary. Of course, we don't know if the surrender sop, alone, was a "necessary" one, or if the disappearance of hope for Russian mediation was also "necessary." But the first ought to have been tried--in the opinion of many; and the second had already disappeared weeks before the bombs, but it was chosen not to inform the Japanese of such. In my opinion, a mistake--rather calculated or not. Finally, getting past these obvious points..it is still not proven that the bombings were necessary, or that reasonable alternatives had been pursued. As I said, Leslie Groves seems to have taken far too much power into his hands from the beginning. He was a very powerful man. It has been said that the JCOS would not have authorized the bombing with all the facts in front of them; that is, IF they had met to discuss the issue. Looking at their individual opinions, one finds it difficult, if not impopssible, to deny the relevancy of such a suggestion.