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Politics : The Donkey's Inn -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Patricia Trinchero who wrote (3277)3/13/2002 5:49:55 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 15516
 

A Pretty Poor Posture for a Superpower


The Los Angeles Times
March 13, 2002

COMMENTARY

By ROBERT S. McNAMARA and THOMAS GRAHAM Jr.

During the Cold War, peace was supported by the
doctrine of "mutual assured destruction," which
simply meant that each side maintained second
strike capability, thereby deterring nuclear war. The
Antiballistic Missile Treaty and other treaties limiting
the use of offensive nuclear forces were the
underpinning of this doctrine. They were also the
basis for ending the nuclear arms race.

Now, the Bush administration has moved to a new
nuclear doctrine described by one commentator as
"unilateral assured destruction."


Should the recently leaked Nuclear Posture
Review, or NPR, become official policy, we can
expect nuclear weapons to spread around the
world. We will live in a far more dangerous world,
and the United States will be much less secure.


According to reports describing the NPR, Russia is still a possible target, but
potentially by offensive forces rather than second-strike nuclear forces. China
also could be a target, with a "military confrontation over the status of Taiwan"
a possible rationale for a nuclear strike.

The NPR goes even further. It explicitly lists Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran and North
Korea as potential targets for U.S. nuclear forces,
putting aside the ambiguity
employed in previous reports. One thing--perhaps the only thing--that these
five states have in common, however, is that all are nonnuclear parties to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.


For 30 years, this treaty has kept nuclear weapons from spreading all over the
world, a development that would be devastating to U.S. security.

The problem is, however, that in 1978, to bolster the treaty, the United States,
Britain and the Soviet Union formally pledged never to use nuclear weapons
against nonnuclear countries that were parties to the treaty except in the case of
an attack in alliance with a nuclear weapon state. (No exception was made for
responding to chemical or biological attacks.)

This pledge, joined by France and China, was reiterated in 1995.


And in what could be the most reasonable request in the history of international
relations, in exchange for agreeing to never acquire nuclear weapons, 182
nonnuclear nations asked that the five nuclear weapons states promise never to
attack them with such weapons. This was done in April 1995 in connection
with a U.N. Security Council resolution.

But the Pentagon plan undermines the credibility of that pledge, which
underpins the nonproliferation treaty.


Further, the basic implication of the NPR--that the U.S. reserves the right to
target any nation with nuclear weapons whenever it chooses to do so--is itself
likely to increase the risk of the nuclear weapons proliferation. If a country
believes it's falling out of favor with Washington, what is the first thing it is likely
to do? A quote attributed to Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes
provides some insight: "Before one challenges the United States, one must first
acquire nuclear weapons."


Finally, the NPR also appears to set forth a 40-year plan for developing and
acquiring new nuclear weapons. It reportedly calls for new air, sea and land
launch platforms to be developed and deployed in 2020, 2030 and 2040, and
it calls for new low-yield and variable-yield warheads that probably would
require nuclear testing. Maintaining a permanent rationale for a robust U.S.
nuclear arsenal and a resumption of nuclear testing flies in the face of vital U.S.
commitments.


These matters are far too important for the administration to decide on its own.
There must be a full public debate, in Congress, on the future of our nuclear
deterrent and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

*

Robert S. McNamara was secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1967. Thomas
Graham Jr., the special representative of the president for arms control and
disarmament during the Clinton administration, is president of the Lawyers
Alliance for World Security and author of "Disarmament Sketches," due in
May from the University of Washington Press.

latimes.com/archiveshttp://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/california/la-000018407mar13.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dpe%2Dcalifornia