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Politics : The Donkey's Inn -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Mephisto who wrote (3241)	3/11/2002 1:36:51 PM
From: TigerPaw	Read Replies (3) \| Respond to of 15516

The weapons that Reagan and Bush Sr. gave to Iran eventually ended up with Hezbola in Lebanon. Hezbola pushed Israel out in large part using the TOW missles. That victory made them think they could win the intifada within Israel. Bad foriegn policy decisions have effects many years after they are taken. TP

To: Mephisto who wrote (3241)	3/11/2002 1:43:40 PM
From: zonkie	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 15516

I think the Israelis have done as well as anybody could expect at keeping civilian causalities on the terrorist side to an absolute minimum. Can you tell me a way that they could keep them lower and still respond to the attacks on their civilians? Sharon has shown more restraint than anyone could expect so far. I am very surprised he hasn't been more militant.

To: Mephisto who wrote (3241)	3/11/2002 7:40:24 PM
From: Mephisto	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 15516

The Middle East Missions The Washington Post Sunday, March 10, 2002; Page B08 THE BUSH administration has rightly decided to resume its efforts to broker an end to the mounting warfare between Israelis and Palestinians. Now it faces a tricky task of diplomatic choreography: simultaneously managing the mission of special envoy Anthony C. Zinni, who returns to a conflict the administration has been reluctant to tackle, and that of Vice President Cheney, who leaves today to advance the Bush administration's own agenda in the Middle East -- starting with its effort to bring change to Iraq. As a practical matter, it is impossible to separate the two initiatives. But the administration must try to avoid two traps that have crippled U.S. diplomacy in the past. One would be to allow Arab states to use the Israeli-Arab dispute to avoid matters of vital interest to the United States, such as the necessity to confront Saddam Hussein. The other would be to reenter the Arab-Israeli maelstrom merely as a gesture of appeasement to Arab allies, without summoning the creativity and willingness to persevere that will now be necessary to restart a peace process. The moderate Arab leaders Mr. Cheney will visit clearly are appalled and frightened by the nearly unprecedented Israeli-Palestinian bloodshed, graphic scenes of which are broadcast nightly across the region. But the crisis has also come at a convenient moment for the Arabs, who are most reluctant to talk with the Bush administration about a new campaign against Iraq -- much less the political, social and economic reforms that must be carried out in their countries if Islamic extremism and terrorism are to be extinguished. If they could, they would speak with Mr. Cheney exclusively about the still-sketchy peace proposal of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, and whether or not it will be endorsed by an Arab summit at the end of the month. The Bush administration is right to encourage that initiative, even if it has little chance of becoming the vehicle of a peace settlement. But it must also press on with the initiatives that are now central to U.S. interests after Sept. 11 -- beginning with Iraq -- and make clear to Arab allies that those initiatives must go forward, whether or not there is progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. At the same time, the seriousness of the Arab-Israeli crisis means the administration cannot afford to dispatch Gen. Zinni once again without giving him a chance to succeed. In the past, the Bush administration's efforts to broker a cease-fire have failed at least in part because of a lack of energy and staying power; its envoys have been reluctant to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, or hold Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat fully accountable for his actions. The impulse has been to retreat to the sidelines whenever one side or the other breaks a promise or behaves badly. Meanwhile, the Bush team has refrained from creating the outlines of a process leading to a permanent settlement that could be offered as an alternative to the current bloodshed. Without that prospect, moderates on both sides have been neutralized. If it is to succeed in this intervention, the administration must be ready to use U.S. influence to demand that both Mr. Sharon and Mr. Arafat cease their attacks -- and that Mr. Arafat then take decisive action against Palestinian terrorists. Israel must be made to ease its pressure on average Palestinians and stop the provocative acts that have contributed to the breakdown of previous cease-fires. Mr. Arafat must understand that a failure to perform will lead to concrete consequences, including a rupture of relations with the United States. If a cease-fire can be obtained, the administration needs to be ready to facilitate the quick beginning of a serious political process, one that will draw in Arab states as well as Israel and the Palestinians. And it must be ready to accept the fact that even if Mr. Arafat cooperates -- and perhaps especially if he does -- extremists will still occasionally manage to carry out acts of terrorism. These must be energetically fought; but they cannot be allowed to serve as a pretext for renewed warfare. © 2002 The Washington Post Company