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Non-Tech : The Enron Scandal - Unmoderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Labrador who wrote (1761)2/19/2002 11:20:25 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
WASHINGTON WATCH -- The Vindication of Arthur Levitt

BusinessWeek Online Daily Briefing: WASHINGTON WATCH
By Richard S. Dunham
Tuesday February 19, 9:01 am Eastern Time

During his tenure as chairman of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt Jr. took a lot of heat from the accounting industry and Corporate America for his plan to strengthen enforcement of securities laws and require far greater disclosure from companies. At the time, Levitt's comments sounded alarmist to many.

Levitt, of course, was right. And as Congress and the Bush Administration consider which changes to enact in this Enron-induced reform frenzy, they would be wise to rip a page out of his playbook. With investor anger on the rise and trust in the markets on the wane, Washington should embrace a bold agenda of reform. New SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt and other regulators would do well to avoid halfway steps [see BW, 2/25/02, ``The Betrayed Investor''].

This is not campaign-finance reform, where the Shays-Meehan compromise plan approved by the House on Feb. 14 is viewed by most reformers as only a ``first step'' in changing a corrupt system. When it comes to protecting investors, it's an all-or-nothing proposition. The 100 million Americans who play the market depend on accurate and reliable information to make their investment decisions. The accounting industry has already been pressured into reversing its decades-long opposition to restrictions on mixing its auditing and consulting work [see BW Online, 1/31/02, ``An Abrupt About-Face by Accountants'']. Washington should now act quickly and decisively to enact additional reforms.

``CULTURAL EROSION.'' Levitt's view is that the Investor Class, though huge in size, isn't an effective interest group. ``It is potentially the most powerful lobbying force in the country, and it is the least well-organized,'' he told a breakfast group of reporters recently. As a result, investors are outmaneuvered politically by business interest groups, most specifically by the accounting industry.

Levitt, a former chairman of the American Stock Exchange, publisher, and investment-company founder, worries that the Enron situation is being viewed by many as ``merely an accounting problem.'' He sees ``very widespread'' breakdowns in the entire oversight system -- from corporate lawyers and accountants to investment bankers, analysts, and boards of directors. There has been ``a vast cultural erosion cutting across virtually every gatekeeper that operates in this arena,'' he argues. ``A culture of 'What can we get away with,' [has taken] hold, rather than a culture of 'What's good for investors'.... The ones who are hurt are the investors who get lured into this culture, get caught up in the hype, and are the last ones to get out.''

As a result, public confidence in the truthfulness of corporate financial documents has been badly shaken [see BW Online, 2/19/02, ``Enron's Legacy: A New Wariness'']. But how to deal with it? Levitt has a simple and obvious first step: ``Financial statements should be written in plain English.'' To police today's unreliable corporate overseers, he would create an accounting watchdog board with broad authority. ``To restore public confidence today, we need to have an oversight body that has the power to subpoena documents,'' he says, ``to bring in the clients [to testify under oath].'' The funding and staffing for any oversight body would need to be independent of the industry, he adds. And that's just the beginning.

WATERED-DOWN REFORM. Levitt urges Congress to provide more funds to pay for expanding the SEC's enforcement staff. In the most cynical kind of Washington shell game, lawmakers have authorized the hiring of more SEC workers -- but haven't agreed to pay for their salaries. That's old-fashioned game-playing.

The self-described champion of shareholders has long advocated a ban on consulting work by accounting firms. Levitt also wants standards for the accounting profession to be set by experts independent of the industry, such as professionals and investors. Those changes have been resisted mightily by the industry's Big Five.

For years, Levitt ran into stubborn resistance on Capitol Hill from lawmakers who thought he was an overbearing alarmist. Today, the ex-SEC boss predicts that the same legislators will try to water down new shareholder protections. ``The political class is antiregulatory,'' he argues. He predicts that a series of halfway measures will be pushed by longtime reform critics to prevent his radical changes from being adopted [see BW, 2/25/02 ``Commentary: Congress Will Huff and Puff and...Do Little''].

NO COMPROMISES. Some in Congress have criticized SEC Chief Harvey Pitt's reform proposals for being half-hearted. But the hue and cry hasn't been that great. And the White House can't be counted on for hard-hitting shareholder protections. The reason: President Bush has tried to ``split the difference'' between business and consumers on many issues, from automobile fuel-efficiency standards to arsenic levels in drinking water. When it comes to domestic policy, that seems to be his nature.

This is no time for compromise-first politics, however. By adopting the more far-reaching reforms advocated by the likes of Arthur Levitt, both Congress and President Bush will be serving investors as well as can be expected in the wake of the Enron fiasco.



To: Labrador who wrote (1761)2/21/2002 7:00:33 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Andersen Still Snared By Enron Octopus

By Dan Ackman
Forbes.com
Thursday February 21

Arthur Andersen took years to enmesh itself with the bankrupt Enron , as the Houston company grew from a pipeline operator to a new-wave energy trader. The Big Five accounting firm is now trying to make an early exit from the massive litigation by offering a settlement of $600 million to $800 million. But lawyers for Enron shareholders and other creditors rejected the offer as too little, too early.
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While Enron's final collapse was stunningly fast, the buildup to the fall took years. Lawsuits seeking compensation are just getting underway, thus even Andersen's record payment offer, for an accounting firm, to settle all claims by Enron, its former workers and creditors was considered premature, according to a report in Bloomberg News.

The real question about the offer, first reported in the Wall Street Journal, is not why it was rejected, but why it was even made in these early innings. It's as if Andersen, still in the Enron spirit of things, was trying to buy a futures contract settling the claims.

Before settling with Andersen or anyone else, lawyers from the shareholders will try to expand the universe of defendants to include Wall Street banks and brokers who issued Enron shares, sold its debt and issued glowing reports about its prospects. Congressional investigators, along with private lawyers, are trying to determine whether Enron offered the firms--including Merrill Lynch , Citigroup , J.P. Morgan Chase and Credit Suisse First Boston --special deals in Enron partnerships even while they were raising money from Enron investors and telling their clients to buy Enron shares.

Among the issues is whether the banks, as partnership investors, were given more about Enron finances than ordinary shareholders. If investor lawyers can show the banks were corrupted or negligent in creating investor losses, the overall pot for settlement would dwarf whatever Andersen or its insurers could pay.

Enron Special Report: Enron's Endgame Just how much those claims are worth is anyone's guess at this point. Enron at one time had a market capitalization of $70 billion. But that number is at least in part an artifact of Enron's wild and crazy accounting practices--its hiding of debt in off-balance-sheet partnerships and its method of booking trading revenue in ways that made it appear a much larger company than it actually was. (See: "Enron The Incredible.")

In addition to shareholders, Enron will face claims by bondholders, trade creditors and commercial banks that lent it money--including some of the same banks that may wind up as defendants in shareholder lawsuits. In the confusion, and while new Enron revelations are still appearing almost daily, plaintiff lawyers say there is no way to know whether Andersen's offer is adequate.

Among the new Enron revelations is news that Kenneth Lay, Enron's former chairman and chief executive, offered a board seat to Robert Rubin as the former U.S. Treasury secretary announced he was leaving the government in 1999. Lay's offer to Rubin was part of a long lobbying effort by Enron and other financial companies to make sure that the trading of financial instruments known as derivatives was left unregulated.

That effort was successful and may have been critical to Enron's rise, even if Lay's appeals to Bush Administration officials on the eve of its collapse were unavailing.

The offer to Rubin was made public from documents provided by the Treasury Department under a Freedom of Information Act request by the Associated Press. Rubin, now vice chairman of Citigroup, received many offers of board seats, his spokesman said, and he had no interest in accepting Lay's. But with or without a seat on Enron's board, he did call Peter Fisher, an old Treasury colleague, last November to seek his intervention on Enron's behalf. At the time, rating agencies were poised to downgrade Enron's credit status, one of the last steps leading to its demise.

With Enron's tentacles so far-reaching, it's no wonder Andersen wants out. But no matter how hard it squirms, it will be months, if not years, before the accountants can elude Enron's slimy grasp



To: Labrador who wrote (1761)2/22/2002 6:12:25 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
DAILY BRIEFING -- How to Make the Enron Gang Pay...

By Ciro Scotti
BusinessWeek Online
Thursday February 21

If the names of the alleged schemers at Enron and Global Crossing ended in a vowel, the pack of them might be cooling their heels in federal detention centers awaiting trial and trying to make bail so steep even Bill Gates couldn't post it. All the while, a posse of prosecutors would be compiling a list of racketeering charges longer than a line of limos at a Mafia wedding.

Of course, there are two reasons that's not going to happen. The first is that these are preppie MBAs with Porsche bank accounts and hired lawyers whose hourly rate could feed a family of four for a month. The second is that their hides have likely been saved by the high-tech executives of Silicon Valley and their Washington lackeys, er, lobbyists.

If the portfolio-bruising dot-com bust wasn't reason enough to detest all those myopic Internet ``visionaries,'' here's one more. Concerned about lawsuits brought by investors who grew tired of getting burned on high-flying stocks, the high-tech industry got behind passage of a law in 1995 that, among other things, went a long way toward protecting corporate executives from prosecution under the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act [see BW Online, 2/11/02, ``Enron Shareholder Suits? Not So Fast''].

SERVING SOFT TIME. RICO, as it is fondly called, was designed to snare mobsters running crime families, especially those who traffic in drugs and violence. But its value as a tool against those who would systematically hype stocks and bilk investors [and employees] is obvious. At least it must have been to the geeks who ended up lifting billions out of the wallets of American investors with little or no return.

Even without RICO, someone in the Enron scandal may be ``going to the pokey,'' as House Energy & Commerce Committee Chairman Billy Tauzin has suggested. But, if it is proved that laws were broken, a few white-collar convicts eventually sleepwalking through a couple of years of minimum-security time and a lot of community service is hardly enough to bring justice to the alleged victims in this case.

Guilt or innocence aside in the Enron case, what is needed to deter greedy executives and restore the confidence of investors in the stock market game are harsh new consequences for high-level managers whose shenanigans -- or ineptitude -- take a company down. The fact is that the top brass of big corporations continues to be paid compensation packages so outlandish they would embarrass Anna Nicole Smith -- even in the face of drooping stock prices, failed visions [think AT&T], and gross mismanagement.

WHERE IT REALLY HURTS. It's time to bring radical accountability to the executive suite in the only language the gimme-guys of Corporate America understand: money. For starters, CEOs, presidents, COOs, CFOs, chairmen, members of the board, and other in positions of power within a corporation should be made liable for criminal prosecution under RICO. We're talking jail time and tripling the penalties. Members of a criminal enterprise -- whatever form it takes -- should not get a free pass because they went to Harvard Business School.

Putting aside the issue of criminal prosecution for a moment, when a public corporation declares bankruptcy, officers paid salaries in excess of $1 million a year should be forced to relinquish gains made through the exercise of stock options in the previous two years. If unable to cough up the cash, all assets -- save their home -- should be liquidated. And repricing stock options for executives after company shares have lost significant value should be outlawed.

Of course, the defenders of overpaid execs would scream that business will be badly wounded if the best and the brightest -- cowed by draconian reprisals for failure -- avoid careers in Corporate America. And innovation would suffer, they would moan and groan, if risk-takers feel a chill.

OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY. But you could also argue that creating a real downside for outrageous or clumsy corporate behavior would lead to stronger management and more thoughtful decisions. The weak would be weeded out. Crazy mergers wouldn't get done. Fast-and-loose accounting would be unacceptable. And the stewards of shareholder value would be more cautious about throwing other people's money around.

Sure, life would be tougher at the top. But then maybe upper-level execs would have a legitimate reason for getting paid those big bucks.

___________________________
Go to www.businessweek.com to see all of our latest stories.



To: Labrador who wrote (1761)2/26/2002 8:16:42 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Enron Executive Said to Be Aiding in Federal Inquiry

By KURT EICHENWALD
The New York Times
February 26, 2002

A senior official from Enron (news/quote)'s finance division, himself a subject of the criminal inquiry into the company's collapse, has begun cooperating with federal officials handling the case, people who have been briefed on the situation said yesterday.

Ben F. Glisan Jr., a former treasurer with Enron who played a central role in the establishment and operation of a byzantine series of partnerships affiliated with the company, has already begun offering information and evidence to both criminal and regulatory investigators, these people said.

Government officials are said to consider Mr. Glisan a crucial participant in the events that led to the debacle at Enron. His name appears on an array of documents involving the partnerships and their transactions. He also worked closely with both Andrew S. Fastow, the former chief financial officer who controlled many of the partnerships, and Michael Kopper, another former official in the finance division with a primary role in the partnerships.

Mr. Glisan, people who have been briefed on the situation said, has already provided prosecutors with what is known as a proffer, in which evidence and testimony a witness could provide in an investigation are described as the first step in obtaining either immunity or a plea deal. No final deal has been reached with Mr. Glisan, the people who have been briefed on the situation said, meaning that no final determination has yet been reached about whether he is fully cooperating and should receive a deal.

Still, there are strong signs that the government believes that it has found an important witness in Mr. Glisan, with prosecutors already appearing to be working to protect him as a witness for any future cases.

For instance, although Mr. Glisan appears from documents to know more about the Enron partnerships than anyone other than Mr. Fastow and Mr. Kopper, he has not been asked to appear before any Congressional committee to explain his actions. That is because Justice Department officials have made it clear to the investigating committees that calling Mr. Glisan to testify — forcing him either to disclose evidence or to take the Fifth Amendment — would severely damage the criminal inquiry. In response, the committees decided to pass on Mr. Glisan's testimony.

"Glisan is a person who is at the center of everything," one lawyer with a role in the Enron investigation said. "He has the potential of being one of the most critical witnesses in this case."

While operating under a proffer agreement, nothing that Mr. Glisan says can be used against him directly, although it can be used to follow up with investigative leads. But if prosecutors find that he has not been fully truthful in his statements, the chances of negotiating a deal worsen — or are eliminated.

Mr. Glisan's lawyer, Henry F. Schuelke 3rd, did not return telephone calls seeking comment. Leslie R. Caldwell, the federal prosecutor who is heading the Enron investigation, declined to comment.

Some lawyers said that Mr. Glisan's cooperation was not surprising, given his representation by Mr. Schuelke, a white-collar defense veteran who is a partner at Janis, Schuelke & Wechsler in Washington. Mr. Schuelke is described by his colleagues in the bar as a lawyer who does not simply reflexively fight potential charges, but recognizes when a client can most benefit by cooperating. A onetime Army lawyer, Mr. Schuelke has represented a number of public figures, including Bert Lance, who served as the budget director in the Carter administration, and Betty Currie, the secretary for former President Bill Clinton during the Lewinsky scandal.

Mr. Glisan's role in the events at Enron's finance division was particularly extensive. He was one of four senior executives who secretly invested in a lucrative partnership known as Southampton Place. Mr. Glisan invested $5,800, which was transformed into about $1 million in a matter of weeks. That transaction was said to be of particular interest to criminal investigators, in part because of the participants: Mr. Fastow and Mr. Kopper were the two largest investors, followed by Mr. Glisan and Kristina Mordaunt, a lawyer who worked for Mr. Fastow and who later became general counsel for Enron's broadband division.

A special committee of the Enron board determined that Mr. Glisan and the other investors violated the company's code of conduct by accepting the interest in Southampton, and they were dismissed from the company last fall.

As an accountant at Enron before his appointment as treasurer, Mr. Glisan worked on a number of transactions that are now central to the investigation into what role, if any, the Fastow partnerships played in the collapse. For example, he was responsible for "transaction support" in the establishment of a partnership known as Chewco. In that role, he had primary responsibility for accounting matters in that transaction, according to a special committee report issued earlier this month.

Accounting issues involving Chewco played an enormous role in the series of shocks that occurred last fall, ultimately leading to the crisis in confidence that threw Enron into its death spiral. Chewco was controlled by Mr. Kopper, who along with his domestic partner, William D. Dodson, received a windfall of some $10 million from their stake in the partnership. Yet, the degree of Mr. Kopper's control of the partnership had been disguised by a side deal that the outside auditor, Arthur Andersen, claims was hidden from it.

Last October, when the board wanted to be fully briefed on Chewco, it called on Mr. Glisan to provide the information. The discovery of the side deals and other accounting issues last fall led the company and Andersen to conclude that Enron had to restate its prior financial reports back to 1997. It is not clear if Mr. Glisan knew of the side deal, but the committee concluded that he may have known of accounting problems.

"Because Mr. Glisan declined to be interviewed by us on Chewco, we cannot speak with certainty about Glisan's knowledge of the facts that should have led to the conclusion that Chewco failed" to meet the standards required for it to be treated as a separate entity from Enron, the committee's report says. "There is, however, substantial evidence that he was aware of such facts."

Mr. Glisan was also a central participant in the structuring and transactions of a group of partnerships known as the Raptors, which also later required restatements of Enron's financial reports. In those partnerships, Mr. Glisan shared responsibility for accounting judgments that, according to the committee report, "went well beyond aggressive."

Southampton was created to profit from one part of the Raptor transaction, with the idea apparently coming from Mr. Fastow and Mr. Kopper, according to the committee report. Internal company documents show that, even though he was profiting off of Enron from that deal, Mr. Glisan still played a principal role in negotiating for the company about Raptor.

Mr. Glisan presented the first Raptor transaction to the company's directors, minutes of board meetings show. Moreover, on approval documents for the first, second and fourth Raptor partnerships, Mr. Glisan was described as the "business unit originator" and the "person negotiating for Enron." Mr. Glisan signed each of these approval documents.

Ultimately, according to the committee report, the Raptor transactions allowed Enron to avoid reporting some $1 billion in losses over a period of a little more than a year. When the transactions were finally disclosed publicly last fall, the results were devastating to Enron.



To: Labrador who wrote (1761)3/6/2002 2:58:15 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 3602
 
Enron's Off-The-Book Casualty: Freedom

By Gary Hull
Wednesday March 6, 2:45 pm Eastern Time
Forbes.com

Suppose the U.S. government treated minorities as it has businessmen since the Enron bankruptcy. A minority is caught robbing a store; to prevent this from happening in the future, politicians propose the creation of a new government bureaucracy: the Federal Minorities Agency. The FMA will control when, where and with whom minorities can shop--and will demand that they pass a battery of psychological tests to ensure that they are not potential shoplifters. The new regulations are necessary, claims the government, on the grounds that since one minority committed a crime, all minorities should be treated as potential criminals.

Yes, this is patently unjust, yet it is routine treatment for businessmen. Consider the plethora of Enron-inspired proposals to expand the scope of current government regulations and to create new ones.

There are calls to regulate employee retirement accounts, including a cap on the amount of company stock that an employee can have in a 401(k) account. Some politicians want to expand the Securities and Exchange Commission so that it can more comprehensively review corporate financial reports. Others want the Commodity Future Trading Commission to regulate the trading of electricity derivatives. There are calls for a new federal agency to control all accountants and demands that accounting firms separate completely their accounting and consulting divisions.

At this point, it seems apparent that certain executives used sham transactions to hide massive debt and to inflate the value of the company's stock. According to knowledgeable securities attorneys, someone at Enron committed fraud, with the complicity of particular accountants at Arthur Andersen , and profited dishonestly by selling over 2 million shares between May and September 2001. If those individuals are convicted of fraud, then they deserve severe punishment. No supporter of the free market or of individualism could defend such dishonesty.

But what should be defended are the rights of innocent, law-abiding businessmen victimized by collective guilt and statism. The statist's technique for expanding the power of government consists of using an actual or alleged economic disaster to evaluate all businessmen as criminals or as potential criminals. The next step is to use this collective condemnation to expand government control over an entire industry.

Consider the demand that accounting agencies sever accounting from consulting. Enron's accountant, Arthur Andersen, purportedly had an incentive to falsify Enron's financial data because Andersen's consulting division had lucrative contracts with Enron. Suppose this is true--that particular Andersen accountants are convicted of fraud and that they rationalize it on the grounds that they feared losing Enron's consulting contracts. Where is the justice in leaping from, individual accountants at Andersen committed fraud, to, all CPAs are (potential) criminals and thereby must be regulated? How is that policy any different from the one that penalizes all minorities for crimes committed by others?

Statists rely on collectivism--the tribalistic notion that an individual is just a cog without rights--to punish all accountants and to push for campaign finance reform.

This legislation seeks to ban so-called soft money, i.e., money given by individuals and corporations directly to political parties. It is an obvious violation of an individual's right to free speech--which necessarily includes the right to support monetarily one's political convictions--and of a television station's right to set its advertising prices. Campaign finance reform was comatose until the Enron scandal--a scandal that, statists claim, proves that rich donors corrode the integrity of our political system.

Suppose the worst is true about Enron's soft money donations--that every penny was used to bribe politicians for special favors. This would only prove that particular individuals are crooks, but it would prove nothing about all soft money donors or recipients.

Imagine the howls of media protest if we applied the same collectivist-statist standards to print journalism. Suppose that a particular writer commits plagiarism. To prevent future journalistic disasters, we need a new federal agency to vet all stories, with the state now controlling every writer on the collectivist premise that a particular writer committed fraud.

Statists first cite a disaster or alleged disaster caused by some individual(s) in industry, and then couple that with a collective evaluation about all individuals in that industry to create a new federal agency and/or to expand the powers of existing regulations. This technique is responsible for the suffocating growth of government regulations since the late 1800s.

In the late 19th century, particular railroads were accused of overcharging farmers. This "economic" crime was used as a pretext for the government to assert control of all railroads and led, eventually, to the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. In the early 20th century, various muckrakers claimed that individual meat packers sold tainted food. Every businessman in the food industry was then treated as a (potential) criminal once the Pure Food and Drug Act passed in 1906. The financial panic of 1907--supposedly caused by the "chaos" of banks issuing private money--was a major impetus for the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, a system which proceeded to outlaw private currency issuance and grant a monopoly to government.

The statists' modus operandi was in full force during the "Progressive" era's massive expansion of government controls. Inspired by the Marxist myth that big business harms the economy, trustbusters such as Teddy Roosevelt succeeded in criminalizing corporate consolidations.

One of the most horrific examples concerns Northern Securities , a railroad trust led by J.J. Hill, E.H. Harriman and J.P. Morgan. This trust consolidated a number of the West Coast's inefficient railroads into a well-managed, profitable unit. But Roosevelt and his fellow statists objected to this consolidation on the grounds that it allegedly violated the rights of small railroads and that it would harm customers. In 1903, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the breakup of Northern Securities and thereby expanded the government's power to regulate all railroad consolidations.

Statists used the Northern Securities case--along with the infamous breakups of American Tobacco and Standard Oil --to make the collective evaluation that every big business, in any industry and at any time in the future, might commit the "crime" of "unfair competition." Thus, any businessman who creates a large market (either through efficient production and/or through consolidation) is presumed guilty.

It is this collectivist argument that led to the creation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914. The FTC, through its power to control mergers and acquisitions and to prosecute antitrust cases, controls the practices and size of big business. The state must regulate every individual in big business, claim statists, because particular big businessmen in the past committed "crimes."

The presumption of innocence is a hallmark of American jurisprudence. But tragically, in an age in which a businessman is presumed guilty simply because he is motivated by profit, businessmen enjoy no such presumption of innocence and are afforded no such legal protection. Unwarranted prejudice against this group--and the legislative, freedom-destroying controls caused by that prejudice--only serves to punish the innocent. That is the most egregious, and least reported, crime committed amid the Enron saga.