To: Hawkmoon who wrote (19901 ) 2/25/2002 6:19:42 PM From: frankw1900 Respond to of 281500 Avowals Aside, U.S.' Afghan Role Has Become That of Peacekeeper By ESTHER SCHRADER and GREG MILLER, [LA] TIMES STAFF WRITERS WASHINGTON -- Despite protestations by the Pentagon that it wants no part of the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, the military campaign has itself evolved into an elaborate police action aimed at quieting local warlords, securing the country's fledgling government and protecting the more than 4,000 U.S. troops in the country against sniper fire. [More at URL ]latimes.com [Snip] "I don't know that anyone can assure that there will be peace and stability and security in Afghanistan for a long time to come, except the Afghan people," Rumsfeld said Sunday on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press." "And we have to help them do that and help them figure out a way to do that." Rumsfeld has conceded that Karzai has reason to worry about instability, with rival warlords jostling for power, Taliban and Al Qaeda militants on the loose and Iran apparently spiriting weapons across the border in support of opposing factions. "It's not a pretty picture," Rumsfeld told reporters last week. If it turns out that the U.S. plan of building up the Afghan army "can't be done as rapidly or as effectively or . . . in a way that's cost-effective, then, clearly, we do something else."This story is a pretty good overview of some of the difficulties in just attaining minimal order - never mind attaining conditions allowing establishment of a democratic government. Also, "occupying" force has certain structural problems as hot fighting dies down. It becomes more static while remaining resistance necessarily becomes/remains mobile. The US, I expect, doesn't want large numbers of its best forces tied down in Afghanistan when it envisions other theatres for them and yet if I understand what Rumsfeld is saying, the US doesn't want to leave without seeing some decent security in place first so that government and institutions may be established and protected. The requirement that an existing or prospective government has to have some coercive force (its own or "loaned") to protect itself and citizens from outside and inside interference seems to me primary before "nation building" can be done. This especially so here where between four and six nations have been supporting proxy forces. As there is only the barest skeleton of government institutions remaining in Afghanistan, fleshing them out so there might be something for a "nation building" project to work with seems reasonable, but this needs protection, I believe. Certainly a national constitutional arrangement in which neither majority nor minority can tyrannize each other, is important and allowing that to operate for a while during which citizens can come to an understanding of how it works is a good idea. And I don't think it would take very long for citizens to understand how it might work. Illiteracy and isolation can be overestimated difficulties in an age of radio. To think Afghan folk are unsophisticated about power arrangements after twenty years of proxy and civil war has to be itself unsophisticated...these folk are real wheeler dealers for whom consultation is a well understood tool. But again it's always security that comes up as the first requirement. Establishing a national army as a first, fleshed out institution therefore seems a good idea but it would have to be truly national - no local or tribal regiments, no overwhelming preponderance of officers from one tribe, etc - seems hard but not impossible to do. It's an institution one could build with - armies have mobility, communications and command structure, they can make highways safe, they're vastly useful in natural emergencies, they ally naturally with physical infra structure building, and if they don't follow the model of Arab armies could be very supportive of education. A properly constituted national army would encourage patriotism beyond the local level. Most important of all a national army would put down the grossest aspects of what I call the 'ten percent rule'. That is, 10% of the population everywhere in the world cause 90% or more of the problems. In a country like Afghanistan with no effective police or law the ten percent become a privateering class and demand tolls on the highways, take tribute from the isolated, and generally take what they want when and wherever they feel like it. If Afghans could agree on the ethnic makeup of their army and have money to pay its soldiers, how long do you think it would take to actually recruit and train the first regiments?