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Non-Tech : The Enron Scandal - Unmoderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (1774)2/20/2002 2:10:58 PM
From: James Calladine  Respond to of 3602
 
22 CENTS!

Well for 22 cents you can buy 37% of a share in WCG, a
company that MIGHT survive, if it pacifies its banks, lenders etc.

Just an example! Do your own DD.

Namaste!

Jim



To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (1774)2/21/2002 5:21:03 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Andersen execs offer leads on shredding

By Flynn McRoberts
Chicago Tribune staff reporter
Published February 21, 2002

HOUSTON -- Two partners in the Andersen accounting firm's office here have given what plaintiffs' attorneys described Wednesday as a road map to help determine who ordered Enron documents destroyed and why they did it.

In depositions taken in a conference room of a Houston hotel this week, partners Thomas H. Bauer and Michael M. Lowther provided a "guide to further information, but we need it from other people," said Roger Greenberg, the lead local counsel for a massive securities-fraud lawsuit against Enron executives and Chicago-based Andersen.

So lawyers for the plaintiffs, led by the University of California Board of Regents, plan to use Bauer's and Lowther's depositions to ask the federal judge overseeing the lawsuit to let them depose "a handful" of additional Andersen employees regarding the firm's document destruction and retention policies.

"The essential questions--who destroyed what documents and why--we have not received answers to," Greenberg said. "We're going to be asking for people who can testify to that information."

The plaintiffs' request for this week's depositions, which are limited to issues regarding destruction and recovery of paper and electronic documents related to Enron, were approved last month by U.S. District Judge Melinda Harmon.

Harmon also is overseeing a class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of Enron retirement plan participants, who notched their own legal victory Wednesday in bankruptcy court in New York as U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Arthur Gonzalez allowed their lawsuits to move forward.

Gonzalez lifted a stay on those cases starting June 21 but gave Enron 120 days to argue why the stay should remain in place, according to attorneys involved in the case.

The thicket of litigation involving Enron's collapse falls into three categories: the bankruptcy, a class-action lawsuit filed on behalf of Enron retirement plan participants and another class action on behalf of Enron shareholders such as pension funds.

The Andersen depositions are for the shareholders' lawsuit. Lowther and Bauer were placed on leave after Andersen admitted to shredding documents after the Securities and Exchange Commission began probing Enron's accounting methods last fall. Lowther reportedly remains on staff but was relieved of management duties.

David B. Duncan, the fired Andersen partner in charge of the Enron account, also was deposed this week, but he asserted his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination, Greenberg said. Duncan did the same when called before Congress last month.

Two other Andersen officials from its Houston office--Michael C. Odom, former risk management partner, and Stephen Goddard Jr., former managing partner--are scheduled to be deposed this week, Greenberg said. They, too, were placed on administrative leave, according to court filings.

Nancy Temple, a lawyer at Andersen's Chicago headquarters, will be deposed on March 4, Greenberg said.

Temple sent an e-mail to Andersen's Houston office on Oct. 12 spelling out the firm's document destruction policy for auditors.

Temple told a U.S. House subcommittee last month that she reminded auditors about the firm's policy for retaining documents but didn't order they be preserved or destroyed after learning the SEC had begun investigating Enron.

Asked about the nature of Lowther's deposition, taken Wednesday, and Bauer's, taken Tuesday, Greenberg replied: "We're not doing cartwheels. They've simply provided additional lines on a map that lead to other people from whom we can hopefully get more concrete information."

Also Wednesday, a spokesman for the University of California Board of Regents dismissed a report that Andersen had offered a settlement of $260 million out of fear that the Enron scandal could put it out of business.

"The university has had no substantive discussions with Andersen" said spokesman Trey Davis.

Copyright © 2002, Chicago Tribune



To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (1774)2/21/2002 7:21:59 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Lay blinded by success like a gambler by a 'system'

By STEVEN BERGLAS
Feb. 20, 2002, 6:29PM
The Houston Chronicle / Editorial
____________________________

WHY did Kenneth Lay do it?

Pundits from every corner of academe are weighing in on this question. But the countless analysts who claim that the former Enron Corp. chairman lied out of greed are wrong.

After 25 years of studying and counseling self-destructive executives whose behavior was at least as abnormal as Lay's, I can guarantee that what drove him -- or, more accurately, caused him to freeze in his tracks as Enron's house of cards was collapsing -- was far more complex.

Consider what is arguably Lay's greatest offense: In late October 2001, despite receiving several warnings about Enron's accounting practices, Lay promised that Enron would again be wildly profitable.

Many Enron insiders who had heard the same warnings found Lay's statements and inaction bizarre.

Yet one of the best-kept secrets of executive psychology is that, once you achieve success, you become a prisoner to the business model that brought you acclaim.

Before its collapse, Enron was the Microsoft of energy, primarily because of Lay's brilliance. He took a garden-variety company -- a union of two pipeline companies -- and propelled it to Fortune 100 status. Rather than merely delivering gas to customers, Lay exploited the deregulation of pipelines, realigning Enron so that it could trade, at a huge profit, the product that others had to drill wells to extract.

The success of this paradigm shift set the stage for Lay's undoing. Rather than sticking to gas, Enron branched into trading whatever seemed tradable -- water, coal, fiber-optic capacity and so on.

Inevitably, Lay stretched this model too far. Before he could realize the damage done, success had warped his thinking. Rather than remaining true to the swashbuckling soul that enabled him to seize an opportunity, he grew hyperconservative and became blindly adherent to the business model responsible for his success.

Why else would Lay ignore Enron Vice President Sherron S. Watkins' warning that "improper accounting practices" could destroy the corporation? A person who was not overcommitted to his self-styled, abstruse accounting practices would have immediately done an about-face to salvage whatever viable resources he could.

Yet Lay continued to tout Enron and, implicitly, his own business model, just as gamblers who have a "system" that wins don't see that they're throwing good money after bad as losses mount up.

Psychologists call this type of management inflexibility "escalation of commitment" -- a process as easy to understand as it is devastating.

Reluctant to face embarrassment by acknowledging that their success has evaporated, many achievers elect to stay the course far longer than they should. Those accustomed to success become overcommitted to bad decisions either by ignoring or suppressing contradictory information, or by psychologically distorting feedback that casts their judgment in a critical light.

By donning rose-colored glasses and insistently sticking to their defunct business model, many successful executives fail to see warnings that they are on a collision course with disaster.

History is littered with failed chief executives who suffered an escalation of commitment.

Consider Kenneth H. Olsen, founder of Digital Equipment Corp. After leading DEC to the top of its industry by building minicomputers, he refused to acknowledge the threat to his business model posed by personal computers. In 1974, Olsen boldly proclaimed, "There is no reason for any individual to have a computer in their home." Shortly thereafter, DEC was nearly bankrupt and Olsen was gone.

This argument is neither an apology for Lay nor an effort to exonerate him. He is responsible for failing to exercise his fiduciary responsibilities. I do, however, urge caution before judging his motives. Contrary to Freud, smoking a cigar is typically far more complex than merely seeking a good smoke.

_________________
Berglas is a faculty member at the Anderson School of Management at the University of California, Los Angeles.



To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (1774)2/25/2002 2:12:48 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Brash Enron Chief, Brash Strategy

By KURT EICHENWALD
The New York Times
February 25, 2002

When the time came earlier
this month for executives
from the Enron Corporation
(news/quote) to explain their
roles to Congress in the events
that led to the company's
collapse, all the top officials
whose actions are being
examined by federal prosecutors
chose to invoke their Fifth
Amendment right against
self-incrimination.

All, that is, except Jeffrey K.
Skilling, Enron's former chief
executive.

In a decision that has left legal
experts and other Enron
executives flummoxed, Mr.
Skilling spent much of Feb. 7 on
Capitol Hill, taking hostile
questions from members of a
House Energy and Commerce
subcommittee. As a result, Mr.
Skilling is now locked into a
series of answers that can be
used against him, regardless of
the direction the criminal case
takes. Tomorrow, he returns to
Congress, this time to answer the
questions of a Senate panel.

Why is he doing it? The answer appears to be based in
part on the character of the man, as well as on the unique
circumstances of the sprawling Enron investigation. It is,
in essence, a high-risk, high-wire legal strategy with a
logic that applies only to the given circumstances, but one
that may ultimately prove to be a colossal blunder.

By cooperating in recent months with other investigators,
however, Mr. Skilling and his lawyers gained access to
crucial documents that could help them formulate their
legal strategy. And he had little to lose by repeating before
Congress much of what he had already said, rather than
suffering the embarrassment of invoking the Fifth.

The risks, according to defense lawyers and prosecutors
familiar with white-collar cases, are almost self-evident.
People who take public and irreversible positions in a
criminal case may be confronted by their own words if
they testify at a trial. That could increase the legal
jeopardy they face, regardless of whether they had done
anything wrong.

"Anybody who is really under severe scrutiny," said Jack
Bray, a prominent white-collar defense lawyer at the King
& Spalding office in Washington, "as so many of these
Enron people would be, is absolutely going off the high
board without looking down into the pool if they testify
before Congress. For everybody who has accomplished
anything by doing it, there are nine guys splattered on
the bottom of the pool."

Beyond the legal peril, such testimony appears to
accomplish little in the long run, lawyers said. Most
people who testify in such situations hope to persuade
Congress that they cannot be blamed for the events under
investigation, as well to save themselves from
embarrassment by not invoking the Fifth. But such goals
are seldom accomplished.

Mr. Bray said, "They usually get gunned down in a series
of interrogations that hurt them, embarrass them and
portray them in the way they don't want to be portrayed."

There is plenty of evidence that Mr. Skilling has suffered
far more damage, at least in terms of public relations,
than even the former chairman of Enron, Kenneth L. Lay,
who chose to invoke the Fifth. Mr. Lay took more than an
hour of public attacks, but ever since Mr. Skilling
answered questions, his testimony has been parsed,
criticized and even held up as an example of possible
perjury.

"All the information we got was that he really thought he
was smarter than everybody in Washington,"
Representative Billy Tauzin, Republican of Louisiana, said
on the CBS News program "Face the Nation" on the
weekend after Mr. Skilling's testified, "that he could come
and just, you know, flamboozle us, just tell us anything
he wanted, and we would buy it. I'm afraid he may have
put himself in some legal jeopardy as a result."

Asked about the reasons behind the decision to testify,
Bruce Hiler, Mr. Skilling's lawyer, gives a succinct answer.

"Jeff explained when he appeared before the House why
he was testifying," Mr. Hiler said. "He said he felt he owed
it to the men and women of Enron and that he hadn't
done anything wrong."

To some degree, current and former Enron executives who
know Mr. Skilling said, the decision to testify was right in
character. A proud man often criticized as arrogant, Mr.
Skilling delighted in dangling his intelligence and success
in front of others. The embarrassment he would have
suffered among his friends and family for invoking the
Fifth would have been devastating, those executives say.

"If you know Jeff, you know why he testified," said one
executive who knows him well. "He's arrogant and
competitive. He couldn't let somebody else win and force
him to humiliate himself."

Some outside lawyers have interpreted that common
explanation as a sign that Mr. Skilling is testifying against
his lawyer's own advice. Mr. Hiler refused to say anything
about his advice, but he signaled that the decision had
been made as part of a broader legal strategy.

"I'm sure there are those who, for their own reasons, wish
he were not testifying," Mr. Hiler said. "And there are
others who don't understand the facts and the evidence."

In truth, while publicity about the Enron case has
exploded in the last eight weeks, Mr. Skilling effectively
made the decision about whether to testify many months
ago. Enron began to spiral toward collapse in the fall,
when much of the country was focusing attention on the
terrorist attacks. But during that time, the Securities and
Exchange Commission began its Enron investigation, as
did a special committee of the company's board.

Both groups, working with little public attention, collected
plenty of documents - the S.E.C. by subpoena, and the
special committee by simply demanding them. Unlike
most executives in such circumstances, Mr. Skilling had
access to few of those records because he had resigned
from the company in mid-August, citing personal reasons.

When both investigative groups asked Mr. Skilling to
testify, he said yes. That gave Mr. Skilling and his legal
team access to important documents that they otherwise
might not have been able to get, weeks or months before
his Congressional appearance. Providing such documents
to witnesses is standard procedure in such interviews.

So by deciding to speak to the S.E.C. and the special
committee, Mr. Skilling had not only the opportunity to
refresh his recollection of events based on the available
documentation but also had a chance to become aware of
any potential issues raised by the documents that posed
legal dangers for him.

Once the decision to cooperate was made, it could be
argued, most of the potential damage from testifying had
already occurred. He was interviewed for two days by
S.E.C. investigators, who were able to drill in on certain
issues, long before he took questions from members of
Congress, each afforded only a few minutes.

The same holds true for his statements to the lawyers for
the Enron board's panel. While no interview transcript
was made, extensive notes were taken. Those notes, along
with the testimony of witnesses in the room, could be
used later to challenge Mr. Skilling.

Was getting documents from those bodies worth the risk
of testifying? After all, Andrew S. Fastow, the former chief
financial officer and a central subject of the continuing
investigations, refused to speak with the special
committee and invoked the Fifth before the S.E.C. and
Congress.

Some facts in this case make Mr. Skilling's decision to
testify more understandable. Unlike many other corporate
scandals, where prosecutors have indicted the company
and allowed executives to walk away unscathed, there is
little doubt that current or former Enron officials will be
charged if crimes are discovered. With the company now
in bankruptcy proceedings, any indictment of Enron
would be largely symbolic.

"Without a corporation out there to plead, that ups the
chances of a prosecution," said John J. Fahy, a former
federal prosecutor in Newark. "And it makes it a lot more
difficult, if somebody pleads guilty, for them to get a
sweetheart deal."

For anyone wishing to cut a deal with the government, the
coin of the realm is cooperation against those higher up.
But the number of potential defendants is relatively small.
By testifying, lawyers said, Mr. Skilling could well be
signaling to potential witnesses and the government that
any allegations brought against him will be vigorously
contested.

Given the prosecution team that has been assembled for
the Enron investigation, lawyers involved in the case said,
anyone's defense strategy should quickly contemplate
what other potential defendants will do.

The Enron inquiry is being run by Leslie R. Caldwell,
head of the securities fraud division of the United States
attorney's office in San Francisco. She has the reputation
of a prosecutor who moves fast to make cases and "flip"
potential witnesses.

Some corporate cases become bogged down for years in
complexity. But Ms. Caldwell, lawyers said, will probably
put the pressure on early, breaking off manageable pieces
of the case, like the potential obstruction of justice
through document destruction. She will start bringing
indictments with the intent of turning defendants into
witnesses against others in the more complex cases. Some
lawyers in the case said the first charges in this case
could come within a few months.

Mr. Skilling's willingness to combat allegations against
him may therefore make him somewhat less of an easy
target for other Enron executives interested in cutting a
deal by offering information against him. Whether that
legal strategy proves to be smart, or the height of folly,
will be clearly known only in the months and years to come.