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Politics : The Donkey's Inn -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Mephisto who wrote (2539)	2/1/2002 12:53:03 AM
From: Mephisto	Read Replies (4) \| Respond to of 15516

The Limits of Power Editorial “ Mr. Bush appears to be developing an assertive new military doctrine that includes the threat of armed intervention against nations that are developing weapons that MAY PUT THE UNITED STATES IN PERIL." The New York Times January 31, 2002 The application of power and intimidation has returned to the forefront of American foreign policy. That was the unmistakable message delivered by President Bush in his State of the Union address when he labeled Iran, Iraq and North Korea an "axis of evil" that he would not permit to threaten the United States with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. Not since America's humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam more than a quarter-century ago has our foreign policy relied so heavily on non-nuclear military force, or the threat of it, to defend American interests around the world. Mr. Bush appears to be developing an assertive new military doctrine that includes the threat of armed intervention against nations that are developing weapons that may put the United States in peril The evolving Bush Doctrine implies a pre-emptive use of conventional force to take out missile launchers, industrial enterprises and facilities that appear to be involved in the fabrication of unconventional weapons. This is a radical departure from what went before. Traditionally, the United States has employed its military forces in retaliation for an attack rather than striking first itself. That should not preclude other options when there is a clear and present danger of attack, but firing first is not a step to be taken lightly. The apparent success of the Afghan campaign should not encourage Mr. Bush to overreach. As much of the world recognized, the attacks of Sept. 11 left the United States no choice but to defend itself, as it has done by dismantling the Taliban in Afghanistan and going after Osama bin Laden and his followers. There may well be circumstances that call for military action elsewhere in the months ahead, perhaps even pre-emptive strikes. Sept. 11, however, does not give Mr. Bush an unlimited hunting license. As a number of his predecessors learned to their and the nation's dismay, turning too quickly or too frequently to the use of force can cost a president support at home and damage American interests and alliances abroad. The muscular formulations used in the State of the Union address — "I will not wait on events while dangers gather," Mr. Bush vowed — reflect a sense among the president and his advisers that American power commands new respect overseas these days. The quick, decisive American action in Afghanistan, including the devastating use of precision weapons, has clearly caught the attention of other nations, especially those hostile to the United States. Add the support Washington has received from nations like Russia and China, and it is easy to see why the Bush administration would conclude that this is a fine time for Washington to brace Iran, Iraq and North Korea with the threat of military attack. The problem comes if the "rogue nations" do not blink and Mr. Bush determines he has to use force to destroy the weapons programs that diplomacy fails to control or overthrow the governments that build them. The military and political situations in the three countries differ. So does the immediate danger their weapons programs present. Indeed, Washington has been trying with mixed success to improve relations with Iran and North Korea in recent years. Designing and executing a military attack, or a covert intelligence operation, to disable weapons programs in Iraq, Iran or North Korea would be challenging enough. Trying to change the governments of those countries — each far larger and militarily more powerful than Afghanistan — would be harder still. Even if these goals could be accomplished, there is no way to assure that the backlash abroad would not be worse than the original threats, including the loss of allied support, a deepening of antagonism toward the United States and anarchy in the target countries themselves. The unrivaled might of America's armed forces can be a powerful factor in world affairs, but it must be used sparingly and wisely. Mr. Bush showed he understood that in the early phases of the war against terrorism. He must guard against the temptation to use power promiscuously as the war evolves. nytimes.com