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Non-Tech : The Enron Scandal - Unmoderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (1901)3/14/2002 11:22:31 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Putting a Bloodhound on Enron's Trail

By Gary Weiss in New York
BusinessWeek Online
Daily Briefing: NEWS ANALYSIS
Thursday March 7, 11:13 am Eastern Time

When New York City police officer Edward Byrne was shot to death on Feb. 26, 1988, authorities became convinced that the execution-style slaying was ordered by Howard ``Pappy'' Mason, head of a violent drug mob. Mason was in prison at the time, and obstacles to proving his guilt seemed almost insurmountable. But after a trial in U.S. District Court in Brooklyn in late 1989, Mason was convicted. The clincher was damning testimony from three former Mason gang members -- who had been persuaded to cooperate by a 32-year-old novice federal prosecutor named Leslie Ragon Caldwell.

Since then, in prosecuting mobsters, drug dealers, crooked ``chop house'' brokerage firms, and corporate malefactors, Caldwell has gained a reputation as a master of cases of mind-numbing complexity. Along the way she has become a master of the ``flip'' -- the cultivation of ``cooperators'' who can turn dry documents and staticky tape recordings into flesh-and-blood crimes.

All of this is bad news indeed for former executives of Enron, Arthur Andersen, and other companies being targeted by Caldwell, a Pittsburgh native who was named in January to head a Justice Dept. task force exploring criminal charges in the Enron Corp. scandal. ``I think any potential defendants in the Enron case will have a bleak and weary day ahead of them,'' says Joel Winograd, a New York criminal lawyer.

DAUNTING CASES. The conventional wisdom -- that any Enron prosecution would face huge obstacles -- ignores the impressive array of weapons available to prosecutors, as well as the recent spate of successful cases involving complex frauds. Some of the most daunting, which also resulted in the heaviest sentences, were prosecuted by Caldwell and her deputy, Andrew S. Weissmann, who is chief of the criminal division of the U.S. Attorney's office in Brooklyn.

One weapon that may be used against future Enron defendants is a little-noted recent change to the federal sentencing rules that beefs up sentences for frauds in excess of $100 million. Such schemes previously would have warranted a 51-month sentence for a first offender but now can draw a sentence of 10 years or more. To be covered by the new guidelines, some part of the fraud must have occurred after Nov. 1, 2001 -- which may turn out to be a crucial date on the calendar for people involved in the Enron mess.

Ironically, Caldwell's appointment was necessitated by an embarrassment -- the recusal of Attorney General John Ashcroft and the U.S. Attorney's office in Houston because of their Enron links. Caldwell, who moved from Brooklyn to San Francisco in 1998, has not granted interviews, and the composition of her team has not been announced. But BusinessWeek has learned that among the lawyers on board with Caldwell is Zachary Harmon, an attorney from the Justice Dept. tax division -- a sign that investigators are probing possible tax-law violations. Also joining the team are Thomas Hanusik from the Justice Dept. fraud division, William Kimball, who worked with Caldwell in San Francisco, and Samuel W. Buell, who prosecuted leading Boston mobsters.

EFFECTIVE DEFENSE? The difficulties facing Enron prosecutors are epitomized by the defiant public stance of former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling. In his testimony before Congress, Skilling insisted that he was not aware of what went on at Enron because, among other things, the company's practices were endorsed by its accountants at Arthur Andersen. While Skilling's story was openly mocked in Congress, it could prove an effective defense against criminal charges.

Overcoming the ``Andersen said it was O.K.'' defense will require countervailing testimony from insiders. Lawyers who have defended and prosecuted white-collar cases are unanimous on the point: no cooperators, no successful Enron prosecution. By providing a ``road map'' for prosecutors, and explaining offenses to jurors, cooperating witnesses proved crucial in dozens of cases brought by Caldwell and her former colleagues in Brooklyn against organized crime and the operators of chop-house brokerage firms.

One brokerage principal prosecuted by Weissmann, Robert Catoggio of Hanover Sterling & Co., was sentenced to 12 years in prison. As in all such cases, the Hanover case was strengthened by cooperating witnesses. ``If I know Andrew, he'll have six cooperators lined up by the time he gets to Houston,'' says Winograd, who has represented mobsters and rogue brokers prosecuted by Weissmann.

FACTS OF LIFE. Lawyers say Caldwell is probably actively hunting for as many cooperators as she can assemble, be they high-level executives or lower-level employees who had access to crucial information. ``In this case, the key to a successful prosecution in Enron is the government's ability to explain the facts of life to low- or mid-level Enron employees and get them on board to cooperate against higher-ranking individuals,'' says Benjamin Brafman, a New York criminal lawyer whose clients have ranged from associates of John Gotti to rapper Sean ``Puffy'' Combs.

Cultivating cooperators is a sensitive task, a mixture of threat and cajolery. The threat is the prospect of a heavy prison sentence. While it's possible to lure cooperators by offering immunity -- a ``no-pros,'' or no prosecution deal -- lawyers familiar with their work say Caldwell and Weissmann have not generally resorted to that. More commonly, cooperating witnesses have been persuaded to plead guilty to criminal charges or indictments that are placed under seal. This prevents former associates from knowing that they've ``turned.''

That can be crucial because cooperators often are asked to rat on their pals. To earn the possibility of a reduced sentence, they are commonly ``wired'' to record conversations with former associates -- a technique used effectively against both white-collar and organized-crime defendants over the years. Those incriminating recordings are then used to induce still more guilty pleas and, often, still more cooperating witnesses.

NO COUNTRY CLUB. Enron defendants may face an additional inducement to cooperate -- the possibility of charges under the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act, which carries stiff prison terms. But even without a RICO prosecution, the potential penalties for white-collar crime are far more severe than is commonly believed. Federal guidelines, introduced in 1987, curtailed parole and severely restricted the sentencing discretion of federal judges. Sentences are now largely determined by those guidelines, which incorporate a variety of factors.

The new guidelines for megafrauds could mean hard time for Enron defendants in prisons that rarely match the ``country club'' stereotype. While federal minimum-security prisons are not bastilles, they are hardly pleasant places to spend a few years. ``Your whole life is regulated -- when you go to the bathroom, how many phone calls you can make, how much money you can spend in the commissary, when you get up and when you go to sleep,'' says Gustave Newman, a lawyer for Hanover's Catoggio, who is appealing his sentence.

Of course, the machinations at Enron may not have sunk to the depths of criminal activity. But by naming prosecutors with a track record of nailing white-collar crooks, the feds have at least gone a long way toward ensuring that, if criminal acts were committed, the bad guys will actually go to jail.
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To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (1901)3/15/2002 4:14:24 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
Houston law firm under fire

V&E attorneys testify they didn't know Enron facts
By JULIE MASON
Houston Chronicle Washington Bureau
March 15, 2002, 12:53AM

WASHINGTON -- Attorneys for Vinson & Elkins told skeptical lawmakers Thursday they didn't know all the facts about Enron Corp. when they discouraged company executives in October from investigating allegations of financial wrongdoing.

During a contentious hearing on Capitol Hill, members of a powerful House subcommittee investigating Enron's collapse repeatedly upbraided the Houston-based firm, saying V&E had a responsibility to know what was happening at Enron.

"The accountants have come in and told us that it didn't fail because of anything they have done. No one from the company's management has said it's failed because of anything that they have done wrong. And none of you have indicated today that the company failed because of anything that you have done wrong," said Rep. James Greenwood, R-Pa., chairman of the oversight and investigations subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.

"Once again the commentary from the witnesses is that the company failed because of loss of confidence of the investors, which sounds an awful lot to me like blaming the victims," Greenwood said.

Testifying before the panel were Joseph Dilg, managing partner of V&E, and Ronald Astin, a partner at the firm.

Former Enron lawyers James Derrick Jr., Scott Sefton and Carol St. Clair also appeared, in addition to Rex Rogers, current vice president and associate general counsel for Enron.

In five hours of often contentious testimony, Dilg and Astin repeatedly claimed V&E's work as chief outside counsel for Enron was thorough and ethical.

The six attorneys largely disclaimed detailed knowledge of many of the financial issues at the heart of Enron's devastating financial collapse.

"Vinson & Elkins and other outside attorneys were employed by and directed to interface with Enron's legal department, not Enron's executives," Dilg said.

The powerhouse law firm was chief outside counsel for Enron, which was its biggest client.

Lawmakers were critical, however, accusing the lawyers of participating in a cover-up to hide what was going on at Enron, which paid V&E $36 million last year.

"The closeness, the coziness of this relationship, is what's bothering many of us on this committee," said Rep. Bart Stupak, D-Mich.

The firm's lawyers were grilled at length about their work investigating allegations raised by Enron Vice President Sherron Watkins in an Aug. 15 memo to former Chairman Ken Lay, warning the company could "implode in a wave of accounting scandals."

In addition to numerous accounting issues, Watkins' portentous memo warned about conflicts of interest and questionable dealmaking that threatened to topple the company.

Derrick, a former partner at V&E who recently retired from Enron, asked the firm to conduct a limited probe of Watkins' concerns.

Under sharp questioning from lawmakers, the V&E lawyers said they never talked to many of the potential witnesses named by Watkins.

They also did not pursue Watkins' claim that bankers may have been pressured to invest in questionable deals with Enron as a condition of future business with the company.

Instead, the firm talked to accountants at Arthur Andersen and executives at Enron, who assured them that issues raised by Watkins were well-known and being managed, the lawyers said.

On Oct. 15, the law firm reported that Enron's practices caused concern "because of the bad cosmetics" and could result in adverse publicity and litigation, but warranted no "further widespread investigation by independent counsel and auditors."

The next day, Enron posted a devastating third-quarter earnings report that included a $638 million third-quarter loss and a $1.2 billion reduction in shareholder equity.

The losses were attributed in large part to a complex series of partnerships undertaken by Enron executives to hide the company's massive debt. The disclosure sent Enron into a financial spiral from which it could not recover.

For months, V&E has been defending its work on the Watkins probe, saying the firm was not asked to look at Enron's accounting practices.

"If a transaction is not legal and it's been approved by the appropriate levels of a corporation's management, lawyers ... may appropriately provide the requisite legal advice," Dilg said. "In doing so, the lawyers are not approving of the business decisions that were made by their clients. Likewise, lawyers are not passing on the accounting treatment of the transactions."

Greenwood took the firm to task for apparently accepting the assurances of former Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow regarding the partnerships and his own conflicts of interest.

"I don't understand why you didn't feel responsible for Enron and its stockholders and make those calls right away," Greenwood said. "You just took Andy Fastow's word for it."

Fastow collected an estimated $30 million in fees from the partnerships, which internal investigators and lawmakes have concluded were fraught with conflicts of interest.

Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., said the V&E probe was more Inspector Clouseau than Columbo.

"If you had not conducted this phony investigation, it might have been possible we would not have seen the collapse of Enron," Markey said.

Several members of the subcommittee complained that V&E's probe amounted to the law firm investigating its own work, since the firm had done work on some of the partnerships.

The $60,000 that V&E charged Enron for the investigation also drew scoffs from lawmakers, who said the relatively minor sum illustrates that neither Enron nor V&E took the investigation seriously.

"Mr Dilg, your preliminary investigation was not a cover-up, was it?" Greenwood asked.

"It was definitely not a cover-up," Dilg replied.

Responded Greenwood: "OK, in what ways would a cover-up look different than your preliminary investigation?"

Amid laughter in the hearing room, Dilg replied that he wouldn't know, he had never participated in a cover-up.

Rep. Billy Tauzin, R-La., chairman of the House committee, noted that in previous testimony, former Enron CEO Jeff Skilling said V&E was aware of certain conflicts of interest now under investigation.

Asked by Tauzin why such conflicts were not probed by lawyers, Derrick responded that Enron's code of conduct requires employees with conflicts of interest to come forward and obtain a waiver.

"You've got to be kidding, Mr. Derrick," Tauzin said. "Any employee could go negotiate against the company, and it was up to them to come and get a waiver?"

Derrick and others responded that the specific conflict Tauzin was referring to was not cited in Watkins' memo, and therefore not within the scope of their probe.

"Had I been blessed with the gift of clairvoyance, had I been permitted to gaze into the future and foresee the events that would unfold in respect of Andersen, I would have advocated the choosing of another path back in August," Derrick said.

Based on the facts they knew about Enron's dealings at the time, Dilg said, the firm stands by its conclusions about Watkins' allegations.

Had they known about conflicts of interest, alleged self-dealing and financial improprieties, the firm would have made a different recommendation, according to Dilg.



To: Glenn Petersen who wrote (1901)3/16/2002 12:16:59 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 3602
 
SEC's Pitt Deflected by Enron

By Kevin Drawbaugh
Saturday March 16, 9:36 am Eastern Time

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Somewhere on his road to rolling back big, bullying government, Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Harvey Pitt wiped out at Enron Curve.

Both the collapse of Enron Corp. (Other OTC:ENRNQ.PK - news) and the Sept. 11 attacks are confronting America's top markets regulator with urgent demands for more government power and spending.

Presiding over an expansion of the SEC may have been the last thing on Pitt's mind when he was appointed last summer by President Bush, but events have a way of changing reformers' plans, said academic experts and officials.

``That's generally the problem with a lot of these people when they come in, they have already staked out some philosophical territory,'' said Bala Dharan, accounting professor at Rice University's Jones School of Management.

``What he's now finding is (that) even if he doesn't get a single new regulation on the books, just enforcing existing ones will need more resources and more people.''

But new regulations are here, and more are on the way.

Since Pitt took over last August, Congress has enlisted the SEC in the war on terrorism by extending federal anti-money-laundering laws to SEC-regulated financial firms.

Momentum is building behind proposals for forming an SEC-supervised overseer for accountants to help avert future financial disasters like Enron, the former Houston energy trader that filed the largest ever U.S. bankruptcy on Dec. 2.

Bush last week called on the SEC to crack down on auditors, impose new penalties on corporate wrong-doers and require faster, more complete disclosures by companies and managers.

Coupled with chronic pay and staffing problems at the SEC, all these new demands have prompted lawmakers in the House of Representatives to propose doubling the SEC budget -- puny by federal agency standards at $438 million -- to $876 million.

The White House is resisting budget hikes for the commission, even as it asks it to take on new jobs. But backing for a bigger, better-funded SEC is virtually unquestioned in both parties on Capitol Hill to help restore public trust in markets shaken by the Enron train-wreck.

CARTE BLANCHE SEEN FOR SEC

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, concluded this month that the SEC was ``increasingly strained'' in fulfilling its duty to protect investors. The commission in 2001 reviewed only about 16 percent of annual corporate filings it received, about half its annual goal of 30 to 35 percent, the GAO said.

Amid such alarming findings, Duke University investment banking and law professor Michael Bradley said, ``People are just willing to write a blank check to the SEC.''

The push for a bigger, costlier commission challenges Pitt's early approach to leading the SEC, which regulates 8,000 brokerage firms, 7,500 financial advisers, 34,000 investment company portfolios and 17,000 publicly traded corporations.

Formerly a private lawyer, Pitt once was big business' 'go-to guy' on securities law. Clients ranged from Enron's former auditor Andersen and accounting industry trade group the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to major corporations such as Dell Computer Corp. (NasdaqNM:DELL - news), Morgan Stanley (NYSE:MWD - news) and Bear Stearns Cos. Inc. (NYSE:BSC - news).

He was fighting the SEC just over two years ago on behalf of accountants over his predecessor Arthur Levitt's push for stricter auditor independence laws. When Bush appointed him, Pitt promised a top-to-bottom review of SEC rules and a more cooperative relationship with business.

In an early speech to accountants, he said the days when accountants had to fear the SEC were over, prompting a testy letter of inquiry in early December from Rep. John Dingell, a Michigan Democrat, on the SEC's attitude toward enforcement.

Ever since, Pitt has made a point to talk tough about the commission's zero-tolerance for law-breakers.

Still, officials observed, the burly Brooklyn native has not seized the Enron Moment to grab more power for the SEC, as his predecessors might have done. Rather, his proposed policy responses to Enron have been circumspect, -- critics would say tepid -- reflecting his personal beliefs.

PITT'S STYLE

``Harvey has healthy respect for the legislative branch. He's handled it quite well. I think there's a difference in style here with previous SEC chairmen. But that represents a change in personal style, as well as philosophy,'' Rep. Michael Oxley, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee and a proponent of a much larger SEC budget, said in an interview.

Even today, Pitt seldom misses a chance to flourish his political convictions. ``I do not believe that the solution to every problem starts and ends with larger and more expensive government,'' he told the Senate Banking Committee last week.

But in the same hearing, he asked Congress for $15 million more for his budget to hire 100 new employees and $76 million for raises for existing staff, who are chronically underpaid.

His top-to-bottom review will occur soon, he said, but it is likely to have a predictable result. ``In light of the events of the past six months, I think it is foreseeable that the SEC will require additional funding.'' Pitt told Congress.