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Non-Tech : The ENRON Scandal -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Baldur Fjvlnisson who wrote (2593)2/7/2002 2:24:21 PM
From: Baldur Fjvlnisson  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 5185
 
Greenspan Should Raise Rates, Bill Gross Says: Rates of Return
By Al Yoon

New York, Feb. 7 (Bloomberg) -- Bill Gross, manager of the world's biggest bond fund, said Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has failed to bring down long-term borrowing costs with 11 reductions in the overnight lending rate between banks. The only way he can succeed now is if he raises interest rates, says Gross.

``Am I daring Greenspan to raise interest rates?'' said Gross, whose firm manages $240 billion. ``Sure, if only to bring down interest rates at the long-end of the curve and to give the economy a chance to recover over the long-term,'' he said.

Thirteen months after Greenspan began to lower the federal funds rate by a total of 4.75 percentage points, the yield on ten- year Treasuries, which set borrowing costs for companies and mortgages, has declined about a quarter-point to 4.9 percent.

Boosting short-term rates would be a ``masterstroke'' that would cut demand for two- to five-year government notes and increase purchases of 10- to 30-year debt, said Gross, who manages the $48 billion Pimco Total Return Fund at Pacific Investment Management Co.

Gross said the Fed, which only directly controls its target for overnight bank loans, needs to find a way to bring down home mortgage and corporate borrowing costs to ensure an economic recovery. The recession, which started in March 2001, has prompted companies to slow investments, cut costs and lay off an average of 152,000 workers a month, the most since in a decade.

``Corporate investment isn't going to benefit and the mortgage refinancing influence on the economy is going to die'' unless long-term rates come down, Gross said. ``The health of the economy ultimately depends on more investment.''

Aggressive Cuts

The Fed's most aggressive series of rate cuts in Greenspan's tenure were ineffective in bringing down 10- and 30-year Treasury yields. That created an incentive for investors to buy securities with maturities between six months and five years, not longer-term securities, Gross said.

Treasury bills, which mature in one-, three-, and six-months and two-year Treasury notes are the most sensitive to changes in the Fed's target rate, called the federal funds rate. As investors expect the central bank to cut rates, they push yields on those securities lower. Ten-year notes and 30-year bonds are traded more on expectations for inflation.

As investors bought Treasuries maturing in five years or less they profited as yields fell. An investor who bought and held a five-year note since the end of 2000 has earned a return of more than 9.5 percent, including reinvested interest. By contrast, investors who did the same with 10-year Treasuries earned less than 8 percent.

Investors may do the opposite if the Fed threatens to increase its target rate, Gross said. A rate increase would ``eliminate the excessive financial leverage hedge funds and government-sponsored enterprises have exercised'' as they bought short-term securities and sold Treasuries maturing between 10 and 30 years, he said.

Paul Chellgren, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Ashland Inc., the maker of Valvoline motor oil, agreed with Gross that the Fed needs to focus on bringing down 10-year note yields to bolster the economy. ``Some of the benefits of the extraordinary loosening of monetary policy haven't flowed through to the consumer,'' he said.

Lower Rates

Some investors said the relationship between the Fed's target and long-term rates isn't as simple as Gross suggests. In 1994, when the central bank lifted the fed funds rate by 2.5 percentage points, 10-year note yields rose 1.91 percentage points and two- year note yields increased at a faster pace to 7.7 percent from 4.3 percent.

In 1994, when the economy was recovering, many traders ``didn't make money'' because their bets on a narrowing gap between two- and 10-year Treasury yields were too early, said Michael Cheah, who invests $1.5 billion of fixed-income assets for SunAmerica Asset Management.

Paul Kasriel, chief economist at Northern Trust Securities in Chicago, said raising fed funds may reduce long-term rates with side effects that may be worse. It could also discourage banks from making loans, which would be a drag on growth, he said, ``If Greenspan's goal is to bring long rates down, a Fed funds rate increase would do it -- but that's kind of a Pyrrhic victory,'' he said.

Gross said long-term rates should also decline as investors become convinced that inflation isn't a threat. He expects the increase in consumer prices to slow to 1 percent to 1.5 percent this year. Inflation erodes the value of the future payments investors receive from fixed-income investments.

Gross doubts Greenspan will follow his advice. ``It's sort of a contrarian view,'' he said.



To: Baldur Fjvlnisson who wrote (2593)2/7/2002 2:26:31 PM
From: Mephisto  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 5185
 
Wall Street's message is trust no one

Paranoia is order of the day, so Krispy Kreme
Doughnuts gets a grilling


David Teather in New York
Thursday February 7, 2002
The Guardian

Krispy Kreme Doughnuts is not a complicated company. It
doesn't trade in difficult to understand intangibles - it sells
doughnuts and pastries. The business was the second-best
performing flotation on Wall Street in 2000 and recently reported
a 68% increase in profits. In fact, Krispy Kreme is just the kind
of "simple" company that investors are being advised to retreat
into.

But Krispy Kreme has not escaped the paranoia running
rampant on Wall Street. Hoping to promote a new
doughnut-making machine during a television interview on CNBC
this week, the chief executive of the company, Scott Livengood,
found himself instead being grilled about accounting practices
relating to retail property leases.

Trust no one. That is the message emerging from a Wall Street
just beginning to feel the full effects of the collapse of Enron, the
energy firm that fell so mightily last month. It has not escaped
the notice of investors that before the bankruptcy of Enron the
company was handing out paperweights festooned with the
company's supposed ethics.

Shifting focus

The effect has been dubbed Enronitis - an appropriate term
because it has spread through the markets like a virus. In the
space of a few weeks, investors have witnessed the biggest ever
bankruptcy in Enron, the fifth-biggest in telecoms company
Global Crossing - and the largest ever retail collapse, at Kmart.
Another wave of companies has either delayed reporting or
restated profits as they come under new levels of scrutiny.

As the events that led to the implosion at Enron have become
clear - the huge debts hidden in offshore ventures, the forced
restatement of accounts - so the focus is shifting firmly to the
checks and balances that were supposed to have pre vented
this kind of thing from happening. A big-five accounting firm
missed the debts that Enron was hiding offshore, regulators did
not recognise what was going on and the banks lending billions
of dollars failed to spot anything. The highly paid Wall Street
analysts following the company continued to post "buy" notes
on Enron shares close to the end. The fundamentals have been
shaken.

If they were unable to protect investors from the alleged
corruption at Enron then why should they be trusted elsewhere?
Are the profits of some of the biggest companies traded on Wall
Street little more than the results of clever accounting, which will
result in more corporate disasters?

A survey for Wall Street Reporter magazine among institutional
investors suggests that there has been a serious impact on
confidence. The survey found that after the Enron collapse 43%
of the 266 respondents were worried about the potential for
widespread fraud.

"People are questioning the fundamentals and the reliability of
financial reporting," says publisher Jack Marks. "There is almost
a crisis of confidence. People are afraid to buy stocks at the
moment because they are worried there are ticking bombs out
there ready to go off. Enron was such a huge company that it
has really shaken people. The impact is very real."

Research note

Credibility and debt levels are becoming crucial indicators. An
early sign of the anxiety caused by Enron's implosion was the
speed with which the discount retailer Kmart dropped into
bankruptcy.

The company fell victim to a crisis in confidence triggered by a
single research note from an analyst who said the company
could face a shortage of cash. Kmart sank into a spiral. The
shares collapsed, debt-rating agencies downgraded the
company and it was forced into Chapter 11 protection when a
big supplier stopped shipping groceries. Kmart, too, has asked
regulators to investigate claims from an employee that its
accounting has been irregular.

A disturbing pattern of cover-ups and conspiracies is beginning
to emerge. Global Crossing, the telecoms firm, is also subject
to questions about its accounting methods. As with Enron, it
has emerged that a whistleblower had warned the board at
Global Crossing months before the collapse that executives had
"intentionally misled" investors.

There have been suggestions that those in the banks and
accounting firms who had sniffed the alleged corruption in Enron
were silenced because they were in conflict with the fee-earning
of other divisions in the banks or auditors. Daniel Scotto, an
energy analyst at the investment bank BNP Paribas, claims he
was fired for attempting to expose the problems at Enron - an
allegation denied by the bank.

The fears are focused on either complex conglomerates or
new-economy companies, many of which have yet to report
profits and do not produce goods that have an easily
recognisable value. Tyco, the conglomerate which makes
everything from fire extinguishers to medical supplies and
bought Conservative party treasurer Michael Ashcroft's ADT, is
now coming under similar pressure.

The group announced surprise plans to split into four to combat
accusations about lack of transparency but the action has not
been enough to stop the rumours of murky accounting methods.
It has already been dubbed Enron mark two amid allegations
that it had not disclosed billions of dollars worth of acquisitions
that were flattering its growth rates. It was also disclosed that
the company paid one of its board directors $20m to help
engineer one of those deals.

Ed Yardeni, chief investment strategist at Deutsche Bank,
argues that the post-Enron environment is exposing tricks that
became commonplace in the hubris of the stock market boom.
The bull market of the 90s, he says, caused many good
managers to turn bad as they raced to keep up with the
ever-increasing expectations of Wall Street. As the bull market
ran out of impetus many were forced to resort to gimmicks to
give investors what they wanted. "This exercise could trigger a
wave of restatements of previous results," he says.

Name and shame

The intense interest in the Enron affair has forced the previously
arcane activities of Wall Street into a wider view that could
cause a fundamental change. The tabloid New York Post, part of
Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, has begun a campaign to
name and shame the analysts that continued to issue "buy"
notes on Enron and Global Crossing almost to the end.

Comparisons have been drawn with the Wall Street crash of the
30s as a wave of fraud was uncovered. That led to the
introduction of proper regulation. In 2002, the response is similar
and the rules are being tightened again. A new watchdog for the
accountancy profession is being set up and there are calls to
separate consulting from auditing. The credit rating agencies are
speeding up their assessments of a company's debts.

The fall of Enron came at a critical time for the markets, which
were building a fragile self-confidence. The key indices have
fallen sharply in recent weeks. Restoring confidence in a market
battered first by a tough economy, terrorism on an
unprecedented scale and now with its fundamental beliefs
shaken will not be an easy job.



To: Baldur Fjvlnisson who wrote (2593)2/7/2002 2:32:44 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 5185
 
CISCO

SLIPPERY CONDITIONS. What to do? Given the welcome increase"

"In technology, Reid says he would focus on name brands like networking gearmaker Cisco Systems (NasdaqNM:CSCO)"
...................................................

"According to Investopedia.com, one-time charges are
"used to bury unfavorable expenses or investments that
went wrong."
That is, instead of admitting that it has been
doing a bad job, management claims that bad results are
caused by extraordinary, unpredictable events: "We're
making lots of money, but we had $1 billion in special
expenses associated with our takeover of XYZ
Corporation." And of course extraordinary events do
happen; the trick is to make the most of them, as a way of
evading responsibility. (Some companies, such as Cisco,
have a habit of incurring "one-time charges" over and over
again.)


Excerpt from the following article:

Bush's Aggressive Accounting
The New York Times
February 5, 2002

By PAUL KRUGMAN

Senator Kent Conrad actually
got it wrong yesterday when
he criticized the Bush
administration's new budget for
its Enron-like accounting. Last
year's budget, the one that
included that big tax cut, was the
one with a strong touch of Enron
about it.
This year's budget
involves a different, though
equally pernicious, kind of aggressive accounting.

Enron's illusion of profitability rested largely on "mark to
market" accounting. The company entered into contracts
that would yield profits, if at all, only over a number of
years. But Enron jumped the gun: it treated the
capitalized value of those hypothetical future gains as a
current profit, which could then be used to justify high
stock prices, big bonuses for executives, and so on.


And that's more or less what happened in last year's
budget. The Bush administration took a bullish 10-year
surplus projection — a projection that had a built-in
upward bias, and in any case should have been regarded
as no more than a guess — and treated it as if it were
hard fact.
On the basis of those surplus fantasies the
administration — aided by an audit committee, otherwise
known as the U.S. Congress,
that failed to exercise due
diligence — gave itself a big bonus in the form of a huge
tax cut.

A year later the wrongness of the assumptions behind last
year's budget is there for all to see, and in a rational world
the administration would be called to account for
misleading the American public. But instead the Bush
administration has turned to the political equivalent of
another increasingly common accounting trick: the
"one-time charge."


According to Investopedia.com, one-time charges are
"used to bury unfavorable expenses or investments that
went wrong."
That is, instead of admitting that it has been
doing a bad job, management claims that bad results are
caused by extraordinary, unpredictable events: "We're
making lots of money, but we had $1 billion in special
expenses associated with our takeover of XYZ
Corporation." And of course extraordinary events do
happen; the trick is to make the most of them, as a way of
evading responsibility. (Some companies, such as Cisco,
have a habit of incurring "one-time charges" over and over
again.)


The events of Sept. 11 shocked and horrified the nation;
they also presented the Bush administration with a
golden opportunity to bury its previous misdeeds. Has
more than $4 trillion of projected surplus suddenly
evaporated into thin air? Pay no attention to the tax cut:
it's all because of the war on terrorism.

In short, the administration's strategy is to prevent
criticism of what amounts to a fiscal debacle by wrapping
its budget in the flag.
And I mean that literally: the
budget report released yesterday came wrapped in a red,
white and blue cover depicting the American flag.

But why am I so cynical? Isn't the war on terrorism a big
deal?

The answer is that emotionally, morally, it is indeed a big
deal; but fiscally it's very nearly a rounding error.

It's true that the administration is using the terrorist
threat to justify a huge military buildup. But there are a
couple of funny things about that buildup. First, if we
really have to give up butter in order to pay for all those
guns, shouldn't we reconsider future tax cuts that were
conceived in a time of abundance?


"Not over my dead body" isn't really an answer.
And it's particularly hard to
take all the grim war talk seriously when the
administration is, at the very same time, proposing an
additional $600 billion in tax cuts.

Second, the military buildup seems to have little to do
with the actual threat, unless you think that Al Qaeda's
next move will be a frontal assault by several heavy
armored divisions.
We non-defense experts are a bit
puzzled about why an attack by maniacs armed with box
cutters justifies spending $15 billion on 70-ton artillery
pieces, or developing three different advanced fighters
(before Sept. 11 even administration officials suggested
that this was too many). No politician hoping for re-
election will dare to say it, but the administration's new
motto seems to be "Leave no defense contractor behind."

I could go on, but you get the point. The administration
insists, and may even believe, that the war on terror has
become a mission. But as far as the budget goes, it's not a
mission; it's an excuse.


nytimes.com