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Politics : War -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Elmer Flugum who wrote (12464)3/9/2002 1:08:47 AM
From: Thomas M.  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 23908
 
zmag.org

Iraq: The Phantom Threat

by Scott Ritter
Christian Science Monitor
January 23, 2002

At this very moment, US intelligence personnel are poring over documents, uncovering
the depth of the anti-American plotting of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network.
Al Qaeda prisoners are being interrogated in an effort to unlock past secrets and
interdict future threats to the United States and the world. As this investigation
proceeds, the web of terrorist networks forged by Mr. bin Laden in his struggle against
the West is becoming clear.

Some of the exposed links are not surprising - including Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Notably absent is Iraq. Given the spate of post-Sept. 11 media
reports linking Iraq with bin Laden, one would expect a flood of evidence coming from
Afghanistan confirming such a relationship.

Even the alleged meetings between Mohammed Atta - a suspected leader of the Sept.
11 hijackers - and an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague are inconclusive. The Czech
government has sent conflicting reports concerning this meeting and, even if the meeting
took place, the supposed topic of discussion - an attack on a Radio Free Europe radio
transmitter used to broadcast anti-Hussein programming - is a far cry from the 9/11
attacks.

The lack of documentation of an Iraq-Al Qaeda connection in this intelligence trove
should lead to the questioning of the original source of such speculation, as well as the
motivations of those who continue to peddle the "Iraqi connection" theory. Foremost
among them are opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress and his
American sponsors, in particular Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, former
CIA Director James Woolsey, and former Undersecretary of State Richard Perle.

During my service as a UN weapons inspector, I had responsibility for liaison with Mr.
Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress to gather "intelligence information" derived from
Chalabi's erstwhile network of defectors and in-country sources. This information turned
out to be more flash than substance. For example, there was the "engineer" who
allegedly worked on Saddam Hussein's palaces who spoke of a network of underground
tunnels where crates of documents were allegedly hidden during inspections. Inspectors
did find a drainage tunnel. However, despite the fact that no documents were discovered,
Chalabi took the tunnel's existence as confirmation that documents also existed, and
spoke as if they were an established fact.

In the same manner, when Mr. Wolfowitz and company needed a link between Iraq and
the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks, Chalabi dutifully trotted out a series of
heretofore "undiscovered" defectors who have "information" about the training of "Arab"
hijackers by Iraqi intelligence at a facility near the Iraqi town of Salman Pak. The site is
reported to be fully equipped with, among other things, a commercial airliner upon which
the trainees can practice their trade, conveniently enough, in "groups of five" and "armed
only with knives and their bare hands." The facility at Salman Pak does exist; its use as
an Al Qaeda training camp is unsubstantiated.

More recently, following President Bush's demand that Iraq permit the return of UN
weapons inspectors or else "suffer the consequences," Chalabi conveniently produced
another "defector" who allegedly had access to Saddam's secret plans to hide
underground biological and chemical weapons facilities from international detection. I
spent more than six years investigating the organizations the defector claimed to work
for, and although elements of his story ring true, the details used to embellish his tale on
weapons of mass destruction are impossible to pin down or, in some cases, just plain
wrong.

The UN stopped using Chalabi's information as a basis for conducting inspections once
the tenuous nature of his sources and his dubious motivations became clear.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the mainstream US media, which give
prominent coverage to sources of information that, had they not been related to
Hussein's Iraq, would normally be immediately dismissed.

This media coverage serves policy figures gunning for a wider war. It generates a frenzy
of speculation concerning Iraq in the public arena, which accepts at face value this
information despite the fact that almost none of what Chalabi has purveyed to the media
about Iraq has turned out to be accurate. There is a substantial lack of clarity and
credible sources on the actual nature of the Iraqi threat to the US. A wider debate on US
policy toward Iraq is imperative, especially in light of the increasing war talk out of
Washington. Rather than relying on information from dubious sources, let's put all the
facts on the table. The conclusions drawn from such a debate could pull us back from
the brink of an unnecessary and costly war.

*Scott Ritter is former chief of the Concealment Investigations Unit for the UN Special
Commission on Iraq.