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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47874)2/21/2002 6:05:50 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Enron built make-believe office to tap Wall Street

Reuters
Houston , 21-02-2002

It wasn't only the accounting that was creative at Enron Corp.

To hawk a new venture to Wall Street at a 1998 conference, the company built a make believe command center and ordered employees to act like they were cutting deals months before it was operational, a former executive said on Wednesday.

According to the executive, Enron staffed the then-inactive nerve center with employees, ordered to act like they were working as two top executives emceed an intricately choreographed show put on for financial analysts in 1998.

Former Enron chairman Kenneth Lay and ex-President Jeffrey Skilling led a rehearsal the day before the show opened in a theatrical presentation of the sort that helped make the now-disgraced bankrupt energy trading giant the darling of Wall Street.

To show analysts what the brave new world of Enron Energy Services (EES) would look like, the company built a shining fake command center for its next-big-thing operation just in time for the 1998 annual analyst conference.

The only problem was that EES was not up and running yet, former Enron senior director Joseph Phelan said in an interview with Reuters.

The former executive at Enron's retail energy arm said the sixth floor was gutted and outfitted with big screen televisions, computers and telephones to the tune of a half-million dollars and converted into a war room that was touted to analysts as the heart of EES.

"The intent was to use it and a month after the analysts took off, the space was used for that purpose. But to time it right for the analyst conference, people were asked to come down and act like they were working on deals," Phelan said.

Phelan called the stage-managed war room Enron's Potemkin Village, a reference to the sham villages set up by Russian general Grigory Potemkin to impress Catherine the Great when she toured the Crimea in 1787. Others referred to the incident as "The Sting," a reference to the 1973 movie about an elaborate confidence game.

Despite the mirage, Phelan said the deals EES ultimately executed were legitimate. "EES went on to successfully close a great many profitable deals, so in hindsight the temporary ruse seemed OK in the end and bought us some time to really develop our infrastructure," he said.

To keep the ruse alive, Phelan said elaborate plans were put in place to make sure the war room was hopping when the analysts were on the site. "You were assigned a shift and told when to show up and they actually scheduled calls with prospective clients and routed them to certain phones. It was pretty stupid," Phelan said.

REHEARSING THE RUSE

Former chairman and chief executive officer Lay and former CEO Skilling, then president and chief operating officer, walked the floor and emceed as the analysts were brought through, Phelan said. EES supervisors directed staff and coached everyone a little bit, he said.

Enron declined to comment on the story.

In 1998, EES was the Houston energy company's next big thing.

The unit promised to manage the energy needs of large industrial customers for a fee and signed several major corporations to multi-year deals in excess of $1 billion. Though it was ultimately profitable, the unit in 1998 was very small and deals were few and far between, Phelan said.

Internally, workers justified the fakery as a way to buy time until the operation got rolling. Phelan likened it to how 1940s automobile visionary Preston Tucker promoted his venture to manufacture the car of the future before he finished working on it.

"It was a scam, but it depends on how you look at it. You know how Tucker didn't have an engine in his car when he displayed it, but he was real and just a bit behind schedule. I think that was the way everybody justified it," Phelan said.

Tucker built 51 prototypes of his car before the US Securities and Exchange Commission began investigating his company for fraud. Although he was ultimately cleared by the SEC, his company folded and the car was never sold to the public.

Enron remains under investigation by Congress, the Justice Department and the SEC.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47874)2/21/2002 6:59:33 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Andersen Still Snared By Enron Octopus

By Dan Ackman
Forbes.com
Thursday February 21

Arthur Andersen took years to enmesh itself with the bankrupt Enron , as the Houston company grew from a pipeline operator to a new-wave energy trader. The Big Five accounting firm is now trying to make an early exit from the massive litigation by offering a settlement of $600 million to $800 million. But lawyers for Enron shareholders and other creditors rejected the offer as too little, too early.
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While Enron's final collapse was stunningly fast, the buildup to the fall took years. Lawsuits seeking compensation are just getting underway, thus even Andersen's record payment offer, for an accounting firm, to settle all claims by Enron, its former workers and creditors was considered premature, according to a report in Bloomberg News.

The real question about the offer, first reported in the Wall Street Journal, is not why it was rejected, but why it was even made in these early innings. It's as if Andersen, still in the Enron spirit of things, was trying to buy a futures contract settling the claims.

Before settling with Andersen or anyone else, lawyers from the shareholders will try to expand the universe of defendants to include Wall Street banks and brokers who issued Enron shares, sold its debt and issued glowing reports about its prospects. Congressional investigators, along with private lawyers, are trying to determine whether Enron offered the firms--including Merrill Lynch , Citigroup , J.P. Morgan Chase and Credit Suisse First Boston --special deals in Enron partnerships even while they were raising money from Enron investors and telling their clients to buy Enron shares.

Among the issues is whether the banks, as partnership investors, were given more about Enron finances than ordinary shareholders. If investor lawyers can show the banks were corrupted or negligent in creating investor losses, the overall pot for settlement would dwarf whatever Andersen or its insurers could pay.

Enron Special Report: Enron's Endgame Just how much those claims are worth is anyone's guess at this point. Enron at one time had a market capitalization of $70 billion. But that number is at least in part an artifact of Enron's wild and crazy accounting practices--its hiding of debt in off-balance-sheet partnerships and its method of booking trading revenue in ways that made it appear a much larger company than it actually was. (See: "Enron The Incredible.")

In addition to shareholders, Enron will face claims by bondholders, trade creditors and commercial banks that lent it money--including some of the same banks that may wind up as defendants in shareholder lawsuits. In the confusion, and while new Enron revelations are still appearing almost daily, plaintiff lawyers say there is no way to know whether Andersen's offer is adequate.

Among the new Enron revelations is news that Kenneth Lay, Enron's former chairman and chief executive, offered a board seat to Robert Rubin as the former U.S. Treasury secretary announced he was leaving the government in 1999. Lay's offer to Rubin was part of a long lobbying effort by Enron and other financial companies to make sure that the trading of financial instruments known as derivatives was left unregulated.

That effort was successful and may have been critical to Enron's rise, even if Lay's appeals to Bush Administration officials on the eve of its collapse were unavailing.

The offer to Rubin was made public from documents provided by the Treasury Department under a Freedom of Information Act request by the Associated Press. Rubin, now vice chairman of Citigroup, received many offers of board seats, his spokesman said, and he had no interest in accepting Lay's. But with or without a seat on Enron's board, he did call Peter Fisher, an old Treasury colleague, last November to seek his intervention on Enron's behalf. At the time, rating agencies were poised to downgrade Enron's credit status, one of the last steps leading to its demise.

With Enron's tentacles so far-reaching, it's no wonder Andersen wants out. But no matter how hard it squirms, it will be months, if not years, before the accountants can elude Enron's slimy grasp.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47874)2/21/2002 11:34:01 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
JP Morgan rating downgraded to negative

Fitch Ratings-New York-February 21, 2002: Fitch Ratings has affirmed current ratings for JP Morgan Chase & Co (JPMC) at 'AA-' senior and F1+ short-term and its subsidiaries following an extensive review of the company. At the same time, Fitch has revised its Rating Outlook to Negative, reflecting our expectations for continued softness in the global economy and in the equity and capital markets. (Outlooks are intended to look forward over a 12 to 18 month time horizon.) These macro economic issues will subject JPMC to continued challenges on the asset quality front and will serve to restrain the performance of many of the firm's businesses, particularly within the investment banking business. We believe that JPMC still has substantial capacity to manage through the current environment, albeit to a lesser degree today than was true several quarters ago as the firm utilized some of its financial flexibility to deal with various issues during the latter part of 2001, including the well publicized Enron situation. We expect JPMC's diverse franchise to afford the company the ability to rebound to profitability, and steadily improve its financial performance over the near to intermediate term. The current ratings also incorporate an expectation that JPMC will continue to show appropriate prudence in both liquidity management and capital management, and we look for JPMC to build its capital positions over the coming year. Clearly we will continue to monitor this situation closely and will reevaluate and likely change the ratings if JPMC is not be able to meet these expectations.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (47874)2/21/2002 11:55:16 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Japan's alarm bells toll on deaf ears

Fears rise as banking system could collapse like a house of cards
By: Jacqueline Thorpe
Financial Post
February 21, 2002

Take Enron, multiply its off-balance-sheet debt by a trillion and what do you get? Japan. That's the joke making the rounds these days about the world's most dysfunctional economy.

"There are myriad problems with the banks, many of them covered up by impenetrable accounting conventions and an army of managers, regulators, auditors and credit raters who have been happy to look the other way for decades," said chief economist Carl Weinberg of High Frequency Economics in a recent report. "How else can a banking system run up a bad-debt book of 200-trillion yen -- US$1.5-trillion -- without triggering alarms."

With the threat of a major credit downgrade hanging over it, the fiscal year-end drawing close and the stock market stumbling, the alarms are once again going off full blast. There's concern that after a decade of denial and dallying over structural reforms, Japan's banking system is about to collapse in spectacular Enron-like fashion.

But the more likely scenario is that the status quo will be maintained, with the economy growing just enough to stave off a crisis but nowhere near the growth the country is capable of.

The latest alarms were tripped last week by Moody's Investors Service when it put Japan's sovereign debt rating on review for a possible two-notch downgrade. As newspapers cheekily pointed out, such a downgrade (and putting a country under review virtually guarantees one) would put the rating of the world's second-largest economy on par with Botswana -- and five notches below that of the United States, Britain, France and Germany.

Meanwhile, the corporate fiscal year-end is March 31, at which time banks will be obliged to write down the value of the equity portfolios acquired in the 1980s boom to today's market prices. And with the Nikkei stumbling well below 10,000, equity losses will be massive.

To Mr. Weinberg's mind, the triple whammy will be enough to push Japan's creaking banking system over the edge and quite possibly create the kind of nightmarish international banking crisis that keeps the world's central bankers up at night.

This is Mr. Weinberg's view of what could happen: Moody's cuts Japan's sovereign rating, triggering downgrades on the banks. That makes it impossible for the banks to do business in the world's capital markets. This in turn creates a cascading failure to settle transactions, similar to the situation in September, 1998, that bankrupted U.S. hedge fund Long Term Credit Management and saw the Federal Reserve Board ride to the market's rescue.

At the same time, new rules drastically reducing deposit insurance set to take effect in April might also spur a rush to withdraw funds, creating an old-fashioned run on the banks.

"Moody's can pull the plug by downgrading the banks to a point where they can't function any more and therefore they become effectively bankrupt in the international community," said Mr. Weinberg. "That's what's different now and what's different on the Moody's side is that since Enron, the people who do things like due diligence and auditing have a lot more heat applied to them."

That may be true, but Japan has shown itself to be skilled at averting economic catastrophe. The government just prints more money. Only yesterday news wires reported rumours the Bank of Japan had asked the government to consider another capital injection for the banks. If the government goes ahead it would be the third injection of public funds in the past four years.

Similarly, the equity portfolio adjustments could be glossed over. Analysts had expected a banking crash when the rules were introduced last year, but when half-year results were due on Sept. 30, the banks simply avoided reporting full statements. The authorities turned a blind eye.

A similar manoeuvre may not be so easy to pull off at the full-year mark on March 31, with international credit agencies breathing down their necks. At the same time, any new debt issuance to pay for the capital injection could in itself trigger a sovereign debt downgrade as more pressure is put on Japan's already sky-high 130% debt-to-GDP ratio. Bond yields could also rise -- and higher interest rates are exactly what the Japanese economy does not need right now.

However, other analysts say the Japanese authorities have any number of manoeuvres that could make it possible for the banking system and the economy to continue to muddle along. Options could include bumping back up deposit insurance coverage, changing the mark-to-market rules or introducing special accounting rules for bad loans.

"They have been able get around these deadlines time and time again because they know how to twist the details and get through the loopholes," said Robert Fairholm, managing editor of International Bank Credit Analyst in Montreal. "It's constant seat-of-the-pants crisis management but no long-term solutions."

Even Mr. Weinberg admits: "They have an incredible capacity to pull it out of a hat."

Some economists say it will likely be a U.S.-led global economic recovery that will save Japan in the short-term, just as it was when the banks were up against the wall after the Asian crisis in 1999.

"I think they will be able to defer the issue on the back of a global upturn," says Andrew Snowball, portfolio manager at Julius Baer Investment Management in London.

A weaker yen could rekindle the export sector, stoking business activity and consumer sentiment and finally putting a stop to the deflationary price spiral that has gripped the country.

Perhaps the biggest argument against a wipe-the-slate-clean catastrophic resolution to Japan's economic mess -- assuming banks can get past March 31 without touching off a world banking debacle -- is that there simply isn't the kind of international pressure that has undone countries like Argentina.

Japan's staggering public debt is virtually all owned by Japanese nationals while its credit with the rest of the world is unparalleled. The economic expansion that made the country the envy of the world in the 1980s stuffed Japanese coffers to the brim.

There is an estimated 1,386-trillion yen (US$10.4-trillion) in private savings stashed away, which Japan could comfortably live off for years, analysts say. Current account figures last week showed Japan earned more from offshore investments and overseas subsidiaries in 2001 than from conventional trade, causing its income surplus to exceed its trade surplus for the first time on record.

"The accumulated wealth of this country is truly staggering," said Allan Seychuk, international economist at Royal Bank of Canada. "And you don't have this external debt situation that does end up sinking a lot of emerging market countries that do have to send payments abroad."

With this huge buffer of international assets, structural reform appears a long way off. True structural reform would entail getting rid of the banks' bad loans, perhaps by having the government buy them up and sell them off and allowing those that can't be cleaned up to go bankrupt.

This would unclog the arteries through which the Bank of Japan has valiantly been trying to pump liquidity, giving the corporate sector access to credit once again. It would also entail reducing regulation and opening the economy to international competition, a sure-fire way of ridding the country of the massive overcapacity hanging on from the 1980s -- and the root of Japan's problems after all.

Japan will have to tackle its problems one day. Its population is rapidly aging and that means the personal savings will be spent and the country will be unable to fund the fiscal deficit forever.