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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47205)1/29/2002 4:36:09 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Here's someone who's really questioning 'Mr. Baxter's suicide'...

Message 16979076



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47205)1/29/2002 5:12:55 PM
From: T L Comiskey  Respond to of 65232
 
"Thinking"...has been Known to cause stress to those who place too much Trust in it .....
Get thee to a Funnery.
t



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47205)1/29/2002 5:14:16 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 65232
 
Amazon rides upstream on accounting fluke

By Al Lewis
Denver Post Business Editor

Sunday, January 27, 2002 - Amazon.com is the Internet bubble that refuses to pop. Last week, the headlines screamed and the sound bytes blared: "Amazon reports first-ever profit."

Analysts crowed that the Internet model was slowly proving itself. And wild-eyed investors drove the online retailer's long-battered stock up 42 percent for the week by Friday's close to $14.44 a share.

They say doctors regularly over-prescribe antidepressants. Maybe that's the explanation. Times are tough, so everyone on Wall Street is taking happy pills.

We are reeling from a recession that began when the very promise that Amazon represents failed to materialize. It's been one tech-wreck after the next, and by now the fallout has darkened almost every sector of the economy.

The layoffs keep coming, the Enron debacle gets uglier every day, corporate accounting practices are increasingly under fire, and what have we learned?

Almost nothing if we believe Amazon is profitable.

Amazon boasted a fourth-quarter profit of $5.1 million, or one penny per share. These earnings are so thin they could have been manufactured in the accounting department by delaying some expenses. But there are many other perfectly proper accounting tricks.

As part of its calculation, Amazon logged a $16.3 million noncash gain, related to Europe's ever-weakening currency. Apparently, the plunging new euro made Amazon's massive European debts much cheaper to service. The savings were booked as a fourth-quarter gain. Without this unusual boost, Amazon would have posted an $11.2 million loss.

This is perfectly legitimate accounting. Still, I'm wondering how many times Amazon can score in the currency market. Right now, no one is predicting another profit. In fact, Amazon says to expect a loss in the first quarter.

I think of Amazon as a mighty river of losses and debt. The Seattle-based wonder has lost nearly $3 billion since it went public in 1997 and it has racked up nearly $2.2 billion in debt. Including its alleged fourth-quarter profit, Amazon posted a 2001 loss of $567 million.

Its stock fell 78 percent in 2000 and from there it fell 26 percent in 2001. Stockholder equity is negative $1.4 billion.

What is amazing about Amazon is that a lot of people figured it would be bankrupt by now, but here it is at ground zero of the tech-sector's nuclear blast, alleging profits. In this holocaust environment, even profits from currency fluctuations are miraculous.

To be sure, things are improving. So what if Amazon lost more than half a billion bucks in 2001? Beats the $1.4 billion it lost in 2000. Or the $720 million it lost in 1999.

Founder Jeff Bezos has just bought more time. Fourth-quarter revenues are up 15 percent to $1.1 billion. He says, no guarantees, but Amazon hopes to achieve positive cash-flow in 2002. That would keep the lenders and investors happy as Amazon continues to expand sales. As part of the sales growth plan, Amazon is offering discounts and free delivery.

That's the problem with Internet retailing. As soon as you start selling a product online, it becomes a commodity, and as soon as it becomes a commodity, everyone wants the lowest price.

The only way to make money on minuscule margins is to have gigantic sales volume. And the best way to get gigantic sales volume is to keep lowering prices.

It's a game that can be won. Just look at Wal-Mart. And it can be lost. Just look at Kmart.

For now, Amazon deserves adulation only because it's still alive. But it isn't profitable. And for all anybody knows, it may never be.
___________________________
Denver Post business editor Al Lewis' column appears Sundays. He can be reached at 303-820-1306 or alewis@denverpost.com.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47205)1/30/2002 7:08:04 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Merrill Officials Invested Their Funds In Enron Partnership That They Sold

By CHARLES GASPARINO and RANDALL SMITH
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Wednesday, January 30, 2002

Nearly 100 Merrill Lynch & Co. executives invested more than $16 million of their own money in a controversial partnership that the securities firm was selling for Enron Corp., even as other senior Merrill officials decided to turn down the offer, people close to Merrill said.

Among the top Merrill officials who put their own money into the Enron partnership were current Vice Chairman Thomas Davis; Daniel Bayly, Merrill's investment-banking chief; and Schuyler Tilney, who heads Merrill's energy investment-banking department and directly oversees the firm's dealing with Enron on corporate-finance matters, the people said.

Though each executive invested less than $1 million, the people said, their involvement highlights the role played by senior Wall Street officials in helping to create some of the partnerships that Enron used to pad its earnings and hide debt from investors -- and that eventually resulted in huge losses that led to the energy-trading company's downfall.

Mr. Davis, Mr. Tilney and Mr. Bayly didn't return calls for comment. Joseph Cohen, a Merrill spokesman, said the investments were entirely appropriate, and common on Wall Street.

The personal investments were part of a total of $22 million Merrill and its officials committed to invest in the partnership, known as LJM2 Co-Investment LP. This partnership was particularly controversial because it allowed some Enron officials to make far more money working part time on the partnerships than they did working full time for Enron. The energy company has estimated, for instance, that Andrew Fastow, whom Enron replaced as chief financial officer in October as pressures on the company mounted, made more than $30 million since 1999 running LJM2 and a smaller partnership, called LJM Cayman LP.

At issue for Merrill is the potential for conflicts of interest. Merrill, like other Wall Street firms, wore a number of different hats with Enron: The big securities firm acted at various times as securities underwriter and investor with Enron. Since 1990, Merrill was among the top five underwriters of Enron's stock and bond deals, according to Thomson Financial, earning fees for helping to raise about $3.7 billion in stocks and bonds for the company. Thus, some critics question whether Merrill officials would let their personal investments with Enron entities interfere with their business decisions in dealing with the energy company.

"Merrill's involvement as underwriter for Enron and its executives' investments raises serious conflict-of-interest questions," says Jacob Zamansky, a New York-based plaintiffs' lawyer. "It gives the appearance that Merrill did this to get Enron deals. Merrill had a vested interest in ... the partnership and investing" in it.

There are other conflicts as well, securities lawyers say. Some top executives at Merrill declined to invest themselves because they believed that the Enron partnership -- which kept assets off Enron's balance sheet -- wouldn't get the best investments, which would be kept by the corporate parent. Another concern: Enron's Mr. Fastow suggested the idea of investing in the partnership to Mr. Tilney, whose wife until last week was a managing director of Enron's energy-services unit. Mr. Fastow through a spokesman had no comment.

It is unclear if top Merrill executives, who also worked on Enron's financings, had more information about the nature of the LJM2 partnership than Merrill's individual customers who were offered opportunities to invest in the partnership. "I'm not saying that Merrill violated the law here," says John Coffee, a professor of securities law at Columbia University in New York. "But this is a big public policy issue. Merrill has an obligation because Enron is a client not to reveal some confidential information, but it also has a fiduciary obligation to its investors to tell them if these securities aren't suitable for them."

Mr. Cohen, the Merrill spokesman, brushes aside such concerns. "The investment partnership was reviewed and deemed appropriate by parties on all sides of the transaction," Mr. Cohen said, reading from a prepared statement. "Consistent with common industry practice, it was offered to qualified external as well as internal investors, and this is not a conflict of interest."

Mr. Cohen added that Merrill high-net-worth clients "in the partnership offering were given the same information as all Merrill executives who wanted to invest."

Mr. Davis, who at the time of the investment headed the institutional-securities group, appears to be the only official on Merrill's executive committee to invest in the partnership. Even though close to 100 Merrill executives invested in the partnership, neither Chief Executive Officer David Komansky, nor his heir apparent, President E. Stanley O'Neal, were in the group, people close to the deal said. One person with knowledge of the matter said some top executives balked at investing their own private money because they were uncomfortable with some LJM2 investments. Mr. Davis, however, headed the institutional group, which counted Enron as one of its big clients.

Merrill, which helped market LJM2 to more than three dozen institutional and individual investors through its vast brokerage network, was only one of many Wall Street firms to invest in the $386.6 million partnership. Other corporate investors in the partnership included Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. two different units of Credit Suisse Group's Credit Suisse First Boston, Citigroup Inc., Deutsche Bank AG, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., First Union Corp., and the CIBC World Markets unit of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

The funds for a $15 million investment from J.P. Morgan Chase came from the private-equity unit of J.P. Morgan, which invests the firm's own funds. While individual Morgan bankers may have stakes in those funds, they didn't have any direct, separate stakes in LJM2, a spokeswoman said.

At Citigroup and Lehman Brothers, which committed $10 million each, and CIBC World Markets, which committed $15 million, the funds came from the firm's own assets and not from outside clients or individual investment bankers, according to people familiar with the investments.

Officials declined to comment at CSFB, a unit of Credit Suisse Group, whose DLJ Fund Investment Partners III, LP made a $5 million commitment, while a CSFB affiliate named Merchant Capital Inc. committed $10 million. Spokespeople had no comment at Deutsche Bank, where an affiliate of its former Bankers Trust unit, BT Investment Partners, committed $10 million, and First Union, whose First Union Investors Inc. committed $25 million.

Officials at some of these Wall Street firms said their investment committees felt pressured to make the investments in order to stay in the running for investment-banking assignments. Some bankers also were concerned about whether they were being asked to make uneconomical investments in corporate castoffs that wouldn't appreciate in value. Indeed, it is unclear what returns, if any, the LJM2 partnership investment has generated for limited partners and investors.

Wall Street securities firms have long made investments associated with their investment-banking business. Sometimes the investments are made to provide extra capital to help clients complete deals. Sometimes the investments are used to acquire an asset a client wants to sell. The funds may come from the securities firm itself, from investment clients, or individuals at the firm who may be offered the chance to make the investments as part of their compensation packages.

What was unusual about the Merrill investment in the Enron vehicle was that some senior bankers chose not to participate out of concern about what the partnership would invest in. In addition, some of Merrill's top executives, including Mr. Komansky, Merrill's chief executive, had been embarrassed in 1998 by disclosure that they had taken personal stakes in Long-Term Capital Management, the highflying hedge fund for which Merrill had raised funds and whose near collapse jeopardized the entire financial system.
______________________________
Write to Charles Gasparino at charles.gasparino@wsj.com and Randall Smith at randall.smith@wsj.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47205)1/30/2002 7:38:36 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
To avoid future Enrons, cut out stock options

By CARMEN R. THOMPSON
The Houston Chronicle
Jan. 29, 2002, 6:14PM

So far overlooked, but fundamental to the discovery of the truth surrounding Enron's collapse and Arthur Andersen's alleged culpability, is the usefulness of compensating certain key executives with stock options.

The pros and cons of extraordinary compensation given to top corporate executives have been written about and debated ad nauseam, but the components, methodology and motivations that underlie such compensation schemes are rarely examined. How should executives be compensated? Do stock options give management appropriate incentive? If so, are more options better than fewer? Should executive compensation be limited in some way?

Stock-option grants are supposed to align management's interests with the interests of shareholders; i.e., if executives are shareholders, they will be more inclined to make decisions that benefit all shareholders. What this theory misses is the fact that investors actually put money on the line while executives with stock-option grants do not.

Most executives see stock options as a form of compensation -- and importantly, compensation for work already performed. After all, stock options vest over a period of time. This view is in direct contrast to an investor's hope that future performance will cause his investment to rise in value. (If an investor doesn't anticipate good future performance, he sells his investment.) Investing involves risk, whereas stock options are riskless.

Some executives would argue that stock options can comprise a significant amount of compensation and are, therefore, a significant source of risk. However, executives are also paid significant salaries and bonuses in cash, mitigating much of their personal financial risk should stock options prove ultimately worthless. Investors in common stock are (usually) not paid partially in cash, but instead, have their entire investment riding on future capital appreciation.

Stock-option plans, or SOPs, can also be manipulated (and often are) by management teams to compensate executives even if the stock price falls. Most SOPs allow managers to grant themselves stock options at any time, for almost any reason. If the stock price falls significantly, management can grant itself options at the new, lower price. Because management usually has sole discretion (with a wink and a nod from the company's board) as to when stock options are granted, executives can take advantage of dips in stock price to grant themselves options on the day the stock hits an all-time low. If you think this is a rare occurrence, ask yourself how many times you've seen a company publish, in advance, the dates it plans to issue stock options. Wouldn't investors be more confident that management was taking a long-term view if a company published the dates of planned stock-option grants one, two, three, five or 10 years in advance?

Investors believe that management has ultimate control over the stock price, and therefore, ultimate control over the value of stock options. This is a long-term view, however, and executives are more short-term in outlook. Experienced management teams know that they can make all the right decisions and still have a stock price that isn't very high due to, among other things, general market conditions. Therefore, to management, stock price cannot be controlled. However, the number of stock options can. For executives, it is better to issue lots of stock options that ultimately have a little value each than it is to issue a few stock options and wait for higher long-term value to be realized.

The common sense of good public policy does not allow accounting and audit firms to be paid with company stock or stock options because doing so creates a conflict of interest and compromises the integrity of the data these entities provide to the public. However, the same standard is not applied to individuals inside public companies who ostensibly have the same duty to the public, such as the chief financial officer, chief accounting officer, general counsel and other employees responsible for preparing documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Logic dictates that these individuals should be held to the same standard, given that the same conflicts of interest can (and, in the case of Enron, do) arise. Wouldn't it be better for investors to be able to ask the CFO questions regarding the finances of a company and know that the CFO has no (or at least, less) incentive to hide material facts?

Material financial facts would also become more visible if the CFO of a public company reported to the company's board of directors instead of to the CEO. Direct reporting to the board would almost certainly result in better disclosure and more unbiased reporting of an entity's financial situation because the CFO would no longer have to traverse political waters involving his or her own boss.

Most investors believe that directors ask the right questions and make decisions based on all available information. Investors believe this because, theoretically, the board has ultimate responsibility to the investing public; but a board is only as good as the inquisitiveness of its members and the information it receives from management. Since most chief executive officers sit on the boards of their companies and most CFOs do not, the information a board receives regarding financial matters has usually been filtered by the CEO (usually to fit the CEO's agenda). By having the CFO report directly to the board, the board would gain insurance that they were receiving an unbiased assessment of material financial details.

The healthy debate this arrangement would foster regarding a company's potential acquisitions/investments would undoubtedly result in better allocation of capital across the company, and would better balance the power between CEOs (the keepers of the vision) and CFOs (the keepers of the financial facts).

The benefits of such a reporting arrangement can easily be seen by examining Enron's situation. If Enron's CFO, Andrew Fastow, had reported directly to Enron's board and been compensated with cash only (not stock options), would he have taken the financial risks he took with shareholder money? If Enron's lead auditor, Arthur Andersen, had had a closer relationship with Enron's directors instead of with Ken Lay and Andrew Fastow, would Andersen have stretched the rules as far as they allegedly did? The answers are obvious. A better balance of power should (and can) exist in America's public corporations.

Unfortunately, we are all investors in Enron now, given the amount of taxpayer dollars being spent by chest-beating public officials vowing to "uncover the truth." Enron should serve as the warning, as well as the catalyst, for much-needed change in the rest of corporate America.

----------------------------------------
Thompson, who lives in Sugar Land, is a chartered financial analyst and a consultant to institutional investors.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47205)1/30/2002 8:59:00 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Vexed By The VIX?

By Peter Brimelow
Wednesday January 30, 7:57 am Eastern Time
Forbes.com

Yesterday's market break could be vindicating a new market indicator. For some time, several investment letter editors have been troubled by the level of the Chicago Board Options Exchange's VIX Volatility Index. The VIX is based on the premium that traders are willing to pay for put or call options, depending on whether they are optimistic or pessimistic about the market. Recently it's been down to below 21.76--about as low as it's been since last summer and the summer before that. With yesterday's break, it's moved upward to 26.26, but it's still quite low.

Last summer, it turned out, of course, that the market was going down. This supported the emerging theory that extreme low readings on the VIX generally suggest a dismal market. Sy Harding of Street Smart Report recently published a particularly fetching chart with pictures of smiley faces (low VIX readings) and hungry-looking bears (bear markets) coinciding alarmingly. Richard Russell ofDow Theory Lettershas just pointed to the same phenomenon: "The VIX volatility indicator is now very low..When option sellers become complacent, the market becomes dangerous."

By contrast, the recent peak on VIX was in the early fall--investors were most worried (well, terrified) right when the market was heading into its post-Sept. 11 low.

No one seems to want to rely on the VIX alone. Ronald Rowland ofAll Star Fund Trader, which is in fifth place for performance over the last five years according toThe Hulbert Financial Digest, cautiously describes current levels as "slightly worrisome."

He adds: "There is no 'line in the sand,' so to speak, in regards to the VIX. Just because the VIX has fallen to a similar level [as last summer] does not necessarily mean that something bad will happen. However, a return to a [early] summer-like stagnant market would not be a huge surprise."