Saudi Arabia's date with the present: Soviet model? Chinese model? Here's an article that adds more depth to the picture.
The Middle East Quarterly
December 2000
Want Democracy? Get a King
by Owen H. Kirby
mequarterly.org
From time to time, the U.S. government has found itself protecting the interests of Middle
Eastern monarchs—most notably in 1990-91, when it rescued Kuwait from Iraq's clutches.
This is invariably a controversial step: President Bush had to contend with the charge that
he was risking U.S. lives to reinstate feudal privileges and a dynastic monopoly of power.
There are other problems, too; U.S. troop deployments in Saudi Arabia, for example, are
today the target of vociferous indigenous criticism (Usama bin Ladin comes first to mind).
Given the profound differences between the political systems of the region's monarchies
and that of the United States, the question arises: is Washington betraying its interests
and its principles when it supports Middle Eastern kings? In view of continued U.S.
interests in the region and the fact that the monarchies are experiencing political change,
the answer is "no." American policy in support of its allies in Morocco, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman is an
investment in Middle East stability and security, important prerequisites for the
development of democratic practices.
The New Generation
We start with a survey of the current situation and future prospects of the region's eight
monarchies, looking first at those whose rulers belong to the new generation and then at
those who rulers belong to the older one.
[He describes the changes the region's monarchies have achieved up to time of writing, which in some cases are considerable but the interesting part of the article is his treatment of the failure of the region's republics and the reasons for the monarchies' survival and implications for the US. These sections are well argued and I post them below. I suspect Kirby would expect Saudi Arabia to follow the chinese model because the government has more inherent political stability -legitimacy- than that of most middle east republics.
Given the present SA king is on his last legs there is going to be some sort of change in the country over the next few years. Are there some other models than change only as happened in China or Soviet Union? The English got to constitutional monarchy through a series of civil wars generally speaking under the circumstances of crown versus church and nobility, and then crown and commoners versus nobility. France didn't get there except briefly during the 19th century - defining moment was the Revolution. Turkey got to a republican state through bloody secularization and following a French model but only after building on monarchy's reforms in 19th century. Iran has become a republic with theocratic oversight for purpose of fighting modernity.
My betting is SA gets to change something like the English with less civil war because other muslim countries wouldn't want to see war ripping through the holy places and the Saudis wouldn't want to make themselves too vulnerable to outside interference. The defining problem, as I see it, is Wahhabism versus modernity and how much blood people representing those forces are willing to spill. In the end game, in Soviet Union and China in the struggle between communism and modernity no one has been willing to get a lot of blood on their hands. But few were predicting that thirty years ago and for good reason.]
The Republics
Most of the Arab Middle East's republican, or presidential, systems (Algeria, Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen) emerged in the post-World War II
period from the rubble of failed traditional leadership and colonial aggrandizement;
today, they are somewhat less secure than their monarchic counterparts. Having
staked their prestige on the overthrow of old regimes and the pursuit of socialist
formulas for societal advancement, the majority of republican states now find
themselves in dire economic and political circumstances, just as many former
communist countries in Eastern Europe did in the early 1990s. With the refusal to
accept the bankruptcy of their ideological or revolutionary underpinnings, along with a
vulnerability to the charges offered by their Islamist adversaries, the governments of
these countries now pose a significant risk to regional stability. In general, the
republican model has failed not only in delivering upon its promises of prosperity but
also in supplanting monarchy as a viable political institution. Iraq suffers most acutely
from this problem, but it is common to many of them.
Viewing tradition, whether in the observation of religion or in the fabric of social
interaction, as one of its greatest adversaries in the drive to create the progressive,
modern state, the republican regimes succeeded in destroying the one element which
monarchic rule has found to be its most consistent and reliable ally. Having dismantled
the structures upon which the old order sustained itself, the republican regimes latterly
find themselves without a lifeline to offer their people in a period marked by the
gradual repudiation of a half century of conflict with the State of Israel and by economic
malaise caused by the centralized command policies of the state. Lifelines once
existed in the form of traditional allegiances and familial relationships based around
local mosques and their attendant schools, courts, and charities. These combined to
form the bedrock for the community, especially during hard times and periodic
breakdowns of the central order. The total-allegiance-demanding state, with its
institutional and associational mechanisms, destroyed the important societal lifelines,
replacing them with promises of progress and restoration of national pride intended to
capture the spirit of the people for the service of the state.
The republican state's monopoly of the public arena left a void, into which have slipped
elements seeking redress for society's ills through Islamic norms. Having stripped
society of its natural support mechanisms, the Middle East's republican leadership has
only itself to blame for the appeal of these extremists to a disenfranchised citizenry
with only a weak loyalty to the state. This threat has also manifested itself in the
region's monarchies, but the republics (especially Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria)
have suffered more; with the dismantling of traditional lifelines, society's capacity to
absorb the shocks of failed economic and social policies has been all but destroyed.
Though the rise of political Islam affords republican leadership an excuse to justify
continued oppressive policies (as a means to confront the Islamist threat), this will
probably turn out to be an only temporary fix, as the demands and very real need for
reform will eventually prove too great to resist.
The Syrian succession after the death of Hafiz al-Asad in June 2000 provides an ironic
commentary on this point: eighty years after losing its short-lived Hashemite monarchy
to French conquest, Syria returned to the monarchic model on the demise of the elder
Asad. Nor is this all, for other dynastic successions are rumored to be under
consideration in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Iraq. But this form of inherited rule bears
none of the hallmarks that give monarchy in the Arab world its strength and legitimacy.
Premised on the need to preserve the regime, rather than social cohesion, a dynastic
dictatorship only increases the divide between leader and subject. For would-be
followers of the Syrian example, the lesson of Pahlavi Iran should offer a sober
warning.
Reasons for Monarchic Survival
The Middle East's monarchies went through a rough patch, especially during the
Nasser era (1952-70), but those that survived are now enjoying a period of
generational change and institutional renewal. Having withstood half a century of
struggle against radical ideologies, the Arab world's monarchs can today look with
satisfaction on the fact that not one of their number has succumbed to revolution since
the overthrow of Libya's King Idris in 1969.20 This gives the Middle East a higher
proportion of monarchies than any other region of the world. Why is that the case?
Analysts have offered several theories for the unusual endurance of Middle East
monarchies, none fully adequate.
The theory of the rentier state holds that the survival of monarchy depends on rewards
and coercion made possible by oil revenues. Thus, Sultan Qabus of Oman could
suppress Marxist-backed rebels in Dhofar in the early 1970s because he had the
means, thanks to petroleum sales. But this theory cannot explain the success of Hasan
II of Morocco or Husayn of Jordan, both monarchs of oil-less and not wealthy
kingdoms, in surviving similar regime crises during the same period. (Hasan survived
coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, and Husayn expelled the Palestinian Liberation
Organization from Jordan in "Black September," 1970.) Nor for that matter does the
theory lend a proper understanding to the situation in Iran, where the shah fell despite
the benefits accrued from oil.
The theory based on size of population is also insufficient. The entire populations of the
Persian Gulf emirates of Bahrain and Qatar might well fit into a two-square-mile block
of (republican) Cairo. But the Kingdom of Morocco is rapidly approaching the
combined size of two powerhouses of the republican model, Syria and Iraq. As with
the rentier concept, population may provide part of the answer but not all of it.
The same holds for explanations based on the tribal-urban differences between
monarchies and republics. Saudi Arabia and Jordan are often given as examples of
the important role of the tribe in underpinning monarchy in the Middle East, for in both
of them the dynasty has roots in tribal alliances and relies heavily on tribal support in
the security services and armed forces. This said, the tribe in monarchies has often
posed a source of weakness. In Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Oman, for instance, rulers
have often found themselves susceptible to tribal pressures and influence. And
disturbances in recent years among Jordan's southern tribes have demonstrated that a
community once regarded as a bedrock of monarchy cannot be taken for granted.
Legitimacy may serve as a better explanation for the endurance of the monarchies.
Their vitality stems from having preserved a link to valued traditions and mores of a
rapidly receding past while withstanding the vagaries of political and social change.
For many, monarchy has come to symbolize stability after a century of traumatic
events that included the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the imposition of European control,
the tribulations of independence, the emergence of Israel, and the rise of radical
Islamism. In the monarchies, those constants based on family, local identity, and
shared religious and cultural experience that traditionally have formed the basis of civil
life in Middle Eastern society have, to a large extent, been preserved and a consensus
reached on their benefit to society. In turn, monarchy has helped sustain and balance
the social adhesives of religion, tradition, and heritage, giving it a legitimacy not
enjoyed by the leadership of the republican regimes. Not having staked their
legitimacy on the rhetoric of revolution and ill-conceived economic policy, but rather on
stability and social cohesion, they are in the enviable position of being able to
contemplate reform without fear of evisceration or abolition.
In all the monarchic states, a debate on difficult issues is occurring; movement,
however incremental, is taking place. This is proof of the capacity of the monarchic
system to change and an indication of the monarchies' confidence and their ability to
see how their own interests are interwoven with those of the state. The debate over
democracy is occurring to some degree in every Middle Eastern monarchy; where this
debate will eventually lead remains uncertain. Will institutional checks preserve the
present level of royal prerogatives? The late Hasan II once stated that "in Morocco, the
king governs; the people would not understand if he did not."21 Is this a view shared
by his son? Or will the debate lead to the Europeanization of Middle Eastern royalty, as
some observers of Morocco have prematurely speculated? It is still far too early to say.
As the arena for democratic debate expands, it is likely that royal families will find their
freedom to maneuver gradually restricted by the presence of a newly enfranchised
citizenry. This, however, does not necessarily imply the imminent demise of monarchy
in the Middle East or a period of instability. On the contrary, the evolution of democracy
should present a further opportunity for monarchy to demonstrate the inherent
strengths that have sustained the institution's relevance and vitality. For U.S. interests,
this should be an augur of stable times ahead.
Implications for the United States
Although monarchies have long been America's most consistent allies in the Middle
East, U.S. policymakers have fretted for an equally long time over the perceived lack
of pluralism in these dynastic states. In part, American leadership has worried about
the loss of these important allies and their replacement by hostile successor regimes;
in part, policymakers have found it difficult explaining to a skeptical American public
why, beyond oil or some other utilitarian reason, monarchies deserve U.S. support,
including even the deployment of American troops.
Fortunately for the policymakers, things are changing. On the first point, having
weathered the challenges of the past century, Middle Eastern monarchies have
emerged in recent years in a strengthened position; they are not about to fall prey to
radical republicans; if anything, as the Syrian case suggests, they are providing a
model for political emulation. On the second point, political change is now occurring in
the monarchies; indeed, whether it be the remarkably candid programming of Qatar's
Al Jazeera satellite television network or the brave stance of Bahrain's new emir
concerning the emergence of women and minorities into the political arena, the
monarchs are now leading the way toward political enfranchisement.
If anything, U.S. policymakers need to be cautious about their response to the positive
developments currently underway in the region. More broadly, if Washington sincerely
wants a further expansion of popular debate in the Middle East, it must craft a subtle
and consistent policy without bias against those states that opt for a gradual approach
(Saudi Arabia) or that stumble along the way (Kuwait). Reproach should be saved for
those states that make no headway at all. It should also assist those who seek help in
developing their democratic practices.
That monarchies have sustained stability during a traumatic time in world affairs is
evidence that they have gotten something right. In this and in other ways, the region's
monarchies have long served U.S. interests. It is only fitting that Washington now
respect current attempts at reform and offer assistance where sought.
Democratization in the monarchies will be neither smooth nor uniform, and there is
much work yet to be done. Every country, with the possible exception of the UAE,
suffers from misguided economic development policies that favor privileged interests.
There are also plenty of unresolved political issues that challenge the process of
democratization, such as Palestinian refugees in Jordan, the Moroccan conflict in the
Western Sahara, Shi‘i discontent in Bahrain, and the presence of "stateless" in Kuwait.
The United States can make its vast democratic experience available to those
undergoing the process to help ease the transition. The esteem with which the peoples
of the Middle East view the U.S. democratic system means there should be a ready
audience for American technical expertise and assistance. Timing and approach need
to be carefully calibrated, however, for suspicions about U.S. intentions are not
uncommon; in particular, it is important that local actors lead any processes of political
reform.
The region's monarchies are in a better position than the republics to contemplate the
changes now required. That these changes may necessitate the curtailing of royal
privileges and open the door to greater pluralism could strengthen monarchy as a
viable political institution.
In contrast, the monarchs' republican colleagues face daunting internal economic,
political, and philosophical challenges that they are not showing themselves
particularly adept at handling. For U.S. policymakers, the republics pose somewhat of
a challenge. However, with the example being set by the monarchies, the United
States could do worse than pressure the republican states to reform—and to emulate
the processes of democratization tentatively occurring elsewhere in the region.
Owen H. Kirby is a program officer for the Middle East and North Africa at the
International Republican Institute in Washington, DC. |
