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Politics : The Donkey's Inn -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Mephisto who wrote (2663)2/5/2002 10:59:35 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
Balance between president and Congress
LEE HAMILTON
February 04, 2002


Once a year, it's hard for Americans, ordinarily absorbed in their
day-to-day activities, to avoid the news from Washington, as every media outlet
covers the president's annual State of the Union address to a joint session of
Congress.

On that night, all eyes are trained on the president as he outlines his
priorities for the coming year. Members of the House and Senate from both
parties applaud respectfully, sometimes enthusiastically. In this annual ritual of
American democracy, the president tries to point the direction for the country,
but in most speeches he also comes across as the nation's "chief legislator,"
giving Congress its "to-do" list for the year.

It is important to remember, however, that the Constitution does
not envision a master-and-servant relationship between the president and Congress.


The framers of the document took care to create a
system of government in which there is a balance of powers and
extensive checks and balances between them. In fact, the framers
actually gave more specific powers to Congress, for they were wary
that a too-powerful president would repeat the wrongs that the king of
England had inflicted on the Colonies.

The president is entitled to recommend legislation,
but his success at seeing his agenda enacted depends to a considerable degree on his skill at reaching out to members of Congress and persuading them to follow his lead.

The president often sees Congress as an obstacle to be overcome,
and always has to calculate how his proposals will play out with Congress.
He cannot dictate what he wants, and faces a huge task in communicating with Congress because of its size and diversity.

One instrument of persuasion is the presidential veto,
and sometimes with an overtly combative stance, a president can bend Congress to his will. But typically, fostering a sense of cooperation and partnership with Congress is the path to presidential success.

These days, we are accustomed to the notion of a president who is active
across a broad front of legislative issues. But until the 20th century, this was not the usual model. Before then, more often than not, Congress was the driving force in government.

In the 19th century, prominent congressmen such as Kentucky's Henry
Clay
were titans on the Washington stage for decades, while presidents came and went. For instance, when Indiana' s William Henry Harrison was elected president in 1840, it was widely understood that he would look to Clay for decisions on most important matters.

But in the first half of the 20th century,
presidents such as Theodore
Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt created the model of the expansive,
activist modern presidency. To members of Congress, the president now looms large in the legislative process. He sets the national agenda and has behind him the vast knowledge and expertise of the federal bureaucracy.

In this media-driven age, he speaks with one
voice against the many voices of Congress,

making it easier for him to command the attention
of the cameras. Using the bully pulpit,
the president can go over the heads of
Congress and make his case directly to the people.

The relationship between Congress and
the president lies at the very core
of our system of government;
under
our Constitution, tension between these rivals
for power is inevitable. The framers did not
set out to promote gridlock between president
and Congress, but they did intend that conflicting
opinions in society should be considered carefully
before government takes action.

It is a dynamic relationship, changing with
every issue and event. Sometimes it is cordial
and cooperative. Sometimes it is hostile and
polarized. And sometimes it is both on the
same day, shifting with the issue under consideration.

Ours is clearly not a system set up for quick, efficient action. Sorting out
who has the real power between the president and Congress in a host of
matters is not easy. But more often than not, Congresses and presidents find a way to work with each other, cooperating where possible, and the nation's business gets done.

The relationship between president and Congress,
while at times tumultuous, in the end safeguards
the people from corruption of power and abuse
of authority by either side. It is a system
that works -- not perfectly, to be sure, but
certainly adequately.

Hamilton is the director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., and director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University. He served as a
U.S. representative from Indiana from 1965 to 1999.



To: Mephisto who wrote (2663)2/6/2002 10:37:50 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 
Choosing the Right Enemies
The New York Times
By MICHAEL O'HANLON

WASHINGTON -- In his State of the Union address,
President Bush took aim at what he called
an "axis of evil" — countries like Iraq, Iran
and North Korea
together with their terrorist
associates. He implied that the United States
might take strong action against all parts of
this global collection of unpalatable actors.


However, Mr. Bush is wrong to lump these
countries and terrorist groups together.
We will harm our security if we fail to
appreciate the great differences among them.

This is particularly true of North Korea
and its tyrannical ruler, Kim Jong Il. North Korea
remains heavily armed and threatening, and
largely as a result of its excessive military
spending, its citizens are extremely poor.
But for all its flaws, the North Korean regime
is not like Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
We can work with Kim Jong Il — provided
that we are smart about how we do it.

Consider how much things improved in the years
before Mr. Bush took office.
Until 1994, North
Korea appeared on its way to developing a sizable
nuclear arsenal. In 1998, it fired a three-stage
rocket over Japan, suggesting it might soon develop
an intercontinental missile capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction against the United
States. Not long ago, American intelligence
officers considered Korea the world's most
dangerous flash point, with the likelihood
that any outbreak of war would lead to
thousands of American deaths and hundreds
of thousands of Korean casualities.

By the end of 2000, the situation had improved
on almost all fronts. In 1994, the Clinton
administration
worked out a deal for shutting
down and monitoring North Korea's major nuclear
facilities. That "agreed framework," which has
held to this day, called for South Korea, Japan
and the United States to provide North Korea
with fuel oil to replace the energy that the
nuclear reactors would have produced — and,
eventually, to build North Korea new nuclear
reactors with less capability for contributing
to a nuclear weapons program.

More recently, the United States convinced
North Korea to impose a moratorium on
long-range missile testing in exchange for a
lifting of most trade sanctions and an improvement
in diplomatic contacts. That moratorium also
continues to hold. And a process of détente began
as well, including a meeting in 2000 between
the leaders of the two Koreas.

North Korea's support for terrorism has
declined drastically in recent years;

there is no evidence the regime actively
supports major terrorist organizations.
Even so, all is not well on the
Korean peninsula. North Korea remains
hypermilitarized; it still exports missiles
and other arms, though in far smaller
quantities than a decade ago;
it may still be quietly working on its
long-range missile program; it might even
have a "basement bomb" project to develop
nuclear arms. Its economy remains a shambles.
And, since Mr. Bush took
office and showed little support for the
"sunshine policy" of South Korea's president,
Kim Dae Jung, toward the North, the process
of détente has essentially been frozen.


What to do? The Bush administration resists
the idea, preferred by some in the Clinton
administration, of simply buying out North
Korea's missile programs. For this administration,
that smacks of blackmail and could encourage
extortionate behavior from Pyongyang. But
the Bush administration has failed to offer
a serious alternative to Mr. Clinton's policy.
Threatening rhetoric does not amount to
a policy and may actually increase the
chances of war on the peninsula.


Rather than merely buying out North Korea's
missile program, the United States and its
allies should insist that North Korea accept
an arms control regime that would scale back
conventional weaponry on the peninsula.
If North Korea were willing to begin economic
reform, perhaps along a Chinese model, the
United States, Japan and South Korea should
commit to providing substantial economic
assistance — not as bribery, but as genuine
aid to help convert the North Korean economy.

What will not work is treating Kim Jong Il
like Saddam Hussein or Mullah Omar. As bad
as Mr. Kim may be, he has displayed some
recognition that he needs to improve relations
with the outside world. He can possibly be
coaxed, but probably not bludgeoned. As he
prepares for a trip to South Korea in less
than two weeks, Mr. Bush needs to make sure
that he wields both a carrot and a stick in
his dealings with Pyongyang — a combination
that has worked well in recent years.

Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution.
nytimes.com