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To: stockman_scott who wrote (47213)1/29/2002 6:07:01 PM
From: Mannie  Respond to of 65232
 
news.ft.com

Japanese banks on a downward spiral
The Japanese government may be ready to bail out the banks but unless it can restart the
economy the current bad loan crisis will continue, writes David Pilling
Published: January 28 2002 18:19 | Last Updated: January 28 2002 22:18

It says much about attitudes to Japanese banks these
days that, when Standard & Poor's chief credit officer for
Asia-Pacific recently described the banking system as
"technically insolvent", his comments caused barely a
ripple among his audience. That is because most
experts without a vested interest in saying otherwise
agree that the world's second biggest banking system is
essentially bust.

"Problem loans probably far exceed the total equity of the
banking system," says Akio Mikuni, president of Mikuni & Co, an independent
credit rating agency. "By realising loan losses or closing unprofitable operations,
the Japanese banking system as a whole would have to be nationalised or given
more money."

This realisation is confronting Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister, with an acute
policy dilemma and may yet force him into an embarrassing policy U-turn. While Mr
Koizumi has talked tough about injecting market disciplines into the Japanese
economy and capping government debt issuance, he may soon be forced to resort
to an old-fashioned government bail-out of the banking industry.

Non-performing loans, which even by the government's conservative estimates are
running at Y43,000bn ($320bn), are about 8 per cent of gross domestic product,
more than double the level prevailing during the US savings and loan crisis of the
1980s. In fact, they may turn out to be much higher since, with interest rates at
virtually zero, even the walking dead of the corporate world can service their debts.

True, in the nine
years to last March,
banks wrote off
Y72,000bn in bad
loans, according to
estimates by
Yoshimasa
Nishimura, a
professor at Waseda
University and a
former head of bank
regulation. But as
fast as old problem
loans are dealt with,
new ones -
multiplied by the
black magic of
persistent deflation -
are being created.
"They can try to deal with either the old non-performing loans, or the new ones, but
not both," says Brian Waterhouse, an analyst at HSBC.

That is not all. Banks' core capital, while technically meeting regulatory
requirements, has been padded with preferential shares (the legacy of previous
government cash injections that must be repaid), as well as deferred tax income
on profits that are unlikely ever to materialise. If these are stripped out, says Fitch
Ibca, a ratings agency, most institutions will fail to meet Basle capital adequacy
criteria. Some will even have negative capital.

Unease about the
financial system has
bubbled to the
surface in recent
weeks with the
collapse of Ishikawa
Bank, the first big
regional institution to
fail since 1999, after
the Financial
Services Agency
stepped up its
inspections.
Nervousness is
being exacerbated by
the planned phasing
out of a blanket
guarantee on bank
deposits, which has
prompted a gradual outflow of deposits from second-tier banks and the
occasional request from anxious customers to exchange their cash for gold.

From April 1, only the first Y10m of time deposits will be insured against bank
collapse, a change that led Moody's to put big Japanese banks on negative
outlook last week. For now, depositors can protect themselves by shifting money
to other types of accounts. But by April 2003 protection on these, too, will be
subject to the Y10m cap. Ratings agencies are now talking openly about the
near-inevitability of a government bail-out to recapitalise the banks.

As yet, there is no
such sense of panic
in Japan, largely
because the public
shares the rating
agencies' belief that
the government has
the wherewithal to
prop up the system.
But if Japanese
people are not yet
alarmed, the same
cannot be said of
international
observers. Last week
Paul O'Neill, the
visiting US Treasury
secretary, warned
that "a banking
system that is struggling to rid itself of bad and risky loans can exert a tremendous
drag on the real economy". Mr O'Neill urged the Koizumi administration to "deal
with the problem in its full extent, rather than through a series of partial measures
designed to minimise the immediate cost."

He was speaking only days after banks - roundly applauded by the Japanese
government - bailed out Daiei, the country's biggest supermarket chain, which is
groaning under Y2,200bn of debts. Last week three of its creditor banks, UFJ, Fuji
and SMBC, put the finishing touches to a Y420bn bail-out designed to spare the
Japanese retailer the fate of Kmart, its less cosseted US counterpart. The
"restructuring", under which Daiei's current management will stay and the
company is allowed to keep such core activities as its professional baseball team,
may still prove insufficient.

Ratings agencies say the three banks with greatest exposure to Daiei were well
enough provisioned to have written off all its debts - but none is in the rudest of
health. All have sharply increased their estimates for loan-loss charges this year
while two have dipped into precious capital to meet increased provisioning
requirements. James Fiorillo, banking analyst at ING, says that a Daiei could have
been "catastrophic" for the banking system: "You don't want the sky falling down
when you're trying to rebuild the foundations."

If even these top-flight banks are struggling to keep pace with corporate
bankruptcies, which rose to near-record levels last year, what hope is there for the
rest of the system? According to tax statistics, about 70 per cent of Japanese
companies lost money last year. Mr Mikuni says this is creating a huge "black
hole" in the economy. He estimates corporate losses as equivalent to 6 per cent of
gross domestic product. "Company losses are now mushrooming so the banks
can no longer support everyone," he says.

Difficulties in the banking system are not an isolated phenomenon but the flip-side
of an economy lunging into its third recession in a decade, says Prof Nishimura.
The fear is that, even if individual banks could survive debt write-offs on a Daiei
scale, a series of such bankruptcies could drag down the banking system.

"The banks are weak not just because of the non-performing loans but because
Japan's economy has itself weakened and will possibly weaken further still," says
Prof Nishimura. The idea that the economy is credit-starved and would spring back
into action if the banking system were fixed is nonsense, he says. There is simply
no demand for credit in a contracting and deflating economy.

The financial problems of the banks are due not only to their past lending
decisions and their inability to write off bad debt. They are also having difficulty
making enough money in interest on loans because short-term interest rates are
practically zero. A gloomy Bank of Japan official points out that, with the overnight
call rate at just 0.001 per cent, a bank that lends Y10bn will make a profit of Y278.
That is not enough to buy a cup of coffee, let alone to cover the cost of making the
loan.

As a result, banks have largely ceased to perform their function of credit creation.
Last year, an increasingly desperate BoJ increased the base money supply by
16.4 per cent. But the flood of yen made little difference to the real economy: money
supply stagnated, while bank lending and consumer prices continued on their
third straight year of decline.

The banks and the real economy have thus become locked together in a
downward spiral, making it hard to fix one without repairing the other. It looks
increasingly likely that the government will soon have to spend another round of
taxpayers' money to recapitalise the banks. But even if it does, it will still face the
intractable problem of getting the economy moving. If it cannot do so, the bad-loan
cycle will be in danger of starting all over again.

Additional reporting by John Thornhill



To: stockman_scott who wrote (47213)1/29/2002 7:33:05 PM
From: elpolvo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
scottman-

there's a grub race going on over at the NNBM
thread. about 30 to go till we hit 10,000.
would you mind coming over and posting all
you know about the Enron scandal?

-polvie

Subject 36873



To: stockman_scott who wrote (47213)1/30/2002 1:55:21 AM
From: Dealer  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 65232
 
From Forbes:

From: Jack Hartmann Friday, Jan 18, 2002 3:15 PM
Respond to of 3429

Nice Siebel article from forbes
Tom Siebel used his own software to anticipate the recession months
ahead of rivals and economists, and braced for the worst in 2001. Now he's
betting on a comeback. A year ago Thomas M. Siebel was revving up for the best year of his life. Sales and profits at Siebel Systems, the sales-automation software shop he founded in 1993, had doubled for the seventh
straight year, to $1.8 billion and $258 million, respectively. Siebel had a 70% share of its core market, and its stock had shot up 50-fold since being offered to the public in 1996. He laid plans to
double yet again in 2001, to $4 billion in sales.
But in February, a month before the recession began, Tom Siebel saw
something that horrified him. At home in his sweats at 6 o'clock one morning,
he logged on to his company's internal Web site to begin his morning ritual: a
review of the sales force's forecasts for the quarter. For the first time, the
figures laid out before him in crystalline pixels of blue, red and black showed
that hundreds of potential deals, ranging in value from a few thousand dollars
to several million each, had suddenly stalled. The backlog of pending sales
had declined from just days before. Worst of all, individual sales reports were
laden with ominous phrases: "budget eliminated," "all IT spending frozen,"
"decision deferred to following quarter."

All of it could mean only one thing: a crash was coming. "The recession was
apparent. Here we were, pedal to the metal, and suddenly the pipeline looked
really bad," says Siebel, 49. Hours later he met with his six senior executives
and gave them the stunning news. He demanded an overhaul of the 2001
growth strategy, set in ink only weeks before. Then he dispatched them to visit
key customers and close pending deals before the rest of the world could
discover where the economy was headed. Siebel himself visited nine
accounts in the following few weeks.

And on Feb. 27 Tom Siebel warned Wall Street analysts, in a conference call,
of a possible tech "depression." He began bracing for pain, laying off 800
employees, cutting off three moneylosing business units, cutting budgets for
travel, marketing and hiring--and lopping 20% off the pay of the top brass.

"By week one of April, we turned a $4 billion company back into a $2.6 billion
company," Siebel says. "We turned this Titanic around." The first quarter of
2001 was bad, but not devastating, for Siebel, with license revenue coming in
at $335 million, off $30 million from the fourth quarter of 2000, its first-ever
such sequential decline--though still up 72% from the first quarter of 2000.
Wall Street pretty much took it in stride.

Economists took nine months to confirm that a recession had descended last
March. The software that gave Siebel an early jump on them and his rivals is
all the more compelling for what it shows today. Tom Siebel now says the
recession bottomed out at the end of November--and that one hell of a
comeback looms.

"I believe we will see the information technology market pick up in Q1 and Q2
and the economy at large by Q3 or Q4," Siebel declares.

What? Silicon Valley still reels from the starkest downturn in its four-decade
history. Hundreds of dot-coms have gone under. Some 600,000 tech workers
have been fired. Real estate prices are depressed, restaurants are empty and
luxury cars tool down the freeways with a sign of the times in the windows:
"For Sale by Owner." A trillion dollars has been lost in telecom stocks. Several
leading indicators, from chip orders to hardware sales, suggest things won't
improve soon. Some 55% of tech managers say spending will stay flat or
decline in 2002, says Goldman Sachs.

Not to worry, Tom Siebel says: "The door has opened." In November and
December Siebel reps hit clients with "far more product evaluations,
demonstrations and visits than in the entire third quarter, and the rate of deal
closings was much greater." All of which, of course, is meticulously tracked by
his software. Better yet, he says, Siebel is a good leading indicator for the rest
of tech. "Software is always the decision that is made first. The hardware and
services follow."

His forecast could presage a powerful rebound in the economy, if not the
stock market. The high-tech sector led the way in the wondrous economic
boom of the last decade, suffered the most in the 2000-01 bear market, and
by rights should lead the economy back up. With tech now accounting for half
of all business capital spending in the U.S., Silicon Valley must revive before a
recovery can take hold.

Others in high tech are betting with him. In telecom, entrepreneurs are buying
billion-dollar fiber networks for pennies on the dollar (see story, p. 80); in
e-tailing, founder Scott Blum just paid 17 cents a share to buy back Buy.com,
insisting it can turn a profit (see p. 86); in software, PeopleSoft is pulling off a
stunning turnaround (p. 90).

At Siebel the advertising budget for the first quarter will rise. The company is
recruiting again, and it is even expanding its backshop, buying up newly
vacated data centers in Utah. It doesn't occur to Tom Siebel to ask: Um, what if
I'm wrong? His software is talking to him, and he believes it.

"Tom instruments his business better than anyone I've ever seen, and he
manages accordingly," says Robert Austrian, a Banc of America Securities
analyst who throttled back his optimism on software firms after hearing Siebel
last February. "He was way ahead in seeing the downturn, and he put the
screeching brakes on."

If Siebel's forecast is premature, the risks to his company are high. This year
Oracle, SAP and PeopleSoft are all intensifying their push into Siebel's core
market. Worse still, license revenue in Siebel's market, once expected to grow
30% a year through 2005, now is forecast to expand just 6% annually in the
next four years, to $5 billion, says Gartner. If Tom Siebel gets crunched
between slow growth and competition, his shareholders will pay the price. So
will he: He still owns 15% of the company, worth $1.9 billion.

Blazing trails has been a hallmark of Tom Siebel's career. He was born in
1952 to an upper-middle-class family in the tony Chicago suburb of Wilmette,
Ill., the sixth of seven children. Tom's father, a corporate lawyer, must have
seen something special in him--or some special need. Tom, then age 15,
was the only one to be sent off to the Shattuck Military School in Faribault,
Minn.

"I wasn't an exceptional student," says Siebel, who still bears traces of a
military bent for order and discipline. "It was a great adventure. It forced me to
think and act independently at a young age."

He earned a bachelor's degree at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign in 1975, spent a few years baling hay and doing
construction work in Idaho, then returned to the campus in 1979. By 1983 he
had earned two master's degrees, one in business and one in computer
science. His master's thesis, which extolled the virtues of algorithms that
might make databases run faster, got him recruited to Larry Ellison's Oracle
Corp., then a young vendor of relational databases.

Siebel was 31 years old when he joined Oracle in 1984. A year later he was
named salesman of the year, vaulting past colleagues on the strength of his
deeper knowledge of the technical intricacies of the product. Siebel quickly
won fame as the highest-paid salesman in the Valley.
His greatest contribution came in 1987, when he showed that Oracle's
multimillion-dollar databases could be better sold over the phone than by reps
pressing the flesh. Siebel designed Oasis (Oracle Automated Sales
Information System), which streamlined lead-generation and accounting for
Oracle's sales force. Soon Siebel's call center, Oracle's first, was the largest
revenue unit. In 1988 Siebel was voted Oracle's Most Valuable Player.

But later, when Siebel proposed to Ellison that Oracle sell Oasis to its own
customers, Ellison balked. In 1990 Siebel walked with millions of dollars in
Oracle shares, but sold them shortly after. He's lucky he did: A year later
Oracle was blighted by an accounting scandal that shaved billions off its
market value and nearly bankrupted it.

Meanwhile Siebel and wife Stacey (herself a former Oracle rep) led a new life
of skiing and travel. It didn't last long. Just months into his sabbatical, Siebel
accepted an offer to run multimedia outfit Cayenne Systems. Another 18
months later, in 1992, Siebel sold newly renamed Gain Technology to Sybase
for $110 million, netting himself $10 million more.

It still wasn't enough. In July 1993, with the notion of an Oasis-like product still
gnawing at him, Siebel rented cheap offices in East Palo Alto and founded
Siebel Systems. He spurned offers of venture capital and funded it himself,
letting a few former Oracle pals and others put up to $100,000 each, including
lawyer James Gaither and brokerage titan Charles Schwab (both still sit on
the board). "I told them the only consolation was that [if we flopped] I would
lose more money than they would," says Siebel.

Siebel named the firm after himself not out of self-aggrandizement, he says
with a straight face, but because "I believed that my reputation would draw
talent." It did. Oracle marketer Patricia House, now 46, joined as a cofounder
(now retired, she still owns a 1.5% stake worth $190 million). David Schmaier,
37, left Oracle's struggling applications business to join Siebel in 1994. He
now heads all product divisions and is the de facto successor, though Siebel
says he will run the show for many more years.

From the beginning Siebel Systems would be different. "Serious and
professional," says Siebel. "No polo shirts, no dogs, no Frisbee in the halls."
No extravagances, either. Nearly every penny of the company's $1.4 million in
startup capital went to developing the software. For months Siebel, House,
Schmaier, four engineers and an office manager did their work at a set of $60
metal folding tables. Despite the spartan office setting, everyone wore
business suits. They placed calls to would-be clients like Ingram Micro, Wells
Fargo and Pfizer to solicit advice on their future product and found the interest
was huge. Siebel Systems was in the black from the day it sold its first product
in June 1995.

Siebel went public in June 1996. On their first day Siebel shares zoomed from
an offering price of $17 to $31, valuing the company at $477 million and Tom
Siebel's then-42% stake at $200 million. That year it had 213 employees, $39
million in sales and net income of $5 million.

For the next four years the company grew at a torrid pace. At the end of 2000
Siebel had 7,400 people in two three-building office complexes in San Mateo,
Calif. and 133 offices in 40 countries.

Then the bottom fell out. By early 2001 it looked as though Siebel's wild ride
was over. Last year its sales growth slowed from 121% to a comparatively
paltry 30%. Siebel missed First Call's earnings estimates in September, and
by then its stock price had plunged 60%. Shares now trade around $28, or 56
times trailing earnings. The company is expected to close 2001 with $2 billion
in revenue and net income of $235 million, off 9%.

That he saw the recession coming last February certainly gave Tom Siebel a
head start on his competitors, but that is only half the story. Siebel's ability to
redirect a then-$22 billion (market cap) global enterprise in weeks owes to a
sophisticated set of management tools, all engineered around one thing:
knowledge.

Using Siebel's own sales software, each of its 1,500 sales agents files
weekly progress reports on current deals. They handicap the odds of a "close"
in such meticulous terms as: "5%, opportunity qualified" or "15%, proposal
presented," all the way up to 100% when a contract is signed. The reports
include details like date of last contact with a buyer, known competitive
bidders and when a rival has been eliminated.

The data are funneled into a "Flash Report," which is what Tom Siebel was
reviewing on that fateful morning last February. Siebel found that "close"
handicaps, which had always increased quickly, hadn't budged for days.
Revenue targets for individual deals, which were usually steadfast (Siebel
does no discounting), had suddenly shrunk. The slowdown had begun.

The data tracking provides fast insight but also stokes performance. By day 7
of each quarter, Tom Siebel posts his three-month objectives for the company
on the Siebel intranet. By day 10, each of Siebel's 465 department heads is
required to post corresponding goals for his or her respective unit. By day 15,
Siebel employees--to a man--post their personal goals for the period on the
portal. There they can be viewed at whim by anyone, the founder included.
Fulfillment of these objectives figures into performance reviews. Every six
months the bottom 5% are given walking papers.

As soon as he saw the end coming last winter, Siebel jumped on the intranet,
retracted the 16 growth objectives he had placed there weeks earlier and
replaced them with 3 simple and devastatingly clear ones: Keep customers
happy, keep cash coming in and protect market share. Within six weeks all
8,000 employees tacked over to this new, bleaker outlook. "Everyone always
knows the goal and how they fit in," he says.

Siebel insists on meticulous product knowledge, too. While most software
companies train mainly their sales staffs, Siebel demands that every single
employee--including secretaries and security guards--complete at least five
Web-hosted tutorials on Siebel products, every quarter. Tutorials end in
exams. Workers must score 90% or higher to pass. The test results, logged
into digital personnel files, also figure into quarterly performance reviews.

Siebel is just as disciplined about his external relationships with customers.
He uses a rigorous third-party auditing service to let customers rate his
company's performance every quarter. In an industry known for hyping
"vaporware," Siebel Systems has an enviable 90% customer satisfaction
level. It had better. This stuff is expensive: typically $300,000 to $600,000 for a
license that might serve 100 sales reps.

Half of the $1 billion in license revenue that Siebel booked in 2001 came from
new customers. Not bad, considering IT spending across all industries sank
through the floor. The auditing service proved so effective, in fact, that Siebel
now resells the auditing system in its new software release, Siebel 7, which it
launched in November.

Customer love is nice, but it can't offset flagging demand. Even if the economy
picks up as Tom Siebel predicts, he will be hard pressed to show the rapid
growth to which his investors have grown accustomed. With $1.5 billion in
cash, Siebel could easily buy its way into new markets, acquiring, say,
PeopleSoft.

PeopleSoft, which dominates the market for personnel management
software, is run by Siebel's former Oracle colleague, Craig Conway (see p.
90), and is rumored to be on the block. Conway denies the company is for
sale, and Siebel scoffs at the idea that he needs to buy his growth.
"PeopleSoft has been offered to us," he says carefully. "We didn't consider it
very seriously. Why would I want to go into that business? It's a crummy
market that is not growing, and it is very competitive."

To prove his point, Siebel waves a graphic that illustrates how his
sector--software for sales automation and customer service--will grow faster
than software for personnel departments or software for enterprise-resource
planning, a market dominated by Germany's SAP.

"I will let the other guys beat each other's heads together in those markets
while I run in this one," he says dryly. Besides, he adds, the market for his
products is still a "green field." Siebel's internal research suggests that just
3% of companies with $1 billion or more in sales use sales automation or
customer service software today. (Verifying this unstintingly optimistic
estimate with any outside observer is difficult.)

But Tom Siebel is eyeing forays into new areas to keep the company growing.
The Siebel 7 release includes a new suite he has dubbed "employee
relationship management." It includes products like Siebel Learning and
Siebel Performance Management, based on the very tools that Siebel has
used to manage his own organization so effectively for years. "The market is
huge," Siebel argues. "Any enterprise that has employees is a potential
customer."

With his existing 3,000 accounts apparently happy, Siebel expects 90% of
them to upgrade to the new Siebel 7 suite within 12 months. If he is right
about that, Siebel Systems could very well return to thriving growth. And if Tom
Siebel is right about his software's role as a leading indicator for the rest of
tech, you can't blame even his bitterest enemies if they end up rooting for him.
Siebel knows: High tech is on a comeback. Remember you heard it here first.
forbes.com

Jack